

SOCIETAL SECURITY ELEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

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Abstract:

The paper analyses the threats that affect the societal dimension of modern security that are a product of the regionalization and integration movements present in the European Union. Knowing the fact that modern security cannot look at the international arena strictly using state centered lenses and in terms of military threats, the Copenhagen School redesigned (has made was called the broadening and deepening of) the security agenda. The most influential of their ideas was that of the societal dimension of security that refers to, „communities that carry an identity” – called societies. Under the effects of globalization what takes place is a complex process to redefine identities and transform its traditional carriers – the nation states. Looking at Europe, this process also implies regionalization inside the member states. Both of them – integration and regionalization – can generate a series of risks and threats for the member states, risks that are the object of this paper.

Keywords: societal security, identity, Copenhagen school

The concept of societal security

Societal security represents, in Ole Waever's opinion, „the society's ability to subsist in its essential characteristics in fluctuating circumstances and in the face of possible or present threats” (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup & Lemaitre, 1993, p. 23). If the State was subject of the military, political, economic or environmental dimensions of modern security, in the case of the societal dimension, it is the society itself whose organizing concept is its identity that is the main subject (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup & Lemaitre, 1993, p. 26). Its security is threatened when societies *perceive a threat in terms of identity* (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup & Lemaitre, 1993, p. 23), i.e. when the “different types of communities, define a trend or a possible threat to their survival as a community” (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p. 119). The imperfect state of the overlap between state and

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society made it possible and necessary to secure identity as a value that must be defended, and allowed the development of the concept of identity security. The need for this security approach is visible in particular in cases in which the State and the societal boundaries do not coincide, for example in the case of threats posed by the State to national minorities or "*social mobilization carried out by State or other political actors to face internal and external threats*" (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 213). In many places around the globe, and particularly in the countries of the third world, there isn't an overlap between the interests of the State and the needs of incorporated communities. For the first time it was taken into account an entirely different category of threats, namely those that states can generate towards their own citizens.

In the Copenhagen school's understanding (also in that of Samuel Huntington) there are two types of societies involved in configuring the specific identity of people: ethnic-national communities and religious ones.

Of course this approach raises the question of identifying the specific actors who have the power to ensure security. If, in the case of the other sectors of security, the security provider is the state or other similar institutional-political bodies, in what pertains to societal security, those institutions can experience difficulties. State actions can cause societal insecurity and attempts to influence identity in one sense or another – especially in terms of societal homogenization – are not always effective, and they can lead to strong counter current manifestations.

Traditionally the institutions that ensured the security of the society were of the religious kind. In medieval Transylvania being Catholic was a condition to ascend to nobility (Smith, 2000, p. 59). Converting amounted to the very passage from one ethnic group to another. In the same sense orthodoxy was the axis around which Romanians' resistance towards assimilation was centered. Societal functional actors are the ones who are credited with spreading and promoting of nationalism: intellectual elites (academies, institutes), the media, and last, but not least the Church.

The communities are, argues Buzan following in the footsteps of Benedict Anderson, imagined communities, self-built (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 120), even though objective factors such as language or territory may be involved, the construction itself is ultimately a political or personal choice. Only through defining what constitutes a value which coagulates a community, the nation in this specific case, we can identify threats to its identity, and analyze the point after which a nation ceases to be itself. Buzan (et al., 1998, p. 121) identifies three major types of societal security threats:

a) Migration – X people is invaded or diluted by a recent influx of Y which will cause it to no longer be what it was, the identity is affected by altering the very composition of the population;

b) Horizontal competition – cultural and linguistic influence of the X neighboring culture will affect the identity of Y people;

c) Vertical competition – people will stop to identify as pertaining to the X people thanks to an integrationist project (e.g. Ex-Yugoslavia, or the European Union), or because of a regionalist even secessionist one (e.g. Catalonia, Kurdistan). Although one project is of a centripetal nature and the other of a centrifugal one, both of which are forms of vertical competition authors argue, because both question how broad or narrow the identity circles should be. (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 121)

A fourth threat, however of an ambivalent character and, because of this, mentioned separately is depopulation. The causes of this phenomenon may be disease, war, famine, natural disasters or policies of extermination to which one could add the causes of an economic nature whether we speak of opportunities or low living standards and, of course, declining rates in natural increase. Depopulation is ambivalent because it does not represent a threat to the identity of a society but primarily to individuals themselves, the carriers of identity – *threat within society* (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 121). It becomes a threat to societal security when it threatens to destroy the very existence of the given society.

In the context of European integration, the issue of preserving societies becomes especially noticeable. Identity becomes increasingly important in a Europe where borders are disappearing: “*In a United Europe those national societies which manage to preserve their moral and identity foundations will enjoy security*” (Sava, 2005, p. 252). In the analysis grid provided by the Copenhagen school, we can affirm that the integration in supranational structures like the EU may be interpreted as implying renunciation of national sovereignty and identity, leading to vertical competition related phenomena.

Not only waiving national identity in favor of a prospective supranational one falls into these dynamics, but also the unchecked enhancement of some sub-national ones/identities of minorities (in this sense we can look towards the myriad autonomist discourses appearing in some of the EU States. The *issue of minorities, nation and Europe*, said Buzan, *produced a complex constellation of multi stratified identities* (Buzan, 2000, p. 132).

Horizontal competition is also favored by globalization, communication flows that allow sharing of cultural assets and information.

Cultures that were once separated and between which the interactions went at low rates, are put in permanent connection via new technologies. In time, one can begin to imitate the model offered by the other, without the latter being able to perform the securitizing functions of the original model and so destabilizing the societal architecture.

European integration from societal perspective

The need for a collective European identity was acknowledged since the very inception of the Union, a shared identity being vital *“in order to avoid fragmentation, chaos and conflict of any kind and to ensure cohesion, subsidiarity and cooperation”* (Pescaru, 2002, p. 212).

The first mention of European identity into a European document can be found in the *Document on the European identity published by Foreign Ministers of the nine Member States*, in December 1973, and adopted at Copenhagen. In the prologue it says: *“The Nine Member Countries of the European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs. They have decided to define the European Identity with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind. They have the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe. Defining the European Identity involves:*

- *reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of unity so far achieved within the Community;*
- *assessing the extent to which the Nine are already acting together in relation to the rest of the world and the responsibilities which result from this;*
- *taking into consideration the dynamic nature of European unification ...”* (*Document on the European identity*, 1973)

The document speaks extensively of the need for unity within the European Union (the phrase *United Europe* appears 12 times in the 22 articles), whose member states had previously *“been pushed towards disunity by their history and by selfishly defending misjudged interests”* (*Document on the European identity*, 1973). Unity is *“a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common”* (*Document on the European identity*, 1973, art. 1). It also speaks of keeping the wealth that comes with the variety of national cultures, and shows which are the fundamental elements of European identity: the attitude towards life, based on its determination to build a society that meets the needs of the individual,

safeguarding the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law and social justice and respect for human rights.

This first institutional step, stipulated in a treaty which aimed to create a shared identity for the inhabitants of the European Union was considered sufficient by many of the European elites. Now all the people of the Union, were “*under the same institutional, civic and political umbrella*” (Pescaru, 2002, p. 202). What followed was that an identity – in the official documents seen as a citizenship – would be born out of the effects of the common law. This attitude was based on the idea that the cultural dimension was subordinate to the economic or political ones. The development of a legal and institutional framework was believed to be enough to drag along cultural integration generating, through various processes of spill-over, a common identity. The institutional toolkit to generate common identity has been enriched with the single currency, which was set up as an important socio-psychological factor suggesting the existence of an area with common responsibilities and privileges. European citizenship has not given birth through itself to common identity across the Union as predicted. Even with the expansion, new member States appeared to be entering a second hand citizenship area, as opposed to the community of rights and obligations initially designed. A pervasive identity able to justify sacrifices and yielding national sovereignty on behalf of the European Community has yet to appear and even the most euro-optimist eurocrats had to admit that, in order to really exist, citizens have to belong to a pre-existent community. As was shown in various cases, the determinants of citizenship are the ability of individuals to feel that they belong to and identify with a certain community (Pescaru, 2002, p. 203-204), so that common identity becomes essential for the emergence of a citizenship that reflects a palpable reality.

Started as an organization with a strong economic profile, the EU has developed also a specific human one, giving birth to the so-called “*European economic man*”. For the moment this model has yet to be surpassed, the so called European citizen still having a strong political and economic profile while lacking the common identity direly needed to support a growing solidarity.

European identity can be built only in relation to the other identities, be they national or cultural. Ole Waever (1995) said that European integration is not a matter of *raison d'état* but *raison de nation*. The success of the European project is closely tied to the ability of nations to ensure their own survival. A nation will “*allow integration only insofar as it is confident that its national identity is not in danger, or even that it is reinforced by contact with*

other identities" (Waever, 1995). Based on the theory of Anthony D. Smith, he sees European identity as a compulsory synthesis between civil and ethnic nations. The European Union will adopt the civil type identification, while European Nations will go towards an ethnic identification that will center on language (Waever, 1995). *"The United Europe will be able to truly become real only if it can be imagined, in different ways and in different historical and cultural circumstances of a number of increasingly important people"* (Bădescu, Mihăilescu & Zamfir, 2002, p. 83)

European identity dynamics

A) Migration as a societal threat

When considering the threats to society, Barry Buzan places migration first and foremost. It may constitute a source of tension more direct and visible than the competition of their identities, as it is proven by recent developments at the European level. In what concerns the European common space we can see that it is largely affected by this phenomenon, in that we can distinguish the existence of a binomial-immigration in the West vs. depopulation in the East.

Migration is a complex phenomenon that involves the movement of people from one area to another area, followed by a change of residence and/or employment in some form of activity in the arrival area (Zamfir & Vlăsceanu, 1998, pp.351-353). On the international stage it is not a new phenomenon. It can be asserted that migration has led to the emergence of ancient world Empires and migration also ended them. From a security focused point of view, however, migration is a new concern, and as we saw, one of the societal threats.

Ionel Nicu Sava (2005, p. 259), defines international migration as *"a collective phenomenon of temporary or permanent transfer, of a broad mass of population from one country to another"*. Although the causes that determine migratory movements are numerous, they are generally attributed to the broader process of overpopulation. This term actually designates, *"the rupture which may occur in one country between the figure of the population and resources available"* (Roman, 2012, p. 16).

Regardless of the favored theoretical approach, migration is basically the expression of social imbalances between developed areas and less developed areas. But you don't have to consider that this imbalance reflects a real economic necessity of the receiving society. Giovanni Sartori believed that the main cause of immigration in Europe is not of economic nature but is

actually generated by the overcrowding existent in surrounding areas, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. Europe is not in so dire an economic necessity but moreover it has a very high standard of living so that even its poor do not accept just any kind of job. This explains the apparent paradox between the high rates of unemployment existing in European States at the same time as the immigrants' number increases (Dănişor, 2010, p. 144).

Between 1945 and 2000, more than 50 million people have migrated into Western Europe, approximately 15% of the current population of the Union not being autochthonous. Until 1990 the percentage of non-nationals residing in the Union with legal forms was put at a modest 4.5 percent (Sava, 2005, p. 259). The collapse of the Communist bloc (although there were no 25 million Russian invaders into Western Europe as predicted by some) combined with the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia and the influx of immigrants from North Africa, have brought about 500,000 immigrants per year. In 2010 per total, in the European Union the percentage of immigrants was about 9.4% but in the next 20 years the percentage could reach 30%, a citizen out of three in the EU having no European origin, what is equivalent, says Ionel Nicu Sava, "*with changing the very societal composition of European countries*" (Sava, 2005, p. 259).

Migration is a challenge to European society aimed at two levels:

➤ *Towards the welfare state* – which is based on the integration of all citizens to provide them with extensive protection and support, starting from free access to the educational system, health insurance, social aid and going all the way up to various political and economic rights. This system has helped homogenize and level the social cleavages present in Western societies regarding the standards of living, unemployment or minorities. Of course the growing number of migrants has put some pressure on this system, giving rise to a general tendency of blaming immigrants for various problems, tendency that has only been amplified by the worsening economic environment, in general, and especially by the euro-zone crisis.

➤ *Towards identity* – as Ionel Nicu Sava (2005) noticed, a good proportion of immigrants, especially those who are visibly different from the autochthonous population, skin color or various racial traits, are considered and sometimes consider themselves as different. Of course the existence of a perceived threat towards common identity doesn't produce effects just on a symbolical plane, but it is reflected directly in the internal cohesion and unity of nations, as they rely on a specific form of ethnic-based national identity.

Buzan (Sava, 2005, p. 258) shows that "*the danger posed by migration is mainly dependent upon the manner in which the relative number of*

immigrants interact with the absorption and adaptation capacities of the society". A given society's capacity to absorb and adapt is related to both the financial and the logistical resources at its disposal intended to facilitate the adaptation of foreigners without sacrificing the well-being of the indigenous population, but also depends to a large extent upon the public mentality and attitude towards immigrants. In this sense, there are significant differences in terms of availability and in the attitude towards immigrants if we compare Spain to Finland.

The presence of a large number of immigrants may have a major impact on the European security environment. Migration affects the right to decide who can enter, work and settle in the territory of a State or group of States. Also, in the medium and long term, migration affects racial and ethnic composition of the population, public culture, social security, jobs and public policy (Sava, 2005, p. 259).

Migration in Europe has resulted in what Castells (2010, p. 358) designates as "*the schizophrenia between the self-image and the new demographic reality*". Although the percentages of immigrants in the European Union are growing and there is an emerging reality of multiethnic societies, most Europeans continue to yearn after ethnically and culturally homogeneous societies. According to an IPSOS survey (2011) approximately 53% of Europeans consider immigration to have a very/fairly negative impact on their country while only 18% consider its impact as very/fairly positive. Also according to another poll 76% of Europeans see in the increasing number of immigrants an important or very important threat to their States (*Report*, 2006). With regard to the moment when this number becomes a serious threat, it varies depending on the society, and is determined mainly by "*the share of immigrants in the total population and spatial distribution of receivers of immigrants*" (Stoica, 2011, p. 132).

B) Identity-competition the new security profile of Romania; construction of a European identity as described by the national security strategy of 2007

Our country has expressed and internalized in official documents, beginning with the very Constitution, its Euro-Atlantic profile and its adhesion to the democratic values required by it. The National Security Strategy of Romania (SSNR, 2007) still allows us to identify the way the Romanian national security is envisioned by the political decision makers directly involved in the accession of Romania to the NATO/European Union.

Primarily what we can notice is the subtitle with a programmatic tint of the document: *“European Romania, Euro-Atlantic Romania: for a better life in a more democratic, secure and prosperous country”* (SSRN, 2007, p.1). So the premises to ensure Romania’s prosperity are seen as lying in the affirmation of its European and Euro-Atlantic profile, which *“offers our country the favorable conditions to accelerated economic and social development”* (SSRN, 2007).

The previous National Security Strategy (2001), published in Official Journal of Romania in December 2001, did not mention this dimension. On the other side if we take into account both the geographical positioning and the historical turmoil that characterize our country, we can notice that these identity profiles are more of projects than realities. This character of identity project also results from the title of Chapter 3 *“Building a new European and Euro-Atlantic identity for Romania”* (2001).

However SSRN does not neglect the national dimension, the construction of a new identity is carried out within the framework of a national, realistic, pragmatic and bold project. Unlike the previous Strategy, SSRN mentions national identity and the associated terms 14 times, whether it is the need to preserve an identity (both the national and those of the various ethnic groups) or the one needed to build a new European/Euro-Atlantic one. In the first chapter, titled *“Premises of a national, realistic, pragmatic and bold project”*, a distinction is being made between the nation and the State. National security, it said to be *“the fundamental condition of the existence for both the nation and the Romanian State; (...) it has as reference the national values, interests and objectives”* (SSRN, 2007, p.7). This distinction is useful and comes in line with contemporary visions of the State/nation relationship.

What this formulation implies however, is that we can build a regional identity to include the national one but that this is also influenced by it. *“The national security strategy of Romania aims at promoting, protecting and defending the national values and interests. They constitute the premises upon which the democratic system of organization and functioning of the society is built and developed, both through governmental and non-governmental institutions and organizations and also through civic action”* (SSRN, 2007). In the Strategy’s understanding, the national values are elements of a spiritual, cultural and material nature defining Romanian identity and, through their protection and defense, there the conditions for the existence and dignity for both Romanian citizens and the state can be ensured. If the value element is suitable to be defended and is a fundamental condition of the existence and survival of the State and of the Romanian nation, we can deduce that if the

value system declines, its destabilization constitutes a grave threat to the existence of these bases. Vulnerabilities should then be seen as also related to a decrease in the value system but this system is part of a broader cultural pattern (Ciocea, 2009, p. 85). Securing the basic value system will lead, as a consequence, to securing the entire cultural construction.

To be able to observe the consequences of a destabilization of the value system we must investigate which is the effect of the interaction between a supranational value system (e.g. European, and a national one). The result of this operation should be identifying the cases in which there is or there isn't a threat ascribed by vertical competition. As we could notice when we analyzed the emergence of the European identity, there isn't yet a coagulated official position on the manner in which the European citizen is defined. One can talk about a *sui generis* European value system only as a potential. The impact on the national system should then be analyzed from the point of view of how being European is constructed. We may distinguish for analytic purposes two situations in which a European value system may find itself, each with specific implications:

a. *A hybrid construction*, resulting out of globalization, an unarticulated model with weak ties incorporating a wide range of different values. Such a model is characterized by a wide freedom of movement and the ability to incorporate the most diverse and different values. The universal fundamental values (e.g. love, freedom) which can be applied to any communities, but are invested with a different meaning by each of them, are favored. The model is therefore essentially abstract and its values are not grounded in the history experienced by the society. These traits make it attractive and accessible, but not stable. Such a model is not rooted in the lived experience of the society and does not offer it the same points of reference and analytical grids as an authentic culture. Hybrid culture is a poor substitute that fails in providing the cohesion necessary to build a functioning society. More than this, being extremely versatile and easily communicable by the media it can infiltrate and cause insecurity for a previous value system. But such an option is deeply desecuritising on the long-term for all nations which would consent to it. It cannot replace national culture, does not generate a real European culture and lacks the depth needed to support deeper integration. Also we should take into consideration that it has an increased potential to generate nationalist and anti-European movements.

b. *An authentic, well-articulated value system* – such a system is still under construction and, as we have previously seen, there are live debates regarding its composition. More than this, throughout history, the European

states have been in conflict with each other the moments of unity being brief. Such examples of unity could be considered, not indisputably, the crusades or the defense against the Ottoman threat. However, such historical examples cannot be used to sustain from a discursive point of view the endeavor to create a common identity. Another factor to be taken into account is that the states still have conflicting versions of some historical events. However an authentic European construction is possible even in the absence of concrete action under the very impact of the passage of time.

About the hybrid the threats it can cause are easier to distinguish in the second case, that of an articulated model. Mălina Ciocea (2009, p. 98) distinguishes two possible sources of threats: incorrect decoding of it or the conflict between it, and national system. The first case represents basically the implementation of inconsistent measures mostly of legal or foreign policy. Against this kind of dysfunctions the organization itself can take action through designated bodies. The latter case requires on the part of countries willing to accede a profound analysis aimed at highlighting the consistency or inconsistency of the two cultural models. If such an inconsistency is found then the society has to decide whether or not it is willing to relinquish non-matching values.

C) Between identity and conflict

As the third aspect of Romanian societal security dimensions we address the competition of identities within our country. Inside the EU, the dynamics that can be ascribed to horizontal competition are much more limited and so less visible than the vertical European vs. national. A notable exception to this is the resurgence of ethnic minorities and the affirmation of their separate identities. Of course, any strategy that seeks to secure ones identity, be it minority or majority, creates insecurity for the other one. This is a manifestation of the societal security dilemma.

Societal security dilemma has been announced by Barry Buzan but hasn't been properly addressed until recently, a very interesting study being that of Paul Roe (2005). He identifies three types of the security dilemma:

➤ A tight security dilemma "*when actors with compatible security requirements misperceive the nature of their relationship and thus employ countermeasures*";

➤ A regular security dilemma when both actors are security seekers, but there is a real incompatibility between their purposes;

➤ A loose security dilemma when actors are not only security but also power seekers and "*are compelled or deterred in employing aggressive*

policies depending on whether offence or defense has the advantage” (Roe, 2005, pp.2-3).

Beyond the existence of a certain type of dilemma, Roe states that, in order to have a dilemma that can grow into a full-fledged ethnic conflict there have to be some underlining factors. In this aspect, J Kaufman identifies four conditions that make powerful sources of intergroup hostility, which we are going to analyze in respect to the Romanian-Hungarian interethnic relations:

a. An external affinity problem

Interethnic relations all across Eastern Europe are at the least problematic. Many of these communities are the result of dramatic border change (our case) or massive population relocations (the case of the Russian minority in the Baltic States), actions that have left both the states and the communities in difficult situations. The states have internal responsibilities, having to abstain from any form of discrimination, but also external responsibilities towards kinship groups that live in neighboring states. If the states choose to assert their protection in an aggressive or inconsiderate way in relation to the other it can cause serious problems in the interethnic climate. Such an assertive attitude is the one that Hungary has chosen whether we analyze the Hungarian law on citizenship¹, the active support for some political parties by the Hungarian authorities (The Hungarian Civic Party) or the rehabilitation of controversial historical figures. More than this, during the 2013 “war of the flags”, the Hungarian officials recommended major changes in Romanian state organization, a position that could be interpreted as intervention into another state’s internal affairs. The recommendation to allow self-governing of Transcarpathia concomitant to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, could be similarly interpreted.

b. The historical dominance of one group by another

Subsequent rapid changes in control over territories inhabited by representatives of another ethnic group are a historical reality for our country. The Romanians that lived in Transylvania had, for a large extent of time, a subordinate position in relation to the other nationalities, a fact that has changed for the first time after the end of World War I, and then again at the beginning of the Second World War, only to be restored to the Post WWI agreement at the end of the conflagration. Of course no change has been smooth and the changes have been quite scaring for the populations. The

¹ Which states that the person or its descendants that have had Hungarian citizenship before 1920 or in the period between 1939 and 1945, can apply for getting it again in emergency procedure, the only requirement being a good knowledge of the language.

abuses and extremism that has often accompanied these changes has offered both sides a strong basis for extremist, xenophobic speech.

c. The presence of negative ethnic stereotypes

Every inhabitant of Romania can come up with a bunch of slurs that portray negatively the other, whether minority or majority. Stereotypes like the Romanians are *"lazy"*, *"uncivilized peasants"* or the Hungarians want *"to steal Transylvania"* or they *"refuse to speak Romanian"* but also *"the common Romanian and the common Hungarian, get along, it is the politicians that poison their relations"* show a certain public perception of interethnic relations that may or may not be accurate.

A study conducted by IRES institute (2013) in the perception of the population towards other nationalities revealed that 41% of the interviewed considered Hungary to be an enemy of our country. On the other hand, 58% of the respondents said that relations with the Hungarian minority have been good, and nearly three quarter have a good and very good opinion about Romanian Magyars.

The said poll (IRES, 2013) gives a useful insight into many of the underlining factors that shape our interethnic relations, for the sake of this study we can observe that there isn't an insurmountable, visceral hate between the two populations. Also the local population isn't commonly considered as an instrument of a foreign power, the relation with the minority being of a substantially better nature than with the Kin state. Of course, both the relations are not as good as they could be and this is easily identifiable in common speech.

d. Conflict over ethnic symbols

Ethnic symbols and their use are, in absence of clear legislative stipulations, subject to heated debates. Symbols are, as Anthony D. Smith (1991, p. 77) states, *"the most potent and durable aspects of nationalism"* and so they can embody a wide array of national ideals. The use and abuse of national symbols can facilitate a kind of mobilization of a certain population hard to attain through other means. The most important ethnic symbol, one who has been a constant source of conflict, ever since its creation, is *"Székely (Szekler) flag"*. In 2013, the decision to ban the use of this ethnic flag in the Harghita and Covasna counties has caused a huge stir, suggestively named *"the war of the flags"* this symbolic conflict being heavily sustained by inflammatory declarations of both internal and foreign origin.

This kind of conflict is characterized by being especially convenient to generate if it finds the necessary underlying societal conditions that can be ascribed to a security dilemma. The Romanian-Hungarian societal security

dilemma is, I argue, a tight one, the security requirements being compatible. A regional identity doesn't fundamentally subvert the existence of the national one, but the task of negotiating the nature and boundaries should be left to the given community. Foreign intervention, using ethnic symbols for political purposes and inflammatory discourse can manipulate societies into viewing their interest as incompatible and or even into disregarding the security requirements of others. This security dilemma is of a regular kind, much more difficult to manage and more so to settle.

Conclusions

At the end of the 19th century Ernest Renan (1992) foretold the disappearance of Nations: "*Nations are not eternal, he said, had a beginning and will have an end, will likely be replaced by a European Confederation*". From then, the cessation of Nations has been prophesized countless times but up to the moment we have yet to bear witness to such an event. So far all integrationist, supranational projects have disintegrated. The European Union must be designed within the framework and with the instrumentation available or proper to the cause and not by following a certain ideology and pan-nationalism is certainly an ideology. Europe cannot be a super-nation, it cannot recreate the United States because it hasn't got deterritorialized ethnic groups, nor can we afford that it recreates that of the Soviet Union. History teaches that ideology is an ill social binder.

The nation today remains topical, even if its traditional support - the state - is facing great changes. Modern nation can no longer be the support and motivation for xenophobia or for violations of human rights in virtue of supreme authority over a territory, or to preserve some features considered as national, as a certain side of the political spectrum is still trying. Ethno-symbolism has the merit of showing that the Nations have pre-modern roots which we must take into account, especially when we are dealing with demiurgic zeal that promote the deletion of nations in favor of a other form of social organization. Also what Anthony D. Smith (1991) affirms is that Nations have been forms of organization adapted to the needs of citizens and a modern creation of the eras in which they made their appearance, and to a large extent, still are. They are not static bodies, frozen in tradition and resistant to any kind of change, even for the better, but instead take something of the dynamism of the age inhabited. As they, in the moment of occurrence, were an instrument of affirmation and safeguarding of human rights, an advanced ideology for the era, likewise in post modernity nation is called upon

to adjust and to find its place. The present research determines me to say that the nation has all the tools needed to achieve this aim, and that the nation will remain a fundamental source of identification, at least for the European area, and, moreover, another identity architecture can develop only by taking into account national characteristics.

Globalization and European integration do not lead to the disappearance of the nation, but rather allow the creation of communities of Nations drawn together through shared values and joined together by trust. Closing up and knowing each other allows the articulation of a European identity without loss of the original. A Europe designed as a melting pot in which the 28 national identities are turned into an amorphous mass loosely linked together through shared respect towards abstract values is not grounded in reality, and cannot be successful. Moreover, it becomes a real threat to the security of the component societies, which are forced, and will take measures of self-protection. Deeper integration remains largely an issue relating to the ability to communicate and transmit, make accessible and attractive the project of the Union, but also one simply related to historical accumulation. Cohabitation leaves, even in the event of further nefarious disintegration, close communities, which share experiences and culture. In this respect we can refer to the existence of a so-called Yugo-sphere and Yugo-nostalgia that appeared following the dismantling of Yugoslavia.

In regard to the modern paradigm of security, the present article was meant to be more of a justification of the need for further study focused on the societal dimension of security. It is arguably the sector that faces the biggest changes and it is necessary, now more than ever, to understand what are the inner organizing mechanics of the society up to where changes are positive, and where insecurity starts. A society's answers to real or perceived threats vary and are extremely difficult to anticipate. Once stimulated, the societal security dilemma becomes nearly impossible to be truly stopped, the effects extending for a long period of time after. The parties which clash in a conflict of identity, tend to treat it as a threat to their very existence and survival, and so the wounds that result are very hard to close. The approaches towards studying this sector of security are not easy to develop, especially in view of the inherent multidisciplinary character as well as the necessity for development of appropriate analysis tools. It is very difficult to speak, on the subject of securing identity, about a unifying theory that is applicable to all forms of societies in the same terms, hence the difficulty of finding a balance between Nations and the European Union, at least in this segment. However an effort to articulate a unified security structure to accommodate these

specifics is of the utmost importance to enable the deepening of the Union and the forging a Union more stable and more adapted to the needs of its citizens. Focusing on societal sector dynamics, including threats, are constant concerns, even if their approach is done on other levels. Migration, population ageing and the emerging of a common identity or, on the contrary, the resurgence of secessionism, all of them have an impact and must be managed on a long-term, integrated at European level. These issues cannot find a solution except through cooperation between Member States and they require serious debates about what it means to be European, and how far are we prepared to go to defend common values.

For our country we can only observe the complexity of this dimension of national security, the existence of all the threats and their inherent particularities. It goes without saying that if we should focus on developments happening within this sector we should have in mind that they do not appear and cannot be resolved in short intervals of time. The fact that the specter of nationalism and secessionism is being drawn out of the box, especially on the eve of elections (not constant) is not a justification of any kind. The particularity of identity conflicts is that securitizing actor, the one who decides what is threatened, is not necessarily invested formally with political power, but is the purest exponent of the group. Bearing this in mind, the fact that political actors make use of this conflictuality only before various elections does not mean that periodic stimulation cannot potentially give rise to third persons that will have a continued activity. Some would say that such a trend can already be identified. Also we should not ignore the spill-over potential, the possibility of shifting the conflict of the societal to other dimensions where it can escalate, and also the broad possibilities of generating tension that social networks offer. Management of identity threats is only possible at the strategic level, and it would be especially useful in this regard for documents of a programmatic nature to be developed, aimed at resolving the issues pertaining to the societal sector of modern security.

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