

## REASONS FOR DEFECTION. HISTORICAL CASES ANALYZED THROUGH CONTEMPORARY MODELS

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### Abstract

*The article aims at harnessing the analytical power of theoretical models employed in studying defection in favor of the enemy and use them to study Romanian historical sources originating during the First World War. These models have been developed in the United States during the 1950s and 60s and are used by this article to study a very different case. The article's main research question is "Can models explaining reasons for defection developed in the US during the Cold War be applied on behaviors detected in Romania at the beginning of the XX century?" The article answers this question in the affirmative, showing how reasons for defection are, many times, similar despite large differences in time and space.*

*The article's first section relies on an exhaustive review of several theoretical models, especially MICE. Further empirical studies have refined this simplification of motivations, uncovering new potential reasons for betrayal such as the existence of "divided loyalties" or of disgruntlement against one's own organization. These represent the analytical blueprint which is later applied on Romanian documents dating from World War I.*

*The second part of the article employs an analytical approach to uncover reasons for defection in Romania and its vicinity. It presents both cases of ethnic Romanians who were Austro-Hungarian citizens and defected in favor of Romania, as well as intelligence successes by the Austro-Hungarian enemy in Romania of that time. The article concludes that the first cases are mainly motivated by "divided loyalties" while the second was mostly caused by money and ideological reasons.*

**Keywords:** defection, motivation, ideology, loyalty.

### Introduction

Both fictional literature and popular action movies, many times simplified versions of complex realities, employ the image of the traitor as an even more radical form of evil than that of the main antagonist. Treason or

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defection is, many times, portrayed as the action of a weak person, tempted by underserved benefits or acting out of unjustified envy, delaying, but never stopping the success of the main protagonist.

Reasons for defection in the world of real espionage are, many times, more complex. Especially in situations of war or of heightened ideological confrontation, defection represents a serious risk to one's own person and the reasons that individuals have to accept these risks are diverse. Moreover, one has to mention that, many times, those that accept to work against their own state for a foreign power are never caught and their reasons for doing that are never known. In many other situations, although those that commit such actions are caught, documents that reveal their motivations (either documents generated by the intelligence service that recruited them, or transcripts of after-the-fact interrogation) remain classified for a long period of time. Thus, their reasons for action can only be analyzed long after the fact.

The present article employs an innovative approach in the field of intelligence studies, using a theoretical model developed by American specialists during and after the Cold War, on Romanian historical sources relating to the First World War. The article aims to answer the following research question: "Are analysis models developed in the US during the Cold War useful in analyzing Romanian historical sources from the early XX century?" The article answers the question in the affirmative, showing that these models can accurately describe the main reasons for defection of both ethnic Romanians from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which did so out of "divided loyalties", and of Romanian citizens working for the Austro-Hungarian enemy for financial reasons. Of course, the two situations do not exclude each other, and both are encountered in all cases. However, certain patterns prevail on each side of the barricade. The differences are determined by the different political and military situations of the two combatants: Austria-Hungary ruled over a vast territory where ethnic Romanians were the majority and had undertaken, in the recent past, a violent cultural assimilation policy of its Romanian subjects, leading to alienation and frustration. On the other hand, the Dualist Empire could mobilize superior financial resources and exercise considerable cultural attraction.

The article's first section will present theoretical models of defection in favor of an enemy intelligence service, models coming out of the research of concrete cases in the United States of America. These emerged in the context of the unprecedented development of Soviet espionage in the US resulting in the interviewing of a large number of American citizens which had worked for the Soviets. The main model discussed is MICE (Money-Ideology-Compromise-Ego), which several intelligence studies mention, in both theoretical and

empirical papers. This was modified several times, sometimes radical changes being advocated.

The second section applies these theoretical models on Romanian historical sources during the First World War, analyzing both the reasons for defection of ethnic Romanians from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as that of Romanians working in favor of the Central Powers. The section concludes that the first phenomenon was far more widespread, and it mostly involved persons of an average social status, attracted by the idea of serving a state that they identified with more, while the second was mostly financially and ideologically motivated, and mostly involved political-military elites.

Beyond the scientific conclusions, one can also state that human motivations are universal, as similar actions were similarly motivated in different times and political-military contexts. Thus, this study allows one to express views on the usefulness of both theoretical models, as well as on universal laws of human motivation.

### **Literature review**

The literature analyzing the motivations of people who defected in favor of the enemy is wholly reliant on American cases which occurred during and after the Cold War. Considering the large number of espionage cases occurring in the US, but also the government's desire to elaborate a profile of the spy, the most important empirical research on convicted spies occurred in this country. To some extent, the literature on the motivations of US citizens convicted of espionage against their own country is contextually dependent on the political situation in the period in which the convicted people acted. On the other hand, certain other kinds of motivations can be extended to other historical periods and political situations. What remains constant, during all times, is that a person who accepts to become a human source for an enemy intelligence service on the territory of the state whose citizen he is, exposes himself to extreme risks, as the death penalty or life imprisonment are common especially during wartime. Thus, although the political situation differs, and some specific situations are not included in the American literature on US citizens committing espionage during the Cold War, this literature can provide a guide to basic motivational categories for defection.

The literature on intelligence studies employs the MICE model (Money-Ideology-Compromise/Coercion-Ego) to describe possible motivations of a person who accepts to become a human source for an enemy intelligence service. According to some authors, this general model was presented, for the first time, to the public by Stanislav Levchenko, a KGB major, who defected to the West in October 1979 (Lowenthal, 2011, p. 150;

Charney and Irvin, 2014). According to this model, four motivations determine a person to become a spy against one's country or organization.

Money is proposed as the first reason in this model. It is one of the most simple and easy to understand motivations. A large part of US defectors, but also of those used by the CIA to spy on the Soviet Union, were financially rewarded. One of the best known cases is that of Aldrich Ames, who was uncovered due to his extravagant expenses. A specific form of this motivation is described by Sebastian Michalak, a Polish researcher who quotes an internal study of the Security Service of the Polish Ministry of Interior from 1980. This study mentions that about half of Polish citizens who spied in favor of Western Countries between 1957 and 1970 did it directly for money, while another quarter were motivated by a desire to be supported in their attempt to emigrate to the West (Michalak, 2011).

Ideology refers to a set of beliefs about what is correct in the world, either in general, or in what regards a country's policy in a certain field. Generally, according to the literature, ideologically motivated espionage was a characteristic of the first period of the Cold War, considerably decreasing during the second part of the conflict, but coming back, to some extent, after the Cold War. The drop suffered in the second period of the Cold War was determined by the revelations about the Soviet policies, which reduced the attractiveness of the communist ideology. The best known cases of ideological spies are the "Cambridge Five" group, out of which Kim Philby is the best known, and Ana Belen Montez. These spied against the UK and the US respectively due to their belief that these governments were mistaken in their ideological orientation (Burkett, 2013). Philby spied in favor of the USSR, while Montez did the same in favor of Cuba. Moreover, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of a threat from radical Islam, a series of American citizens began to defect in favor of al-Qaida, convinced of the need for global jihad (Herbig, 2008).

Compromise/Coercion includes the blackmail of people or their coercion through other means (ex. threats against one's family) to determine them to commit espionage. Fictional literature refers to men seduced by female agents of foreign intelligence services or of gay men blackmailed because of their sexual orientation (Charney and Irvin, 2014).

Ego involves the defector's belief that he is superior to those around him due to his activity or to the desire of thrills to escape the daily routine. Those having these reasons for betrayal have the image that their activity offers the possibility of an adventurous life, making them believe they are better than others (Burkett, 2013, pp 7-9).

Other theoretical approaches come to complete or modify the MICE model, recommending new factors that explain reasons for defection of people

involved in espionage activities. Stan Taylor and Daniel Snow (1997) recommend the replacement of the last two reasons (Compromise/Ego) with the "Ingratiation" and "Disgruntlement". The first refers to the desire of the defector to please someone, especially a friend/lover, while the second describes a situation where the potential defector is dissatisfied by the way the organization that he is part of treats him and decides to take revenge. The best example of such a situation is an employee who believes that he would have deserved to be promoted, but was not or that he was unjustly punished (Taylor and Snow, 1997, pp. 101-125). Another possible factor that determines espionage in favor of another country is, according to the PERSEREC report (see below) the existence of "divided loyalties", that is, a situation where a person, either due to cultural or to family connections, feels closer to another country than that whose citizen he or she is (Herbig, 2008).

A radical change of the MICE framework or of its different versions was suggested by Randy Burkett, a CIA representative to the US Navy post-graduate school. He recommends the replacement of the MICE acronym with RASCLS (Reciprocation-Authority-Scarcity-Commitment and Consistency-Liking-Social Proof). This model is constructed on the universal principles of human action suggested by Italian psychologist Cialdini. These are, according to Cialdini's theory, Reciprocation, Authority, Scarcity of Resources, Commitment and Consistency, Liking and Social Proof. According to Burkett, reciprocity means the recruiter's availability to help a potential source with a favor or to fulfill a need before requesting anything. According to psychological theories, people feel compelled to repay a favor that was done to them. Authority presupposes the adoption of a posture suggesting that the recruiting officer is part of an important organization which can considerably influence the course of events. The third term, translated as limited resources, presupposes that the recruiting officer tell his source that what he can provide is urgent and important in the given situation, and, thus, to generate, immediate action. According to Burkett, it is necessary that an intelligence officer prove that he is fully committed to the relationship and does not change his behavior, while requesting the same from his source (commitment and consistency). Then next term presupposes that the source be flattered, so that a pleasant human relation ensues between the officer and his source, while the last (social proof) requires the suggestion that the agent is not alone, that other agents exist and that defection is desirable behavior also for other people (Burkett, 2013).

Three major sources of empirical studies have been documented by this article: academic articles, the Slammer project report and the reports of the PERSEREC project. These have researched the motivations of individuals involved in espionage activities against one's own country. Unfortunately, all

these studies were made in the US and exclusively refer to citizens that spied against this country. Motivations for defection in other contexts can be analyzed only through the secondary analysis of academic articles discussing espionage cases, but not expressly focusing on motivations.

In the above mentioned article, Stan A. Taylor and Daniel Snow analyze the cases of 139 Americans officially charged with treason in the United States and employ a four-factor motivational schema: Money-Ideology-Ingatiation-Disgruntlement. The two authors analyze only the period 1940-1990 (the Cold War), and employ open sources to establish motivation for each case. The two authors attribute motivation directly, without access to detailed interviews with those accused of espionage. The article concludes that the financial and ideological motivations are similarly important between 1940 and 1970 (especially during the first two decades of the Cold War), while during 1970-1990, the importance of financial motivation increases significantly, while the other factors decline. According to the authors, the very low pay of military personnel in lower positions (enlisted personnel, non-commission officers), generated significant temptations and favored espionage. Only 23,7% of the total spies committed their crimes for ideological reasons, a much lower percentage during the 70s and 90s, especially after the revelations of the crimes of the Soviet Union and the crushing of the Hungarian (1956) and Czechoslovak (1968) uprisings (Taylor and Snow, 2007).

Psychologist Leroy Stone (1992) undertook empirical studies on the motivations of those who committed espionage against the US. He built a database of 186 persons accused of espionage, employing 59 motivational variables. The coding for the variables was done by consulting open sources for each case. As in the study performed by Taylor and Snow, Stone imputed motivations by himself, relying on the use of open sources. By employing the method of Principal Component Analysis (a statistical method implying the grouping of primary variables in new variables generated automatically), Stone concluded that a visible difference exists between financially and ideologically motivated defectors. Thus, those that betray for money, do not have ideological motivations and vice versa. Moreover, the author could not detect any relationship between other motivations for defection, such as the state of one's career, each of these being self-standing motivations (Stone, 1992).

One of the most important sources of studying condemned spies in the United States is the PERSEREC project of the Defense Personnel and Security Research Center. This center was founded by the United States Department of Defense, after the scandal caused by the defection of John Anthony Walker (an US Navy NCO, who sold classified documents to the Soviets and was arrested in 1985). This research center was founded to fulfill the recommendations of the Stilwell commission, which evaluated the weaknesses of the system of

granting access to classified documents in the US. The PERSEREC project holds the largest database of persons convicted for espionage against the United States, generating, up to date, three reports on their motivations. The most relevant report for this article is the last, which included espionage activities between 1947 and 2007. Again, one has to mention that motivations for espionage were imputed by researchers on the basis of consulting open sources, without directly talking to those condemned for espionage. The PERSEREC reports use a motivation schema divided between: money – divided loyalties – disgruntlement – ingratiation – coercion – thrills – recognition/ego. Unlike other studies, this report includes the possibility that a spy is motivated by different factors, presenting data on the prevalence of more important reasons when several exist (Herbig, 2008).

Similarly to the study by Stan and Taylor, the third PERSEREC report observes the increase of the financial motivation in the second period of the Cold War, followed by its decrease in the period after the conflict's conclusion. If, in the first part of the Cold War (1947-1979), spies that had money as the sole motivation represented 47%, this increases to 74% during 1980-1989, and dramatically decreases to only 7% between 1989 and 2007. Moreover, the percentage of spies motivated primordially, but not exclusively, by money varies between 43% and 60%, to decrease to only 39% after 1989. Alternatively, the existence of divided loyalties as a sole motivation falls from 16% between 1947 and 1979 to 11% between 1980 and 1989, a jump being later observed to 57% after 1990. A similar evolution is seen by divided loyalties as a primary rather than a sole factor. Disgruntlement reaches 22% for the period 1989-2007, after its importance had been diminishing during the previous period. Other possible motivations are less relevant, as the number of cases that they cover is much smaller. One of the report's conclusions is that espionage against the US after 1989 is heavily influenced by the globalization process, many defectors being naturalized American (foreign-born citizens), who keep cultural connections with their (or their parents') country of origin (Herbig, 2008).

Another source of information on the motivation of those condemned for espionage against the US is the Slammer report (thus entitled as the research was undertaken in maximum security prisons where the condemned were locked up – therefore the term "slammer"). This was carried out under the auspices of the CIA at the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s, the report being finalized in April 1990, but partially declassified only 16 years later (Stein, 2010). Unlike previous studies, the Slammer project report relied on the detailed interviewing of 30 people sentenced for treason, taking advantage of the presence of a specialized psychologist and a

counterintelligence officer. Moreover, family members and persons close to the defectors were interviewed, so that their real motivation can be studied. Thus, the project could identify the motivation of sentenced spies more directly, rather than through open sources. The synthetic information presented publicly shows a profile of the traitor as mostly motivated by disgruntlement against the way that the organization he is part of is treating him, as he believes that he would have deserved more, for example a promotion or a better material situation (Project Slammer Interim Report, 1996). Moreover, the traitor believes he is better than other colleagues and that his organization does not accept that. Moreover, those sentenced for espionage believe that they are superior to the security procedures established by the organization and their success in working undetected for a specific period reinforces that. One way that spies use to detach themselves from the results of their own behavior is the perception that their actions do no harm to concrete individuals, a potential change in the “global balance of powers” being perceived as an extremely abstract possibility (Project Slammer Interim Report, 1996). Psychologist William Pollack, a US psychologist, issued the hypothesis that the money received by the convicted spies are meant to validate one’s own ego, which the organization wounded (Pertman, 2001).

Unlike static models presented above, Terrence Thompson, a former CIA psychologist (the head of the polygraph testing division), who interviewed a part of those condemned for treason, elaborated a dynamic evolution model of the person committing espionage. According to Thompson, the decision of beginning espionage activities is taken at the intersection between “opportunities, a life-crisis, a negative character trait, triggered by a particular event”. Thompson believes that the access to classified information represents an opportunity to commit espionage. In most cases, life crisis is created by the absence of enough income, by a sudden move decided by superiors, or by the reevaluation of life which the mid-life crisis causes (in the case of Robert Hanssen, he could not afford to take his children to catholic school, as he perceived his religion requests). Weak character traits are, according to Thompson, the predisposition to crime or to a life of luxury, which was present, for example, in Aldrich Ames. To reduce the negative character of one’s own actions, most spies believe that their actions are not evil, but that they are doing a good deed. For example, Earl Pitts said that he wanted to get revenge against the FBI, but is not really betraying his country. Finally, the triggering event came due to situations such as financial or marital problems (Thompson, 2014).

Other cases revealed by specialized literature did not focus exclusively on motivation, as they were analyzed in the context of studies on intelligence activity in certain states and in certain periods of time. An article on MI5 operations against the Irish Provisional Army presents the case of an agent called "Observer B", who offered information to British intelligence on the activity of the terrorist organization, but also of rival militant groups (belonging to protestant loyalists in Northern Ireland). According to the case officer, "Observer B", could be considered an ideologically motivated agent, as his main motivation was the desire to "combat extremism and violence, regardless of their source". Therefore, in a confidential report consulted by the author of the article, "Observer B" is described as "having a desire for peace", but also as a powerful "anti-Republican, intensely loyal to the United Kingdom, but deeply opposed to the use of force by the protestant community to impose its will on the Ulster Government and the Roman-catholic minority" (Charters, 2013).

A study on KGB operations that took place in Israel during the Cold War revealed that the main motivation of those who chose to work for the Soviet intelligence service was money. One of the spies, Israel Bar, became a target for a counter-intelligence operation because of the luxury lifestyle he led, which contrasted significantly with the relative scarcity of Israel in the 1950s. Another example was that of Levi Levi, who worked for Polish intelligence inside the Israeli counter-intelligence service (Shabak or Shin Bet), becoming a suspect due to a golden chain he wore. The only case of ideological motivation presented in the article was Zeev Avni, who worked for the KGB due to his communist beliefs. The article concludes that the soviet service offered large sums of money to its agents in Israel, and this constituted the main motivation for espionage activities (Shpiro, 2011).

Other sources to establish reasons for defection can be memoirs, such as those written by Henry Crumpton, a former CIA officer. These can represent a source for assessing the motivations of those who worked in favor and not against the United States. Crumpton used the MICE system to describe the motivation of his sources. In his recollection, he presents the case of financially motivated sources, who were led to commit espionage by the low pay they received. Further, Crumpton discusses the situation of an African tribal leader willing to help the US because he believed tribal organization was obsolete and conducive to violence. Then, he focuses on the case of an encryption officer in an Eastern Bloc embassy, compromised after losing a large sum of money or that of a small-time civil servant who was disgruntled by being ignored by all in his organization (Crumpton, 2013).

**Espionage and betrayal in Romania and its vicinity, at the beginning of the XX century**

Although the theoretical models presented above have been mostly elaborated relying on the experience of the Cold War, the attempt to employ them to analyze events occurring in Romania and its vicinity at the beginning of the XX century will confirm that reasons for defection can be studied according to universal patterns.

Since 1915, when it became obvious that Romania would join the Entente, and that the Romanian army would begin its offensive in Transylvania, national intelligence structures aimed at ensuring a continuous and diversified information flow on Austro-Hungarian military capabilities to the Bucharest decision-makers.

In addition to providing counter-intelligence support for the Romanian Army, Romanian intelligence structures organized, during the two years when Romania was a neutral party (1914-1916), complex intelligence actions in Transylvania.

To this end, Romanian intelligence especially aimed to recruit persons whose employment was of such a nature that they could easily travel without arising suspicion, especially during wartime, when the movement of people and goods is heavily restricted in all belligerent states.

The main reason for defection by Austrian subjects of Romanian ethnicity was the existence of "divided loyalties". Many of them felt closer to Romania, which they perceived as "their country" and, many times, felt a desire to contribute to the potential union of Transylvania and Romania. One cannot deny that some of these collaborators also received material compensation, but it was not this that motivated them to take such a perilous course of action (in case they were discovered, the sentence was generally death by shooting or hanging). Moreover, the employees of Romanian intelligence structures, both of those belonging to the Ministry of Interior and to the Ministry of Defense, aimed to predominantly recruit Romanians who had already shown signs of sympathy for Romania. Most human sources were recruited from among intellectuals – doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, professors, engineers, primary school teachers or priests or state employees such as forestry employees, postmen, railway workers or salesmen (Brestoiu and Bobocescu, 1979, p. 105).

Documents elaborated by the agents of State Security (the Ministry of Interior's intelligence structure), point out to the presence of the consciousness of belonging to Romania among their collaborators. In a Note elaborated on the 23rd December 1914 addressed to the leadership of the

State Security, one of its agents describes the extent of the help that could be provided by Greco-catholic (uniate) priest of Iablanița, George Tătucu. According to the note, he is described as “He is a worthy man, honest, untainted, maybe the most trustworthy Romanian priest in Caransebeș. Worthy of all the Romanian State’s trust” (ANIC, DPSG, 592/1914, f. 2).

The same agent points to the orthodox priest Iulius Musta, of Glimboca (Banat), who could offer important services given his good knowledge of trans-Carpathian travel routes which would be vital to Romanian troops about to cross the mountains. As he was in Bucharest on business in December 1914, the State Security agent requested permission to recruit him immediately so that he could provide intelligence as soon as he returned to the Banat. Moreover, given the good material condition of the two priests, it was estimated they would not require any form of compensation from the Romanian state for their secret activity (ANIC, DPSG, 592/1914, p. 3).

In addition to numerous and well-motivated civilians, we also encounter imperial army officers who betrayed their country out of patriotism and worked in favor of Romania. Strategic intelligence was obtained, according to what Marshall Alexandru Averescu states, from an ethnically Romanian hussar, who, in 1916, deserted the imperial army and crossed the mountains. In Bucharest, he pointed out to the Romanian General Staff that the Central Powers Campaign plan against Romania foresaw the occupation of Oltenia as its main objective, to be reached from the very beginning of hostilities.

“I came to believe this information – pointed out Marshall Averescu in his notes – as it was evidence of an intelligent plan and, when the enemy undertook efforts and concentrated 3½ divisions – I supposed that the goal was to isolate Oltenia through the occupation of Pitești” (Averescu, p. 365).

By studying archival documents, one can observe the complexity of intelligence activity carried out in the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the two years of neutrality (1914-1916). It is estimated that approximatively 1.000 persons (Ștefănescu, 2009, p. 41) – Romanians, but also other individuals belonging to other nationalities who lived in Ardeal – were agents of the Romanian Army, State Security or the Gendarmerie. Obviously, they were considered “traitors” by Austro-Hungarian authorities, and were severely punished if discovered.

Eugen Cristescu, the head of the Special Intelligence Service (1940-1944) wrote about this topic: “Through offensive intelligence action, State Security and the General Staff succeeded in obtaining intelligence on Austro-Hungarian military movements, employing especially Transylvanian

Romanians, who were used as informers and who, at the end of the War, were employed as superior civil servants in the Security Service of Great Romania" (*Din Memoriile lui Eugen Cristescu*, 1968, pp. 14-15).

From General Maximilian Ronge, the head of the intelligence service of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during 1914-1918, we can find out that a significant number of cases were discovered by the imperial counter-intelligence services during the two years of neutrality; over 100 cases of "treason" by civilian and military citizens of the Habsburg monarchy in favor of Romania were discovered (ANIC – MR. MSM, 119, pp. 181-182).

On the other hand, the intelligence services of the Central Powers also recorded notable successes in recruiting high military and political officials in the Old Kingdom, especially during the period of Romanian neutrality. The main reason for this betrayal was a financial one. We can recall the case of General Vasile Zottu, the head of the Romanian General Staff during 1914-1916. The general's destiny is tragic, as he committed suicide on the 12<sup>th</sup> of November 1916 after Romanian State Security agents stole, on the 16<sup>th</sup> of August 1916, a briefcase out of the car that the German ambassador, baron von dem Busche, was using to depart Bucharest. The briefcase contained an "explosive" document: the 200 page list of the "parties, officers, politicians, journalists and real-estate agents who allowed themselves to be corrupted" (Neagu, Marinescu and Georgescu, 1977, pp. 86-87).

In order to show the extent of the corruption, we can point to the discovery of a letter through which the German intelligence center in Sofia communicated to the Reich legation in Bucharest that the sum of 25 000 gold-marks had been sent to support the activities of its espionage network in Romania (Brestoiu and Bobocescu, 1979, p. 132).

Considering that the collaborator network of the German intelligence in Romania included people with important positions in the state (including the name of Alexandru Marghiloman, an important politician), the director-general of State Security, Iancu Panaitescu, forwarded the file stolen from the diplomat to King Ferdinand and Prime-Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu.

Although these discoveries required the taking of urgent organizational measures, given that the Transylvanian offensive was about to begin on the 15/28 august 1916, the immediate replacement of superior officers who had been proven to be enemy agents was no longer possible. To avoid the "demoralization of the army", the names of officers and generals who had betrayed in favor of the enemy, was not made public. However, their access to operational files was restricted and they were placed under surveillance until they could be eliminated from their positions and brought

before a Court Martial. General Zottu was suspected of favoring the transmission of the Romanian Army's campaign plan for a war on the side of the Entente to the Central Powers. When he found out that their names was on the list stolen from von dem Busche, both general Zottu and major Ionescu, the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army Corps killed themselves to avoid the expected interrogation, the public humiliation and the death sentence that was going to be issued (Ștefănescu, 2007, 45).

However, attempting to attract active or retired officers to commit subversive action by paying them was not an infallible method as is shown by a conclusive example which occurred in the beginning of the First World War.

Considering the extension of the conflict which had begun in the summer of 1914 (at that moment, none of the major powers involved did not expect that the war would become global in scale and would lead to the remodelling of the world), both the Central Powers and the Entente try, under all possible forms, to sabotage the war effort of the enemy coalition. An interesting case, featuring the German ambassador von dem Busche, is pointed out by the agents of State Security.

The German Ambassador attempted to corrupt a reserve navy captain, Gheorghe Coandă, to undertake actions aimed at disturbing the Danube River traffic through which Serbia, a major Austro-Hungarian enemy, was supplied with military materiel (ANIC – DPSG, 177/1914, p. 1). The action aimed at sinking barges loaded with weapons and different military material which were loaded in the Russian port of Reni and unloaded on Serbia's territory. Mines necessary for the action would be given to the Romanian captain by the German official, and the former would plant them in the Danube's waters between Cernavodă and Galați.

Coandă requested that some money be paid as a deposit, as well as a 6000 lei down payment. However, after receiving the money, the captain contacted the Russian military attaché, colonel Semenoff, and suggested to organize a series of fake "attacks" against Russian transport ships. These ideas were not carried out (ANIC – DPSG, 177/1914, p. 8) and Germany ended up paying large sums of money without obtaining concrete benefits, while actions to block the Danube failed completely.

Another example, from a different vicinity of Romania and in a completely different context, points out to the universality of the financial motivation. In October 1917, the Bolshevik party succeeded in taking over power in Russia. Through its large intelligence network in the Bessarabian and Ukrainian communist movement, Romanian State Security was able to inform the Bucharest leadership about the plans and intentions of the

communists. The elite group around the feared Cristian Rakovsky was penetrated. Rakovsky had established his general headquarters around Odessa, aiming to "ignite" the communist revolution, including in Romania.

A note labeled as maximum emergency, dated October 1917, included a report by the "Odessa Security Agent" (no details on his identity were mentioned): "I have been told by a person from Rakovsky's entourage, that the latter had sent a memoir to Petrograd, requesting a decisive action against Romania. Rakovsky and the Russian Jews are leading the plot

Two agents on my payroll in Rakovsky's entourage, would, for a generous amount of money, attempt to find out the intentions of the Jewish Committee and of its leader. One of them told me that he is ready to assassinate Rakovsky in exchange for an important sum of money.

Please urgently instruct me about the sum of money I could offer these people to stimulate them to give me information on Rakovsky's plot against the King and Government. Even an hour of delay could result in losing this opportunity" (ANIC – DGP, 3/1913, p. 48). Unfortunately, documents extant in the Romanian National Archives did not allow us to identify the end of the affair, but it is clear that there was no success in assassinating Rakovsky.

In archival documents, one can encounter examples of defection by professional military officers for "moral" reasons, due to their political-ideological convictions. In addition to the shock caused by the frontline defeats (which occurred in a very short time), as well as to the resulting evacuation to Moldova of Romanian state authorities, the betrayal of colonel Alexandru Sturdza, the son of well-known politician Dimitrie A. Sturdza and commander of the 7th Mixed Brigade, created significant commotion among Romanian troops (Otu and Georgescu, 2011). Colonel Sturdza deserted to Germany convinced that only an alliance with Wilhelm II's Reich could save Romania from occupation by the Tsarist Empire. State Security reports show that his action was not spontaneous, but had been planned well ahead.

Considering his decisions as a front-line unit commander, the colonel's desire to sabotage the intentions of State Security employees to send agents behind the German-Austro-Hungarian frontline: "Gheorghe Gherman, an inhabitant of Tulnici, Vrancea county, was sent by us across the mountains with specific requests that we had assigned, being recommended by Romanian military authorities. Colonel Sturdza, the commander of the 7th Mixed Brigade, informs us, through address No. 1062 of 20 November 1916 that, when Gheorghe Gherman requested to be allowed to cross the border, this was categorically refused, with the simple and naive reason that he is not trustworthy. As Gherman disappeared, Sturdza decided that he be found.

Colonel Sturdza, the commander of 7th Mixed Brigade, also informed us, through address no 1088 of 21 November 1916, that Gheorghe Gherman, after having clandestinely crossed the border, committed espionage in favor of the enemy and betrayed the movement of Russian troops to the Austro-Germans. Sturdza ordered that any person sent this way be arrested for lack of trustworthiness. The head of the Intelligence Bureau of the Northern Army, through address No. 62 of 2 December 1916, considering the case presented by Colonel Sturdza, forbids the Intelligence Center to send informers across the border. The intelligence center, based on official documents in the file, whose authenticity could not be denied by anybody, reported that all of colonel Sturdza's intelligence does not correspond to the truth" (ANIC – DGP, 16/1926, pp. 54-55v).

Sturdza's actions of sabotaging the national military effort would be completed through his crossing to the enemy side in the early morning of February 6th 1917, an action which led to major shocks across the army, as well as across Romanian public opinion. His enthusiasm quickly collapsed, as he was not successful in his propaganda among Romanians held prisoners in German camps, aiming at creating an "army" fighting against the Central Powers. This occurred despite the promises made to soldiers in very difficult situations, who, due to lack of food and exhausting work, were suffering thousands of casualties.

### Conclusions

The main aim of this article was to apply models of analysis developed to study reasons for defection at a particular time and in a particular geopolitical context to a completely different context, in order to verify their validity. Through the study of Romanian historical sources from the time of the First World War, one can validate models developed 30-50 years later in the specific context of the Cold War. Employing these models allows for a novel approach to historical sources used, until then, in primordially descriptive ways. Thus, a new light on the universal phenomenon of defection is cast, given that it is susceptible of different manifestations according to the specific context and situation.

The article mainly employs the MICE (Money-Ideology-Compromise-Ego) model, also discussing its partial modifications. In the classic model, defectors are motivated either by money, ideology, blackmail or arrogance. This model was applied to spies captured in the United States, where the empirical study determined the replacement of the last two terms with motivations such as "divided loyalties", "disgruntlement" or "ingratiation".

A radical reconsideration argued for the replacement of MICE with the RASCLS model, which represented a considerable departure from the original.

Historical analysis of sources relevant for the period of the First World War in the Romanian area revealed radically different motivations for collaborating with enemy intelligence services. Firstly, when analyzing the activities of Romanian intelligence in Transylvania, at the time under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, strong “divided loyalties” were found among the ethnic Romanian inhabitants. Despite significant risks to their welfare, many of them engaged in espionage against their own state, offering crucial information to Romania. Austrian citizens of Romanian ethnicity were experiencing feelings of loyalty to Romania, something to which Hungarian assimilationist policies must have contributed.

On the other hand, the activity carried out by the Austro-Hungarian intelligence services on Romania’s territory, as well as its conspicuous successes, must not be denied. Among the important sources of information that these services recruited were superior officers of the Romanian Army, drawn either by money or by the appeal of a superior culture, especially when weighed up against tsarist Russia, which was Romania’s formal ally. Moreover, the communist movement represented a permanent source of concern for the Romanian authorities, considering that the inner circle of the revolutionary Rakovsky was penetrated by State Security agents, by relying on important sums of money.

The article’s final conclusion is that, regardless of the applicability of one or another analysis model, the phenomenon of betrayal is universal, extending across time and space. Understanding the perennial motivations which determines it can help an intelligence service to protect itself from enemy intrusions and to also obtain success in its offensive operations against an enemy.

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