

## **HISTORY AND MEMORY IN INTELLIGENCE**



## THE ROMANIAN SECRET SERVICE (SSI): FROM AGENT TO HUMINT COLLECTOR

Bogdan Alexandru TEODOR\*

Mihaela TEODOR\*\*

### Abstract

*Talent or human capital is the most important single factor that determines business success or failure. In this respect, the topic of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), or what is more popularly referred to as people, talent, human capital, was and remain one of the hottest topic of the intelligence history. Today, HUMINT may be defined as the collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector, from people and their associated documents. During the entire interwar period, the chief of Romanian Secret Service (SSI) strived to introduce modern principles for conducting the Romanian intelligence activity, as archival documents state. One of the modern principles applied was the permanent concern for recruitment of human sources or agents. Having in mind the contemporary definition of HUMINT, this paper aim to provide a historical perspective on the Romanian Interwar Secret Service's policy of recruitment, trying to identify inside the structure of the SSI the defining elements of intelligence.*

**Keywords:** *intelligence, agent, HUMINT collector, Romanian Secret Service, interwar period*

### Introduction

The role of the Romanian intelligence services from the interwar period, as well as their structural evolution and main areas of activity were

---

\*Associate Professor Dr. within "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, teodobogdanalexandru@gmail.com

\*\* Researcher Dr. within National Institute for Intelligence Studies, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, teodor\_mihaela@yahoo.com

closely connected to the domestic and foreign risk factors.<sup>1</sup> To cope with the challenges, during the entire interwar period, the chief of Romanian Secret Service (SSI) strived to introduce modern principles for conducting the Romanian intelligence activity, as archival documents state. One of the modern principles applied was the permanent concern for recruitment of human (re)sources or agents, being generally accepted that talent or human capital is the most important single factor that determines business success or failure.

Starting with the contemporary definition of HUMINT collector, used by military intelligence field manuals or intelligence dictionaries, this paper aim to provide a historical perspective on the Romanian Interwar Secret Service's (SSI) policy of recruitment, trying to identify inside the structure SSI the defining elements of intelligence. First, we will define the terminology used for the purpose of our study. After a short presentation of the changes occurred in intelligence field during the Great War, we will examine the Secret Service's archival documents in order to identify which was the recruitment policy and what were the characteristics of intelligence agents and if there is a similarity with the characteristics of the HUMINT collector.

**What means what!** The term "agent" was often used in the intelligence literature to refer both to officers and the people they recruited or sources, which can often be confusing. According to the contemporary intelligence dictionaries, "the agent is a person unofficially employed by an intelligence service, often as a source of information" (*Language of espionage*). The same contemporary literature refers to the person recruiting the agent as either "officer" or "case officer". In accordance with the Romanian archive documents used in this research as main sources, we will use the term "agent" to refer to the person being recruited and employed by the Intelligence structure to obtain secrets or carry out covert activities (Suvorov, 1984).

---

<sup>1</sup> A version of this article has already been published as Bogdan TEODOR, Mihaela TEODOR, *The Great War and the Romanian military intelligence structures: changes in the recruitment policy*, in The 14<sup>th</sup> International Scientific Conference "Strategies XXI". Strategic Changes in Security and International Relations, Vol. 2, eds. Gheorghe Calopăreanu, Iulian Martin, Constantin Popescu, Ioana Enache, Gelu Alexandrescu, Daniel Ghiba, Marius Serbeszki, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, April 26-27, 2018, pp.184-194, ISSN 2285-8415, accessible on-line at <https://www.strategii21.ro/A/2018-04.%20STRATEGIC%20CHANGES%20IN%20SECURITY%20AND%20INTERNATIONAL%20RELATIONS/Security%20and%20Defence%20Faculty%20Vol%202%20Strategic%20changes%20in%20security%20and%20international%20relations%202018.pdf>

The Human Intelligence Collector, commonly referred to as HUMINT, provide Army leaders with vital information about enemy forces, dispositions, plans, tactics, strengths, and weaknesses, as well as detailed information about the battlefield (*U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual*, 2015). HUMINT may be defined as the collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector, from people and their associated documents (press, letters, official documents etc.) (*Human Intelligence Collector Operation*, 2006, p. 22; *U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual*, 2015).<sup>2</sup>

HUMINT includes overt, sensitive, and clandestine activities and the individuals who exploit, control, supervise, or support these sources (Air Force Pamphlet, 1990). HUMINT collectors, conduct screenings, interrogations, and debriefings of civilians on the battlefield, prisoners of war and detainees to collect information, participate in intelligence gathering operations; draft intelligence reports (*U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual*, 2015). Therefore, HUMINT activities require significant time to identify and develop potential sources of information. HUMINT collectors interact with and question other human beings and will often be a qualified linguist in the target area language. Based upon these skill sets, commanders may assign HUMINT collectors missions similar to activities often associated with civil affairs, criminal investigative command, or interpreters or translators (*Human Intelligence Collector Operation*, 2006, p. 20).

A HUMINT source is a person from whom information can be obtained. Potential HUMINT sources include threat, neutral, and friendly military and civilian personnel, as stressed *The Stratford Glossary of Useful, Baffling and Strange Intelligence Terms*. Categories of HUMINT sources include but are not limited to detainees, refugees, local inhabitants, friendly forces, and members of foreign governmental and non-governmental organizations (*Human Intelligence Collector Operation*, 2006, p. 22).

As we stressed already, based on definition of HUMINT collector, this paper aims to provide a historical perspective on the Romanian Interwar Secret Service's policy of recruitment, trying to identify inside the structure of SSI the defining elements of HUMINT collector and to prove that the Romanian Intelligence Service from interwar period was a modern one.

---

<sup>2</sup>According to the *U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual*, 2015, 'HUMINT is the collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector (military occupational specialties [MOSs] 97E, 351Y [formerly 351C], 351M [formerly 351E], 35E, and 35F), from people and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines'.

### The Great War and the Romanian intelligence structures

Researchers agree that the Great War changed modern warfare, military intelligence evolving as a significant force arm in most of the participating countries. Moreover, most of national intelligence structures were forced to rapidly modernize, revising espionage and intelligence tradecraft to fit changing battlefield tactics and technological advances. At the outbreak of the war, many nations had weak or fledgling national intelligence communities. Thus, the experience of the war formed the first modern intelligence services, serving as forbearers of the intelligence communities in France, Britain, Germany, and Romania.<sup>3</sup> As Terrence J. Finnegan stressed in his research, when the war was over “many nations participating in the conflict realized the necessity for some sort of permanent intelligence services, or large government intelligence agencies” (Finnegan, 2009).

The situation of Romania during last period before the outbreak of World War I was extremely complicated<sup>4</sup>. The state was situated between two powers: Austria-Hungary and Russia. So, it had to conduct the policy of cautious balance, even if part of the Romanian political elites presented evident pro-German sympathies. However, in 1914, political and economic influences of Russia and France became much more effective than dynastic links with Germany. King Charles I Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen tried to argue about the necessity of Romanian access to the alliance with Central Powers in the context of Bucharest's aspirations for Bessarabia, but he had to accept the status of Romanian neutrality (see more in *Romania during First World War*, 1987, vol. 2). After the outbreak of European war, Romania tried to maintain the neutrality, officially declared on August 4th, 1914. This policy lasted to 1916, but in the atmosphere of regular diplomatic pressures from both sides of the conflict. However, key-events took place in August 1916. On August 17th Romania signed in Bucharest political treaty and military convention with Entente. Bucharest received guarantees of territorial integrity and promises of concrete compensations (Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina).

Thus, Romania entered the Great War, beginning military operations against Austria-Hungary on August 28<sup>th</sup> 1916. The Romanian Army was quite

<sup>3</sup> See more about the French intelligence at Eric Denécé, *Les Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité Français: perspective historique*, in “Note Historique”, Centre Français de Recherches sur le Renseignement, no. 47, Novembre, 2016. Read more about British Intelligence on Nigel West (coord.), (2015), *Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence*, Second Edition, Rowman & Littlefield, New York – London. Read more about German Intelligence on Adrienne Wilmoth Lerner, *World War I. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security* available on-line on <http://www.faqs.org/espionage/Vo-Z/World-War-I.html>

<sup>4</sup> Read more about Romania and the Great War in: *Romania during First World War*, 1987, vol. 2; *România în Marele Război*. Testimonies available on <https://ispaim.mapn.ro/pages/view/118>.

large, with over 650,000 men in 23 divisions, but it suffered from poor training and equipment and lack of organized intelligence, particularly when compared to its German counterparts (*Romania during First World War*, 1987, vol. 2, pp. 832-833). At the front, the conservative military culture was forced to grapple with its tradition and make sense of combat in the new stationary environment. Concerning the Romanian military intelligence component, there was an Information Office within the General Headquarters (Bureau 5, Section III) which had in 1916 only 14 officers and some civilians as translators and designers (Spânu, 2012, pp. 202-211).

According to archive documents, the mission of the Information Office was to search, collect, and centralize information about the enemy by using various means: "secret agents behind the front lines, secret agents in the area of operations, military and civilian authorities at the border, and aerial recognition" (Spânu, 2012, p. 74). The secret agents sent behind the front lines should recruit informers and collect information about enemies' war preparations and population's mood. The secret agents sent in the area of operations should recruit informers and collect military information, and additionally they should act as counterespionage agents.

In practice the military intelligence structure does not look like that organized structure provided by the documents, as Col. Nicolae Condeescu, the future Head of the Information Section, states in his document from April 1918: "at the mobilization were set up information offices at Armies, Army corps and divisions, but were not prepared, did not exist officers well trained and doctrine. Instructions from head office could not be met easily." (Spânu, 2012, pp. 267-269) Thus, most of the archive documents stressed that at the beginning of 1916 the Romanian military intelligence structure was not very well organized, although officials talked about secret agents special trained for intelligence work and recruiting informers and spies with special funds provided by the army. Moreover, security agents from Direction of Police and General Security had to be seconded to the military units to carry out intelligence collection and counterespionage (Spânu, 2012, p. 74).

The lack of organization was reflected in the defeat suffered in the first part of the Romanian campaign with major repercussions on the military potential and combat capacity of the Romanian Armed Forces. During first months the Romanian forces broke into Transylvania on the depth 130 km, but there were first and last successes. On December 1916, allied forces entered to Bucharest, and the next year Germans and Austrians conquered southern Moldova and whole Wallachia (*Romania during First World War*, 1987, vol. 2). Romania suffered over 200,000 military casualties and two thirds of the country fell under a harsh occupation regime, the Government and the King had to retreat to Moldova.



Mărășești battle.

Source: <https://romaniadacia.wordpress.com/2014/11/16/for-the-heroes>

In 1917, when both belligerent sides were making huge efforts to win the final victory, for Romania it was vitally important to rebuilt the Army in order to expel the occupying forces, since the existence of the Romanian state depended on it. Romania embarked on the reconstruction and strengthening of its combat capability during the first half of 1917 through multiple national efforts and allied help. The Romanian Army's reconstruction involved both re-organization and modernization, especially in terms of intelligence. The reorganization was initiated by King Ferdinand and the Romanian government. It was carried on under their leadership and control in the free national territory. A notable contribution to the reconstruction of the Romanian army was made by the 1,600-strong French military mission led by General Henri Mathias Berthelot (Tănase, 2015), which supervised the process and helped retrain Romanian troops.



French military mission led by General Henri Mathias Berthelot

Source: [https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misiunea\\_Militar%C4%83\\_Francez%C4%83\\_\(1916-1918\)](https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misiunea_Militar%C4%83_Francez%C4%83_(1916-1918))

General Henri Berthelot, with a part of his mission colleagues<sup>5</sup>, set up headquarters in Iași and became actively involved in solving tasks concerning cooperation with the representatives of the allied states.

The reorganization pursued the reduction of the effectives of the "Operations Army" to parameters that suited the country's resources for waging a long campaign. The infantry divisions were ensured identical structure to make replacements and maneuvers easier on the battlefield. The army corps became only a command body for tactical coordination. The cavalry divisions received more machine guns. The artillery material underwent a homogenization process, with two regiments for each division, while the heavy artillery was organized as a distinct group (*Romania during First World War*, 1987, vol. 2). Priority was given to trench warfare, the assimilation of new military technology and night combat. Considerable progress was achieved with the technical-material equipment of the army by means of its provisioning with armament, ammunition and other combat resources from inside the country, but even more importantly from abroad (*Romania during First World War*, 1987, vol. 2).

The reorganization also involved the other troops (combat engineers, air force, navy), and services as Information Service which underwent notable improvements with the help of French specialists. The directions, organization and methodology of the training of the command staff and the troops were considerably improved and special training centers were set up. Together with this corps of elite officers and technicians, General Henri Mathias Berthelot managed to inspire the Romanian army with the French methodical, clear spirit, as the *Deuxième Bureau* inspired the Romanian Secret Service.

### **Reorganization, emphasis on professionalism and continuity in intelligence work: from information officers to intelligence agents**

If in the first months of the Great War the Romanian Intelligence proved not existed, in the battlefield, Romanian military leaders learned that access to accurate and timely information was essential to gain advantage in battle. After the Army reorganization, their command and control came to

---

<sup>5</sup> See more about the French military mission in Romania at Dumitru Preda, *Berthelot și România/Berthelot et la Roumanie*, (1997), Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House; Petre Otu, *L'influence de la doctrine militaire française sur l'évolution de l'armée roumaine (1878-1940)*, in "Revue historique des armées", no. 244 / 2006, pp. 28-49. Petre Otu (coord.), *Reforma militară și societatea în România, de la Carol I a a doua conflagrație mondială*, Occasional papers, Year 6, no. 8, 2007.

depend on constantly collected intelligence from a rapidly expanding list of sources and methods to support decisions from the planning stages to their execution.



Source: <https://romaniadacia.wordpress.com/2014/11/16/for-the-heroes>

For doing this, they accepted the creation of a permanent intelligence entity inside the Romanian Army, having as model the similar French regulation, as it was stated in the official document entitled *Instructions regarding the organization and functioning of the Intelligence Service* released on February 20, 1917 (Spânu, 2012, pp. 225-234; Spânu, 2010, pp. 117-118). There, we can find guidance on Service's organization principles, its recruitment policy and mission, and the first mention of the Secret Service. There was a special organization with responsibilities in "issues of both espionage agency and counterespionage" for which were issued special instructions on April 15, 1917: *Instructions on measures to be taken by Major Staff, services or army bodies in order to avoid indiscretions and guard us against enemy espionage*. (Spânu, 2012, pp. 235-237) According to this document, one of the innovations introduced in the organization of intelligence and counterintelligence structures was collecting intelligence by using nonofficial covers or secret agents permanent employees of the Secret Service, and trained personnel to centralize and exploit information gathered. Moreover, the document provide information about intelligence agents who must had morality and been trained to respect the principles on organization of the intelligence work as: conducting screenings, interrogations, and debriefings of civilians on the battlefield, prisoners of war and detainees to collect information, participate in intelligence gathering operations; partitioning and transmitting information in special conditions. Some of those characteristics we can identify in the list of HUMINT collectors definition.

Thus, we can state that it was about professionalizing the collecting information job, the information officer turning into intelligence agent.


At the same time the first document provide information about the prisoners or deserters interrogations as a principal mean to collect information about enemy used by Romanian intelligence agents (Spânu, 2012, pp. 230-231). We can already recognize some of the HUMINT collector characteristics: interrogations to be made only by intelligence officers and translators from intelligence offices of every army unit. As we know Human intelligence includes the most basic form of military intelligence, which is observation. In the Great War, and not only, Romanian soldiers at the front lines watched their enemies for details that might provide information on what the enemy is doing, as well as where and when and how fast.

By the summer of 1917, the Romanian Army stood on more equal ground with their enemies, in terms of intelligence work as specialists state. The results of the reorganization and modernization were visible, being confirmed in the great battles of the 1917 year. The work of the intelligence agents contributed to the three great battles, decisive for the Romanian nation's destiny, delivered at Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz, representing a turning point in the war on the Eastern front (*Romania during First World War*, 1987, vol. 2, pp. 832-833).

In the 1917 reorganization process, Romanian soldiers and officers were trained in new intelligence skills developed on the Western Front, as stressed the provisions of a new normative document from January 20, 1918: *Instructions on the duties of the various echelons of Intelligence Service* (Spânu, 2012, pp. 256-266). The document provided the information requirements, the intelligence means and personnel. Thus, everyday combat operations at every echelon, especially by infantry and artillery elements, led to intelligence collection opportunities.

Each combat unit had its own information office and procedures requiring collection and dissemination of information within its sector, by intelligence officers and special agents. They conducted screenings, interrogations, and debriefings of civilians on the battlefield, prisoners of war and detainees to collect information, and drafted intelligence reports. All reports generated by daily operations supplemented other material including aerial photography and patrols observation. According to Terrence J. Finnegan, the most voluminous source of intelligence information in positional war came from the interrogation of prisoners. (Finnegan, 2009, pp. 29-30) In the Great War, the capture and retention of prisoners took place during all levels of operations on both sides. Not only was a captive one less

threat, prisoners were often treasure troves of information on critical issues that other forms of collection threw no light on.



Source: <https://romaniadacia.wordpress.com/2014/11/16/for-the-heroes>

Concerning the prisoner interrogations, the document state that: "Interrogation of a deserter or prisoner will give good results if executed by officer informant from Regiment even in an observer or trenches so that the prisoner can show on the ground the points on which he make declarations" (Spânu, 2012, pp. 253) It took great care in separating prisoners. Personal letters, documents, and correspondence taken from prisoners helped in identifying opposing units and provided information for tactical and strategic analysis. Interrogators used data from detailed photographic mosaics of his sector to trace with sources, prisoner or deserter, their itineraries from the rear to the front line trench network, confirming statements with specific details from photographs to include an isolated tree, house, or any other visible feature.


Human intelligence also came from the interrogation of repatriated civilians who crossed through Allied lines from German-held territory. Interviews were normally conducted by intelligence personnel in the sector in which they crossed to whatever information the refugees had on nearby German activity and intentions. Today this are the features of an HUMINT collector job.

The information offices also had a counterintelligence component where intelligence agents were instructed to look for the antennae of enemy listening devices. At the same time the Information Office had a Secret Service which was appointed with a military officers as head of the Service, a police officers and a number of secret agents for espionage and counterespionage activities.

### **A permanent intelligence service with specialized elements: from agents to HUMINT collectors**

After the 1917 campaign, the head of the Information Office within the Romanian Army's the General Headquarters realized the necessity for some sort of permanent intelligence service. Thus, in the Report no. 289 from April 28, 1918, Col. Nicolae Condeescu, the Head of the Information Office, proposed the organizing principles of a permanent intelligence structure after the demobilization from July 1<sup>st</sup>, 1918 (Spânu, 2012, pp. 267-269), proposal approved in May by General Christescu. The document prove the military leaders' interest to keep the Information Office organization and functioning: two offices and the Secret Service appointed with special intelligence agents for espionage and counterespionage activities.

Until 1927, Army's the Secret Service, which was the core of the Romanian Intelligence Service from interwar period, was organized and reorganized several times however keeping its mission: collecting intelligence by using nonofficial covers or secret agents permanent employees of the Secret Service, and trained personnel to centralize and exploit information gathered



Col. Nicolae Condeescu and Mihail Moruzov.

Source: [https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolae\\_Condeescu](https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolae_Condeescu) and [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mihail\\_Moruzov.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mihail_Moruzov.jpg)

A special moment was the 1924 year when at the head of the Secret Service was appointed Mihail Moruzov. During the entire time he ran the Secret Service, Mihail Moruzov strived to introduce modern principles for conducting the intelligence activity. For this, he emphasized the need for a modern recruitment policy, which principles reflect in the future organization

instructions. Specialized military and civilian personnel which can be characterized as HUMINT collector was targeted.

The Secret Service was reorganized through the *Provisional Instructions on Intelligence* (1927) – 6 sections were established – and specialized military and civilian personnel was employed. The objectives of the Secret Service were stated in article 42: “the Secret Service gathers, sometimes, accurate intelligence of vital importance for conducting operations, and this is often mixed with false information. Using it requires precision and an in-depth verification of sources” (Spânu, 2010, pp. 136-137).

The new context also allowed the elaboration of working norms aiming first and foremost to strengthen the counterintelligence capabilities. Consequently, inside the Secret Service was elaborated a set of documents entitled *Measures to insure that the enemy's intelligence activities carried out through spies do not succeed* (Spânu, 2010, p. 137), which set out the main lines of action or Service's requirements: 1) rigorously controlling both the foreigners who live inside the country and those who want to enter it; 2) surveillance of suspected military and civilian individuals; 3) surveillance of the meetings between intelligence and army officers and foreigners, as well as the surveillance of individuals who move around commandments, military barracks and troops while conducting military exercises; 4) establishing permanent duty posts within the army and commandments so as to make impossible intelligence collection; 5) instructing military personnel, of all ranks on the negative actions of enemy espionage agents and the consequences of those actions for our army and means of defense; 6) raising public awareness and educating the society on the dangers posed by the subversive actions of the enemy through the publishing of literary works, based on real events.

These types of actions were assigned to counterintelligence agents, defined as “any individual who contributes in peace and war time to the deterrence of enemy actions conducted with covert means, in order to determine the defense capacities of the opponent's army” (Spânu, 2010, p. 137). In addition, the Secret Service adopted complex instructions regarding the manner to set up surveillance operations of suspicious persons, where there are mentions of the qualities required of agents and the manner in which missions should be executed: “Agents must have the following qualities: moral loyalty; firm beliefs, should lack inclinations towards drunkenness or other vices, should possess courage, agility, presence of spirit, be physically fit, be persistent, cautious, fellowship, take a responsible and serious attitude towards their work responsibilities, as well as towards the entire state security system, strong body, strong legs, good sight, hearing and memory as well as a common appearance” (Spânu, 2010, p. 137).

**Multiplying the number of specialized elements.** The document we are going to refer to in the next section was preserved in the archives under the name of *Statute of the S. Service*, and entered into force, as it is mentioned in article 12, on April 20, 1934 (Spânu, 2010, pp. 240-245; Troncota, 2008, p. 147). It is about the increasing role and importance of the Secret Service of Information although it stays within the military intelligence structure.

According to article 1: "The S. Service is the technical body of the Army's Intelligence Service (Spânu, 2010, pp. 240-245). Article 5 was very important because it established for the Secret Service the task of recruiting and training capable elements of executing intelligence missions, domestically and abroad, according to the requirements of the Service, the documents provide information about military and civilian elements used as three category of agents who had to be trained inside the Service were functioned a special training program: indicating agents, recruiters and contact agents. As the document state, the human resource was a permanent concern for the Secret Service. This is why article 6 regulated the manner in which personnel appointments and promotions were to be made. Secret Service could formulate proposals for the appointment of government officials and directly appointed its own covert personnel, according to the Service's needs. The appointment decisions as well as the persons' files were kept in its own archive. The overt personnel were appointed through a ministerial decision, while the covert personnel could not be appointed or replaced, by anyone but the Secret Service (Troncota, 2008, p. 147). Moving a person from the category of covert personnel to overt personnel could be made only on the basis of a report, addressed to the Defense Minister, who could decide in favor of moving that person in the ranks of the overt personnel, situation in which the real name of the employee was introduced in the payments sheet. Moreover, the entire personnel of the Secret Service was considered to be a "specialized element" (Troncota, 2008, p. 147). There is a similarity with the activities carried out in the HUMINT spectrum which can be covered and uncovered.

The Secret Service organization and functioning instruction were not changed but threats multiplying in relation to new domestic and international political context. Therefore information requirements multiplied and consequently the number of agents multiplied. Through order no. 668 from January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1938, the Secret Service passed from the Ministry of Defense under the authority of the General Staff of the Army.

Consequently, a new document, classified "Top Secret" was adopted entitled *Ministerial Decision no 2.200 from March 29, 1938 regarding the organization of the "S" Service of the General Staff of the Army and the justification of the intelligence fund*. (Spânu, 2010, p. 335) This document

emphasized the need to adapt the Secret Service in order to be able to respond to wartime intelligence needs: "The Chief of Staff [...] will give all the orders and instructions necessary for the organization and functioning of the S. Service so that it can respond in time of war to the operational needs of the army" (Spânu, 2010, p. 335).

The norms regarding the appointment of the personnel were almost entirely preserved during the 1938 reorganization (Spânu, 2010, p.253). However the number of the Service's personnel, civil and military, reached in 1939 to 36 officers and 306 civilians including 44 principal agents and 100 special agents. It was about the agents which was trained for intelligence missions, domestically and abroad, according to the requirements of the Service. At the same time, it was about civilian personal specialized in intelligence analysis, which was aimed at deepening understanding of tactical and strategic situations, including events in progress. In 1938 the Service needed information on military and political evolutions both from Western and Eastern Romanian borders.

### Conclusions

For the large public, collection of information/intelligence from human sources (HUMINT), the oldest of the existing methods, identifies itself with spying and clandestine activity. Consequently, there is a similarity between the terms used to designate the person providing the information, agent, source, informant, collaborator, which we emphasized in this study. For the purpose of our research, we used the term agent to refer to the person being recruited and employed by the Intelligence structure to obtain secrets or carry out covert activities. After a short presentation of the changes occurred in intelligence field during the Great War, we examined the Romanian Interwar period Secret Service archival documents in order to identify which was the recruitment policy and what were the characteristics of intelligence agents and if there is a similarity with the characteristics of the HUMINT collector.

In the Great War, unfortunately, the lack of organization of an intelligence structure within Romanian Army was reflected in the defeat suffered in the first part of the Romanian campaign. However, after the great defeat from 1916, Romania embarked on the reconstruction and strengthening of its combat capability during the first half of 1917 through multiple national efforts and with the French Military Mission contribution. In terms of intelligence, the French mission provided the equipment and technical support the Romanian army needed. The Romanian expertise acquired during the First World War highlighted the close link between

human resource, armament and combat equipment. However, it is operational and tactical intelligence, not necessarily numbers, technology, or tactics that can have the most decisive impact on how forces are employed and how success is achieved in wartime operations.

Concerning the professionalization of the information agents, the archival documents provide information about the prisoners or deserters interrogations as a principal mean to collect information about enemy: *interrogations to be made only by intelligence officers and translators from intelligence offices of every army unit*. Thus, we can recognize some of the HUMINT collector characteristics, both offensive and defensive activities, especially when it comes to the activity of military units. In offensive actions, collecting information from human sources provides information on the environment of operations (geographical, social, political), establishing relations with civilian or local people in an area, detecting enemy positions, and providing the elements necessary for establishing the details of offensive missions. In terms of defensive activity, HUMINT collectors aim to detect the intentions of the enemy forces about the risk of an attack and to ensure that their forces are mobilized for a counter-attack, or for a position that allows for minimal loss of human resources, or materials.

For the interwar period, the existence of documents which regulate the activity of the Secret Service *shows the permanent concern of the Service's leadership to recruit and train the human resources*. Secret Service could formulate proposals for the appointment of government officials and directly appointed its own covert personnel, secret agents, according to the Service's needs. The professional training of the personnel, irrespective of the compartment in which they were operating represented the responsibility of each manager. Another permanent concern for the Service's leadership in addition to training the human resources was insuring its counterintelligence protection. Thus, censorship was imposed to curtail any chance of an enemy acquiring a critical snippet of information. This was achieved by hiding the identity of the employees. Each member of the Service used for the transmission of information a numerical code, and he communicated only with this direct hierarchical superior. During the entire interwar period, Mihail Moruzov strived to introduce modern principles for conducting the intelligence activity. For this, he emphasized the need for a modern recruitment policy, which principles reflect in the future organization instructions. Specialized military and civilian personnel, which can be characterized as HUMINT collector, was targeted.

### References:

1. *Air Force Pamphlet 200-18, Target Intelligence Handbook: Unclassified Targeting Principles*, Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, October 1, 1990. Available on-line on <http://fas.org/irp/nsa/ioss/threat96/part02.htm>.
2. Finnegan, Terrence J., Col., USAFR (Ret.), *The Origins of Modern Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Military Intelligence at the Front, 1914-18*, in *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 25-40, available on-line on <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no4/military-intelligence-at-the-front-1914201318.html>
3. *Human Intelligence Collector Operation. Field Manual Headquarters No. 2-22.3*, Department of the Army Washington DC, 6 September 2006, available on-line on <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf>
4. *Language of espionage*, available on-line on <http://www.spymuseum.org/education-programs/news-books-briefings/language-of-espionage>.
5. *Legenda unui General (The Legend of a General)*, by Stelian Tănase, 7 December, 2015, available on-line on <http://www.stelian-tanase.ro/legenda-unui-general/>
6. Lerner, Adrienne Wilmoth, *World War I. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security* available on-line on <http://www.faqs.org/espionage/Vo-Z/World-War-I.html>.
7. Otu, Petre, (coord.), *Reforma militară și societatea în România, de la Carol I la a doua conflagrație mondială*, Occasional papers, Year 6, no. 8, 2007.
8. *România în anii primului război mondial (Romania during the years of World War I)*, 1987, Bucharest: Military Publishing House, vol. 2.
9. Spânu, Alin, (2010), *Istoria serviciilor de Informații/contrainformații românești în perioada 1919-1945*, Iași: Demiurg Publishing House.
10. Spânu, Alin, (2012), *Serviciul de Informații al României în războiul de întregire națională (1916-1920)*, Bucharest: Military Publishing House.
11. Suvorov, Victor, (1984), *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence*, Chapter3, Agents, MacMillan Publishing Company, available on-line on <http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov8/16.html> and [http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/8238028#cite\\_note-Suvorov-IM-03-0](http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/8238028#cite_note-Suvorov-IM-03-0).
12. *The Stratford Glossary of Useful, Baffling and Strange Intelligence Terms*, available on-line on <http://www.scribd.com/doc/219780109/The-Stratfor-Glossary-of-Useful-Baffling-and-Strange-Intelligence-Terms#scribd>
13. Troncotă, Cristian, (2008), *România și frontul secret 1859-1945 (Romania and the Secret Front)*, Bucharest: Elion Publishing House.
14. *U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual*, Department of the Army, Rowman & Littlefield, 6 January 2015, available on-line on <https://books.google.ro/books?isbn=1493016229>