INTELLIGENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE LIAISON: A PRIMER

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Abstract

This article, through adopting mainly a briefing and review approach, provides several insights into the phenomenon of foreign or international intelligence liaison as it occurs in the early twenty-first century. Building in a 'research retrospective' manner on 10 years of research conducted by Adam Svendsen, the article examines how international intelligence liaison can be, first, conceptualised, and then, second, analysed. By way of granting insights into its core characteristics, a multi-level approach towards its evaluation is presented, followed by a systems approach towards its analysis, including referencing system of systems dynamics. Before coming to some overall conclusions, involving examining the question of whether there is an increasingly challenging future for international intelligence liaison, key processes closely associated with international intelligence liaison are detailed, namely discernible regionalisation, globalisation and professionalization trends.

Keywords: intelligence liaison, international, globalisation of intelligence, information.

Introduction

Adopting largely a briefing and review approach, this article provides a brief introduction to the phenomenon of *foreign* or *international intelligence liaison*. Mainly, it draws on a range of different research conducted on intelligence liaison to date, including some insights into how international intelligence liaison can be effectively evaluated.[1]

An overview is possible. As argued before elsewhere: 'The term "intelligence liaison" is expansive. It offers synonymy with the interchangeable terms "intelligence cooperation", "intelligence sharing", "intelligence pooling",

[1] To enrich their overview, readers are directed to consult the sources and 'reference libraries/lists' provided within all the works cited throughout this article.

"intelligence alliance", "intelligence collaboration", "intelligence integration", "intelligence fusion", "intelligence access" and "intelligence exchange".'[2]

Furthermore, a general definition of 'intelligence liaison' that provides at least some beginning, workable insights, is that it consists of:

> *relevant communication, cooperation and linkage between a range of actors, usually at (but not limited to) the official intelligence agency level, on intelligence matters – essentially exchanging or sharing information, particularly of military and/or political value, and which especially (and purposefully) relates to national (extending to global, via regional) security. It also includes: usually secret (covert and/or clandestine),* [(and frequently, although not exclusively)] *state activity conducted by specialized 'intelligence' institutions to understand or influence entities.*[3]

Analysis has even been extended to both identify and declare intelligence liaison as an 'essential navigation tool', helping defence and security (including law enforcement) practitioners find their directions and pathways through contemporary contexts of globalised strategic risk (GSR) and during the burgeoning conduct of operations, which are often multi-functional in their nature (MFOs), extending at times to being 'special' (SpecOps/SOs).[4]

More specifically, '*international* intelligence liaison', when taken in its more precise technical detail, 'is further divisible into: (a) bilateral – two parties involved; (b) trilateral – three parties involved; (c) multilateral – when four or more parties are involved (even if interacting on a 'hub-and-spokes' basis…); and (d) plurilateral.' The last category of which 'can be bilateral to

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[2] A.D.M. Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.12.

[3] 'Intelligence liaison' as defined in Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, p.13 - Private and non-state actor contributions are additionally included in the definition cited above. For the applied use of intelligence liaison, see also A.D.M. Svendsen, 'NATO, Libya operations and intelligence co-operation – a step forward?', *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, 13, 2 (December 2011), pp.51-68, and his, 'Sharpening SOF tools, their strategic use and direction: Optimising the command of special operations amid wider contemporary defence transformation and military cuts', *Defence Studies*, 14, 3 (2014), pp.284-309.

[4] A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Intelligence Liaison: An essential navigation tool', in J. Schroefl, B.M. Rajaee and D. Muhr (eds), *Hybrid and Cyber War as Consequences of the Asymmetry* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang International Publishers, 2011).

multilateral, but between *different forms* of parties, such as the European Union (EU) and the USA (a supranational entity and a state, respectively…).'[5]

Underscoring its significance, the long-standing phenomenon of international intelligence liaison has grown exponentially in the early twenty-first century.[6] Closely following behind that observable 'curve' of events and developments, the literature focused on evaluating international intelligence liaison has grown equally substantially and diversely.[7]

Indeed, today that literature has become sizeable enough so that we can viably attempt, albeit in very beginning manners, to 'schoolify' (assign through grouping into different 'schools' of literature) the different approaches evaluations adopt.[8] This work is undertaken alongside further extending our efforts towards 'theorising' international intelligence liaison, so that improved understandings are better realised.[9] Attention is now turned to the key aspects of international intelligence liaison.

Core characteristics:

As witnessed over several years, naturally there are many ways that the complex phenomenon of international intelligence liaison can be

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[5] Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, p.101; J.I. Walsh, *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); R.J. Aldrich, 'International Intelligence Co-operation in Practice', ch.2 of H. Born, I. Leigh and A. Wills (eds), *International Intelligence Co-operation and Accountability* (London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2011).

[6] See, e.g., as introduced in A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Connecting intelligence and theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations', *Intelligence and National Security*, 24, 5 (October 2009), pp.700-729; for greater insights into the history of international intelligence liaison and for cases of its past use in previous eras, see, e.g., A.D.M. Svendsen, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method out of Mayhem* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), esp. pp.36-37, and his '1968 – "A year to remember" for the study of British Intelligence?', ch.14 in C.R. Moran and C.J. Murphy (eds), *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945* (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2013); A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Intelligence Liaison', *Intelligencer* - Journal of the US Association of Former Intelligence Officers - AFIO (May 2015).

[7] See, e.g., as discussed in Svendsen, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation*, pp.69-70.

[8] See, e.g., *ibid.*, esp. pp.74-80.

[9] See, for example, as introduced in several of the sources cited throughout this article; see also, e.g., A.N. Seagle, 'Intelligence Sharing Practices Within NATO: An English School Perspective', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 28, 3 (2015); W.R. Curtis, 'A "Special Relationship": Bridging the NATO Intelligence Gap', *MA Thesis* (Monterey, CA: US Naval Postgraduate School - NPS, June 2013).

conceptualised and then evaluated.[10] Here in this brief article, first, a 'multi-level perspective' is adopted. This is followed, second, by a 'systems approach' towards its evaluation.

[10] See, notably, J.T. Richelson, 'The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 4, 3 (Fall 1990); J.J. Wirtz, 'Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 6, 1 (1993); H.B. Westerfield (ed.), *Inside CIA's Private World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995) and his 'America and the World of Intelligence Liaison', *Intelligence and National Security*, 11, 3 (July 1996); M.S. Alexander, 'Introduction: Knowing your Friends, Assessing your Allies – Perspectives on Intra-Alliance Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security*, 13, 1 (Spring 1998); D. Stafford and R. Jeffreys-Jones (eds), *American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939–2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); M.M. Aid and C. Wiebes (eds), *Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War: From Cold War to Globalization* (London: Routledge, 2001); R.J. Aldrich, 'Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances', *Harvard International Review*, 24, 3 (Fall 2002); C. Clough, 'Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 17, 4 (2004); S. Lander, 'International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17, 3 (October 2004); R.J. Aldrich, 'Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation', *International Affairs*, 80, 4 (2004); W. Rees and R.J. Aldrich, 'Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?', *International Affairs*, 81, 5 (2005); J.E. Sims, 'Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 19 (Summer 2006); R.D. Steele, 'Commentary: Foreign Liaison and Intelligence Reform: Still in Denial', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 20 (2007), pp.167-174; D.S. Reveron, 'Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror', *Orbis*, 50, 3 (Summer 2006) and his 'Counterterrorism and Intelligence Cooperation', *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, 1, 3 (Summer 2008); A. Svendsen, 'The Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11: Frameworks and Operational Parameters', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 21, 1 (March 2008), his, 'The Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11: The Optimization of Intelligence Liaison Arrangements', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 21, 4 (2008), and his 'Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations'; A.D. Clift, 'The Evolution of International Collaboration in the Global Intelligence Era', ch.13 in L.K. Johnson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); E. Aydinli and M. Tuzuner, 'Quantifying intelligence cooperation: The United States International Intelligence Behavior (USIIB) dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, 48, 5 (September 2011); D. Munton and K. Fredj, 'Sharing Secrets: A Game Theoretic Analysis of International Intelligence Cooperation', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 26, 4 (2013); J. McGruddy, 'Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International Oversight', *Journal of Strategic Security* (2013); J. van Buuren, 'Analysing international intelligence cooperation: institutions or intelligence assemblages?', ch.7 in I. Duyvesteyn, B. de Jong and J. van Reijn (eds), *The Future of Intelligence: Challenges in the 21st century* (London: Routledge, 2014), and his 'From Oversight to Undersight: the Internationalization of Intelligence', *Security and Human Rights* (2014), pp.239–252; J.I. Walsh, 'Intelligence Sharing', ch.30 in R. Dover, M. Goodman and C. Hillebrand (eds), *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies* (London: Routledge, 2014).

Adopting a multi-level perspective:

Sophisticated approaches towards analysis (answering the 'what is it?' question) and assessment (addressing the 'so what?', 'why?' and 'what does it mean?' queries) frequently adopt a 'multi-level' line of work. These efforts are most notable in the field of War Studies and there is no exception when also evaluating international intelligence liaison.[11] For instance, as already discussed at length elsewhere and summarised here:

> *Discernible within intelligence liaison relationships, extending to the globalization of intelligence, are eight different, yet interrelated, levels of activity and experience. They each offer many different insights, and can hence be subsequently used for analysis purposes. Ranging from 'high' and 'macro' to 'low' and 'micro', these levels comprise: (i) the ideological level; (ii) the theoretical level; (iii) the strategy level; (iv) the policy level; (v) the operational level; (vi) the tactical level; (vii) the individual (as 'professional') level; and (viii) the personal level. These levels ... should be kept in mind.*[12]

A multi-level perspective is additionally helpful when analysts of international intelligence liaison are modelling and are - at least attempting to - theorise the phenomenon. In value terms, that last theorisation work is undertaken for providing, amongst many aims, improved knowledge and practical guidance, such as to both operators and other decision-makers beyond.[13] Further efforts are required.

Advancing a systems approach towards evaluation:

As international intelligence liaison is such a far, wide, and deep-ranging phenomenon - eluding simple, quick and easy characterisation - it also responds well to being evaluated both systematically and systemically. Particularly, this is when it is taken as a 'whole', in more holistic-extending manners towards its comprehensive unpacking.

Adopting a systems approach is valuable. Indeed, as previous research has presented: 'The anatomy of intelligence liaison can be conceptualized as having eight closely interrelated, systemic attributes or variables.' These, in turn, are then listed as consisting of:

1. *internal influences/factors;*
2. *rationale;*

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[11] See, for instance, references to 'levels of war' in J. Ångström and J.J. Widén, *Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War* (London: Routledge, 2015), esp. p.203, col.2.

[12] Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, p.12.

[13] See, for example, efforts as illustrated in Svendsen, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation*, p.64; see also R.J. Aldrich, 'US–European Intelligence Co-operation on Counter-Terrorism: Low Politics and Compulsion', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 11, 1 (February 2009).

3. *types and forms;*
4. *conditions and terms;*
5. *trends;*
6. *functions;*
7. *external influences/factors;*
8. *effects and outcomes.*

And, perhaps, '[m]ore fundamentally, these eight attributes or variables provide useful criteria that can be employed for benchmarking and theory-testing' purposes, including for better meeting management, accountability and oversight aims.[14] As the overall 'age of systems' continues to unfold in contemporary circumstances and is readily anticipated to continue into the rapidly advancing future, those systemic attributes or variables (as presented above) benefit well from being further explored and then harnessed in their detail.[15]

Not least for the analyst of international intelligence liaison, they serve as 'analytic filters to accept and, through exposing limitations and parameters, reject at least aspects of the other bodies of theory and approaches consulted. This process of theory-testing is an effective way of trying to better explain the phenomenon of intelligence liaison, and to better answer the general question of *why* it occurs.'[16] Both the improved analysis and then management of risks is equally advanced.

Moreover, since international intelligence liaison is not subject to being a 'single' system in its composition, developing 'system of systems' (SoS) or 'federation of systems' approaches equally have relevance both to it and to the work that concerns it (its tasks). For example, this can be most clearly demonstrated with reference to the use in intelligence domains of (amongst others): PMESII - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information/Intelligence and Infrastructure components (as used, for instance, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - NATO); PESTLE - Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal/Legislative and Environmental (as employed in EUROPOL); STEEP - Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental and Political (as frequently adopted in business/commercial/private sector companies and other 'business intelligence' contexts); HSCB - Human, Social, Cultural and Behavioural; and DIME -

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[14] Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, p.99.

[15] See as detailed in section '3.0 Unpacking the eight attributes of intelligence liaison: A quick reference' in Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, pp.100-107.

[16] *Ibid.*, p.100; see also Svendsen, 'Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations', pp.725-727; J.E. Sims, 'A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics', ch.4 in G.F. Treverton and W. Agrell (eds), National Intelligence Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); for more of a specific case study-orientated approach, see D. Munton, 'Intelligence Cooperation Meets International Studies Theory: Explaining Canadian Operations in Castro's Cuba', Intelligence and National Security, 24, 1 (February 2009).

Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (as both, at least on occasions, drawn on in the US Military).[17] Simultaneously, many *processes* are involved, as the next section examines further.

International intelligence liaison processes:

Akin to several other phenomena, international intelligence liaison and its associated 'business' (activities, interactions, and so forth) is also subject to undergoing many processes. Again, this characteristic allows for a diverse range of guiding and framing theories to be drawn on during its evaluation, for example including evolving 'business process management' (BPM) approaches.[18] In this section, three major international intelligence liaison processes have been highlighted for their further examination below: i) 'regionalisation'; ii) 'globalisation'; and iii) 'professionalisation'.

i) 'Regionalisation':

When increasing wider trends relating to international intelligence liaison are opened up for inspection, areas appropriately rationalised as the 'regionalisation of intelligence' emerge. That last process is perhaps manifested most notably in Europe, with at least aspects developing in other regions, such as Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.[19] Relating to Europe, as has been argued:

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[17] A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Advancing "Defence-in-depth": Intelligence and Systems Dynamics', *Defense & Security Analysis*, 31, 1 (2015), pp.58-73; A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice: Enhancing "macro" to "micro" systems thinking via "System of Systems" dynamics', *Defence Studies*, 15, 2 (2015), pp.105-123; B. Connable, *Military Intelligence Fusion for Complex Operations: A New Paradigm* (Washington, DC: RAND, 2012); A. Dupont and W.J. Reckmeyer, 'Australia's national security priorities: addressing strategic risk in a globalised world', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 66, 1 (2012).

[18] A.D.M. Svendsen with M. von Rosing, H. von Scheel, A-W. Scheer, et al., 'Business Process Trends' chapter in their (eds.), *The Complete Business Process Handbook: Body of Knowledge from Process Modelling to BPM*, Volume 1 (Burlington, MA: Morgan Kaufmann/Elsevier, 2014), from p.187; see also B.S.C. Watters, 'The Utility of Social Science and Management Theory on Military Operations: of Portacabins and Polo Fields', *Defence Studies*, 11, 1 (2011).

[19] For 'regionalisation of intelligence' trends discernible in other regions across the globe, see, for example, references to ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) in Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, esp. on p.39, 81 and 93; see also P. Chalk, 'China, the United States and their future influence on the ASEAN community', *The Strategist - AUS* (16 March 2015); P. Parameswaran, 'Malaysia to Host New Conference to Tackle Islamic State Challenge: ASEAN states and dialogue partners to participate in two-day meeting', *The Diplomat* (8 October 2015); A. Panda, 'India and Pakistan Are Set to Join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. So What?', *The Diplomat* (7 July 2015); in Latin America, Z. Shiraz and R.J. Aldrich, 'Globalisation and borders', ch.27 in Dover, Goodman and Hillebrand (eds), *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, p. 270; in the Middle East, A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Developing international intelligence liaison against Islamic State: Approaching "one for all and all for one"?', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (2016).

> *[D]uring the early 21st century, we have witnessed, in general, greater intelligence cooperation in Europe. ... The enhanced intelligence cooperation in Europe has been most focused on the issue of counter-terrorism. This was catalysed especially in the wake of high-profile terrorist atrocities – notably the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks and the 7 July 2005 London bombings... Other issues that have spurred closer regional intelligence and security cooperation, such as confronting transnational 'organised crime', civil protection and crisis management concerns, have also formed important priorities.*[20]

Furthermore, continuing the demarcation of longer-ranging trends:

> *In Europe there is the development of an ever-more complex web consisting of a plethora of variously overlapping international intelligence liaison arrangements. Collectively, these provide a form of regional intelligence coverage and intelligence and security reach, resulting in the delivery and production of effects and outcomes that can, in turn, today, be regarded as being generally satisfactory. How the arrangements and their associated networks overlap and complement one another is important, accounting for the connections, and notably the 'disconnects', that publicly come to our attention.*

Through strategy/policy-lenses, however, the conclusion still resonates that 'Room for tidying remains', with there being ample scope for further movements to be advanced within this domain of intelligence activity into the future, as the recent horrific terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015

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[20] A.D.M. Svendsen, 'On "a continuum with expansion"? Intelligence co-operation in Europe in the early Twenty-first Century', ch.8 in C. Kaunert and S. Leonard (eds), *European Security, Terrorism, and Intelligence: Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan/Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics Series, 2013), p.185; see also the sources listed in ibid., pp.203-214; also published as A.D.M. Svendsen, 'On "a continuum with expansion"? Intelligence cooperation in Europe in the early twenty-first century', *Journal of Contemporary European Research (JCER)*, 7, 4 (December 2011); for other recent treatments of European-related intelligence cooperation, see also R.J. Aldrich, 'Intelligence and the European Union', ch.44 in E. Jones, A. Menon and S. Weatherill (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), from p.627; B. Fägersten, 'European intelligence cooperation', ch.8 in Duyvesteyn, De Jong and Van Reijn (eds), *The Future of Intelligence*, his 'EU doesn't need a CIA - but better intelligence would help', *EurActiv.com* (16 October 2015), and his 'Intelligence and decision-making within the Common Foreign and Security Policy', *European Policy Analysis* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, October 2015).

reinforce.[21] When overlaps are better taken into account, the 'regionalisation of intelligence' trends are not alone, also extending further into more 'globalised' realms.

ii) 'Globalisation':

Although remaining somewhat contested with regard to intelligence, 'globalisation' has many meanings in the international intelligence liaison context. The analytical challenge is to adequately cover all of the dimensions involved and to suitably delineate their associated implications, without getting more distracted by overwhelming noise. Ultimately:

> *manifest as a proactive response to the familiar general long-term historical trend, recently more rapidly accelerated, of: (i) 'globalization* writ large*' (essentially what we generally understand by the term 'globalization'…); and (ii) the impact of 'globalization* on *intelligence' – most notably the influence of all of globalization's well-known 'nasties', felt especially post-1989 and after the Cold War…; (iii) the 'globalization* of *intelligence', occurring especially in the early twenty-first century and post-9/11, can be discerned…*
>
> Moreover:
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> *Arguably the most direct manifestation of 'intelligence* and *globalization', including delving most deeply into what globalization means for intelligence, the globalization of intelligence is emerging through the mechanism of enhanced international intelligence liaison, together with being facilitated by the developments occurring both within and beyond those arrangements. This process includes factors such as 'intelligence and security reach dynamics' … and developments extending beyond merely the regionalization of intelligence processes, including overlapping with 'glocalization'* [(where the 'local' and 'global' connect, frequently messily)]…[22]

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[21] Svendsen, 'On "a continuum with expansion"? Intelligence co-operation in Europe in the early Twenty-first Century', p.186; M. Banks, 'EU calls for Europe-wide intelligence agency', *Defense News* (23 November 2015).

[22] Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, p.xxi; see also R.J. Aldrich, 'Intelligence', ch.16 in P.D. Williams (ed.), *Security Studies: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2012 [2ed.]), his 'Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem', *Intelligence and National Security*, 24, 1 (February 2009), his 'Beyond the Vigilant State: Globalisation and Intelligence', *Review of International Studies*, 35, 4 (October 2009), and his '"A Profoundly Disruptive Force": The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization', *Intelligence and National Security*, 26, 2 and 3 (2011); see also further review and discussion in A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Special Issue on "The CIA and US Foreign Relations Since 1947: Reforms, Reflections and Reappraisals," ... Section I: Challenges and Reform', *H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable Reviews*, III, 6 (December 2011), esp. pp. 26-36; G. Hastedt, 'Book Review: *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, Adam N.[(sic.)] M. Svendsen. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, 238 pp.', *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 21, 2 (June 2013), pp. 125-6; Shiraz and Aldrich, 'Globalisation and borders'.

And, while some substantial research has been undertaken into UK and US intelligence and security activity in recent years, what has been confronted has not only been largely an 'Anglo-American' story. Other countries across the World are simultaneously involved.[23]

iii) 'Professionalisation':

Perhaps most controversial in relation to international intelligence liaison activities is the claim that 'a process along the lines of "professionalization" can be identified effectively in this realm of intelligence activity…'[24] Furthermore, 'In its overarching nature, the process of the professionalization of intelligence cooperation can be clearly characterized as being mixed and uneven…'[25], with the argument that 'both structural and cultural dimensions are clearly involved during the process of "professionalization"'; and that those dimensions can be empirically observed within the domain of international intelligence liaison, as well as when examining the intelligence-related contexts beyond.[26]

Again, contemporary international intelligence liaison is clearly being shaped by some interesting, debate-provoking trends. These are deserving of further analysis and consideration, such as through the employment of more specific case studies.[27] In overarching terms, striking effectively balanced

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[23] For more of an 'Anglo-American' focus, see R.J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001); A.D.M. Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11* (London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010), and his '"Strained" relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American intelligence and security co-operation', ch. 8 in S. Marsh and A. Dobson (eds), *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives* (London: Routledge/Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics Series, 2012); P.H.J. Davies, *Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective* (Praeger Security International, 2012 [2vols]); M.S. Goodman, 'Evolution of a Relationship—The Foundations of Anglo-American Intelligence Sharing', *CIA Studies in Intelligence*, 59, 2 (2015; UNCLASSIFIED). For a focus beyond merely 'Anglo-American' intelligence and security worlds, see R.J. Aldrich and J. Kasuku, 'Escaping from American intelligence: culture, ethnocentrism and the Anglosphere', *International Affairs*, 88, 5 (September 2012), and P.H.J. Davies and K.C. Gustafson (eds), *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013); Z. Shiraz, 'Drugs and Dirty Wars: intelligence cooperation in the global South', *Third World Quarterly*, 34, 10 (2013).

[24] Svendsen, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation*, p. 3.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[27] For the value of adopting a case study approach in this area, for instance with historical examples of intelligence liaison, see, e.g., D. Munton and M. Matejova, 'Spies without Borders? Western Intelligence Liaison, the Tehran Hostage Affair and Iran's Islamic Revolution', *Intelligence and National Security*, 27, 5 (2012), pp.739–60; R.E. Bock, 'Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation, 1941–45: Normative Insights from the Dyadic Democratic Peace Literature', *Intelligence and National Security* (2014); see also, E.J. Haire, 'A Debased Currency? Using Memoir Material in the Study of Anglo-French Intelligence Liaison', *Intelligence and National Security*, 29, 5 (2014), pp.758-777; A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Painting rather than photography: Exploring spy fiction as a legitimate source concerning UK-US intelligence co-operation', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 7, 1 (March 2009), pp.1-22.

conditions of '*optimised (intelligence and security) reach*' in intelligence enterprises (missions and operations), including liaison relationships, emerge as key.[28] Some overall conclusions are now presented.

Conclusions: An increasingly challenged future?

As has been demonstrated above, many different criteria can be deployed relating to international intelligence liaison in present contexts, as well as being relevant to intelligence and its associated enterprises, and their subsequent evaluation, more broadly. Those analytical distinctions are helpful for management and governance, such as:

1. What are the differences between 'information' + 'intelligence';
2. the type(s) of intelligence involved – SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT, etc.;
3. the different forms intelligence can take – is it 'raw' or 'finished' and 'processed' intelligence, 'single-source' or 'all-source', analysis ('what is it?') or assessment (UK) and estimate (US) ('what does it mean?') product?;
4. (a) purpose: what is it needed for – 'strategy' and 'policy' or 'tactical' and 'operational' purposes? + (b) Relevance: Thereby, is it operationally-viable, actionable and 'serious' intelligence, or is it more 'sanitized' intelligence, in order to better protect sources and methods, for strategic and decision-making purposes?;
5. how is the intelligence access, sharing or exchange occurring – is it *ad hoc* (conducted on a 'need to know' basis) or more regularized and institutionalized (conducted on a 'need to share and pool'/'use' basis), formal or informal?;
6. when is the intelligence access, sharing or exchange taking place – for instance, is it *a priori* (before events, in an attempt to pre-empt and prevent them) or *post facto* (in the context of post-event investigations);
7. where is the intelligence access, sharing or exchange taking place – for example, is it in an organization at headquarters level, more in the field in 'operational commands', and is the location equipped with 'Sensitive Compartmentalized Information Facilities' (SCIFs), if such distinctions exist (e.g., in the NATO context)?

[28] A.D.M. Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, esp. p.110.

Specific details soon acquire enhanced importance, and, clearly, many challenges concerning international intelligence liaison exist.[29]

As a coda, with the cascades of Edward Snowden-related so-called 'revelations' - revealed through the high-volume of previously secret intelligence material he has leaked to the international media since June 2013 - many of those international intelligence liaison considerations listed above can be expected, at their least, to be revisited. This is together with some challenging 're-balancing' within international intelligence liaison relationships being both demanded and, to some degree, anticipated into the future.[30]

Regardless of whether or not more specific international intelligence liaison relationships are subjected to further adjustments in their details, many calibration and configuration constructs do continue to retain their value for meeting most constructive optimisation requirements. Especially, this is as the essential phenomenon of international intelligence liaison persists overall for enabling defence and security (including law enforcement) practitioners to most viably accomplish grander strategic ends and missions. Ideally, this is realised as successfully as possible in the increasingly globalised environments in which they work and have to engage. Yet again, necessity concentrates minds and efforts.

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1. Aldrich, Richard J. (2012). *Intelligence*, ch.16 in P.D. Williams (ed.), Security Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, [2ed.]).
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[29] This list is substantially based on that published in Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror*, pp.41-42.

[30] See commentary in A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Buffeted not Busted: The UKUSA "Five Eyes" after Snowden', *e-ir.info* (8 January 2014) - via: < http://www.e-ir.info/2014/01/08/buffeted-not-busted-the-ukusa-five-eyes-after-snowden/ > (accessed: March 2015); see also discussion in A.D.M. Svendsen, '"Smart Law" for Intelligence!', *Tech and Law Center*, Milan, Italy (June 2015) - via: <http://www.techandlaw.net/papers/smart-law-for-intelligence-adam-d-m-svendsen.html> (accessed: August 2015).

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