

The American Intelligence Services in Romania during 1944-1948 – political aims and objectives –

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to provide an overview on the main political objectives and tasks of the American Intelligence Services in Romania at the beginning of the Cold War (1944-1948).

Research is based on an analysis of the archive documents prepared by the Romanian Intelligence Special Service (SSI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of the United States, as well as successive structures that preceded the actual Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The main topics of interest for the American services in this region were: the Romanian Government, the Democratic Parties Union, the Parliament, opposition parties, censorship, and the Romanian-Soviet relationship.

In our assessment, critical events unfolding in Romania at the time and the way in which they were approached by American intelligence, provided the latter with essential insight and expertise to be used in countering Communist guerrillas and the threat they posed to democracies in the “Free World”.

Keywords: intelligence, Romania, Office of Strategic Services, Cold War, Communism

According to The Romanian Special Information Service’s (SSI) documents, between 1944 and 1948, of all foreign intelligence services operating on our territory, the American service was the most active. SSI has been able to establish that internal links of the American espionage were realized mostly with agents of the British Intelligence Service on our

¹ This document is part of a PhD thesis entitled “The American Intelligence Service in Romania Between 1944-1948”, currently under elaboration at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest. Translated by Cristina Ivan.

territory, as well as with those of the Hungarian and Turkish Intelligence Services. The intensity of the American espionage activities determined SSI to consider that this could have been the cover for a potential systematic organisation in Romania of “intelligence bases for the entire Eastern European region”².

It is our objective to present, in this article, the main political objectives and tasks that the American Intelligence Structures focused on³. According to the directives the leadership of the American Military Mission in Romania gave, the analysis of the political situation in Romania, as well as the drafting of monthly bulletins, was tasked to analysts under Burton Berry (the political representative of the US in Romania). Documents were later on sent to the US State Department.

SSI was informing the Groza government that the American Intelligence Structures were taking interest in: the activity of both Government and Parliament, as well as that of the opposition (e.g. historical parties, opinion trends), dissident, reactionary and subversive organisations, the public opinion’s morale, as well as its life standard, effects of Anglo-American propaganda on the Romanians state of mind, political trials and their verdicts, judicial system, censorship, reasons and causes behind drafting ratified or rejected laws, the Soviet-Romanian relationships, as well as actions that, might have had, in time, strong anti-soviet impact. SSI was also reporting that the American intelligence structures surveilled events regardless of their domain: “Each indigenous element is regarded as a public opinion representation body, therefore the American service reports any account, even those containing obvious exaggerations. The material is processed according to theme. It is based on a questionnaire response system (inquiry), and then gets the final form (in the Rome headquarters). According to statistics, Americans have a tendency to draw precise conclusions on the subject of interest. All those that require help from the Americans are interviewed on their life conditions. Letters and correspondence to relatives and acquaintances in the US are, in their turn, carefully examined by the American Intelligence Service. It seeks to identify those passages in which current situation in the country is discussed, a fact which is exploited by John Popa [a veteran of the Office of

² Central Library of the National Intelligence Academy “Mihai Viteazul”, Documentary Fund 140, pp. 62-72.

³ We use the generic name “American Intelligence Structures” to mark the activity of all the American intelligence units carrying out covert activities within the American Military Mission in Romania (marine, air, army, security, State Department etc.).

Strategic Services – OSS], working under the direct leadership of [Roy] Melbourne on the internal Romanian line of the *Security Office*”⁴. *Security Office* was the structure drafting individual profiles (*Who’s Who*) of every political figure, as well as Romanian service workers and individuals getting in contact with the American Mission. Profiles of government members, as well as members of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) or of the political environment were referred to as special files and, in case one of these individuals travelled outside the country, the file was sent to the office in the country of destination.

On November 9th, 1944, the American lieutenant Henry L. Roberts sent to Washington a report in which he clearly stated: “Russia takes active, covert interest in progressively turning Romania into a communist country as well as eventually annexing part of the country or attaching it entirely to the Soviet Union”⁵. This piece of intelligence is reiterated on April 1945, by another report, this time drafted by The Research and Analysis Department (R&A) of OSS, which highlighted: “During the past 7 weeks since the Democratic Front took over power in Romania, important steps have been made by the communists to consolidate power by enforcing aggressive measures to intimidate political opponents and eliminate them from the Romanian Army, police and state departments. (...) In one week only, 52 Army generals were made redundant. Other three generals were arrested under the accusation of allowing Iron Guard members escape to Germany. (...) By the end of March 1945, well informed sources from the Communist Party have told our OSS agents that the number of political arrests in Romania reached 30,000. (...) All these actions have been supported by Soviets, who also enforced, with the assistance of the Propaganda Ministry, a strict censorship of the press”⁶.

In March 1945, an OSS agent in Bucharest has even managed to send to Washington a plan for turning Romania into an entirely communist

⁴ Central Library of the National Intelligence Academy “Mihai Viteazul”, Documentary Fund 140, pp. 62-72.

⁵ Cristian Troncotă, *România și frontul secret, 1859-1945*, Editura Elion, București, 2008, p. 366.

⁶ Detailed description in Doc: *The Democratic Front Government of Rumania*, OSS, Research of Analysis Branch 3070S (Secret), 27 April 1945, Current Intelligence Study Number 15; approved to be declassified on January 2002, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/>, accessed on December 11, 2010.

country, a document signed by Evgheni Suhalov, who was, at the time, the Cominform representative. The source, so called F-O, mentioned that the *plan* was to be fully implemented in two stages, set to accomplish the following objectives: a) completing the Agricultural reform by confiscating main land properties and ruining their owners; b) destructuring the army in its current form and creating a new one, from the “Tudor Vladimirescu” and “Avram Iancu” divisions (the latter located in the Soviet Union at that time). The army was to incorporate all officers activating on soviet soil; c) liquidation of all banks via attacks performed against the National Liberal Party (PNL), whose members owned the majority of private banks; d) destroying small country farms in order to cut their owners access to land, cars and cows, a measure considered necessary for these people to be forced to adhere to the collective farming system; e) the king’s abdication and subsequent exile of the royal family; f) step by step suppression of trading firms doing business with US and Great Britain and redirecting exports towards the Soviet Union; g) abolishing historical political parties by arresting, assassinating, and kidnapping of its members; h) creating a police entity based on the concept of an NKVD type “popular militia”; i) directing rural population towards industry, which was to be rapidly developed in Romania; j) no foreigner would be allowed entrance to Romania, except for those coming from countries under direct Soviet Unions’ influence⁷.

In our opinion, the fact that the American espionage managed to obtain such a plan, disclosing soviet intentions in Romania, was of utmost importance in planning further steps of the American agents. Washington could have counteracted early in advance the soviet action, by sending personnel specialized in the fields targeted by Soviets.

Early 1945, part of the American attention focused also on Transylvania for which Romania was under a lot of pressure by the Soviet

⁷ See document in: Ioan Chiper, Fl. Constantiniu, Adrian Pop, *Turning Romania Into a Soviet Country. Anglo-American Perceptions, 1944-1947*, Iconica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993, pp. 135-139; authors cite: Washington DC National Archives, RG 220, *Record of the Office Strategic Services*. References to the document are also made by Constantin Buchet, *Romania and the American Containment Policy*, in *The Totalitarian Regime Archives*, Year VI, No. 21, (4/1998), Bucharest, p. 88, and Cristian Troncotă, *Romania and the Secret Front*, pp. 366-367.

Union. SSI reported that American intelligence sent to the spot special observers assigned with documenting the topic. Some intelligence, given to SSI by an informant within the Swiss Diplomatic Delegation, suggested that the Anglo-American had already decided to create observation posts in Cluj, Timișoara, Constanța and Iași, by sending there residents under the pretext of liquidating financial and economic pending issues⁸.

On August 6, 1945, SSI informed that the American Mission had been tasked to urgently draft a detailed report on the political situation in Romania and the Government's intentions. Historical parties PNL and PNT circles have been contacted for details. Engineer Paul Zota was the link between these two parties and the American Mission. He was one of those drafting daily reports and other intell' documents to be later on delivered to the American Mission either directly or via link persons⁹. In September, having received orders via a military courier, an SSI informant drew attention to the fact that the leaders of the opposition parties, namely Dinu Brătianu and Iuliu Maniu, had been entrusted by the American Military Mission, to draft a detailed report on events in the country since August 23rd, 1944. The report was to be focused on the political situation. In order to carry out this task, the two parties' leadership asked several trustworthy party members to document and provide statistics on the implementation of the Truce Convention, agricultural reform, measures on education, public order, new laws drafted by the Ministry of Justice, the activity of the People's Party etc. The SSI informant also stated that: "the data were to be collected both in the capital city and in the country, for this reason regional organisation leaders being confidentially tasked. The report would be drafted with the assistance of the two parties by no later than September 1st, 1945"¹⁰.

One month later, the 8th November manifestation took place. According to officials, it "was ended by the brutal intervention of the Anglo-American imperialists in the life of the new democratic regime

⁸ SRI, ANIMV, *FD 148*, p. 6.

⁹ National Archives (AN), Council of Ministries Presidency – Special Intelligence Service (PCM-SSI), File 38/1945.

¹⁰ AN, PCM-SSI, Dosar 38/1945.

of the country”. Following investigation of the Martial Court cabinet, it was established that during that day, the crowd, instigated by PNT and PNL, went to the American Diplomatic Office, shouting slogans such as: Down with the terrorist government! Long live the atomic bomb! Long live the US and Great Britain! etc. During the “attack” against the Interior Ministry, there were also heard slogans such as: “English! US!”. An English officer leading the group attempted to force the back gate of the Interior Ministry and burn the fence, while pretending of course to photograph and observe violent manifestations”. Investigations also showed that American and British journalists have chosen to take only those shots that put demonstrators in a good light¹¹. SSI established that engineer Șerban Ghica, a member of PNT, identified as demonstrators’ leader, took refuge in the hotel room of the American *International News* war correspondent, Thayer Mary. He could not therefore be arrested, American officers Sehechelford (or Shackel-Ford) and Dalle lobbying for the aforementioned¹².

The next day, SSI reported that general van Schuyler (head of the American Military Mission in Romania) had ordered that all American Mission officers attend manifestations. SSI signalled among others: major David Scott Cripps, colonel Walter Ross, colonel Sehechelford, Jack Maher, seargent Castelli, soldier Danko P. John, driver Otkovsky George, Chiriac and Mrs. Croitoru (American citizens of Romanian extraction), as well as journalists Sam Brewer, Frank O’Brien, Mary Thayer, Fodor, Markham, Rossin, Harrison, Sally Brown etc. “Major Cripps photographed attacks on cars, their overthrow and arsoning by the crowd. He also recorded declarations and then returned to the mission to urgently develop films”¹³.

A few days later, on November 14th 1945, commissary Tălăngescu Gheorghe, from Bucharest State Intelligence Division, was reporting: “Indeed, colonel Emmens and major Glonde, of the American Military Mission, were assigned to document manifestations from November

¹¹ Apud: Stelian Neagoe, *Political History of Romania 1945-1947*, New Alternative Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996, pp. 334-337.

¹² AN, PCM-SSI, File 43/1945, *The Activitiy of Foreign Intelligence Services*, November 8-14, 1945.

¹³ The White Book of Security, *August 23, 1944 – August 30, 1948*, Volume I, Romanian Intelligence Service, 1997; Mihai Pelin (coord.), Constantin Aioanei, Nevean Tunăreanu, Florin Pintilie, pp. 585-590 and p. 604.

8th 1945. (...) They have been assisted by captain Armoore [Norman Armour], from the American Intelligence Service and Sam Brewer, O'Brien, Ms. Nelson, from the American Military Mission, Ms. Mony Horovitz and Mrs. Dorobanțu. (...) The Commission has been given a series of photographs illustrating events occurred in the Palace Piazza and the Ministry of Interior. These, as well as the photographs taken by American journalists were integrated into an album called *"How is Romania being governed"*.

Mr. Coposu [Corneliu], Iuliu Maniu's secretary, has been reported to enter the American Mission three times, on November 12th, 1945¹⁴. (...) Informant N. 1 has warned that tomorrow Coposu will bring to the Mission several reports and photographs, received from National-Peasant Party regional organizations, that are to be delivered to major Long. Reports coming from the outside, as well as relevant photographs will be integrated into a documentary which is being drafted at the American Military Mission to be later in the week sent by plane"¹⁵.

On their part, communist authorities staged early in advance interventions to annihilate "the brutal interference of the Anglo-American forces". The General Working Confederation was given orders that, starting early morning, large groups of railway workers are posted in the Palace Piazza. They have been ordered to wait discreetly, "so as not to attract the attention of Etheridge's men. Nevertheless, they were instructed to use, once the latter left, all means to annihilate any form of public manifestation. These teams were to be, if necessary, changed by rotation"¹⁶. It's also worth mentioning that, when preparing the manifestation, historical parties relied on the presence of Mark Etheridge, which was US president's delegate for Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, Etheridge arrived in Romania only on November 19th, 1945.

In the following months, American intelligence focused on the arrests ordered by the Romanian government, as many of those targeted were accused of having taken part in the National Resistance Movement, supported

¹⁴ At that time, Corneliu Coposu was considered one of the leaders of the National Peasant Party intelligence apparatus.

¹⁵ ASRI, File in archive "D", no. 2595, f. 177 (PPC, SC Group 3rd, November 14th, 1945).

¹⁶ White Book of Security, *August 23rd, 1944 – August, 30rd, 1948*, Volume I, Romanian Intelligence Service, 1997; Mihai Pelin (coord.), Constantin Aioanei, Nevian Tunăreanu, Florin Pintilie, p. 583.


by the US. General van Schuyler noted that a source with high rank in the Ministry of Interior informed Charles Hulick, councillor of the State Department in Romania, that these arrests had nothing to do with the “movement of resistance” in Romania, but was rather the result of direct orders from NKVD. The latter instructed that Romanians make every necessary effort to put the blame on the American Mission for incorrect actions. The source also stated that, for over a month, the Romanian counterespionage has managed to obtain important documents from the American Mission’s files, which were photocopied and later returned. These documents offered sufficient evidence to incriminate the activity of the American Diplomatic Mission in Romania. SSI was also informed that during February 20-23, 1946, a conference was organized at the American Diplomatic Mission, attended by Burton Berry and his collaborators. The subject of the conference was the leakage of information. One of the topics tackled with had also been soviet journalist’s procurement, from an obvious insider, of intelligence that linked the American Mission with the leadership of the Romanian historical parties. Frank Stevens was said to have nominated clerk Simon Rad, supposed to have reported the information to O’Brien, who, in his turn, passed it on to the Soviet agency TASS¹⁷.

1. War is knocking on the door

Year 1946 proved significant in the Romanian political context. No later than January 5th, Harry Truman sent his famous letter to James Byrnes. In it, the president of the United States expressed discontent with the State Department’s approach to the Soviet block and reproached the State Secretary that he had not been directly informed and consulted prior to the latter’s visit to Moscow and the concessions made to the soviets in the name of the American government. Truman had obviously read the Etheridge report, from where he took a series of information on Romania and Bulgaria: “Intelligence that confirms our forecast on the policies adopted by these states”. Truman also stated to Byrnes that, in the future: “I shall not recognise the legitimacy of these governments unless they make radical changes. Furthermore, I believe we must protest as strong as we can against Russia’s programme in Iran (...), because now there is no shred of doubt that Russia intends to invade Turkey and occupy the Black Sea crossings to the Mediterranean. (...) For this reason, I believe there is

¹⁷ ASRI, File archive “D”, no. 2595, f. 250 (Note: *Conference Held at the American Mission*, February 26th, 1946).

no more time for compromise. We must refuse to recognise both Romania and Bulgaria until their governments agree to our demands; at the same time, our position to Iran must be acknowledged by the Soviets. We must also insist for the internationalization of the Kiel Channel, of the Rhine-Danube navigation channel and of the Black Sea crossings. Equally important is maintaining a strict control on Japan and the Pacific Ocean". The United States president ended his letter with the following, quite evocative, words: "I am tired of pampering the Soviets"¹⁸.



Photocopies: Pages from Harry Truman's letter to James Byrnes, January 5th, 1946

Harry Truman's letter also reveals that, starting with 1946, the American government decided on a more aggressive approach to the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat against the Balkans and the Middle East was a serious enough reason to make the American administration take a more drastic stand than before. For the first time since the war ended, the United States were ready to defend their international interests, even by war. The US government asked intelligence services to draft a rapid general

¹⁸ Truman's Letter to Byrnes, dated January 5th, 1946, 11 pages, can be downloaded at: <http://arcweb.archives.gov/arc/action/ShowFullRecordDigital?mn>.

assessment on the soviet interests and general context. Allies were searched for and help was welcomed. In their turn, reports drafted by the *Central Intelligence Group* supported Washington's efforts, showing that "the Soviet Union has acquired a strong and inflexible position in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, where the lack of representation of the installed *friendly governments* is more than well known". In these states, "URSS is forced to maintain said governments in power as a representative government could not be trusted to support Soviet interests"¹⁹.

American historians Eduard Mark, Peter Grose, James Callanan and Larry L. Watts claim that Washington was at that moment trying to decisively block the communist expansion to the Balkans and Middle East. The US government ordered the *Office of Special Operations* (OSO) to destabilize the communist regime in our country, and, between July and November 1946, SSU/OSO gave technical and financial support to the Romanian political opposition so as, in the advent of a war, the latter could take over power and support Western Allies against the Soviet Union²⁰. For the operation in Romania, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, *Director of Central Intelligence*, received direct orders from President Harry Truman. Frank Wisner also played a significant role as consultant²¹. Choosing Romania as the other side of the bridge was no accident. American strategic thinkers knew well both our national territory and the people. The Latin character and origins of the Romanians were in permanent contradiction to the Slavic character defended by the Soviets in the Balkans²². The old OSS network in Romania, made up of Ira Hamilton, Thomas Hall and Robert Bishop, was made operational. Frank Wisner and the *Office of Special Operations* (OSO) were assigned to provide reports on current operations to the State Department²³. Another advantage reached by that fall was the fact that general van Schuyler, ex-chief of the American Military Mission in Bucharest, was assigned deputy head at the Pentagon. In this quality, he was

¹⁹ *Soviet Foreign and Military Policy*, Central Intelligence Group, Top Secret, ORE 1, 23 July 1946; www.foia/cia/gov/does/.

²⁰ OSO was previously known as the *Strategic Services Unit* (SSU).

²¹ Frank G. Wisner – was the head of the OSS Mission in Romania during the August 23rd, 1944 events, and major Robert Bishop, counterintelligence officer, was his assistant.

²² Reference: Larry L. Watts, *God, Protect Me From My Friends ... The Clandestine War of the Soviet Block in Romania*, translated by Camelia Diaconescu, RAO Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011.

²³ Peter Grose, *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain*, Mariner Books, New York, 2000, p. 165.

ordered to directly supervise George Kennan's and Frank Wisner's plans of instructing East European refugees to form guerilla troops. Agents of the American secret services were instructed to train a series of the National Peasant Party leaders and their partisans so as to be ready to take action, thus closely following the model previously used by Americans in organising the French resistance during the War (*French Maquis*). Opposition leaders were supported to travel over the border to organise a strong Romanian force in exile. Contacts were being insured by "those royalists who had prepared the coup d'état on August 23rd, 1944"²⁴.

The Anglo-Americans also prepared an operational plan to gather intelligence meant to back developing operations. This is proven by the "questionnaire" drafted by Colonel Brendon, head of the British *Intelligence Service* in Romania²⁵. Seized by SSI, this document gave evidence on "the new directives given to intelligence officers", who, that summer, were to collect intelligence on: a) the real and conspired name, origins and brief political profile of senior clerks within the Ministry of Interior, General Police Headquarters, Prefect Office, Bucharest City Police and the Special Intelligence Service; b) who is in charge of politically motivated surveillance actions, who gives instructions, who are the senior officers in charge of their execution, who drafts surveillance plans in Bucharest and in the country? c) Who carried out the arrests of the officers at Sinaia [The Resistance Group *Sinaia*, n.n.²⁶], who are the detainees and where were they taken? d) Where is general Aldea being detained, who carries out the interrogation, how is the general treated, who is supervising the guards? e) who are the leaders nationwide (by region and district) and what are their formal and informal political tasks, details on their marital status, address, occupation, political activity, loyalty to the system etc.; f) name and short biographical presentation of the senior officers within the Jandamery General Inspectorate, their attitude towards superior cadres and the regime; g) similar data on senior officers (as well as, if possible, junior ones) from the T. Vladimirescu and other divisions; h) What are the services within police and military bodies mentioned above that deal with the Hungarian

²⁴ Also see: James Callanan, *Covert Action in the Cold War. US Policy Intelligence and CIA Operation*, by I. B. Travis & Co Ltd, New York, 2010, pp. 18-52.

²⁵ Early 1947, colonel Brendon is signalled as general and chief of the *Intelligence Service* in Romania.

²⁶ The Resistance Group Sinaia was arrested on June 23-24, 1946. During November 11th-18th 1946, Resistance Organisations were trialed: Black Coats, National Resistance Movement, Avram Iancu's soldiers, The Resistance Group Sinaia.

issues? Managers, senior clerks, supervising cadres, what were they instructed to do and on what purpose? i) Leaders' names and premises of the armed communist factions, as many details as possible on street, number etc.; j) their approximate numbers, whether former social-democrat individuals are also enrolled? k) Other potential deposits of weapons? l) Leaders and premises of Jewish organisations (Zionist and other), details on their paramilitary factions, their location, and number of members, age, instruction drill, and weapons possessed? etc.; m) what is the relationship between Zionist organisations and the Communist Party? n) what is being known about recent lay offs and changes in the Intelligence Service, what is the reason behind, who has been or is about to be replaced?²⁷.

Unfortunately, the operations planned in Romania by the *Office of Special Operations* and the other American intelligence structures were unsuccessful, their failure being hard to explain in Washington²⁸. The Soviet Romanian counterespionage managed to infiltrate the National Peasant Party Supporters and thus compromise the entire action. Americans involved in the operation were forced to leave Romania, and those recruited by the *Office of Special Operations* became targets of public trials organized by communists. Pessimism and the state of terror in which Romanian political elites found themselves can be added to the list of causes at the back of the American failure. Two weeks before the November 19th, 1946 elections, the Central Intelligence Group submitted to the American Government a report intitled: *Communist Pre-Electoral Tactics in Rumania*. The report made a shocking x-ray of the Romanian political stage: "The electoral pattern, carried out so successfully in Yougoslavia and Bulgaria, shows that on November 17 [?], when the Romanian people will vote, the Groza Government expects to win 85% of the votes. (...) The Government has run the campaign through violence and terror, a fact which made it difficult for opposition representatives to submit their candidacy. We assess Romanian elections will be carried out less transparently than the ones in Bulgaria and Yougoslavia. Extreme measurements taken by the government against the opposition suggest the Communist Party believes that it is time the voting process give full justification for turning the country into a communist state. One of the tactics is the premeditated introduction of a difficult procedure which requires filling in no less than 16 separate

²⁷ AN, PCM-SSI, File no. 53/1946, Information Magazine, *Foreign Intelligence Service*, July 4th-23rd, 1946.

²⁸ See also: James Callanan, *Covert Action in the Cold War. US Policy Intelligence and CIA Operation*, by I. B. Travis & Co Ltd, New York, 2010, pp. 18-52.

registration documents for each candidate, some of them being very difficult to obtain. Communists control all printing houses, the radio and press distribution, which means the opposition, cannot carry out an electoral campaign. The Government is discouraging opposition leaders, accusing them of subversive activities. Their homes are frequently searched, some are being arrested, others jailed without a trial. (...) By using what has become by now familiar tactics to produce conflicts, communists have managed to strengthen their position against the opposition, in the context in which both historical parties [PNȚ and PNL] had dissident representatives in the Groza government. At the same time, in their desperate struggle for support, communists allowed former Iron Guard leaders gain positions in the government. Also for the first time in the history of Romania, a now revitalised Army will vote with an obvious result – despite all accounts of individual soldiers' lack of support to the communist ideology. Fearing anti-Semite actions and having gained several concessions, the Jewish Group also promised 200,000 votes for the government block. In this context, Election Day will be a quiet one. Opposition leaders acknowledge their lack of power in countering the terror regime ruling the country. Elections will be supported by the Army, the secret police and militia, approximately 10,000 retired military staff being mobilized for the occasion²⁹.

In drafting the above mentioned report, the US Central Intelligence Department is likely to have also relied on intelligence collected by Colonel Edward Farnsworth who, "valid sources reported", informed the American Commandment at Caserta that: "the (Romanian) government has drafted lists with the names of 120,000 dissidents which are to be sent to concentration camps starting with August 1946, the main goal being that of taking them out of the electoral campaign"³⁰. This is the general picture presented by the *Central Intelligence Group* to the American administration on the Romanian political stage before November 1946.

Lt.-col. Charles W. Hostler, former head of the OSS station in Bucharest, has his own memories on the events. He notes that since the objective of the government controlled by Groza was the physical neutralisation of the political opposition, several refugees requested help

²⁹ (13) Weekly Summary Excerpt, 8 November 1946, *Communist Pre-Electoral Tactics in Rumania*, (Top Secret); <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/>, accessed on 10.10.2011.

³⁰ AN, PCM-SSI, File no. 53/1946, Information Bulletin, Foreign Intelligence Services, 4-23 iulie 1946.

at the US Military Mission in order to escape Romania: “One morning, 6:30 hours, I was called on the phone by Theodor Manicatide, who told me that a Security team was at his house. Manicatide and his family were ordered to get dressed and pack a few things as they were to be arrested. Half dressed in my uniform, I jumped in the jeep and drove like crazy to his house (...). Stepping down from the car, I went straight to the head of the Security team, waving permits granted by the Allied Control Commission. This guy, completely ablaezed by the firm request of an American officer to set that family free, hesitated and went to speak on the phone to his superior. Meanwhile, I got the family and their small luggage into the car and speeded to the US Military Mission Headquarters (...). Finally, around 50 individuals took refuge inside the Mission premises.³¹ (...) Starting that day, our lives became a lot more complicated, threatened not only by the Romanian communist government, but also the soviets (...). During those days, the American Mission headquarters in Bucharest had become too small and the staff could hardly provide food, clothes and beds for the Romanian refugees. A solution for their evacuation had to be found, especially since communist authorities were receiving intelligence suggesting searched opponents were protected inside the American Military Mission building (...). For this purpose, I recommended using a small airplane we had, a DC-3/C-47, initially used once a week to send the mail to the nearest American military avanpost, located in Viena, Austria. To be able to pass the soviet soldiers that guarded the US Mission and the airport, the Mission doctor had sedated the Romanian patriots, who were then put, one by one, in mail bags. Bags were taken by truck to the Băneasa airport and carelessly thrown into the plane. In Viena, they were discreetly unloaded and taken over by US intelligence staff. For ten weeks in a row, five individuals a week were taken out of the country this way. Theodor Manicatide and his family were among them. Some of those evacuated, among which former Foreign Affairs Minister Constantin Vișoianu³², later on formed the Romanian Government in exile that incessantly worked with the West

³¹ In his *Journal*, Van Schuyler recalls that, around June 1st, 1946, engineer Manicatide was arrested for treason in front of the American Mission in Bucharest, being accused of disclosing military intelligence to a foreign power. The US representatives protested and Manicatide was then placed at their disposal. They took Manicatide and his family out of the country and send to Italy. On the same occasion, one of Burton Berry’s trusted secretaries, a Ms. Olteanu, was also arrested. About Manicatide’s departure, Peter Grose mentions that “the loyal spy Manicatide and his family were helped to escape from Romania October, 16th, 1946”.

³² Constantin Vișoianu left Romania late November 1946.

searching solutions to free Romania from the communist regime. (...) Ever since then, I kept a feeling of great affection and admiration towards Romania and the Romanians. In 2004, I came back with my wife, to visit Bucharest, Transylvania, Constantza and Mamaia. As I travelled, memories came back to me”³³. For his deeds, Charles Hostler was congratulated by his superior, general van Schuyler.

Historian Tim Weiner also looked into the events narrated by Charles Hostler. He pointed out that it took only a few weeks for the soviet intelligence services and the Romanian secret police to find out who the spies were: “Americans and their senior agent flew away to escape alive while the soviet security forces crashed most part of the Romanian resistance. PNT leaders were accused of treason and sent to jail. Manicatide, Hamilton and Hall were condemned in absence as a result of a public trial during which witnesses swore the above mentioned declaired themselves to be agents of the new American intelligence service”³⁴.

Historian Peter Grose confirms the implication of General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, head of the American intelligence, in our country. According to Grose’s research, Vandenberg ordered to lieutenant Ira C. Hamilton and major Thomas R. Hall to get involved in organizing the National Peasant Party into a force of resistance: “Major Hall, OSS officer in the Balkans, spoke little Romanian³⁵, while lieutenant Hamilton didn’t speak the language at all. Their guide was Theodor Manicatide, a former seargent of the Romanian army intelligence division, the only significant agent that Frank Wisner recruited two years before”. Grose shows that Manicatide facilitated for Hamilton and Hall meetings with PNT leaders, during which Americans offered the clandestine support of the US: weapons, money

³³ Charles W. Hostler Memoires are intituled: *Soldier to Ambassador: D-Day Normandy Landing to the Persian Gulf War. A memoir Odyssey*, Publisher, San Diego State Univ Pr. 1993, reedited 2004. Unfortunately, for the current research I could not obtain the entire cited work, but only fragments posted on the Internet, as well as the article “*Charles Hostler, the American that saved the lives of 50 Romanian*” signed Petrina Calabalic and published December, 25th, 2008 at: <http://banateanul.gandul.info/ultima-ora/arhiva-banateanul-charles-hostler-americanul-care-a-salvat-vietile-a-50-de-romani-2592207>, where several freagments of the above cited are also reproduced, accessed on 10.10.2011.

³⁴ Tim Weiner, *CIA – A Secret History*, Litera Internațional Publishing House, 2009, p. 26.

³⁵ Thomas Hall had a PhD in Phylosophy and was an expert in South European history (n.n.).

and information. Peter Grose underlines the importance that Manicatide's espionage actions had for the Americans. He doesn't overlook the fact that: "Manicatide was one of the few assests withdrawn [from Romania] by the American special services after resigning from OSS"³⁶.

On November 20th, 1946, Frank Wisner was reading the *New York Times*. On page ten, a brief article informed that his former agent Manicatide, also former employee of the US Mission, was convicted to life imprisonment for having escorted a certain lieutenant Hamilton from the American Military Mission to a PNT congress. By the end of that winter, almost all Romanians who had worked for Wisner were either jailed or deceased. "A brutal dictatorship has been enforced in Romania, the power take over having been hastened also by the American undercover failed operations"³⁷.

As a consequence, the US-URSS relations became even more tensed. The burden fell heavily on the Romanian political opposition members. A new trend occurred as well. Repressive actions by the authorities were now being targeted also at the numerous communist activists and their loyal forces which, during the war, had supported the cooperation with the "Anglo-American allies". Everywhere in Romania and across the communist block, a real witch hunting was taking place. Those who used to have any contact with the Americans were no longer considered trustworthy and became undesirable (illustrative examples being for that matter Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu or Bellu Zilber).

Another consequence of the American failure was that the US interest to our country significantly diminished after 1946, active attention being detoured farther and farther away to the West. The new state of affairs must also be placed in the broader context of the events ongoing around Romania at that time and the strengthening ties between "brethren regimes". Romania thus became a second line objective, of interest to America solely as part of the URSS satellites' group. The terror experienced during those years has been accurately depicted by Rudolf Schoenfeld, the new American minister in Bucharest, who, in July 1947, reported the following:

³⁶ Peter Grose, *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain*, Mariner Books, New York, 2000, p. 165.

³⁷ Tim Weiner, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

“As a matter of fact, no Romanian citizen, I repeat: absolutely no Romanian citizen, has dared enter the Mission to discuss political issues”³⁸.

2. American strategic turning towards the West

Nevertheless, even though Romania has become more and more difficult to penetrate, we cannot state that it had been deserted. On the contrary, American Military Mission members in Bucharest received strict orders to resist as long as possible, American intelligence positions in Romania being the most advanced in the communist block. John Prados, a writer with expertise in the clandestine aspects of the Cold War, confirms that Americans did not abandon the fight against Communism, but, on the contrary, intensified it. Prados shows that, starting with 1947, American secret wars were carried out on all continents. Operations involved thousand of fighters in their respective countries as well as many American agents, including American armed troops. The US involvement took many shapes, from warnings of armed conflict to supporting with any means possible the invasion of independent states or carrying out surprise attacks side by side with paramilitary forces³⁹. We can then conclude that the strategic turning of the clandestine war towards the West represented, and must be understood as a withdrawal in the face of the communist espionage, otherwise very aggressive. Having lost Romania, and we underline here *lost not abandoned*, US attention turned to Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, there as well, the situation eventually took the same turn. Very eloquent was President Dwight Eisenhower's declaration, made after the Hungarian revolt of 1956, when pressure was placed on him to carry out a military intervention. Then, he bitterly remarked: “Now, Hungary is as inaccessible to Americans as Tibet”⁴⁰. In conclusion, the US needed to rethink the American strategy to counter communism. This was going to be focused rather on “containment”, from margins to center, as a sort of continuous “prospective operation” in search of weak points to be exploited when time will come, either via a real war or via actions aimed at undermining from within.

³⁸ Joseph F. Harrington, Bruce J. Courtney, *Relații româno-americane, 1940-1990*, Institutul European, Iași, 2002, p. 85.

³⁹ John Prados, *Războaiele Secrete ale Președinților. Operațiunile sub acoperire desfășurate de CIA și Pentagon, începând cu perioada celui de-Al Doilea Război Mondial, până la Golful Persic*, Editura ELIT, Tipografia MULTIPRINT, Iași, 1996, p. 10.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 126-127.

Early summer 1947, American agents in South Eastern Europe informed the US Central Intelligence Direction that URSS accelerated the cultural, economic and military programme aimed at its satellites' coordination. It was a sign that the Soviets had set forth a new political strategy to isolate Central and Eastern Europe. The report intitled *Apparent Soviet Plans in Eastern Europe*, drafted by the US Central Intelligence Direction (CIG), attracted attention that URSS wanted to form a Slavic Federation or a Balkanic one, engulfing Yougoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and, eventually, the Greek Macedonia. Plans were also made to form a Danubian Federation, to include Hungary, Romania and, possibly, Cehoslovakia. At the same time, URSS apparently aimed at enforcing a new control system – via intercultural and economic links, as well as military agreements and alliances. CIG mentioned that Poland, Cehoslovakia and Yougoslavia are already linked to URSS by such arrangements and plans were made for the recent Romanian – Yougoslavian Agreement and the imminent Romanian – Bulgarian agreement to be used to enlarge the circle, Hungary being the next link in the network. American analysts were of the opinion that, for URSS, such a network of alliances bore the advantage of turning into a real federation. Nevertheless, it was also stated that the soviet federation plan run the risk of triggering intensified national opposition⁴¹.

Another worrying element was represented by the soviet strategy of postponing the signing of Peace treaties with its satellites. The US Central Intelligence Direction (CIG) assessed that the passive attitude of the West towards the states found under soviet occupation, “allowed the Soviet Union consider itself strong enough to ratify treaties without any prejudice to its domination force (...). Now [July 1947], there is enough evidence to suggest that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan stipulations forced the Soviet Union reconsider its position towards Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria”. Strictly referring to Romania, CIG assessed: “Once the Peace Treaty is ratified, despite total control on country's economy, there is hope that soviet positions will be weakened by King Mihai and Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the National Peasant Party which remains the symbol of popular opposition against the communist government. Most likely, the Treaty is not going to be ratified until Maniu and PNT will not be eliminated from the Romanian political stage and until solutions are not found to get rid of the King Mihai (...). The absence of any popular demonstrations against the recent arrest of Maniu and his supporters is likely to encourage

⁴¹ (25). *Apparent Soviet Plans in Eastern Europe* (Top Secret), Weekly Summary Excerpt, 20 June 1947; <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/>.

the communists to take a decision against King Mihai I⁴². As it is well known, the Groza government did not hesitate to take the decision and King Mihai lost his governing powers.

The Anglo-American hesitation during 1947, can be partially explained by the fact that the two states hoped the Peace Treaties would force the Red Army withdraw from Romania and then, they could act on the spot. In Bucharest, rumours said that “the US and Great Britain postponed any intention towards Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland until Russian troops withdraw, this being the reason behind their own postponing of signing the peace treaties with the former German satellite countries”⁴³.

Soviets, though, had their own plan B, apparently being ready to annex Romania. Confirmation on this intention is found in an American document issued by R.H. Hillenkoetter, *Director of Central Intelligence*. On June 17th, 1948, Hillenkoetter warned subordinate structures that: “This August, URSS intends to voluntarily incorporate Romania to URSS, the action being planned as follows: 1) The Communist Party Government has the country under control and is sufficiently anchored; 2) The Romanian Orthodox Church shall be better controlled by the Patriarch Marina; 3) In August, peasants will be busy with crops and won’t have either time or attention to political changes, as this is going to be the last problem on their minds; 4) The US will be well over head in Presidential elections, so a reaction from the West is not to be expected”⁴⁴. Motivation behind the Soviets giving up the plan of annexing Romania remains unknown, but it is possible that it was a result of the new soviet strategy to clean the international image promoted by Moscow. Then, in the summer of 1948, industry and the financial banking system nationalization, the control enforced over the Orthodox Church and the birth of the National Security as an institution of official repression, gave a new dimension to the terror regime in Romania.

⁴² (29) Weekly Summary Excerpt, 25 July 1947, *Strategy of Soviet Delay in Treaty Ratification*; <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/>, accessed on 10.10.2011.

⁴³ Conf: Alin Spănu, *History of Romanian Intelligence/Counterespionage Services between 1919-1945*, Demiurg Publishing House, Iași, 2010, p. 596; the author cites Central Historical National Archives, fond MR-IGA.

⁴⁴ *Memorandum for Assistant Director, Collection & Dissemination, Assistant Director, Reports & Estimates and Assistant Director, Special Operations*, 17 June 1948, R. H. Hillenkoetter; www.foia.cia.gov/best-of-crest/, accessed March 21st, 2012.

3. The Communist Regime in Romania is plotting against the West

Bad news for Americans also came from the so called “safe” territories. In November 1948, CIA analysts warned their government on “the more and more aggressive strategy of the communist block in the heart of enemy territory, concerning political issues of Western democracies”. The report intitled *France: Soviet Pressure; Communist Labor*, for example, highlights important issues. Beside the details it provides on latest URSS operations and its satellite countries in supporting and financing miners on strike in France, the report also unveils the first actions by which the Romanian Communist Party got involved in international clandestine operations (Romania carrying out such actions in Greece). According to CIA: “Lately, URSS and working parties in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania provided 90,000,000 francs (approximately 288,000 US dollars) to support the strike of the French miners. This support is unprecedented yet still irrelevant if compared to the help soviets provided to the same strikers along the years. All these soviet actions clearly demonstrate their plan to sabotage the European reconstruction programme”⁴⁵.

And surprises were not over. Another CIA report depicted Romania as taking over a much more important role in sabotaging democracies in France and Italy than we would expect. On December 1st, 1947, US ambassador in Rome, Mr. Dunn, got hold of a document containing an assessment of the recent special conference of the Cominform in Poland. The document stated: “Politburo Sovietic is the direct coordinator of all communist campaigns against governments of France and Italy. Campaigns involve interventions which can be described as rather violent than constitutional. Although general strikes to block operations of the European reconstruction programme represented a preferred type of intervention, communists did not restrict to this method. The campaign was directly supervised, from Moscow, by Zhdanov, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, via his personal representative Ana Pauker, the Romanian Foreign Affairs minister. Mrs. Pauker was a member in the new Special Committee from Belgrade, made up of communist parties’ representatives from URSS, Yugoslavia, France and Italy, which operated independently from Cominform, with which body, it was, however, expected to synchronize communist actions in France and Italy. The Committee disposed

⁴⁵ (110). *France: Soviet Pressure; Communist Labor* (Secret), Weekly Summary Excerpt, 26 Nov. 1948; <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/>, accessed on 10.10.2011.

of unlimited means, which included financing, food and military equipments, so that the campaign could be carried out effectively". In its assessment on the information supplied by the US ambassador in Rome, CIA gave the following forecast: "We consider the communist movements in France and Italy as incapable of taking control over said states without material support from the outside. Such support would, in turn, trigger the risk of a major conflict and URSS is not, at the current moment, ready for a conflict"⁴⁶.

The next year, in 1949, the *Central Intelligence Agency* became even more pessimistic in its assessments. In a large Intelligence Memorandum, *Satellite Relations with the URSS and the West*, the American agency attracted the attention of policy makers on a series of conclusions with respect to current affairs in Central and Eastern Europe. The disappointment of American analysts was visible: "URSS succeeded in imposing its domination over Eastern Europe, by using methods and instruments of intimidation and control (...), exercising a decisive military pressure (...), and controlling communist parties via Moscow trusted agents (...), while the soviet secret police holds control over all police and security forces in the satellite countries. (...) Soviet domination and control are stronger in the Balkans, especially in Romania and Bulgaria, than states from the North"⁴⁷. In a subchapter intitled "Satellites vulnerabilities to a potential separation from Kremlin", above mentioned document expresses strong opinions on URSS satellites, showing that: "Direct extension of the soviet control over the satellites, as well as the power instruments in the hand of communist parties annihilate any potential separation from the Soviet Union even by war. (...) Although 90% of the population in these states is hostile to communist regimes, it is very difficult for the respective majority to be activated, a fact which became obvious when the population itself was directly attacked by communists (...). An illustrative example is represented by the Orthodox Church, which, although representing the majority in the Balkans, succumbed to the instruments used by communists. (...) Albania is, of all the satellites, the most likely to defect, due to its geographic position, in relative isolation, and the instability of the current regime. (...) Poland is also a serious candidate, as 95% of its population

⁴⁶ (46) Daily Summary Excerpt, December 1st, 1947, (Top Secret) *Reported Communist Drive to Seize Power in France and Italy*; <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/>, accessed on 10.10.2011.

⁴⁷ Doc: Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: *Satellite Relations with the URSS and the West*, Intelligence Memorandum No. 248, 7 November 1949, Secret, Approved for release, June 2000, NND 965059; <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/>, accessed on 10.10.2011.

is catholic and obviously nationalistic. (...) On the other hand, there is Romania, where the soviet control is exerted everywhere. Romania is considered to be the least capable to separate from its masters in Kremlin. (...) The communist regime in Romania will continue to control closely the population and the country will be brought as close as possible to being incorporated by URSS (...). Although some Communist Party members can be replaced, the nationalistic deviation of the Romanians cannot be considered as a threat to the pro soviet regime. The history of political adaptability of the Romanians explains, most likely, their reaction to the current soviet dominance. Most Romanians believe that soviet domination will end with the current leaders' neutralization. Anyway, **the Romanian people are incapable of carrying out a subversive action against the regime, the attitude it displays being one of hostile inertia** [our bold]. Political parties have been destroyed. Church does not represent a stronghold against the soviet control either, the anticommunist Roman Catholic, Unitary and Orthodox clerics having already been bent down. Practically, we have no indicator to attest that illegal resistance exists or will be developed [in Romania]. At the current moment, the small, apparently spontaneous, riots are caused merely by dissatisfaction over working conditions or state appropriation of agricultural land. To conclude, given the mentioned situation, the coordination and development of small opposition groups to form a movement of resistance cannot be done in this country"⁴⁸. We also note that quoted document, *Satellite Relations with the URSS and the West*, seems to have been drafted by major Robert Bishop, former OSS officer in Bucharest or somebody under his coordination⁴⁹.

4. Communists and the tactics of the coup d'état – a lesson learnt by Americans in Romania

In 1950, CIA (ORE – *Office of Reports and Estimates*) presented a synthesis entitled *Theory and Practice of Communist Subversion*⁵⁰, an incursion into "close supervision of the soviets and their actions to occupy a state", that being the objective followed by Frank Wisner and

⁴⁸ Doc.: Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: *Satellite Relations with the URSS and the West*, Intelligence Memorandum No. 248, 7 November 1949, secret, approved for release, June 2000, NND 965059; <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/>, accessed on 10.10.2011.

⁴⁹ On the original document there can be found the following handwritten mention: *Return to → mr. Bishop.*

⁵⁰ Doc.: *Theory and Practice of Communist Subversion*, Central Intelligence Agency (ORE 56-49), 28 February 1950, p. 176; <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/>, accesat la data de 10.10.2011.

his OSS mission in Bucharest. Personally, I consider the document has many similarities with the famous work “The tactics of the coup d’etat” of Curzio Malaparte. *Theory and Practice of Communist Subversion* is, in fact, an early warning manual against communist danger and soviet occupation. Even though it does not explicitly mention that, the document makes reference to actions and facts used by communist guerrilla to take over power in Romania and neighbouring countries. In the subchapter intitled “Intelligence activities of the Communist parties”, ORE presents the priorities of the communist insurgents, as well as a “General scheme for taking over power in the city by the communist insurgents” with the following steps: 1) taking over police headquarters and departments, cutting off its connections to the outside; 2) occupying the city hall; 3) occupying headquarters of all state authorities in order to paralyse all industry and transport infrastructure depending on them; 4) taking over main railways knots and stations, bus terminals, airports, all points which could be used by government forces; and 5) occupying main communication knots, phones, telegraph, radio. All these actions, warned ORE: “are aimed at paralysing the government and its loyal forces, serving as a psychological weapon in disseminating and intensifying panic and disorder within civilians. (...) Once the city has been occupied, a new [comunist] military organisation is ready to take control. New people are recruited, new authorities are being set and any type of resistance is quickly suppressed. (...) When taking over a city, communists always rely on the element of surprise. They frequently mobilize a number of forces that continuously hinder authorities with false alarms, so as, at the moment of the real communist attack, they are taken by surprise. Most of the times, communist insurrections take place early morning, when well organised and prepared groups of so called strikers simultaneously take over said objectives”⁵¹.

Theory and Practice of Communist Subversion places great emphasis to the intelligence activities carried out by the communist parties: “When the Communist party aims to become a revolutionary organisation, it first acquires the capacity to quantify factual information in order to be able to correctly estimate its capabilities in the hostile relationship with the environment in which it operates, but also the resources it can organise against opposition etc. (...) The party must identify the most important areas

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

in which it must take action. What are the political and economic capacities as well as the other circumstances that can insure success? What are the individual, collective or governmental obstacles it must face? What are the weaknesses of the opposition? How strong is the support it can rely on in case neutral masses arise? What are the problems which could be exploited in the most profitable way? (...) For this, the Communist Party develops an entire range of intelligence operations. The party machinery, including auxiliary personnel and sympathisers, represents at the same time an intelligence system and an organisation in action. Individually, each member reports on a hierarchy, intelligence being rapidly passed to the Political Bureau and members of the Central Committee having seats in the Parliament. (...) Some communist parties have set up special departments for research, including economic ones. Intelligence is collected, analysis is drafted and reports are processed for the benefit of party leaders. (...) An important segment of the communist party intelligence is represented by party newspapers, their reporters and correspondents. They all form a priceless source of information, intense cooperation being carried out on an international level as well [exchange of information] between "brethren" parties. (...) Another segment of the party intelligence comes from specific activities, such as *covert intelligence*, which consist of information on the private life of hostile personalities, details from the inside about government and hostile political parties capabilities, information on plans and activities carried out by the police, security services and armed forces, information on internal administration and governmental officials, as well as data on the development of industrial capacities and technical progress. (...) Most of the times, the intelligence apparatus of the communist party is difficult to detect, as it is highly secured. Personal loyalties between leaders and members, tested over time, contribute to this effect. Indoctrination also plays an important role. (...) The General Secretary and the Cadre Department jointly organize and control party intelligence operations. Heads of the party intelligence structures target all coercive state bodies (police, army, and security services), the state administrative apparatus and hostile political groups, as communists believe all these authorities's main role is to prevent communist revolutions from happening. Therefore, most of the party staff specialized

in intelligence is trained and indoctrinated in URSS, within special schools. (...) To insure counterintelligence, the Communist Party considers all its cadres must be protected from potential measures of penetration carried out either by police agents and informants, or by agents of hostile [foreign] intelligence services. This way, the party tasks either an officer or a special department. As a rule, party's internal security is assigned to the Cadre Department (Personnel) as well as the Control Commission. The latter (also called Discipline and Security Commission) is devoted to the party leader and has the power to carry out investigation, answer allegations, and provide solutions and suggestions. By consequence, the Control Commission traditionally represents the the "High Court" of the communist party, and, is, regularly, the one who issues sentences and can decide on excluding somebody from the party ranks. The Cadre Department has broader attributions, it being tasked to collect intelligence from all fields of activity that are of interest to the party: political, private (intimate), biographies, economic, religious, educational and job history. According to party interests, the Cadre Department assigns and organises the best communist militants. It also keeps up to date records of all changes occurred in the lives and status of party members and can also decide to place suspected offenders under surveillance (...) ⁵².

5. Conclusion

It is our assessment that actions carried out during the events unfolding in Romania represented an opportunity the American intelligence used to study, on the spot, the techniques and methods used by the soviets in undermining democracies of states that they either occupied or placed under their influence. The expertise gained here was later on used as foundation for countering communist guerillas which threatened democracies in the Free World. The American agents sacrifice on the Romanian front was not in vain. The other part of Europe, which managed to maintain its freedom, must be grateful to them.

⁵² *Ibidem.*

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