

INTELLIGENCE ÎN SECOLUL XXI

THE PLACE OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS IN POLITICAL THEORY

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Abstract

Today the realm of intelligence gathering is perceived as involved in bulk or mass surveillance, threatening both privacy and democracy. As political regimes in the West are changing towards more authoritarian or totalitarian control of the acts and thoughts of their citizens this raises the question whether intelligence organizations should serve democracy or the political system. The author traces some of the technological, political and societal developments that have caused this altered state, in which there seems to be little room left for resistance. In spite of this there is some countervailing power in the form of sousveillance. However, just like other possible constraints, such as oversight committees and to a lesser degree the judiciary, sousveillants do not seem the safeguarding of the rights of citizens. The author concludes that in this respect a big role is to be played by independent academics.

Keywords: *intelligence, security state, surveillance, sousveillance, technology, democracy.*

Mass surveillance versus sousveillance

For a long time terms like “security state”, “intelligence state” or “surveillance state” were reserved for non-democratic states, not belonging to the West.¹ Defining Western democratic states in similar terms was a custom reserved for leftist authors.² Today, however, even establishment authors in the West admit that their state systems can be dubbed “surveillance states”,

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¹ E.g. Andrei Soldatov & Irina Borogan, *The New Nobility. The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2010); Xuezhong Guo, *China's Security State* (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

² E.g. Shane Harris, *The Watchers: The Rise of America's Surveillance State* (New York: Penguin); Tom Engelhardt & Glenn Greenwald, *Shadow Government: Surveillance, Secret Wars, and a Global Security State in a Single Superpower World* (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2014); Glenn Greenwald, *No Place to Hide. Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State* (New York: Shichosha/Tsai Fong Book, 2014).

indicating that “[i]t is hard to know where [...] intelligence ends and mass surveillance begins.”³ These possibilities of surveillance will be enhanced by the expansion of the all-invasive Internet of Things. And things will turn even worse since the moment does not seem far away where this surveillance may take the form of bodily intrusion because people will have brain computer interfaces.⁴ No wonder, some would call today “the golden age of intelligence”.⁵

On the opposite of the spectrum, citizens are no longer powerless when it comes to intelligence. The time that official intelligence services held a near-monopoly on intelligence gathering comparable with the government monopoly on the use of violence is definitely over.⁶ In an age of democratization of technology, an age which belongs to the amateur, intelligence organizations no longer have the technological edge over others, which in older James Bond films was epitomized by the gadgets of the geek Q.⁷ We are nearing the situation where every individual can be his own profiler or intelligence organization and where Wilhelm Agrell’s maxim would apply: “If everything is intelligence, nothing is intelligence.”⁸ And thus a situation has developed where even citizens in democratic societies feel threatened by mass surveillance, but on the other hand governments may stand exposed as a result of so-called sousveillance.

Technological changes

All this is, however, not merely the result of technological developments. Behind all this is also a changed idea of the legitimacy of

³ John Hughes-Wilson, *On Intelligence. The History of Espionage and the Secret World* (London: Constable 2016), pp. 159, 303.

⁴ Bob de Graaff, “Pas op voor hersenvredebreuk. Minister Plasterk geeft veiligheidsdiensten grote technologische vrijheid” *De Groene Amsterdammer*, Vol. 139, 10 september 2015, pp. 14-17.

⁵ Michael Morrell, “The importance of intelligence” *The Strategist*, 31 August 2016.

⁶ Bob de Graaff & Cees Wiebes, *Gladio der vrije jongens. Een particuliere geheime dienst in Koude Oorlogstijd* (’s-Gravenhage: Sdu Uitgeverij Koninginnegracht, 1992); Wolfgang Krieger, “US patronage of German postwar intelligence”, in: Loch K. Johnson (ed.), *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 100.

⁷ E.g. Richard A. Best Jr., “The Dilemma of Defense Intelligence”, in: Loch K. Johnson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (Oxford etc: OUP, 2010), p. 431; Bob de Graaff, “De nieuwe burger in de wereld van inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten”, in: René Cuperus en Menno Hurenkamp (ed.), *Omstreden vrijheid. Waartoe een vrije samenleving verplicht* (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 2015), pp. 213-227; Andrew Keen, *The Cult of the Amateur. How today’s internet is killing our culture and assaulting our economy* (London/Boston: Nicholas Brealey, 2007); Glenn Reynolds, *An Army of Davids. How markets and technology empower ordinary people to beat big media, big government, and other goliaths* (Nashville, TE: Nelson Current, 2006).

⁸ Kris Wheaton, “Top 5 things only spies used to do (but everyone does now)” *Sources and Methods*, 2 July 2012, accessed 15 September 2016 at <http://sourcesandmethods.blogspot.be/2012/07/top-5-things-only-spies-used-to-do-but.html>; Bob de Graaff, “Geheime dienst is God niet”, *De Groene Amsterdammer*, Vol. 138, 13 February 2014, pp. 34-37.

opposition and resistance in a society. I dare to argue that there is a tendency in current western democracies to develop undemocratic features. And this raises the question whether intelligence organizations' main mission is to uphold democracies or to uphold the political order? As long as the political order and democracy coincided, this was no question at all. Nowadays, it is.

If technology is not the only trend to blame, there must have been political, social and mental processes that have either preceded, accompanied or followed technological trends that altered the role intelligence plays in western democratic states.

What follows are some personal observations that are offered as food for thought rather than as thought, let alone intelligence. I will therefore look into the relevant technological developments, societal trends and organizational changes within the intelligence communities that produced this new revolution in intelligence in the West.

Obviously technology has played its role. Intelligence has always served as the eyes and ears of its master and consequently has been about that what could be observed and overheard. With every technological innovation in domains of observation and communication the realm of intelligence has expanded, whether it was the invention of airplanes, satellites, telegraphy or telephony. Intelligence has since long added new ways of snooping to surveillance from behind trees and out of closets.

The revolution in communications in recent decades has certainly caused some of the innovations in intelligence. Especially the Internet, mobile phones and social media have increased the number of communications. But not only that, these new ways of communication were also (until recently) often openly accessible. Sending an email amounted to sending a message on a postcard in earlier times. Many of these messages lacked the erstwhile envelope, which nowadays makes a comeback in the form of encryption. Offered a box of candy the intelligence communities have not refused the treat, thus, as is often the case with gluttons, becoming sufferers of obesity. The intelligence community has demanded an uplifting of all restrictions to get access to the new media and messages. It is indicative that in recent Bond movies Q has been replaced by an IT whizz kid. However, the technological edge is diminishing. Everybody can become a one man's or one woman's jihad hunter or start his own Bellingcat.⁹ Technology becomes democratized, but unfortunately, chances are the breakers will appropriate the latest gadgets

⁹ E.g. Anonymous, *Terrorist hunter* (New York: Ecco, 2003); Shannon Rossmiller, *The unexpected patriot* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2013); Thanassis Cambanis, "The jihadi hunters", Boston Globe, 2 October 2014.

before the makers do.¹⁰ The 21st century is the century of the amateur, unfortunately also when it comes to violence.

From intelligence to information

The omnipresence of intelligence is also caused by the fact that the traditional divide between intelligence and information is fading out. It used to be said that intelligence comprised only that information that was reliable, relevant and timely. However, this is not true of the current hunt by intelligence services for big data. Surgical searches for strategic intelligence have given way to a collect-and-see-later-what-is worth. In spite of the idea that hunters take the place of gatherers in intelligence,¹¹ all agencies have started hoarding and are on the outlook for new storage facilities.

The ubiquity of communications and signals, often geo-locatable, has led to the phenomenon of big data. Big data facilitates inter alia pattern recognition and holds the promise of pre-science, which amounts to the wholly grail of intelligence agencies.¹² Today supermarkets can tell that a customer is probably pregnant even before she herself may know based on a sudden change in shampoo preference. Nowadays McDonalds in the US can predict what customers who enter their driveway will order, based on the brand and the building year of the car they drive and the number of its occupants, with an 85 per cent certainty. I think many spy and terrorist hunters or radicalization watchers would like to be able to do the same. And this is exactly the totalitarian temptation produced by the success stories of big data. One has to be normal in order not to become an anomaly that attracts the attention of surveillants.¹³

¹⁰ Martin Rees, *Our final century. Will civilisation survive the twenty-first century?* (London: Arrow Books, 2003), pp. 3, 70; Martin Rees, "We are in denial about catastrophic risks", in: John Brockman (ed.), *What should we be worried about? Real scenarios that keep scientists up at night* (New York etc.: Harper, 2014), pp. 9, 12-13; V. Vinge, "MADness", in: ibidem, p. 7.

¹¹ Charles Cogan, "Hunters not Gatherers: Intelligence in the twenty-first century", in: Len V. Scott and Peter Jackson (ed.), *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century. Journeys in Shadows*, (New York/London: Routledge, 2004), 147-161; Philip Lisagor, "Should Intelligence Officers be 'Hunters' or Gatherers'?", *Cicero Magazine*, 13 January, 2015.

¹² Rudi Klausnitzer, *Das Ende des Zufalls. Wie Big Data uns und unser Leben vorhersagbar macht* (Salzburg: Ecowin, 2013); Patrick Tucker, *The naked future. What happens in a world that anticipates your every move?* (New York: Current, 2014).

¹³ Cf. Robert Dover, 'Communication, Privacy and Identity', Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand (ed.), *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies* (London/New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 302; Patrick Tucker, "The military is already using Facebook to track your mood", *Defense One*, 2 July 2014; Ben Quinn & James Ball, "US military studied how to influence Twitter users in Darpa-funded research", *The Guardian*, 8 July 2014; Vinu Goel, 'As data overflows online, researchers grapple with ethics', *The New York Times*, 12 August 2014.

The pressure for prevention

Under public pressure that a government's score on fighting terrorism should be near 100 per cent intelligence agencies try to turn commercial tools for patterning customer preferences into government tools for mind-reading, because every failure to apprehend terrorists before they commit their violent act infringes upon the credibility and legitimation of the authorities.¹⁴ And thus governments tend to give their highest priorities to security, giving leeway to budgets, staff and mandates of intelligence organizations.¹⁵ Almost everywhere in the West anonymous phonecards, encryption and professional confidentiality are under threat from government encroachments, thus bringing about 'a prevailing culture where breaching privacy is the norm'.¹⁶

The pressing public demand for outstanding performance has led to preventive actions, again a phenomenon that can be traced elsewhere in society. Especially improvements in medical science and neuro-science have underscored the idea that prevention is better than repairing damage. It is no coincidence that the acronym for the major UK anti-radicalization and anti-terrorism program is PREVENT.

This urge to prevent has also led to the wish to read the thoughts of people. When it comes to jihadism more and more people in western democracies are punished not for what they did but for what they may have intended to do. People are punished because they wrote threatening messages on the Internet, because they seemed to prepare for travel to the Caliphate.

And it is no longer only actual acts or intentions to commit them that have come under scrutiny but also acts of sympathy or apology.¹⁷ Having grown up in the 1960s when I posted pictures of Che Guevarra and Ho Chi Minh in my teenage room and having seen how the capitalist clothing industry has appropriated the image of Che Guevarra, I often wonder why it is that similar acts from teeners showing sympathy for Osma bin Laden or showing the flag of Islamic State are no longer tolerated.

¹⁴ Cf. Frank Furedi, *Invitation to terror. The expanding empire of the unknown* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), pp. xiv, 5, 77; Philip B. Heymann, *Terrorism, freedom and security. Winning without war* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 135-139.

¹⁵ "Premier Michel: "Veiligheid is topprioriteit"", *Het Laatste Nieuws*, 27 August 2016; Rajeev Syal, "Bulk data collection vital to prevent terrorism in UK, report finds", *The Guardian*, 19 August 2016.

¹⁶ Dover, "Communication", p. 303. Cf. e.g. Joel Harding, "GCHQ Details Cases of When It Would Use Bulk Hacking", *Motherboard*, 19 August 2016.

¹⁷ Bob de Graaff, "Why continue counterterrorism policies if they are hurting?", in: M. Cherif Bassiouni and Amna Guellali (ed.), *Jihad: challenges to International and Domestic Law* (The Hague: Hague Academic Press, 2010), pp. 249-273.

The fact that in the UK pleas can be heard for safe open spaces, where people would be allowed to express freely their thoughts,¹⁸ demonstrates how far western democracies have turned into states guarded by thought police. According to Privacy International, an international NGO, the United Kingdom and United States belonged, together with Russia, China and four other Asian states to the category of “endemic surveillance societies”.¹⁹

This trend is all the more worrying because there are technological advances towards brain-computer interfaces. And as intelligence services have successfully pleaded with their governments that there should be no technological limits to their snooping, it may be expected that they will use the fact that it is allowed to them to trespass people’s homes and people’s computers to also burgle their way into their brains.

According to current trends, when it comes to prevention, one is inclined to say: the younger, the better. Just as the medical world is intruding the woman’s womb during her pregnancy to prevent the birth of not so perfect babies, the age at which intelligence services may start meddling into people’s lives is sliding towards early youth. We still do have juvenile justice in most western democracies, but we do not have the same understanding and safeguarding protection for youth when it comes to intelligence gathering.

In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s those who came into the range of intelligence services, either because of espionage or political violence, were almost naturally already of age. With today’s declining age of terrorist offenders and radicalized youths many minors become legitimate targets. In The Netherlands the General Intelligence and Security Service recently declared that people as young as nine years old may become objects for surveillance especially with an eye to returning children who have grown up in Islamic State’s Caliphate.

The issue of otherness

In the 1960s and ‘70s opposition against political systems came clearly from within. It came more or less from the sons and daughters of those who ruled. Besides a feeling of being of the same blood there was the expectation, whether or not justified, that in due time the radical youth would turn into law-abiding citizens, following in the footsteps of their parents. Today’s

¹⁸ “Stop, look, listen: the university’s role in counterterrorism”, accessed 15 September 2016 at <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/the-universitys-role-in-counterterrorism-stop-look-and-listen>; R. Sutton, “Preventing Prevent? Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy On Campus”, accessed 15 September at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Preventing-Prevent_webversion3.pdf; Catherine Bennett, “Why free speech is integral to the intellectual life of our universities”, *The Guardian*, 20 September 2015.

¹⁹ Dover, “Communication”, pp. 297-298.

opposition seems to be easier to cut out from society, to be alienated or foreignized. Everywhere in the West there is a call to take away people's nationality if they have dual passports. And even if they have none. On more than one occasion Dutch authorities have in rather unparliamentary language told people who sympathized with Islamic State or showed their feelings for president Erdogan too enthusiastically "to fuck off" to their Islamic State or their country of origin.

The intelligence services are riding on these waves of growing intolerance towards otherness, especially when it can be explained in terms of poor immigrants or Islam. This intolerance is unfortunately partly the result of the liberation that was experienced in the West during the 1960s: the acceptance of women as equal to men, the acceptance of public showings of the female body, the acceptance of homosexuality, the liberation from the churches. Some of those who fought for this kind of liberation and tasted its fruits do not accept that an influx of foreign others turn back the clock. This explains the grim reactions when mosques are erected in western cities or burkinis appear on western beaches. Erstwhile tolerance takes on Talibanesque demonstrations of intolerance when women in burkini's or burkini-like clothing are fined or even ordered to undress. Comparisons with people wearing white socks in sandals or fat men in speedo swimming trunks who could also be forbidden are beside the mark, because they cannot be framed as similar ideological clashes.²⁰

Ideologies transcend geographical boundaries and threats have become transnational. Terrorists are both far away and may be amongst us. This has erased the boundary between security and intelligence agencies. Intelligence is forward security and security at home demands intelligence.²¹ Whereas the internal security services in the West's democratic society's had a strong tendency to stay within or close to the rule of law, the blurring of the divide between external intelligence and internal security had the tendency to taint the latter with the cowboy-like behavior of the former.

²⁰ Boaz Bulbulovitz, "In Wake of Burkini Ban, Muslim Women Demand Criminalization of Fat White Men in Speedos", The Mideast Beast, 24 August 2016; Hala Arafat, "The burkini is a toxic ideology, not a dress choice", The Hill, 23 August 2016, Sophie Fuggle, "Brigitte Bardot vs, the Burkini", Foreign Policy, 23 August 2016; Adam Seligman, "The burkini as a mirror", Open Democracy, 25 August 2016; Aurelien Mondon, "Defending the indefensible: France, the burkini affair and the further mainstreaming of racism", Open Democracy, 1 September 2016; Rachel Marsden, "France's Burkini Ban a Symptom of Deep Discontent", Baltimore Sun, 7 September 2016.

²¹ Bob de Graaff, "Waterboarding, rendition, secret flights and secret prisons: degeneration or fruition of intelligence in the fight against terrorism?", Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence, No. 4 (December 2010), pp. 5-14.

Limitless intelligence, endless war

Both armed forces and law enforcement have given way to intelligence, outside as well as inside their organizations. In the armed forces intelligence already sometimes trades its traditional support function for situations in which intel is in the lead and law enforcements at least professes to create intelligence led policing, even though the results may so far be generally disappointing.

Intelligence never ends and knows in principle no boundaries. In combination with war, it has dramatically changed the character of war. War used to be bound in space and time. Today's so-called intel wars are global in reach and eternal in duration.²² They are both the outcome of the changed threat situation and the cause as they perpetuate the idea of threat, instill suspicion and fear and thus legitimate a continuous state of emergency, which in its turn is threatening for certain parts of the population. In the end we enter the sphere where no citizen is innocent until checked and proven not to be guilty. In 2013, exactly 69 years after allied troops landed on Normandy to liberate Europe from totalitarian rule the *New York Times* wrote: "Essentially, the [US] administration is saying that without any individual suspicion of wrongdoing. The government is allowed to know whom Americans are calling every time they make a phone call, for how long they talk and from where."²³ It would be easy to add other measures in other countries that add up to this totalitarian kind of surveillance, such as the possibility to follow people's movements on the basis of their cell phone signals or the the routine registration of license plates. The idea that this is only about metadata and "therefore" harmless was refuted by no one else than former head of the CIA and NSA Michael Hayden: "We kill people based on metadata."²⁴

There was a time when western democracies could enter the arena of human rights with their heads held high and face the competition with authoritarian and totalitarian dictatorships. This time is over. It has become

²² Matthew M. Aid, *Intel Wars. The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror* (New York etc.: Bloomsbury Press, 2012); Bob de Graaff, "Waar is de onzichtbare vijand?", *Militaire Spectator*, Vol. 181, No. 1 (2012), pp. 14-24; idem, "Why Kant Is Wrong: The World on its Way to Eternal War", Herman Amersfoort et alia (ed.), *Moral Responsibility & Military Effectiveness, NL ARMS, Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, 2013*, (The Hague: Asser Press, 2013), pp. 279-299; idem, "Forever war", *Filosofie & Praktijk*, Spring 2014, pp. 13-23.

²³ Editorial Board, "President Obama's Dragnet", *The New York Times*, 6 June 2013.

²⁴ David Cole, "We kill people based on metadata", *The New York Review of Books*, 10 May 2014. Cf. "NSA can easily find individuals hidden in metadata-study", *RT*, 26 December 2013; What an IP address can reveal about you. A report prepared by the Technology Analysis Branch of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, May 2013.

rather easy for dictatorships to hold up a mirror and throw the ball back in 'democracy's' court.

Inhibitions?

Is there reason to become fatalistic about these totalitarian tendencies in the intelligence world of democratic societies? Or can we still detect inhibitory influences?

One such a factor might be reminiscences of authoritarian and totalitarian rule in a country's history. For about half a century the memory of the Second World War and occupation regimes was enough to block developments towards too intrusive governments and intelligence services. Indicative of this trend was the obstruction of the 1970 census in The Netherlands by a campaign under the slogan: 'Before you know it is again so far: one carries a whip, the other a star.' However in the 1990s memories of World War II ceased to be the moral judge over current politics. It was in that context that privacy arguments were no longer able to hinder the introduction of an identity document for Dutch citizens. So, this erosion of citizen's privacy and other individual rights was already taking place before the events of 9/11. It was softened by the way such intrusions were camouflaged thanks to technology. Whereas many citizens would have objected against policemen sitting in a lanternpost opposite their house 24/7, watching their doings, hardly anybody objected against surveillance cameras doing actually the same.

In countries where the memory of totalitarian rule was sometimes still fresh the inhibitions regarding privacy intrusions were sometimes more difficult to sideline. A striking example is Germany, where the reminiscences of both the Nazi and Stasi past are still very vivid. It resulted in much more severe criticism in the wake of the Snowden revelations in Germany than for instance the UK, which lacked a similar past.²⁵

In continental Western Europe a substantial part of the intelligence services' employees had had experience in wartime resistance. And although this may have made them determined to fight totalitarian threats, there was always a certain awareness that one should not become like the Nazi or communist opponent.²⁶ This resulted in several European countries in the decision not to mix intelligence and police functions. However, with the

²⁵ E.g. Christoph Scheuermann, "Britain's Blind Faith in Intelligence Agencies", Spiegel OnLine, 21 August 2013.

²⁶ E.g. Eleni Braat, Van oude jongens, de dingen die voorbij gaan ... Een sociale geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (Zoetermeer: AIVD, 2012); Chris Vos et alia, De Geheime Dienst. Verhalen over de BVD (Amsterdam: Boom, 2005).

passing of time and in the light of new threats this so-called *Trennungsgebot* is being eroded, even in Germany.

Apart from memory there are institutional inhibitions against intelligence services leaving the path of democracy. In the past forty years almost all western democratic societies have created some kind of oversight committee and often more than one, independent, parliamentary, judicial or executive. No matter how they are organized, all of these regulatory bodies are under the threat of losing at least part of their function from three sides. First, the privatization of intelligence threatens to bring intelligence functions outside the domain of official oversight. This tendency will only be strengthened by the fact that some technological functions of intelligence organizations, such as datamining, cyber security or social media intelligence will have to be outsourced. Second, an international cooperation between national intelligence services that was thought impossible a few decades ago is taking place; however, oversight committees are organized on a national basis and are therefore ill equipped to investigate international cooperation. And third, as part of the expansion of intelligence other government institutions that are not within the remit of the oversight committees may develop functions that are not checked. And a possible fourth issue would be the lack of the technological know how to control the newly developing functions of intelligence organizations in the field of e.g. signals intelligence or social media intelligence.

Another inhibition to undemocratic turns of intelligence organizations in western democracies would be the judiciary. I have to say that for as far as my knowledge goes judiciaries have been conservative brakes on governments that threw judicial controls and institutional guarantees overboard with remarkable ease. National judiciaries have furthermore been backed up by the European Court of Human Rights, which also forced governments to enact legislation that would carry away the Court's approval.

However, the more complex the doings of intelligence services become the more difficult it will become for judges to form themselves an idea as to the lawfulness, fairness and proportionality of the intelligence services' activities. They will increasingly depend upon the use of expert-witnesses. However, in the past decades a kind of intelligence and security industrial complex has come into being, not unsimilar to the military-industrial complex against which U.S. president Eisenhower warned at the end of his second term. How independent are experts or are they tied in with the government?

This brings in individuals and opposition movements that practice sousveillance and try to resist the fundamental shifts of power between the

individual and the state which the current surveillance practices lead.²⁷ Such people are and will have to be technically proficient. And since not every citizen qualifies for such a position, it may lead to all-out intelligence wars between perpetrators of surveillance and sousveillance, at best with the perpetrators of sousveillance acting on behalf of the other citizens, at worst at his expense.

In light of the way democratic societies and their intelligence services are developing and given the few remaining obstacles left, this underscores the need for independent and autonomous experts in the field of intelligence, preferably from the academic world, that hopefully will remain able to safeguard intellectual freedom. I can think of few places that would be more appropriate to end my presentation with such an entreaty than this conference.

²⁷ Editorial Board, "Obama's Dragnet". 100; Ronald J. Deibert, "Deep Probe. The evolution of network intelligence", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 186-187; Andy Greenberg, "How to anonymize everything you do online", *Wired*, 17 June 2014.

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 13. Dover, "Communication", p. 303. Cf. e.g. Joel Harding, "GCHQ Details Cases of When It Would Use Bulk Hacking", Motherboard, 19 August 2016.
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