

TERRORISM SERVING GEOPOLITICS. THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALEKSANDR DUGIN'S GEOPOLITICAL DOCTRINE AND EVGENY MESSNER'S CONCEPT OF "REBEL WAR"

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Motto:

Without geopolitics it is not possible to understand the events in Ukraine –
every attitude excluding that is doomed to an immediate failure.
(Aleksandr Dugin, March 14, 2014)

Every man, whether a serviceman or a civilian,
takes part in the information warfare no matter of its form.
(Gen. Vladimir Markomienko, 2000)¹

Abstract:

Defining the interests of the state in reference to its geographical location is the key element to understanding political actions being taken by the Russian Federation in an international domain.

The geographical location of Russia has been influencing for centuries the way of perceiving the world by the Moscow leadership elites. Starting in the 16th century, they have been forced to pursue their policy in three main directions: The Western one (from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains), The Southern one (from the Danube River to Persia) and The Eastern one (from the Volga River to the Altai Mountains).

Keywords: state interest, geographical location, Dugin, geopolitical doctrine.

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¹Vladimir Markomienko (Russian: ВладимирИгнатьевичМаркоменко) – General Lieutenant, between 1995 and 1996 serving as the I Deputy Director General of the Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information providing support to the President of the Russian Federation (Russian: Федеральноеагентствоправительственнойсвязииинформациипри ПрезидентеРФ, ФАПСи). See: А. Колпакиди, *ЭнциклопедиясекретныхслужбРоссии*, Москва 2003, p. 616. Compare: A. Soldatov, I. Borogan, (2010) *The New Nobility. The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB*, New York, pp. 20, 282, 292. Quoted after: Г. Почепцов, (2000), *Информационные войны. Основы военно-коммуникативных исследований*, Москва, p. 2.

Introduction

Defining the interests of the state in reference to its geographical location is the key element to understanding political actions being taken by the Russian Federation in an international domain. The essence of this reliance is precisely reflected in the views of the orthodox philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1947), who coined the statement of “the power of space over the Russian soul”. As he wrote, *the Russians do not possess the narrowness of the Europeans, who concentrate their energy on a little space of their souls, neither do they possess the wariness, the economy of time and space, intensity of culture* (Бердяев, 1990, p. 64). The geographical location of Russia has been influencing for centuries the way of perceiving the world by the Moscow leadership elites. Starting in the 16th century, they have been forced to pursue their policy in three main directions:

- The Western one (from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains),
- The Southern one (from the Danube River to Persia) and
- The Eastern one (from the Volga River to the Altai Mountains).

That is why they have always tried to stay active in all three areas at the same time, which demands both consolidation of the country and centralization of its authorities (Le Donne, 2004, pp. 15-38; Nowak, 2008, pp. 13-24). Furthermore, existence in the open geographical spaces resulted in constant fear of the outer threat, which implied the tendency to guarantee safety through applying preventive and offensive activities. It is worth underlying that the present foreign policy of Russia shows an increased activity in the following geostrategic areas: from the Balkans, through the Black Sea Basin (Transnistria, Crimea), then through the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea Basin, the whole Central Asia, and then as far as Sakhalin and the Arctic (Gorodetsky, 2003; Grachev, 2005, pp. 255-275; Wiśniewski, 2013, pp. 365-385).

According to some of the Russian elites, the new border layout, being the result of the collapse of the Soviet Russia, is unfavourable when comparing to previous periods. The reflection over geopolitical consequences of that event is still vivid in the minds of representatives of not only the Russian political class, but also the majority of the Russian society. Hence the slogans referring to the reconstruction of the lost empire have been gaining a significant impact on the shape of the foreign policy applied by the Russian Federation, which means that probability of violating international order for geopolitical and geostrategic reasons is relatively high (Grabowski, 2011, pp. 21-22; Кириллов&Крючков, 2008, pp. 10-21). The involvement of Russia

in the armed conflicts which took place after 1991 can only confirm that thesis. It is worth underlying that the conflicts were conditioned by, inter alia, geographical locations neighbouring the territories of the post-Soviet areas, especially those with diverse ethnic, social and religious structures, which is particularly meaningful in case of the annexation of Crimea and the events in the West of Ukraine (Grabowski, 2011, p. 38; Эллисон, 2005, pp. 147-191).

Hence it is not surprising that geopolitics in Russia is understood as a political strategy applied also to international relations (Колосов, 1996, p. 86; Колосов & Н.С. Мироненко, 2001, pp. 9-29). What is more, geopolitics in present Russia has gained the status of a general world view, a universal concept which helps to build the world view and one's own attitude towards it (Косолапой, 1996, pp. 57-61; Marciniak, 2004, pp. 4-13; Mäkinen, 2008, pp. 34-49; Isakova, 2005, pp. 10-23). A good example confirming that opinion are the views of Valery Korovin – the Director of the Centre for Geopolitical Expertise providing support to the Head of the State Duma and a prominent activist for the neo- Eurasian movement. His statement published in “Izvestija” (Russian: «Известия») journal contained precise information about the aims and methods of the Russian policy towards Ukraine, as well as its global context. Valery Korovin distanced himself from the ideological heritage of the Soviet Russia, criticising its leaders for *ideologisation of the foreign policy*. He underlined that *the geopolitical method* applied in order to stop Russia's collapse was recognized as the basis of state security strategy only after Vladimir Putin's rise to power in the Russian Federation. According to Korovin, the basic aim of the Russian foreign policy should be restricting the influence of the “Atlantic Block” (the USA and the European Union) through creating a global, regional and subregional security model. This aim should be achieved by absorbing the countries and the nations belonging in the past to *the Russian space* (close to Russia in civilization and culture) to *the orbit of Eurasian geopolitical pole*. According to Korovin, it should be done in the way similar to the annexation of Crimea, which he interpreted as *supporting the regional and local conflicts solving through keeping the peace*. What is more, in Korovin's opinion *the geopolitical method* should be treated as the basis for all actions taken in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior and the Federal Security Service, in order to neutralize any threats to security of the state (Коровин, 24 IV 2014; Пустошкин, 1976, pp. 521-522; Grygajtis, 2011, pp. 10-18). The quoted statement reveals that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is one of the stages in the implementation of the broader political doctrine aiming at strategic reintegration of the post-Soviet space, and in the further perspective – building of the so-called multipolar world. The author of that concept is Aleksandr Dugin – an influential intellectualist and a theoretician of the Russian

geopolitics and euroasianism. The basis of the eurasian movement, reborn thanks to Dugin, is a constant thought of rivalry for the power over the space between countries, political-military blocks, international organisations and civilizations (See more Kerr, 1995, pp. 977-988; Smith, 1999, pp. 481-494; O'Loughlin, Toal, Kolossov, 2005, pp. 322-335). Aleksandr Dugin has always claimed that anti-western Eurasian ideology and academic geopolitics serve substantial, far-reaching Russian imperialistic aims. In his opinion geopolitics is: "(...) the worldview of power, education about power and for the power (...). Geopolitics is the discipline of political elites, both the real ones and the alternative ones; its history proves that it is dealt with exclusively by people actively engaged in ruling over nations and countries or preparing to that role (...). In the present world it is the book of power, which should be taken into account while taking global (important) decisions, such as alliances, starting wars, making reforms, restructuring societies, applying economic and political sanctions on a large scale" (Дугин, 1997, pp. 13-14).

The interpretation of the above definition by Dugin shows that geopolitics is a subjective vision of space, rooted in the consciousness of a given society or political environment. It is the result of a rational and subjective calculation of the interests and political goals, as well as cultural factors (historical experience, national myths etc.). Those factors significantly affect the activity of a given subject, which in this particular case is a political practice (Potulski, 2010, pp. 9-10; Tuathail, 1998, pp. 16-39; Lashchenova, 2013, pp. 110-118; Ambrosio, Vandrovec, 2013, pp. 435-466).

According to contemporary researchers, Aleksandr Dugin is a representative of political environments close to the idea of the Russian Empire restoration. This idea became the leading motive of his long political, scientific and journalistic activity. His high position in the narrow circle of the group of people close to President Vladimir Putin is widely known. Dugin officially states that he prepared a lot of geopolitical projects commissioned by the authorities². He is often presented in mass media as an expert or a

²А.Г. Дугин, *Стратегические выводы Прямой Линии Путина* [online], <http://evrazia.org/article/2505> [availability: 20 VI 2014]: *На теоретическом уровне эта идеология, в центре которой стоит Народ, развита в работе, которую я подготовил по просьбе Кремля ещё в 2007 году, под названием «Обществоведение для граждан Новой России» (...) На практическом уровне в 2011 году эта идея – взять Народ в качестве основы идеологии – была как политический проект предложена мной Администрации Президента, в результате чего появился проект Общероссийского Народного Фронта. Я полагал, что эта идеология могла бы стать мировоззренческим ядром «Единой России», но Путин решил иначе.* Compare: В. Иванов, *Дугин – политический Мерлин России* [online], <http://www.evrazia.info/article/4377> [availability: 20 VI 2014].

commentator of current political events. An important factor in the biography of Aleksandr Dugin is his relations with high rank representatives of the Russian law and order institutions. It seems obvious that those relations highly influenced his brilliant career. What is more, his initiative has led to creating such political and social organisations as: the International Eurasian Movement (Russian: Международное Евразийское движение, МЕД), the Eurasian Youth Union (Russian: Евразийский союз молодёжи, ЕСМ) and "Izborski Club" (Russian: Изборский клуб). These organisations gather experts from different areas, as well as most noticeable people from the Russian political and cultural world sharing his ideas (Dunlop, 2001, pp. 91-127; Umland, 2010, pp. 144-152; Wojnowski, 2014, pp. 11-38).

The main purpose of this research is presenting the assumptions of the Russian doctrine in relation to Ukraine and specifying the methods of its realisation. First of all, it is necessary to show the relation between Aleksandr Dugin's geopolitical doctrine and some aspects of the Kremlin's foreign policy – both global and regional. This is the subject of the first part of this article. Secondly, it is crucial to define the ways of realisation of foreign policy, which, having in mind Korovin's opinions, may be referred to as "geopolitical method". Basing on his statements it can be said that geopolitical method should be understood as diverse activities helping to achieve a given political doctrine. As it was said before, Korovin suggests that the "geopolitical method" should be mainly applied by law and order institutions. Therefore, a thesis should be advanced here, according to which a "geopolitical method" is also, apart from standard forms of military activities, a wide spectrum of asymmetrical activities. This definition refers to unconventional methods of warfare, such as terrorist activities, information, psychological and economic warfare (Wejkszner, 2009, pp. 120-121; Arreguin-Toft, 2005, pp. 1-48; Katz, 2013, pp. 77-85). The intention of the author of this article is therefore to present the Russian concept of asymmetrical activities, to which one should definitely include the so-called "rebel war" (Russian: мятежевойна) being right now an element of a wide concept of the Russian "information warfare" (Russian: информационная война). A question should be raised to what extent Russia, fulfilling its geopolitical goals in Ukraine, has used the possibilities advanced by such activities. In order to evaluate that, it is necessary to show the analogy between theoretical aspects of such activities and practice, which is the subject of the second part of this article.

The territory of Ukraine in the geopolitical doctrine of Aleksandr Dugin and his supporters

The starting point for considering the meaning of Ukraine in Aleksandr Dugin's geopolitical doctrine is his fundamental masterpiece titled *The Basics of Geopolitics. Geopolitical Future of Russia*. This outstanding book, both in form and content, was released in 1997. It is worth underlying that generals and strategists from the Military Academy of the Russian Federation Armed Forces Headquarters (Russian: Военная академия Генерального штаба Вооружённых сил Российской Федерации) participated in its origin. The book presents geopolitical doctrine, which is supposed to help the rebuilding of the lost empire comparable with the Soviet Russia. Nowadays, this book is the basic position devoted to geopolitics, obligatory in universities and military academies. It gained huge popularity both in Russia and abroad, so it cannot be neglected. The author's ideas are supported by many Russians. What is more, the content of the book constitutes the basis for Dugin's otherwritten works, as well as programs for the political parties and organisations established form his initiative (Dunlop, 2001, pp. 93-94; Eberhardt, 2010, p. 236; Дугин, 2011 și 2012).

The most important task set by Dugin for the Russian nation is the creation of powerful continental empire. The first step on the way to the world's supremacy should be the strategic integration of the post-soviet space and creation of the Eurasian Union, which would be the geopolitical equivalent of the Soviet Russia (Дугин, pp. 170-175; Дугин, 2002, pp. 781-787). One of the basic conditions to reach that goal is, inter alia, spreading the strategic control over the part of the globe described by Dugin as the "Russian South" (Russian: русский Юг), namely the territories located in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula from Serbia to Bulgaria, Moldova, southern and eastern Ukraine, Rostov, Krasnodar Krai, the Caucasus, eastern and northern coast of the Caspian Sea, the Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) as well as Mongolia, Tibet and Manchuria. Ruling over those territories is just a temporary stage for further expansion to the South and the "warm seas". According to Dugin taking such an action is crucial for securing the Russian borders. In his opinion, leaving those territories in the "geopolitical vacuum" would create a possibility to include them into the "Atlantic" influence zone. The territory of the "Russian South" is treated by Dugin as the main platform of confrontation between the Russian Federation and the "Atlantic" world, the place where the fate of the future empire will be decided of (Дугин, pp. 340-345). However, as he claims, setting the new geopolitical order in this part of the world is not possible without regulating

the status of the Ukrainian statehood. In his opinion, taking control over Ukraine would allow Moscow for continuous expansion to the West and to the South. The control over the south-eastern part of Ukraine would assure Russia an inviolable border, which would be the northern coast of the Black Sea. This would restrict the influence of the "Atlantic" Turkey, whose main purpose, according to Dugin, is the realization of the "Turanism-related geopolitical project" – the idea of assembling the Turkish nations, especially the ones living in Kazakhstan, Tatarstan and The Sakha (Yakutia) Republic, which would obviously threaten the Eurasian Union (Дугин, pp. 347–349, 356; Сотниченко, 2011, pp. 4–14; Сотниченко, 2011a, pp. 141–149; Telkin și Williams, 2011, pp. 145–186).

Gaining control over the Western Ukraine would be the first step to decomposing the so-called "dressing station" (Russian: санитарный кордон). This definition, according to Dugin, refers to countries located in the eastern part of a little European peninsula between the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea. This area has the strategic meaning for the security of the Russian Federation. On one side of this border area the western peripheries of the Eurasian continent are located, on the other side, according to Dugin, there is a bridgehead of the "Atlantic world" subordinate to the Atlantic empire – the USA. Cultural differences multiply geopolitical diversity of that region, since "the dressing station" is the very place of ethnical-religious longitudinal demarcation between the countries of the Latin civilization and the Byzantine Empire heritage (Eberhardt, 2010, pp. 167–187). The "dressing station" include, most of all, Poland, but also Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Western Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Dugin underlines that the characteristic feature of foreign policies of the countries located in this region is hostility towards Russia and Germany and servility towards the USA. The existence of the "dressing station", which in Dugin's opinion is the product of the Atlantic geopoliticians implemented after World War I, is the source of conflicts between Germany and Russia. What is more, this product prevents the union between the Eurasian Empire and the so-called continental Europe, identified by the geopolitician as being under the German influence. Furthermore, the diversified cultural character of the countries of the "dressing station" hampers their full integration with both the East and the West. That is why it is necessary for Russia to liquidate the "dressing station" through a total reorganization of the Central-Eastern European countries' borders. The new geopolitical order should not be reached through territorial annexation. Instead, Dugin suggests creating several federations of the regions characterized by the uniform geopolitical

orientation, which means the ability to integrate in religious, cultural, ethnic and economic aspects with the Eurasian empire or the continental Europe staying under the German control³. Taking the religious background under consideration (the dominance of the Catholic and Protestant influences), the Russian geopolitician claims that the following countries stay under the German influence: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the part of Ukraine where Greek-Catholic and strong Ukrainian nationalism dominate. The remaining part of Ukraine should be integrated with the Russian Federation. Other countries of the south-eastern Europe, where the Orthodox Church believers dominate, such as Serbia, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Greece, as well as mostly Muslim Albania should be, in his opinion, included into the Russian influence zone reaching as far as the Ionian Sea (Дугин, pp. 219-228 și 224-226; Бовдунов, 2011, pp. 4-18; Eberhardt, pp. 228-232)⁴.

The division of Ukraine, suggested by Dugin, is closely related to the above geopolitical scenario. In his opinion, the existence of Ukraine is unexplainable in the geopolitical sense and its fate is determined by the country's name, which is the synonym of the border region, the buffer zone between the East and the West. He also underlines that no unique civilization has been formed in the territory of Ukraine. According to Dugin, the Dniester River and the Dnieper River, two biggest rivers flowing in the territory of Ukraine, have for ages efficiently restricted the integrative possibilities of this country. He claims that a huge Ukrainian space is inhabited by different "ethnos" (Russian: этнос – meaning "society") who have diverse geopolitical goals. The ethnic inhabitants of Great Russia and having the same roots (in

³ Dugin claims that Belarus, because of Catholic minority with an unfavourable attitude towards the Eurasian Empire, also belongs to the "dressing station". See: А.Г. Дугин, *Основы геополитики...*, pp. 368-370. Compare: Л.В. Савин, *Россия-Украина-Польша: геополитические императивы*, in: *К геополитике*, Л.В. Савин (red.), Москва 2011, pp. 225-235.

⁴It should be underlined that in Dugin's geopolitical arrangement both allied countries, namely Germany and Russia, should cooperate and fight against any aspects of Russophobia in Central Europe and anti-German movements in Russia. Partnership and cooperation of both countries should be confirmed by the project involving liquidation of all mutual agreements and substituting them with tripartite ones – the idea strongly postulated by Dugin. For example, German-Polish or German-Ukrainian, relatively Russian-Polish or Russian-Ukrainian relations and alignments should be changed into agreements of three countries. Russia should become one of the parties in the first case, whereas Germany in the latter one. In result, several countries located between Russia and Germany shall lose any aspects of sovereignty and their future will be decided upon by joined authorities from Moscow and Berlin.

terms of civilization) inhabitants of Little Russia are both Russia-oriented, whereas different in culture "ethnos" of the Western Ukraine are becoming a part of the Western-European cultural zone (Дугин, pp. 376-377; Дугин, 2011, pp. 8-25; Багдасарян, 2012, pp. 138-143)⁵. This is why the presently existing Ukraine cannot fully unite with the Eurasian block or the Central Europe, which is under the German influence. In such a geopolitical arrangement, Ukraine – a puppet in the hands of the American politicians – can only exist as a part of the "dressing station", being the source of destabilization of the Eastern Europe and the seed for a potential armed conflict. These are the reasons why a sovereign Ukraine, as it is today, poses a threat to the interests of Russia and is a serious danger to its security, which Dugin identifies with as much as invading the territory of the Russian Federation (Дугин, pp. 347-349; 378-379). That is why, similarly to other countries belonging to the "dressing station", it is necessary to divide Ukraine into four parts of homogeneous geopolitical background, i.e.:

⁵It is worth underlying that Dugin uses the word *ethnos* (Russian: этнос, from the Greek: *ethnos*) while discussing geopolitical situation of the "dressing station". In his works it means societies strictly bound with the territory they inhabit, possessing a number of special qualities such as: history, language, legislation regulating interpersonal relations, customs and morality. According to his concept, this idea is subordinate to the idea of nation, which is identified with a country and consists of many *ethnos*. See: А.Г. Дугин, *Этносоциология*, Москва 2011, pp. 8-25; В.Э. Багдасарян, *Этнос и проблема цивилизационной идентичности*, в: *Этноцентр: Сборник материалов по проблемам этносоциологии и социальной антропологии*, А.Г. Дугин, А.Л. Бовдунов (ed.) Москва 2012, pp. 138-143. Hereby Dugin, referring to the theory of Lev Gumilev, creates a scientific legitimization of the process of including different ethnic groups and even national minorities to the "Russian nation". In case of Ukraine, this theory leads to the conclusion that Ukraine is not inhabited by one Ukrainian nation but individual *ethnos* which leads to the conclusion that Ukraine is not a country and the Ukrainians are not a nation. The Russian geopolitician strongly supported his view in the interview given to the Polish magazine "Frona" in 1998: "Russians and Germans perceive the world in terms of expansion and we will never change that. We are not interested in just keeping our own country or nation. We are interested in absorbing, by exerting pressure, a maximum number of categories that would complete us. We are not interested in colonization like the British, but in setting our strategic geopolitical borders, even without russification, though some russification sometimes is necessary. In its sacred-geographical evolution Russia is not interested in the existence of independent Poland in any form. Neither Ukraine. And it is not because we dislike the Polish or the Ukrainians – it is because the rights of sacred geography and geopolitics tell so (...) I am convinced that there will be a place for the Germans, the Polish, the French and the Italians in our common Eurasian home. The Russians will only impose the barbarian, sacred lifestyle to the whole Eurasia. The way it works will only depend on a given nation's predispositions. For example, I see the Polish as defenders of the Slavic racism." Quoted after: *Czekam na Iwana Groźnego. Rozmowa z Aleksandrem Duginem. Rozmawiał Grzegorz Górny*, Moscow 1998, „Frona. Pismo poświęcone” 1998, issue 11-12, pp. 133, 139.

- the Eastern Ukraine, the region on the right bank of the Dnieper River, from Chernihiv to the Sea of Azov, which for ages has been close to Russia in a political, religious and ethnic sense. Dugin does not exclude giving a wide autonomy to that region, but he does not specify its range. In the future, as Dugin claims, that region should be annexed to the Russian Federation,
- the Crimean Peninsula, which should be under the strategic control of Russia. Because of the complex ethnical character of that part of Ukraine, it should be given autonomy taking into account the interests of all “etnos” living there, namely inhabitants of Great Russia, Little Russia and the Crimean Tatars,
- the Central Ukraine spreading from Chernihiv to Odessa (including Kiev). The Central Ukraine is close to the Eastern Ukraine because of the same cultural background and that is why it should be under the Eurasian influence,
- the Western Ukraine, including: Volhynia, Galicia, Transcarpathia and the eastern part of Bessarabia. This part of Ukraine has the main impact on politics in the whole country, being the support for the anti-Russian and pro-Western forces. That is why the purpose of Russia should be not the annexation, but the permanent control over that region through the establishment of the “Western Ukrainian Federation”, integrity of which could be regulated depending on the needs. The strategic Russian border should be moved westwards as far as possible (the eastern part of the Central Europe). The cultural-religious border, on the other hand, should be located between the Central Ukraine and the Western Ukraine. Such a solution should help to protect the Orthodox Russia against the influence of Catholicism, as well as the United and Uniting Churches (Дугин, pp. 376-383; Коваленко, 2010, pp. 15-22; Корнев, pp. 25-32; Савин, 2011, pp. 51-64).

In order to eliminate Ukraine as an American policy's tool in the Central-Eastern Europe it is necessary to execute its political decomposition. A successful realisation of that process in the forthcoming years (taking into account that the concept derives from the book published in 1997) should be the main imperative of the Russian foreign policy in this part of the world. The Russian Federation cannot become a strategic, political and demographic empire without integration with Belarus and Ukraine (Дугин, pp. 382-383).

The “orange revolution” was the main reason for the radicalisation of Dugin's and his intellectual followers' ideas concerning Ukraine. The revolution was perceived as artificially planned and supported by the USA

with only one aim – to create the government in Kiev whose purpose will be to break off all Ukrainian relations with Russia. That is why the success of the “orange revolution” was treated, for obvious reasons, as a threat to the Eurasian empire (Максимов, 2010, pp. 19-23; 27-43; 86-104; Черемных и Восканян, 2013, pp. 60-94; Стариков, 2013, pp. 88-94). It is worth underlying that one of the consequences of that event was setting the concept of not only a close integration of Ukraine with Russia, but also the methods of reaching that goal. For example, stirring an armed uprising in some parts of Ukraine was postulated, which in case of present events has a significant meaning. On 26 April 2006, in the Russian Exhibition Centre, located in the north-eastern administrative part of Moscow, the second convention of the Eurasian Youth Union took place. The society was established by Dugin and it is active both in Russia and in the countries associated within the the Commonwealth of Independent States. During the convention, it was decided that Russia and Ukraine belong to a uniform geopolitical space. It was underlined that the Russian Federation deprived of its relations with Ukraine will lose the status of the Eurasian empire, becoming an Asian country. On the other hand, Ukraine without close connections to Russia is predestined to political and economic marginalization. Pro-Western Ukrainian government, established as a result of the “orange revolution”, was recognized as a regime occupying the country. Leonid Savin – the moderator of the Ukrainian fraction of the Eurasian Youth Union, and Valery Korovin – the leader of the organization at that time, who both took part in the convention, postulated establishing the Eurasian Movement and the Eurasian Uprising Army in Ukraine. The basis for that undertaking would be the Eurasian Youth Union, which is active in many Ukrainian cities and regional structures of the National Bolshevik Party (Russian: Национал-большевистская партия, НБП). The main task of the uprising army would be conducting a guerrilla warfare and *getting rid of the invaders in the occupied territory* ⁶.

⁶Публичная интернет-библиотека Владимира Прибыловского, Съезд ЕСМ объявил повстанческую войну Украине [online], <http://www.anticompromat.org/esm/esm02.html> [availability: 29 VII 2014]: „Перед членами нового союза выступил координатор ЕСМ Украины Леонид Савин, который пригрозил вновь возрождающемуся оранжевому режиму Украины, что «если оранжевое марионеточное правление на Украине восстановится, то мы начнём сопротивление оранжевой власти, создав Евразийскую повстанческую армию на Украине, а так же евразийский рух» (...) А в условиях, когда Украина захвачена «оранжевой» прозападной марионеточной властью, ЕСМ не видит иных способов очистить оккупированную территорию от захватчиков, кроме как путём создания повстанческого движения – евразийского фронта на Украине. Сегодня ячейки ЕСМ – узлы будущей повстанческой армии находятся во всех городах и населённых пунктах Украины. Как только «оранжевые» вновь объединятся – мы откроем партизанское сопротивление, создав Евразийский Рух и Евразийскую повстанческую армию”.

In the following years, Aleksandr Dugin consequently proclaimed his views, treating Ukraine as a deteriorating country suspended in geopolitical vacuum between the West and the East. He also postulated, on numerous occasions, the idea of dividing Ukraine as he suggested in his book *The Basics of Geopolitics*⁷. Interpretation of the events that occurred in Euromaidan led to Dugin reaching for the geopolitical and eschatological-philosophical arguments. In his opinion, the world has been witnessing for ages a planetary struggle between the "Supercivilization of the Sea" (embodied by the USA, the UK, Australia and their allies) and the "Supercivilization of the Land" (embodied by Russia, Continental Europe excluding the UK, the Arabian countries, middle-Asian countries, China, India and Japan). Dugin associates the "Supercivilization of the Sea" with individualism, conformism, materialism,

⁷ It is worth to quote some of Dugin's opinions concerning geopolitical future of Ukraine as an example. On 13 August 2008, commenting on the Russian-Ukrainian relationships, Dugin said: "Ukraine acts as if it was a NATO member state, as if its security was guaranteed by a country possessing nuclear weapon. Russia won't accept that. Please, split Ukraine into two parts: Crimea, Kharkov, Donetsk, Kiev will be yours. Volhynia and Ivano-Frankivsk may as well become the NATO members (...) This may end with a war. An armed conflict with Russia about Crimea may lead to a civil war in Ukraine. Who sows the wind, will reap the whirlwind" – quoted after P. Eberhardt, *Koncepcje geopolityczne Aleksandra Dugina...*, p. 236. Compare: A.G. Dugin, *The fate of Ukraine is settled. An interview given to the Russian state television in 2009* [online], <http://geopolityka.net/prof-dugin-kwestia-podzialu-ukrainy-jest-juz-przesadzona/> [availability: 29 VII 2014]. In 2013, Aleksandr Dugin formulated three options of solving the problem of Ukraine. The first one assumed the division of Ukraine into two parts: the western and the south-eastern ones. This could prevent a potential civil war, which was to endanger Ukraine. The second option involved a complicated wheeling and dealing with pragmatic Ukrainian authorities in order to make them accept the eurasian integration project under the pressure of circumstances or promises of political, economic and energy advantages. In Dugin's opinion, this would be a peaceful scenario, possible to be implemented in case of a social-economic crisis in Ukraine. In order to reach that goal, one should reach for the "network-centric warfare" arsenal, aiming at subjugating the Ukrainian elites – using both open and clandestine methods – and convincing them to the rightfulness of the Eurasian integration through the use of economic, energy, information and scientific instruments. The third option, according to Dugin the most avant-garde one, assumes the use of the western-Ukrainian nationalists. In his opinion, they do not share the ideas of liberalism, individualism, tolerance, multicultural aspects, human rights and other postmodernist standards, which became dominant in the present western society. Dugin underlines that the Ukrainian nationalism is the main obstacle on the path to the realisation of the eurasian integration project. However, it is worth trying to "convert the poison into the cure" and the enemy into an ally, because the eurasian empire assumes keeping the tradition and the characteristic cultural features of the "ethnos" and nations, including the Ukrainian ones. See: А.Г. Дугин, *Евразийский проект и его украинская проблема* [online], <http://www.odnako.org/magazine/material/evraziyskiy-proekt-i-ego-ukrainskaya-problema/> [availability: 29 VII 2014]; J. Darczewska, *Anatomia rosyjskiej wojny informacyjnej. Operacja krymska – studium przypadku*, Warsaw 2014, pp. 20–22.

modernism and capital, whereas the “Supercivilization of the Land” with tradition, hierarchy, personalism and collectivism. In mythology, it symbolizes the struggle of Leviathan, i.e. the USA, with Behemoth, i.e. the Eurasian civilization (Дугин, 2012, pp. 15-22; Дугин, pp. 14-19, 466-471).

Nowadays, this confrontation takes place both in the ideological and information, as well as in the economic, military and political spheres⁸. The place of the geopolitical rivalry, apart from Transnistria, Caucasus, Abkhazia, the South Ossetia and Georgia, is also Ukraine. According to Dugin, the main goal of the USA is the realisation of the strategy developed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, which assumes separation of Ukraine from the Eurasian civilization, at the same time reducing Russia to the role of a regional superpower. In his opinion, the first step of that strategy execution was the overthrow of the legal authorities in Kiev with the help of Ukrainian nationalists supported by the USA and establishing the anti-Russian government, which started extermination of the Russians living in Ukraine. This is how Russia was made to give a “symmetrical response” to the “Atlantic provocation in Kiev” in the form of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, fulfilled with the help of its inhabitants supported by the Russian army. What is more, the Ukrainian crisis being the result of the events in Euromaidan was treated by Dugin as a reason for the revision of Ukrainian integrity. The next step taken in order to “protect the Russian borders” was applying the Crimean

⁸ It is worth underlying that cyberspace is also the place of the struggle between the two “supercivilizations”. Aleksandr Dugin postulates the development of the Eurasian, multipolar cybergeopolitics based on the use of the Internet. Thanks to that, it will be possible to create virtual, network-centric civilizations that will constitute an opposition block against the Atlantic globalisation, which hostile towards Russia. Virtual civilization should be attached to a given geographical area. They should also possess their own cultural codes, which Dugin understands as paradigm of the activities of numerous, supranational organisations such as religious, political and ecological associations, which thanks to the Internet tools, could effectively promote their ideas. Diverting the vector of the Internet use from a homogenous instrument to a platforms placed in given language systems will cause the rise of the virtual equivalent of the multipolar world. Such virtual platforms, like the Chinese Internet or the Runet, can, in Dugin’s opinion, create the basis for a true opposition against the civilization and political monopoly of the USA, which is popularized in the form of globalization. He also claims that the potential of the Internet as a “Global Network” – geopolitical instrument of the West – should be used consciously and with political craftiness in order to reintegrate the post-Soviet space. Dugin suggests creating the project called “Virtual Eurasia” (Russian: Виртуальная Евразия), whose existence will amount to occupying the broadest possible Internet sector and building its own virtual space. According to him, Eurasia exists not only in the physical, economic and political space, but also in the virtual one. See: А.Г. Дугин, *Попкультураизнаки времени*, Санкт-Петербург 2005, pp. 486–493; B. Gołabek, *Runet jako extra territorium byłego ZSRR – wokół rosyjskiej cybergeopolityki*, in: *Studia nad rosyjską geopolityką*, L. Sykulski (ed.), Częstochowa 2014, pp. 95-100.

scenario in the eastern parts of Ukraine (Brzezinski, 1997, pp. 30-48; 87-118). It is worth underlying that Aleksandr Dugin, for whom the situation in Ukraine is also a personal matter (his mother was Ukrainian), became actively engaged in the conflict (<http://evrazia.org/article/2469>). His role in the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation seems to be much broader than just coordination of information, finance and logistic support given to the separatists by his organizations. Aleksandr Dugin is supposed to be one of the authors of the final solution of the Ukrainian problem and the creator of the geopolitical model of the actions taken, which is establishing of the pro-Russian state bodies in the territory of Ukraine. There is evidence for such an assumption. During the Russian-Georgian war he was in the South Ossetia, advising the seizure of Tbilisi and overthrowing of president Mikheil Saakashvili. The next step was to be taking over the Crimean Peninsula, which, as Dugin put it, *is a part of Russia anyway* (Ньюман, [online]). In an interview he admitted that the leaders of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic are his close friends, who in the 90s of the last century took part in his geopolitical courses. He underlined that they took a thorough training and strongly support the idea of neo- Eurasianism. He also confirmed that he stays in touch with them. What is more, Dugin claims that the Donetsk People's Republic is the final stage of a political project, which was conceived as a response to the "orange revolution" during a training meeting of the International Eurasian Movement near Volodymyr in 2006⁹. In the context of Dugin's statements, it is worth remembering that in 2006 within the neo- Eurasian school of geopolitics and idea of creating the Eurasian Uprising Army in Ukraine was born. Apart from that, he also revealed that his son Artur, a prominent activist of the Eurasian Youth Union, took part in the Crimean operation, as many other activists of the neo- Eurasian movement joining the "Crimean Self-Defence". During the operation he performed tasks involving blocking of the Ukrainian government buildings in order to prevent

⁹А.Г. Дугин, *Вводит войска в Новороссию* [online], <http://dynacon.ru/content/articles/3314/> [availability: 31 VII 2014]: „Да, я многих из них знаю, донецких лидеров практически всех лично, и они действительно мои единомышленники, они патриоты, они с моим участием изучали геополитику, некоторые из них, россияне, вместе со мной ещё с 90-х годов прошли путь патриотической оппозиции. Некоторые из них были в наших лагерях ещё в 2006 году и, кстати, Донецкая республика как виртуальный проект была создана в нашем евразийском лагере под Владимиром в 2006 году. Я нахожусь с ними в постоянном контакте. Таким образом лидеры ДНР и ЛНР, да и всё движение в Новороссии является частью проекта возрождения России, за которую мы многие десятилетия бьёмся, бьюсь я лично, мои соратники по Евразийскому движению, такие, как Александр Проханов и другие. На самом деле в Новороссию вложили своё сердце, душу, всё, что мы имели, все патриоты России, имеющие какое-то влияние”.

the leaks of sensitive information (he is also said to have taken part in blocking the Ukrainian party from giving information to the outside world or manipulating the information that was to be given out in the way favourable to the Russian party). Next he decided to become a journalist of Russia Today to take part in the information warfare (Дугин, *Это моя война!* [online]). One of the long-term activists of the Eurasian Youth Union was also Aleksandr Prosiolkov, who until his death on 31 July 2014 was the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Donetsk People's Republic (<http://rossia3.ru/proselkov3107>). It is worth underlying that the main leaders of state administration in the self-appointed republics and their armed forces – Denis Puszylin, Igor Strielkov, Aleksandr Borodaj, Pawel Gubarievand, Valery Bolotov – took part in a special gathering of the “Izborski Club” in Donetsk. It is to be pointed that the organisation itself gathers the most influential people from the Russian political scene and constitutes an intellectual background for the Kremlin. Aleksandr Prochanov – a writer, politician and the chairman of the “Izborski Club”, together with Aleksandr Dugin, Valery Korovin and other experts prepared the project of a new country located in the south-eastern part of “ex-Ukraine”. The new geopolitical phenomenon, including the Luhansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic, was proclaimed on 12 May 2014. This is how a new country, the Federal State of Novorossiia (Russian: Федеративное государство Новороссия, Ukrainian: Федеративна держава Новоросія) was created (<http://novorossia.su/ru/node/2386>).

The name of the country is not accidental – it is supposed to indicate that the territory in the past belonged to the Russian Empire and the Russian Federation as its successor has the right to annex it (Краснов, 1863)¹⁰. Dugin underlines that the Donetsk District and the Luhansk District have always been an integral part of Russia and the people living there, who have always

¹⁰ The term „Novorossiia” was used between XVIII and XX century in the Russian Empire and meant the “wild steppe” – the territories located north of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea and south of the borders of the Republic of Poland (before 1793). Nowadays it is the area of the southern part of Ukraine, annexed to Russia in 1774 after the war with Turkey. Between 1764 and 1783 as well as between 1796 and 1802, that territory was the Novorossiia Province divided in 1802 into: Yekaterynoslavska Province, Chersonska Province (1802–1803 – Mikolayovska Province) and Taurydzka Province. Bessarabia (from 1812 a district and from 1873 the Bessarabia Province) and the The Province (*Oblast*) of the Don Cossack Host (Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog) were also part of Novorossiia. Source: *Россия. Географическое описание Российской Империи по губерниям и областям с географическими картами*, Санкт-Петербург 1913, pp. 58-64. Compare: Н. Краснов, *Материалы для географии и статистики России, собранные офицерами Генерального штаба. Земли Войска Донского*, Санкт-Петербург 1863, pp. 1-596.

been strongly connected to the Orthodox Catholic Church, should be treated as the south-western part of the Eurasian civilization. Those people have always declared their strong connection to Russia. The lands of Novorossiia became a part of Ukraine by accident – in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Russia. Those territories may be a part of Ukraine, only when Ukraine integrates with Russia. In Dugin's opinion, the historical identity of the "ethnos" from Novorossiia derives from the Russian-Soviet past influenced by Kievan Rus', the Russian Empire, the Orthodox Catholic Church and the Great Patriotic War. According to the authors of Novorossiia, that country is to be subordinate to "sovereign authorities" and free from the influences of the oligarchs, whose wealth should be nationalized (Дугин, *Время Новоросии*; Дугин, *Крым в России. Что дальше?* и Дугин, *Новороссия часть Русского мира*). Those ideas were also reflected in the political programme of the Social-Political Movement, the Party of Novorossiia (Russian: Общественно-политическое движение «Партия Новороссии»), established on 13 May 2014 by Pawel Gubarev (<http://novorossia.su/ru/node/1753>).

It should be underlined that some geopolitical concepts proclaimed by Dugin and connected to him the neo-eurasian environment are clearly visible in the Kremlin's activity and president Vladimir Putin's statements. First of all, the key element of the Russian policy towards the new Ukrainian authorities is the demand of the constitutional reforms, which would divert the country from unitary to federal, with a significant privilege of the eastern and southern regions. This can be confirmed by the statement of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 17 March 2014, in which Moscow demanded that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine establish a constitutional assembly with the equal representation of all regions belonging to Ukraine. This body would prepare and approve the project of the new constitution. According to the Russian concept Ukraine is to be a "democratic federal state", whose separate regions will have the right to choose independent legislative and executive authorities and will be given broad powers reflecting their historical-cultural specific characters. Extorting such solutions would guarantee Russia the control over the Kiev policy through controlling the policy of the eastern regions of Ukraine. That would mean diverting Ukraine into a loose assembly of federal regions without uniform economic, cultural and social policy and the regions with their legislative authorities would not have to follow the central authorities, which would in particular concern the eastern regions (Olszański, 2014, pp. 1-2; Moshes, 2014, pp. 2-3).

What is more, the president's statements concerning far-reaching geopolitical projects reflect the concept of neo-eurasianism. In one of his statements, Vladimir Putin underlined that Russia is becoming the centre of the

Russian World consisting of the Russian-Ukrainian-Belorussian core. Its main space will consist of the post-Soviet space inhabited by the Russian-speakers. Belonging to the Russian World will be guaranteed by cultural aspects such as language, the Orthodox Church and common values no matter of nationality or ethnic origin (Menkiszak, 2014, pp. 1-7; Panov, 2010, pp. 85-94). Thus, president Putin's views are equal to the definition of Valery Korovin's *eurasian geopolitical pole* being a part of so called multipolar world¹¹.

¹¹After the collapse of the Soviet Russia, the country applied an idealistic vision of creating an international order based on the common interests of all great world powers. In the middle of the 90s of the last century, this idea changed into a realistic vision based on multipolarity. The starting point for that concept became the theory of multipolar world formulated by Aleksandr Dugin. The theory assumes creating a configuration of many centres of power and influence having both contradictory and common interests. See: S. Bieleń, *Erozja monocentryzmu w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, w: *Studia nad geopolityką XX wieku*, P. Eberhardt (ed.), Warszawa 2013, p. 110. Building the eurasian empire, as well as geopolitical reorganization of Europe is a necessary response to the USA's victory in the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Russia. On the ruins of that communist empire a new, stronger superpower reflecting traditional values of Eastern-Slavic, Turanian and Finn-Ugrian people is to be built. This requires elimination of the unipolar Western World dominated by the power of the USA and substitute it with the bi- or multipolar system. This will enable an expansive policy of the Eurasian empire. The supporters of neo-eurasianism advocate leaving the unipolar world dominated by the USA behind, since in the present world order Russia is no more than a "black whole" placed between the Euro-Atlantic World and the Third World. One of the main goals postulated by the Eurasian policy supporters is mobilization of the resources of the peripheral countries (of the Third World). This in turn is reflected in Dugin's philosophical views, who indicates that postliberalism has blurred the differences between the left and the right. Communism stood against capitalism from the left side and fascism from the right one. He claims that one can stand in the middle, which means accepting the present order, or in the peripheries, which means standing against it. Thus the main Dugin's idea is to mobilize the peripheries, which means mobilizing what has been rejected. In practice, it means metaphysical and political activation of the postindustrial society margins. See: А.Г. Дугин, *Четвертая политическая теория. Россия и политические идеи XXI века*, Санкт-Петербург 2009, pp. 16–17. Next Russia should aim at a close, strategic union with most important European powers (mainly Germany and France). Geopolitical expansion and unions with regional powers such as China, India or Iran shall constitute the basis for consolidation of the potential of the countries belonging to the Eurasian continent. New multipolar world order, in the Eurasian theory supporters' opinion, should be based on creating four main spheres: Anglo-American, Pan-Eurasian, Euro-African and Pacific. The first one would include Anglo-sphere (USA, Canada, the UK, Australia and a part of Polynesia) and the Latin America. The Euro-African sphere would include the European Union and Africa. The areas of the Soviet Russia, Turkey, Iran and India would constitute the Pan-Eurasian sphere, whereas the areas of the East Asia and the South-East Asia would form the Pacific sphere. In further perspective, in the frames of the four mentioned spheres, the neo-eurasian theorists draw a more detailed division: twelve "enormous spheres" as a backward "ideal model" of the future. The twelve spheres include: North-American (USA, Canada, the UK, Australia and a part of Polynesia), Middle-American (the whole continent of the South America), European (the European Union and the European countries associated with the EU: Switzerland, Island and Norway), Arabian-Islamic (the countries of the Maghreb, Sudan the Arabian Peninsula), Transsaharian (the countries of the Transsaharian Africa), Islamic-Continental (mainly Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Syria), Indian, Chinese, Japanese and the area of the "new Pacific" (South-Eastern Asia). See: Zob. А.Г. Дугин, *Теория многополярного мира*, Москва 2013, pp. 276-337; L. Sykulski, *Integracja polityczna Eurazji we współczesnej rosyjskiej myśli geopolitycznej*, in: *Studia nad geopolityką XX wieku*, P. Eberhardt (ed.), Warsaw 2013, pp. 349-365.

Thus, the annexation of Crimea to Russia and the activities of the separatists in the south-eastern part of Ukraine should not be treated as an authentic freedom-related aspiration of its inhabitants described by the Kremlin propaganda as the "Russian Spring". It appeared to be an artificially created geopolitical project implemented with the help of technological social control, as well as information and military aggression. The project was created by the Russian geopoliticians supported by the Kremlin and connected with the eurasian environment identified by Aleksandr Dugin. The true goal, supported by the realization of Dugin's geopolitical doctrine, is most of all a close attachment of the south-eastern areas of Ukraine with Russia, which in the further perspective will deprive the Ukrainian nation of its sovereignty. The real possibility of realizing such a scenario is indicated in the analyses of the main Russian geopoliticians, who draw the vision of the future development of that situation. In that context, a prognosis by Gen. Col. Leonid Iwaszov seems to be particularly interesting. In his opinion, the Euromaidan events started the process of Ukraine collapse. In the perspective of one or two years new referendums – similar to the one that took place in Crimea on 16 March 2014 – are more than probable. Russia should actively support the activities which aim at returning the south-eastern regions to their home country. After "stabilizing" the socio-political situation in those regions, a step further should be taken in the form of a "rebel war" (Russian: *мятежевойна*). It should affect the western regions of Ukraine, especially where the religious-cultural border goes, which means the line between the Central Ukraine and the Western Ukraine. Thus, it is necessary to provoke strong protests. It can be achieved by the use of, inter alia, disputes on a religious ground, repressive activities of the new authorities and lowering the standard of living of the local inhabitants in comparison with the inhabitants of Novorossiia annexed to the Russian Federation. Thanks to such operations, through the process of the federalization of Ukraine, it will be possible to get the situation "stabilized". Four federal republics would then be established: the Western one with the capital in Lvov, the Central one with the capital in Kiev, the Eastern one with the capital in Kharkiv and the Southern one with the capital in Dnipropetrovsk. According to the general, another scenario is also possible: the mentioned state bodies can be independent, however the economic crisis and the disputes between desiring power and influence oligarchs will lead to a crisis situation. In such circumstances, some "independent countries" may aspire to a close integration with Russia. The Western Ukraine (Lvov) should be deprived of such a possibility. According to Iwaszov, in order to get this idea implemented, strong activity of the Russian institutions and social organizations is necessary. That enigmatic statement should be, of course, understood as the "information warfare" (Ивашов, 2014, p. 11).

Aleksandr Dugin considers a similar scenario for Ukraine. In his opinion, the left part of Ukraine and the regions neighbouring the Black Sea should stay under Russian control. Thanks to that, it will be possible to support the resistance centres against “junta”, i.e. the government in Kiev, without the necessity of a direct military intervention (Дугин, *Крым в России. Что дальше?* [online]¹². Valery Korovin also does not consider the existence of Ukraine, as he predicts that it will be split between the Atlantic and Eurasian blocks (Коровин, 2014, pp. 19-21).

The geopolitical plan that Russia has in reference to Ukraine seems to be obvious – it is about a permanent subordination of Ukraine through gaining control over its foreign policy, internal policy, security and economic processes. Thus, keeping an unstable situation in Donbass is just an instrument applied in order to keep control over the whole Ukraine.

Evgeny Messner’s “rebel war” as an element of the Russian “information warfare” on the example of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

According to Gen. Leonid Iwaszov, the main method of the realization of the Russian geopolitical goals in the territory of Ukraine is the so-called “rebel war”. Theoretical basics of that phenomenon were described by Colonel of the General Headquarters of the Tsarist Army and veteran of both world wars, who spent the last years of his life as a scientist of military academies in Argentina – Evgeny Messner (1891-1974).

As early as in the 60s of the last century, he warned the world against the era of unconventional wars, today referred to as asymmetrical or irregular¹³. Messner’s scientific interests concerned psychological aspects of the art of war, soldiers’ and officers’ morale and different forms of conflicts¹⁴.

¹² А.Г. Дугин, *Крым в России. Что дальше?* [online], <http://dynacon.ru/content/articles/2864/> [availability: 31 VII 2014]: *Вся территория Украины вряд ли будет дружественной России, точка не возврата пройдена. Поэтому задача теперь запретить хунту в Правобережье (граница – русло Днепра, а на Юге к России отходит вся полоса Причерноморья – это необходимо, чтобы прервать черноморско-балтийский санитарный кордон). Параллельно естественному кошмару, который начнётся на Правобережье, в этой Киевской-галицкой державе, можно будет поддержать очаги сопротивления хунте и на Западе, но на сей раз точно без прямого участия войск.*

¹³ Compare footnote 16 of this article.

¹⁴ Е.Э. Месснер, *Лик современной войны*, in: *Военная мысль в изгнании. Творчество русской военной эмиграции*, И.В. Домнин (ed.), Москва 1999, pp. 363-404. Detailed biography of Evgeny Messner can be found in: И.В. Домнин, *От Первой мировой до «Третьей Всемирной». Жизненный путь Генерального штаба полковника Е.Э. Месснера*, w: *Хочешь мира, победи мятежевойну! Творческое наследие Е.Э. Месснера*, И.В. Домнин (ed.), Москва 2005, pp. 18-51; К. Александров, *Армия генерала Власова 1944-1945*, Москва 2006, pp. 26, 41-42, 182, 248, 507; И.В. Домнин, *Краткий очерк военной мысли Русского Зарубежья*, in: *Военная мысль в изгнании. Творчество русской военной эмиграции*, И.В. Домнин (ed.), Москва 1999, pp. 448-527.

Basing on his personal experience and erudite knowledge supported by knowledge of a few foreign languages, Messner published numerous monographs, articles and research, among which special attention should be paid to *World Rebel War* (Russian: *Всемирная Мятежевойна*) published in Buenos Aires in 1971. Its integral part constitutes a study titled "Mutiny, or the name of the Third World War" (Russian: *Мятеж – имя Третьей Всемирной*) published in 1960 in the capital of Argentina as a separate study¹⁵.

Revolution in Russia, philosophy of the Sun Tzu art of war, both world wars and numerous regional conflicts are said to be the inspirations of Evgeny Messner's search for the genesis of a new way of waging war. Taking precise observation, Messner concluded that regular soldiers' fight is often entwined with riots of political, social and economic backgrounds or with terror attacks and activities carried by secret organizations, sabotage groups and individuals. These activities are difficult to classify. It is also hard to point to their origin. He called the new phenomenon "fighting with a rebellion" (Russian: *борба мятежом*), shortly "rebel war" (*мятежевойна*, from Russian *мятеж* – rebellion, riots). In Messner's opinion, psychological aspect was barely used in the past wars, but in "rebel war" it is to be the main tool. That is why "rebel war" is to be the psychological warfare. Messner underlines that in the future, this will be the prevailing way of waging wars and his abovementioned study is just an exiguous one, not covering the whole problem¹⁶.

The main rule of waging a "rebel war" is using national movements, rebellion etc. as the subjects of revolution (Месснер, 2004, pp. 15-23, 332-340). According to Messner, revolution is most of all a psychological

¹⁵ Neither Polish nor Western researches have recognised Evgeny Messner's academic works. It is worth remembering that his leading monographs have not been translated into English so far. A scientist who has recently took an interest in that issue in our country is Kazimierz Kraj. See: K. Kraj, *Wojny asymetryczne czy miateżewojna Jewgienija Messnera zagrożeniem dla bezpieczeństwa w XXI wieku*, „Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i praktyka” 2012, issue 3, pp. 33-41; idem, *Мятежевойна Jewgienija Messnera*, "Е-Terroryzm" 2012, issue 2, pp. 16-18.

¹⁶ It should be noted that waging wars using asymmetrical activities was the subject of deep study of the Nazi philosopher Carl Schmitt. In one of his works, he suggested that such activities should be legally legitimized in international law. See: C. Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen*, Berlin 1975; T. Kochi, *The Partisan: Carl Schmitt and Terrorism*, "Law Critique" 2006, issue 17, pp. 267-295. Schmitt's views became the basis of Dugin's statements, who claims that guerilla groups using terrorist methods of fight constitute the main tool in the conflict between the "Supercivilization of the Sea" and the "Supercivilization of the Land" and Russia, because of its traditions of the Napoleonic Wars and the Great Patriotic War, is an *enormous guerrilla empire*. Dugin's opinions are thus a trial (though only ideological one for the time being) to legitimize the asymmetrical activities applied in the Russian policy. See: А.Г. Дугин, *Философия войны*, Москва 2004, pp. 96-100.

phenomenon, which should be understood as a quick and radical change in people's consciousness. The art of revolution is based on creating and separating an active group led by revolutionary leaders from the society or a nation. Revolution is characterized by psychological processes taking place in masses stimulated by active groups. It bases on law instincts and psychology of the masses, as result of which a civilized man becomes a barbarian. According to Messner's concept, psychology of the "rebellious masses" is the main tool leading to victory or failure. The aim of a war is not only neutralization of the enemy's armed forces, but also destabilization of the whole country with the use of psychological factors: demoralization, fear and the feeling of uncertainty being the result of guerrilla and terrorist groups activities (Schmid, 2005, pp. 137-146). That is why a "rebel war" is often described by Messner as a "half-war", which should be understood as a transitional stage between peace and conventional war activities. "Rebel war" is also characterized by the impossibility of precise determination of the conflict parts, hidden behind and carrying out activities using irregular "non-state" groups (Месснер, 2004, pp. 46-59). It is also hard to point the exact starting point and the end of such a war, in case of which there are no such terms as theatre of war or the front line in their standard meaning. The main goal of a "rebel war" – according to Messner – is *gaining control over the enemy's soul*. That is why in order to be successful it is necessary to make a psychological profile of not only people, but most of all the whole group, society or nation. That implies huge challenges for the new form of intelligence – the so-called psychological intelligence (Russian: психоразведка) (Месснер, 2004, pp. 105-116). Activities are carried out not only in traditional space (land, sea, air), but also (most of all, in fact) in the human psyche. The concept of the front line in case of a "rebel war" refers to individual spheres of society's activities such as economy, politics, culture etc. An important goal of a "rebel war" is the process of your own nation's integration and winning a part of the enemy's nation over to your side. That is the task for journalists, saboteurs, provocateurs and propagandists. All social groups of the enemy should be put under psychological pressure. According to Messner, an important role in that activity have political parties and social organizations. The secret of keeping psychological control over the rebelled masses is based on defining their needs and shaping their new consciousness (neo-consciousness) in a way that they treat as expressing their own will (Месснер, 2004, pp. 59-64; Зелинский, 2008; Кириллов, 2012, pp. 71-74).

After general description of genesis, definition and aims of a “rebel war”, Messner presents its main participants. He divides them into four groups:

1. “rebel masses” (Russian: мятежные массы) meaning disobedient citizens or revolting crowds, constituting the biggest in number and the most disorganised group taking part in a conflict. This group is characterized by unpredictability and radicalism of attitude passing from activity to passivity and vice versa, which is a big challenge for the operational command, in traditional art of war comparable to commanding coalition troops.
2. “rebel columns” (Russian: мятежные колонны), described also as “cryptoarmy” or “secret police”, meaning individuals or groups chosen from the “rebel masses” whose main tasks concern terrorist and subversive activities. Members of such groups can be described as ideologists serving the idea they fight for. “Rebel columns” are mainly saboteurs, terrorists and provocateurs.
3. “rebel militia” (Russian: мятежное ополчение) meaning irregular, voluntary guerrilla groups or insurgent army. This group is strictly bound to the nation or ethnic group it comes from. “Rebel militia” is territorial, which means it stays active in the area its members come from and is usually supported by local population.
4. “army in a rebel war” (Russian: войско в мятежевойне), which constitutes an equally important element during a conflict. Activities of “rebel masses”, “rebel columns” and guerrilla groups should be coordinated with the task of a regular army. In Messner’s concept regular army plays only a supportive role to guerrilla groups, “citizen militia”, revolting social groups or national minorities (Месснер, 2004, pp. 65-73; Beckett, 2001; Arquilla, 2012; Larson, Eaton, Nichiporuk, Szayna, 2008; Svete, 2009, pp. 381-399).

Cooperation of the four abovementioned groups should aim at reaching precisely defined goals, which Messner defined as:

- disintegration of the hostile nation’s morale;
- disintegration of active parts of the country (army, guerrilla groups, social movements);
- taking over or deactivating objects of psychological value;
- taking over or deactivating objects of material value;
- implementing activities aiming at winning allies or weakening the enemy’s allies;

- protection of your own nation's morale;
- saving your own armed forces;
- securing your own objects of psychological and material value,
- neutralising the factors that could potentially lead to neutral countries' reaction (it should be taken into consideration that not only governments, but also social groups may react) (Месснер, 2004, pp. 110–116 and 212).

It should be mentioned that Evgeny Messner's concept of a "rebel war" was reflected in the early 90s of the last century, during the creation of the Russian asymmetrical activities doctrine, incorporated in the broad concept of "information warfare". The operation in Crimea and escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict gave the possibility to evaluate the concept of Russian "information warfare", which became the subject of a thorough study by Jolanta Darczewska (2014). She acknowledged that the Russian theorists understand the concept of information warfare as influencing the consciousness of the masses in the international rivalry of the civilisation systems in the information space, which can be achieved by the use of special ways of control over information resources, used as "information weapon". The Russian concept of "information warfare" refers to psychological warfare and specpropaganda used during the times of the Soviet Russia. The author underlined that the technological dimension of information warfare in Russia has been marginalized and pushed out from the public space, at the same time giving place to cultural and ideological factors. The main task of "information warfare" is reaching precise aims in foreign, regional and internal policy, as well as securing geopolitical advantage. Nowadays, in Russia there are two schools of "information warfare" established by Igor Panarin and Aleksandr Dugin – the main representatives of the concept of geopolitics and leaders of the public opinion, having connection with special services. The author claims that they try to sensitise their own society to information threats from the outside, at the same time formulating the Russian system of information counteracting. They deal with the concept of "information warfare" both in theory and in practice (Месснер, 2004, pp. 11-18).

It is worth pointing to numerous studies by Igor Panarin, Aleksandr Dugin, Valery Korovin or Leonid Savin, which have popularizing, disinformation and propaganda function, discussing in detail mainly the American concept of information warfare. Its aim, as the authors claim, is disintegration of Russia and destabilization of the post-Soviet space. They also point to the alleged weakness of Russia and the necessity to build their own concept of "information warfare" in order to oppose the aggression from the

West, which previously caused the Soviet Union collapse (Дугин, 2007, pp. 321-347; Савин, 2011; Савин, 2012; Коровин, 2014, pp. 177-309; Коровин, 2009; Панарин, 2010). Comparing studies of the abovementioned authors with theses of the American theorists lead to the conclusion that the definitions and methods of implementation of "information warfare", allegedly Russian, have been taken from the American works (not far from the abovementioned definitions) and have been adjusted to the Russian propaganda purposes. This could be confirmed by Dugin's journalistic activity, in which he recognized the American concept of waging Network Centric Warfare and being its integral part the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) formula as main tools of stirring "flower revolutions" in the post-Soviet territories. Basing on the American literature he created the model of "Eurasian network", which is supposed to be a response to the American "Network Centric Warfare challenge" (Дугин, pp. 333-347; Дугин, 2008, pp. 2-10; Дугин, 2013, pp. 38-68; Ferris, 2004, pp. 199-225; Kipp, 2014, p. 36; Бедрицкий, 2008, pp. 54-86). A similar concept was also formulated by Igor Panarin, who adopted the American theory called *noopolitik* into the Russian grounds (Панарин, 2006, pp. 163-172; Arquilla, Ronfeldt, 1999).

Thus, the concept of "information warfare" by the abovementioned authors, which is strictly related to the American original, is hard to be recognized as a real reflection of the practice applied in the Russian Federation. It is then worth to ask a question about the authentic theoretical assumptions of the Russian information warfare and its realization. While analyzing this problem, it is also worth to pay attention to the achievements of the army in the subject matter. Theoretical and practical aspects of this kind of war have been studied by the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the beginning of the 90s of the last century. These activities were stimulated by the American achievements in the area of operations conducted on the basis of information during the war in the Persian Gulf, no matter how close they were to Evgeny Messner's concept of a rebel war based on the information-sociological factors (Grau, Thomas, 1996, pp. 508-511; Thomas, 1996-1997, pp. 81-91; Heickerö, 2010, pp. 13-15; Лебедев, Лютов, Назаренко, 1991, p. 14).

Definitions of "rebel war" formulated by the Russian servicemen are quite universal and refer to activities conducted both during wartime and peacetime. It is to be pointed that they are not to be found in the studied by geopoliticians, political scientists and leaders of the public opinion. In the military nomenclature, the term "information warfare" is not used. In Russia it is reserved for publicists, scientists and civil analysts. In the military

environment, the terms “information confrontation” (Russian: информационное противоборство) or “information fight” (Russian: информационная борьба) are preferred. Both terms are used interchangeably and the difference between them is not clear enough (Grau, Thomas, pp. 516-517; Воронцова, Фролов, 2006, pp. 3-5). It is then worth to mention a few chosen definition as examples. In the 90s of the last century, one of the pioneer theoreticians of this form of conflicts, Col. Sergey Komov, defined information warfare as information counteracting, as well as protection of your own sources with the use information according to a uniform plan aimed at winning and keeping advantage over your enemy. He claims that should be just one of many diverse actions taken against your enemy (Комов, 1996, pp. 76-80; Комов, 1994, pp. 16-17; Комов, 1997, pp. 18-22). Anonymous officer of the Military Academy of the Russian Federation Armed Forces Headquarters, quoted by Timothy Loyd Thomas, comes up with a similar definition of information confrontation. In his opinion, it is just one of many forms of resolving conflicts between the parties, whose goal is to win and keep information advantage over your opponent. This can be achieved by applying information-technical and information-psychological means, through affecting the decision-makers, command and control system, people and information sources of a given country (Thomas, 2003, pp. 208-210; Clogg, 1997, pp. 425-430).

The opinion of Vladimir Cymbal – an analyst in the Russian Ministry of Defence, who considers the definition of information warfare in both broad and narrow senses, is equally meaningful. In his opinion, information warfare in the broad sense is a set of activities applied by one country against the citizens of another country or group of countries during peacetime. These activities concern the influence on the society’s consciousness through education, art, culture, education system, administration etc., which should be carried out by civil special services – the Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service. The latter one’s main task should be getting control over the information sources of other countries, sabotage of information technologies development in the countries treated as hostile and neutralizing communication systems and information networks of the enemy. An important task of that service is also building and implementing the systems guaranteeing the information security of Russia. On the other hand, “information warfare” in the narrow sense means military activities aiming at getting information advantage over the enemy in the scope of information spreading, use and processing, as well as implementing effective decisions allowing for getting advantage in the battlefield. The realization of this sphere

of information warfare should be the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces¹⁷.

The definitions presented here imply that the Russian "information warfare" is a set of diverse, coordinated in time activities, carried out by both military forces and civil special services in many areas, in order to neutralize the enemy with the use of information-technological and information-psychological tools. An American Col. Timothy Loyd Thomas, dealing with the subject matter for two decades, has tried to classify those activities. Basing on an extensive material confronted with the statements (which he knew from his own experience) of representatives of the Russian military environment, taking part in conferences in Washington and Moscow as long ago as in 1996, he created a precise structure of the Russian "information warfare", radically different from the one promoted by the Russian military technologists. According to T. L. Thomas, the Russian "information warfare" is characterized by a diversity of means and flexibility of activities in many distant spheres, which is valid even today. It takes the following elements:

- philosophical aspect of "information warfare";
- information security as an aspect of national and global security;
- information sources as government potential;
- the definition of information warfare.
- computerization of armed conflicts:
 - electronic tools of armed conflicts;
 - automation of armed conflicts;
 - application of robots in armed conflicts;

¹⁷ T.L. Thomas, *The Russian View of Information War*, in: *The Russian Armed Forces at Dawn of the Millennium 7-9 February 2000*, M.H. Crutcher (ed.), Carlisle 2000, pp. 338, 342-343; S. Blank, *Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency*, „American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy” 2013, issue 35, no. 1, p. 41; K. Giles, „Information Troops” – a Russian Cyber Command?, w: *Third International Conference on Cyber Conflict*, C. Czosseck, E. Tyugu, T. Wingfield (ed.), Tallinn 2011, pp. 45–60. It should be underlined that the first of the definitions given by V. Cymbal refers to the Russian concept of the "ideological sabotage" or "ideological rebellion". See: *Контрразведывательный словарь*, Москва 1972, pp. 90–91. A lot of information concerning the "ideological sabotage" was revealed by the KGB officer and correspondent of RIA Novosti Jurij Bezmiennov, vel Thomas Schuman. In his opinion, the "ideological sabotage", which he associated with psychological warfare, ideological aggression and propaganda warfare, is a long-term process (lasting for the last 15-25 years) divided into four stages: "Demoralization", "Destabilization", "Crisis" and "Normalization". The goal of that process is to subjugate a given country without the need for starting an open armed conflict. See: T.D. Schuman (J. Bezmiennov), *Love Letter to America*, Los Angeles 1984, pp. 17-46. Compare: idem, *No "Novosti" is Good News*, Los Angeles 1985; idem, *World Thought Police*, Los Angeles 1986.

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- intellectual tools of armed conflicts (intelligent weapon allowing for precise strikes);
- fight computerization (operation preparation);
- battlefield computerization (battlefield digitalization).
- information-psychological warfare:
 - military-patriotic education of your homeland citizens;
 - moral-psychological preparation of the military staff;
 - psychological operations against civilians and military staff of the hostile country.
- information-technical warfare:
 - applying communication and control systems in a confrontation;
 - the role and place of intelligence in information warfare.
 - the use of special programmes aiming at:
 - 1) destroying information source;
 - 2) redistribution of information sources;
 - 3) protection of information sources.
- preparation of the personnel meant to take part in information warfare,
- aspects of the international law concerning information warfare (Thomas, 1996, p. 34; Thomas, 1998, pp. 40-62; Thomas, 2009, pp. 465-491).

It should be mentioned that in the beginning of the 90s of the last century, a net structure consisting of civil special services (FAPSI, FSB, SWZ) and a part of the armed forces was created. It was responsible for information warfare and perfecting its methods, which include both psychological and technical elements (Thomas, 1998, pp. 156-172). They refer to the Russian pattern of the "ideological sabotage" and Evgeny Messner's concept of "rebel war". Thus, it should be concluded that promoting the image of the Russian Federation as a victim of the aggression from the West and a country completely unprepared to face "information warfare" is just disinformation aiming at justifying the "war against «information warfare» carried out against Russia". The Russian concept of "information warfare" is evolving and is constantly adjusted to a current geopolitical situation (Thomas, 2010, pp. 265-301; Goble, 2009, pp. 181-196). It could be confirmed by deliberations of two distinguished theoreticians associated with the Centre of War-Strategic Studies of the Russian Federation Armed Forces Headquarters (Russian: Центр военно-стратегических исследований Генерального штаба Вооружённых Сил Российской Федерации): Col. Sergey Czekinov and

(retired) Gen. Lt. Sergey Bogdanov (Main, 2000, pp. 47-62; Чекинов, 2010 pp. 3-5; Giles, 2014, p. 21). They have applied the term “asymmetrical activities” (Russian: асимметричные действия) into the Russian grounds defining it as complex and systematic activities of political, diplomatic, economic, information and military character. They show that the information confrontation should play an important role in the process of a given country’s management system and control disorganization. It should also influence public opinion, resulting e.g. in anti-government demonstrations and destabilization of a given country or other entity being the target of those operations, whose essence is to be the use of intellectual advantage. In that context, operating with the systems of presenting the world, the people, the essence of civilisation and directions of its development, as well as the most important values, should be recognized as the contemporary “information warfare” (Russian: информационное оружие).

Apart from the information-technical and information-psychological factors, scientific-technical and political-psychological instruments should also be used. These technologies help to influence the subjects of “information warfare”. The main goal of that type of war is to manipulate the consciousness of a society or a nation with false visions of the surrounding world and thus directing and stimulating their activities. The subject of information confrontation is then the system of traditional values, ideals and myths constituting the basis of a given nation’s culture and its self-identification. The ultimate goal is making the victim to accept the aggression and treating the imposed way of thinking and actions as their own. That is why geopolitics is so important in case of “information warfare”, since it provides scientific argumentation serving as a weapon in waging this type of war. On the other hand, the meaning of asymmetrical activities in the military sphere should be reaching the goal without an armed struggle. This is to be reached through intimidating the enemy and making him realize, by demonstrating the military readiness in a strategic territory or destroying his most dangerous entities, that a potential armed struggle is useless (Чекинов și Богданов, 2010, pp. 13-22; Thomas, 2014, pp. 105-106; Короход, 2013, p. 302; Бухарин, Цыганов și Бочкарева, 2013, pp. 14-21; Цыганов, Васин, Бухарин, 2007, pp. 25-30; Бухарин, Матвиенко, 2008, pp. 2-9; Rothstein, 2007, pp. 160-187; Лайнбарджер, 2013).

The events taking currently place in Ukraine are a model example of the use of theoretical aspects of the Russian asymmetrical activities presented above. It is then worth to study every single stage of the conflict in comparison with the theory. On 28 February 2014, an operation was launched in Crimea,

aiming at taking the military control over the peninsula by Russia. The operation was participated by the local troops of "Crimean Self-Defence", supported by unidentified formations of the Russian army. They took control over most of the strategic facilities such as airports, communication junctions and passages, as well as the buildings belonging to the Ukrainian army and the Security Service of Ukraine. Within a week, the whole peninsula was under control. Though some buildings stayed under the Ukrainian army control, they were blocked and deprived of any ability to conduct military activities through cutting off energy, water and other supplies. The most significant fact is that the whole operation was conducted without an open fight between the parties of the conflict. Self-appointed authorities from Simferopol started forming the autonomous armed forces on the basis of the local self-defence troops and the buildings taken away from the Ukrainian army. Armed soldiers with hidden faces wearing uniforms without any emblems, called "green people" or "gentle people" surprised the world media and analysts ironically commenting the conflict. They took over the airport in Sevastopol claiming that they had come to defend it against the "Bandera troops from Kiev". However, they did not inform anyone who they were and what country they come from. When it was clear that the alleged troops did not pose any threat to the airport, they were withdrawn. At the very moment the information was publicized, they came back and took the airport over again¹⁸.

These activities are evident enough to be referred to as the so-called psychological special operations (Russian: психологические специальные операции) being within the competence of special operations troops GRU. One of that formation's ex-members, Col. Vladimir Kvaczkov explains that their goal is to manipulate people's (both servicemen and civilians) consciousness and emotions, by means of confusion and demoralization, in order to make them feel friendly towards the Russian army (Квачков, 2010, p. 376). This was reached by removing all the emblems from the soldiers' uniforms, making it unable to identify the country (so-called crypto-operation) and the formation they serve for, as well as by forbidding to communicate, in any form, with the civilians. All this led to many

¹⁸ Because of the information warfare going on in both Russian and Ukrainian media, the primary source allowing for the reconstruction of actual events of the conflict are the analyses prepared by the experts of the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw. See: A. Wilk, *Rosyjska interwencja wojskowa na Krymie* [online], <http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-03-05/rosyjska-interwencja-wojskowa-na-krymie> [availability: 16 VIII 2014]; T. Iwański, W. Rodkiewicz, A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, A. Wilk, *Rosja wobec Ukrainy: nie tylko Krym* [online], <http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-03-12/rosja-wobec-ukrainy-nie-tylko-krym> [availability: 16 VIII 2014].

contradictory interpretations of “green people”, “soldiers in uniforms” or “gentle people” and inability to define the enemy and taking the right actions. What is more, the effect of surprise was achieved, which allowed Russia for its own interpretations of events: during the peaceful demonstration in Maidan, over one hundred people died, whereas during the military intervention in Crimea no one was hurt. This operation was also described as *strategic provocative information n-driven operation* (Russian: стратегическая наступательная информационная операция) aimed at preceding the military intervention with preparations based on the use of information (Почепцов, *Информационные операции и Крым: базовые причины для манипуляций* și *Информационные операции и Крым: причины и следствия. Часть 2* [online])¹⁹. Thus, the Russian activities in Crimea confirm one of the rules of a “rebel war” – the one concerning the use of rebelling masses put over the years under the adequate psychological-information pressure (so-called intoxication) (Darczewska, 2014, p. 20; Nord, 2004, pp. 87-111) supported by regular army. To reach that goal, multidirectional and mass activities were initiated: federal TV and radio channels, newspapers and the Internet sources. This was supported by diplomats, politicians, political scientists, experts, as well as the elites of science and culture. The arguments were given that the real threat to Crimea comes from the “Bandera troops invading the peninsula”, “the NATO troops taking control over the Black Sea Fleet” or “derussification of the Ukrainian citizens”. It was also said that the government in Kiev was established by foreign special services, especially American and Polish ones, whose espionage network (being the property of the Military Information Services, WSI) had been for years the tool of the American interests in Ukraine, especially in the petrol-energetic sector (Савин, 2008, pp. 50-51). As it was mentioned before, participation of activists from the Eurasian Youth Union in the Crimean operation was also confirmed, which complies with the definition of the “rebel columns”. As Evgeny Messner predicted, the army was played a secondary role. The first line belonged to the “rebel masses” and the “rebel columns” taking over individual buildings and facilities. The goals were reached by the information-psychological pressure, sabotage and economic sanctions, without any armed struggle, taking over an intact infrastructure and avoiding casualties among soldiers and activists, as well as among the inhabitants of the peninsula. An important element was also

¹⁹For regulations concerning the international law on wearing uniforms and emblems during armed conflicts see: W. Hays Parks, *Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniform*, w: *International Law Studies. Issues in International Law and Military Operations*, J.B. Jaques (ed.), Newport 2006, pp. 69-121.

president Vladimir Putin's attitude, who stayed calm and misinformed the western leaders (Cimbala, 2014, pp. 359-379; Berzins, 2014, pp. 1-7; Darczewska, pp. 5-6; 31-32; Vázquez Liñán, 2009, pp. 137-159).

The Crimean scenario was repeated in the next months. On 6 April 2014 in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Luhansk, groups consisting of several hundred to two thousand pro-Russian activists rebelled, which ended with taking over government buildings. In Kharkiv and Donetsk, local government buildings and the buildings of SBU were also taken over. The activists made similar political demands, which confirms that the action had been planned before and it was coordinated by and consequently directed from Russia. On the Eurasian Youth Union's website one could find the instructions on "self-organization" and taking buildings over by crowds (*Молот Правды. Жителям Юго – Востока: инструкция по самоорганизации* [online]). The establishment of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Kharkiv People's Republic were proclaimed and in Luhansk people refused obedience to the government of Ukraine. On 11 May 2014 a referendum on sovereignty of the Donetsk and Luhansk Districts was organized. On 12 May 2014, a resolution on the Luhansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic sovereignty was passed and negotiations on establishing Novorossiia were started. This was a breaking moment and passing to another stage of the conflict, when the authorities of the self-appointed republics established armed militia with an important role of instructors from Russia (Iwański, Menkiszak, *Prorosyjski "separatyzm" narzędziem przymuszenia Ukrainy do federalizacji* [online:]).

The example of Igor Strielkov vel Girkin is quite significant in that context. On 15 April 2014, the SBU Press Service announced that one of the leaders of the subversive group of separatists occupying government buildings in Sloviansk was indentified. It appeared to be the abovementioned Igor Strielkov who, according to the SBU, was a soldier of the GRU Spetsnaz, which made it obvious that the separatists were instructed and supported by the Russian military intelligence. Strielkov soon became the subject of information warfare between the parties of the conflict: Ukraine exposed his connections to the Russian special services in order to prove the engagement of those services in the separatist activities, whereas the Russian propaganda made Strielkov a hero of national fight for freedom. Thus a historian and historical re-enactments enthusiast was to become a soldier in the fight for the freedom of Novorossiia – voluntarily, as a patriot (Скоморохов, 20.V.2014). Strielkov himself admits that he has never been a member of the GRU, but the FSB. His real name is Girkin and "Strielkov" is his false name (Виноградов, 5.VII.2014).

Aleksandr Czerkasov, the President of the Foundation of Human Rights "Memorial", exposed interesting details concerning true activities of Igor Girkin. Basing on relations of the witnesses, he revealed that in 2001 Girkin participated in murders and kidnapping of the Chechen citizens, at that time serving for the 45 Independent Regiment for Special Operations of the

Airborne of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Russian: 45-й Отдельный полк специального назначения Воздушно-десантных войск Вооружённых Сил Российской Федерации) (Черкасов, May 21, 2014). The main task of the military formations of that type was special intelligence (Russian: специальная разведка) with all available means – from observation, through combat actions aiming at the seizure of the demanded persons or facilities, to radio-technical intelligence (Министерство обороны РФ, *Разведывательная Подготовка Подразделений ВДВ*, pp. 5-10, 56-71).

An important part of their activity is also *special operations concerning formation, support and combat use of irregular forces* (Russian: специальные операции по формированию, поддержке и боевому применению иррегулярных сил). According to Kvaczkov, such operations aim at establishing irregular formations performing the tasks of armed forces, which Russia is vividly interested in. They include intelligence tasks for the guerrilla groups and insurgent troops, as well as for the organizations involved or likely to get involved in a given conflict. It also includes any kind of help, especially in the area of training and logistics, as well as the use of numerous means of operational protection with the help of the espionage network available (Квачков, 2010, p. 376). So it can be concluded that the example of Strielkov is a vivid confirmation of the Russian support for the Luhansk and Donetsk militia and separatists, both during preparations and during the conflict itself. The SBU accused Strielkov of directing the operational activities in Crimea, aiming at preparation of the invasion and liquidation of the Ukrainian espionage network in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk (Скоморохов, 20.V.2014). It should however be underlined that the front line of armed activities belongs to the militia, the Russian special forces playing a supportive role. An interesting example of that is a telegram from Strielkov in which he reports that his personal source of information from Kiev informed him about an attempt of making a reportage by the Ukrainian TV station. The reportage was to be about “the alleged crimes of the Russian soldiers”. Next Strielkov asks Dugin to publicize that information on the Internet, fact which is supposed to give the Russians advance and discredit the Ukrainian attempt (*Сводки от Стрелкова Игоря Ивановича. Сообщение от ополчения* [online]). So here we have a vivid example of providing the separatists with information support by the Russian special forces. The militia consists of several-people groups carrying out guerrilla activities. Their leaders come from the military environment, very often from Russia or having been trained in that country. It should be considered that they had precise knowledge about the theatre of armed activities and its character, since many veterans of special forces serving in Ukraine left to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Russia (Козлов, 2010, pp. 151-161). After starting an open fire with the Ukrainian army those troops very often withdrew trying to drag them into the street fight. They also organized traps which were very effective. A good example

and confirmation of that could be the operation carried out on 22 May 2014 under the town of Wolnovacha, in which separatists shattered the 55 Mechanical Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces killing 18 and injuring 32 soldiers, which was the biggest loss for the Ukrainian army in its 23-year history. The separatists were supported by civilians who blocked the Ukrainian columns. So here we have a clear example of cooperation between "rebel masses" and "rebel militia" described by Evgeny Messner (Żochowski, Wilk, Źi Konończuk, *Konflikt w Donbasie – wymuszona deeskalacja?* [online]).

Equally important element of a "rebel war" is activating the "rebel columns". The definition that Messner came up with may be referred to the groups of mercenaries and volunteers not only from Russia, but from the whole post-Soviet territory and even from the Balkans. It is widely known that among the "Novorossiya defenders" there is a Serbian troop of about 250 people called "Jowan Szewicz". The ascending number of mercenaries is accompanied by the delivery of military equipment and any other supplies from the territory of the Russian Federation.

It appears that supported by Moscow mercenaries took control over local separatists groups²⁰.

Russian activities in the territory of Ukraine revealed the effectiveness of organizations of a new kind. One vivid example can be the Eurasian Youth Union, whose activists evidently supported separatists by organizing referenda in Moscow and ensuring information support, but most of all by

²⁰ Aleskandr Matjuszyn, nickname "Warjag", one of the leaders of the Donetsk People's Republic's armed forces, can be an excellent example of ideological attitude characterized by Messner in his definition of "rebel columns". He gave an interview in which he revealed the backstage of his activities in Ukraine, where his main goal was to prepare an uprising. After graduating from university, he started his political activity in the ranks of the Moscow skinheads, taking part in riots and street fights. Next, he joined Dugin's National Bolshevik Party (NBP) LED by Eduard Limonov. After returning from Moscow he dealt with establishing the party structures in the Donetsk district. However, he left the party after "Limonov's selling himself to the liberals". During the "orange revolution" he was one of the founders of the campaign called "Ukraine without Yushchenko". After leaving the party he joined a new movement called the Donetsk Republic (Russian: движение «Донецкая Республика»). He directed its activities in the town of Makiejevka. He got arrested by the SBU. Since he dealt with training the youth groups of the Donetsk Republic, in 2007 he was accused of leading illegal armed troops. Aleskandr Matjuszyn underlines a huge role of his cooperation with Dugin's Eurasian movement supporters and the Russian nationalists at that time. He said that the establishment of the Donetsk People's Republic was not accidental – it was a long-time plan of the activists. His statements make it clear that they were supported by Moscow. After declaring the independence of the Donetsk People's Republic he was appointed as the commander of the Volunteer Battalion "Warjag" (Russian: Добровольческий батальон «Варяг»), subordinated to the Ministry of State Security of that republic. The main goal of that battalion, apart from the front fight, is also fighting and getting rid of "saboteurs" and "thieves". М. Учитель, Александр «Варяг» Матюшин: нам нужна республика нового типа [online], http://rossia3.ru/politics/vatjag_matyushi [availability: 31 VII 2014].

coordinating humanitarian help (Публичная интернет-библиотека Владимира Прибыловского, *Евразийский Союз Молодежи* [online]). On 14 May 2014, on the organization's official website one could spot an announcement about the recruitment to *the volunteer squads fighting the Nazi American mercenaries and oligarchs in the territory of Novorossiia* (Евразийский Союз Молодёжи, *Помощь Донбассу, запустаться добровольцем!* [online]). Pavel Karnishev, the present leader of the organization, informed that a group of about one thousand volunteers was formed. Paramilitary organization called the Eurasian Youth Union is a youth fraction of International Eurasian Movement. The Eurasian Youth Union was established during the convention that took place on 26 January 2005 in which about 600 participants took part. The present number of its members is unknown. The union's structures are active not only in Russia, but also in other countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as in Germany, Italy and Romania. Its strict leadership include Pavel Karnishev, Dmitri Jefremov, Arthur Dugin and Aleksey Bielajev-Gintovt- the organization's "stylist". The union has military-like organized structures, both centrally and locally (Публичная интернет-библиотека Владимира Прибыловского, *Евразийский Союз Молодежи...*).

The main leaders are called moderators. The idealistic profile of the union is characterized by radical anti-American attitude and the hostile attitude towards the West. However, the idealistic profile created by Aleksandr Dugin is also shaped by the occult references²¹. The main goal of the union is to establish Eurasian army and carry out Eurasian revolution. The Eurasian Youth Union has a network structure; it tries to influence the widely understood youth environment, using the arsenal characteristic for information warfare. The most important role here has the Information-Analytical Division, the so-called information cell of the KGB, which was directed by Valery Korovin (Публичная интернет-библиотека Владимира

²¹ It is Worth mentioning that the emblem of the Eurasian Youth Union is a stylized "Chaos Star", the symbol of magical rebirth in the West. The symbol, taken by Dugin from the works of an occultist Aleister Crowley, refers to the "magic of chaos". Since for Dugin the term "chaos" is a synonym of a different, opposite to the western culture term "order", creating new possibilities of action and reaching political goals. Dugin had a positive attitude towards Crowley's works (who, by the way, was an MI-6 agent) and wrote that *radical revolutionary trends were perceived by Crowley as the realization of the equinox storm with the help of the powers of chaos in order to wipe out the remains of the rotten civilizations, getting closer to the logical and cyclical end*. See: L. Sykulski, *Koncepcja Radykalnego Podmiotu i „czwarta teoria polityczna” Aleksandra Dugina w kontekście bezpieczeństwa Polski i Unii Europejskiej*, „Przegląd Geopolityczny” 2014, issue 8, p. 236; A.G. Dugin, *The Multipolar World and the Postmodern*, „Journal of Eurasian Affairs” 2014, issue 2, pp. 11-12.

Прибыловского, Коровин Валерий Михайлович [online]; Катехизис члена Евразийского Союза Молодежи [online]; Arquilla, Ronfeldt, 2001, pp. 1-25). Without any doubts that organization is an information support to the Kremlin. Its members deal with information warfare in a scientific dimension. In 2007 the union's activists carried out a cyber-attack on the Ukrainian president's website. After that incident, the Ukrainian structures of the organization were strictly controlled by the SBU, which led to many of its members leaving the union (*Евразийские боевики из Восточного Казахстана?* [online]).

It is however worth underlying that the Eurasian Youth Union is only one of many "rebel columns". Aleksandr Dugin and his supporters very quickly adopted the idea of "information warfare". Its concept was borrowed by Dugin from the ideologists of the so-called New Right movement. Getting political power (in the region, country or the whole continent) should be accompanied by imposing one's culture, the way of thinking and the system of values. In order to reach that, one should carry out a cultural-ideological invigilation of university environments and representatives of such professions as doctors or lawyers, who influence the public opinion. Such an idea was postulated by Alain de Benoist, who is widely respected among the eurasianists and strongly supports the "Fourth Political Theory" by Aleksandr Dugin. The Eurasian Youth Union is just a part of a bigger organization of a network character, which is a "conveyor belt" of ideology coming directly from Moscow²².

Conclusions

To sum up, it should be underlined that Russia has presented its own concept of "information warfare" to the whole world. In this particular case we can talk about diversification and synchronization of many activities. Their common feature is the use of information and its processing as the main weapon based on the psychological factors supported by the use of modern technological solutions. Information warfare takes asymmetrical activities, which are skilfully directed. All the factors mentioned above create a unique, Russian concept of "hybrid warfare", which constitutes a serious threat for the security of the widely understood West. The Russian way of carrying out a conflict, in its far genealogy, refers to the Sun Tzu war philosophy and the military heritage of the people from the East, based on the concept of the

²² An example of the network is another organization called the Global Revolutionary Alliance, GRA, established by Dugin. This is a new type organization not officially bound to the centre it works for. Such organizations realize the so-called strategy of non-directed resistance. See: L. Sykulski, *Koncepcja Radykalnego Podmiotu...*, p. 238. Compare: J. Tomaszewicz, *Strategia oporu niekierowanego w wojnie asymetrycznej*, „Przegląd Geopolityczny” 2009, issue 1, pp. 161-191.

maximum weakening of the enemy at the expense of the minimum own losses. Taking into account the specifications of the Russian activities and possible scenarios of the situation development, one should consider that in case of Kiev's disagreement to the federalization of the country the war, irrespective of its form, may last for years. It is probable that the divisions between the parties of the civil war, because of so many victims, will deepen and the constant "occupation" of the eastern districts by the government forces will be inevitable in order to stabilize that part of Ukraine. The occupation, on the other hand, will mean spending money on huge military bases equipped with the latest military technology and the maximum operational protection of that region by the Ukrainian special services, which may be very costly for that country. In further perspective, this situation may lead to escalation of the conflict, carried out not only in the form of regular fight, but also typically terrorist activities in the territory of the whole country, making it unstable. The situation may be compared to Ulster²³.

The difference is that the Ukrainian case is much larger in scale. The world media reports about terrorist attacks in Ukraine will be equally natural as the ones reporting another bomb explosion in Iraq or Palestine. However, there is one possible scenario. The separatists will be given support (both human and technological) allowing them not only to keep Donbas, but also to carry out offensive activities further into the western part of the country. The potential for such activities is significant: in Odessa, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia or Dnipropetrovsk thousands of separatists are waiting for orders and weapon. The economic crisis and the rise of anti-government movements in Ukraine may only be in favour of such scenario. A different matter are the separatist movements in the Zakarpattia Oblast, which are said to escalate along with the internal problems from the neighbouring Moldova. In this case the official military intervention from Russia should also be considered as one of the possibilities.

²³ The conflict in Ulster (Northern Ireland) is the most known and described European conflict, in which terrorist methods were used. The main reasons of that conflict was the desire of the Irish nationalists and Republicans (mainly Catholics) the province governed by the UK to the Republic of Ireland. This was opposed the Unionists (mainly Protestants) who claimed their integrity with the UK. The conflict took both military and political basis, with simultaneous engagement of politicians, paramilitary and terrorist organizations, as well as the UK and Irish security forces. The activities were carried out mainly in the territory of the Northern Ireland. From time to time, they escalated to the territories of England, Ireland and the continental Europe. It lasted until the end of the 60s of the last century, until the signature of the Good Friday Agreement in Belfast in 1998. Regardless of the agreement occasional attacks till take place. See: J. Loughlin, *The Ulster Question Since 1945*, London-New York 2003; J. Muller, *Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada: A Silent War*, London-New York 2010; L.A. Smithey, *Unionists, Loyalists, and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland*, Oxford 2011.

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