

**THE RELATIONS OF THE SECURITATE WITH
SIMILAR STRUCTURES OF THE MEMBER STATES
OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION.
FROM INFORMATION EXCHANGES TO ISOLATION**

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Abstract

This article attempts to present a perspective on the collaboration of Romanian security and information services with similar structures in the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries during the Cold War.

The assumptions made by the article are: the absence of a study exclusively dedicated to the problem; the possibility of researching documents from physical or virtual archives recently declassified and given for research; the importance of exchanges of information in the work of Cold War security and intelligence services; Romania's effectiveness in exchanging information with partner countries and the impact on national security; the inefficiency of the inter-institutional collaboration between the Romanian intelligence and security services with similar structures due to the political oscillations in Bucharest.

From the analysis of the available scientific material, exchanges of information between the Securitate and the homologous services of the Warsaw Treaty Organization experienced oscillating periods, from constant information exchanges to some sporadic ones, and by the end of the Cold War these exchanges did not exist. Lack of institutional collaboration was a factor for which the Securitate was de-institutionalized as an institution in December 1989, influencing Romania's evolution as a state on the international stage.

The dissolution of security and intelligence services at key moments of a state's history is not a desirable scenery for the security of that state, in my opinion this is rather the biggest vulnerability of that state.

Keywords: *security, intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, intelligence cooperation, diplomacy*

The study aims to demonstrate whether there was collaboration and how effective this collaboration was, between the Department of State

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Securitate and similar structures within the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), and if this had a direct impact both on the evolution of the Romanian security and intelligence services, as well as Romania's evolution on an international level after 1989. For a small state such as Romania it was impossible to provide itself with the necessary intelligence regarding a sustainable development. Exchanges of bi- and multilateral information between the Romanian security and intelligence services with similar structures in the WTO countries have existed but will diminish considerably towards the end of the Cold War. The Department of State Security found itself isolated near and during the events of December 1989, which in my view contributed to the destruction of the security institution and the state.

Inter-Agency Intelligence has been imposed as a necessity of intelligence gathering since the emergence of the first institutionalized intelligence/counterintelligence structures. The fall of the Iron Curtain across Europe triggered a "race" between the secret services on one side and the other during the Cold War. Just as the popular democracy regimes were installed in the Central and Eastern European countries through coercive means and with the help of the Soviets, the security and intelligence services of these regimes were created under close supervision and Soviet model. The new geopolitical configuration and the imperialist threat required a "fraternal" collaboration of intelligence /counterintelligence structures in the socialist countries. The issue of studying such collaboration is diminished by the lack of material on the specificity of the problem and the course followed by certain archives after the collapse of communist regimes. Romania's situation is special in this issue due to the fact that the country was enrolled on its own trajectory targeting a foreign policy line and a security agenda independent of the directives drafted by USSR in the other countries in its sphere of influence.

A careful analysis of the available information highlights that for the duration of the existence of the Securitate as a law-based institution, its relations with security and intelligence services in the socialist camp have seen growth and decline. Overall, it may be admitted that there was an ineffectiveness of Securitate's co-operation with homologous services largely due to divergences in political evolution. In the case of Romania, the interinstitutional collaboration or inter-agency intelligence, according to current usage, can be phased in as follows: a) a stage in which in each socialist country the activity of intelligence/counterintelligence was led by the Soviet counsellors and attempted a close collaboration with KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti - State Security Committee of the USSR, 1954-1991) - GRU (Glavnoe Razvedivatelnoe Upravlenie - the Soviet military

espionage service or the Military Intelligence Directorate), as authorities in the field; b) a second stage, after the declaration of the "Brezhnev Doctrine", attempting to reset the interinstitutional collaborations of the system, in which USSR hoped that Romania would return to its original boldness; c) the last step is identified with the loss of patience of the former partners to wait for the Romanian state to return to its initial position. In fact, the last step finds Securitate in total isolation from similar services and labelled as enemy of the latter.

Sending Soviet advisers to all communist countries to help reinforce the regimes tends to support the idea that there have been bilateral or multilateral meetings on the secret services line since 1947-1948. The idea can be denied on the basis of current information. KGB would not have wanted multilateral contacts between the secret services in the fraternal states because it would have made it harder for its missions to obtain the information it wanted from each country. A first step towards bilateral co-operation was reached in 1950, between MGB (Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti - Ministry of State Security of the USSR in the period 1946-1953) and ÁVH (Államvédelmi Hatóság - Hungarian State Security, 1948-1956) through the espionage departments at the initiative of MGB. It was intended to coordinate projects and activities, controlled by the Soviets, led by Colonel Filatov first, then by the Colonels Tikov and Jelisejev, against SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)¹.

Such collaborations varied from one state to another. The most obedient services to KGB were KDS (Komitet za državna sigurnost - Bulgarian State Security), STASI (Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit - Ministry of State Security or East-German State Security, 1950-1990), StB (State Security - Czechoslovak State Security), ÁVH, SB (Służba Bezpieczeństwa - Polish State Security), at the other end of the line being located (Department of State Securitate). The Bulgarian KDS was so dependent on KGB that on a visit from May 27 to June 1, 1968, for an exchange of experience with SCC (State Security Council of Romania, 1968-1967) Lieutenant General Mircio Spasov would say that:

"USSR is the one that gives confidence in defending the security of the socialist countries and that without USSR our countries could not

¹ László Ritter, „The Soviet – Hungarian Intelligence Co-operation in the Early Cold War Period” in *NKVD/KGB Activities and its Cooperation with other Secret Services in Central and Eastern Europe 1945-1989*, Alexandra Grúňvá (ed.), Bratislava, 14-16th November 2007, p. 248.

do much. As for Bulgaria and its security authorities, it could not even conceive of existence without the support of USSR"².

The first multilateral meeting, evidenced by documents, of representatives of the secret services in the communist sphere took place in 1955, in the context of the foundation of WTO (May 14, 1955). The data on such contacts are incomplete, so the first meeting would take place in Bucharest, being seconded by two other in Berlin and Prague³. The Prague meeting would lay the foundations of the "Radio Counter Intelligence Coordination Group", which was set up in Warsaw in 1956. They attempted jamming the entire electromagnetic spectrum, especially the R.E.L. (Radio Free Europe), whose activity was considered a threat to communist regimes⁴.

There have been several attempts to collaborate on intelligence and technology exchanges. Between 4 and 6 March 1958 a meeting was held in Bucharest between representatives of PRR (People's Republic of Romania), USSR, PRB (People's Republic of Bulgaria), HPR (Hungarian People's Republic), CSR (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic), focused on: fighting subversive actions orchestrated by Western espionage; improving the exchange of information and conducting joint actions⁵. Just one year after this multilateral meeting was also held in Bucharest, between 4 and 12 March 1959, a meeting between the Romanian and Bulgarian delegations to coordinate the activities regarding the identification of the Romanian royal intelligence agency that had activated against Bulgaria and other issues of common interest⁶. It should be noted that throughout the sixth decade KGB had a real "tournament" of bilateral contacts with the similar secret services in the communist states, most of the contacts being established with the StB. Also during the year 1958 there were exchanges and requests for information between the Securitate and similar Hungarian, Bulgarian and Soviet services⁷.

² The Archives of the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (A.N.C.S.S.A.), Documentary Fund, File N° 88, vol. 4, tab 288.

³ Florian Banu, „From collaboration to isolation. The relations between the Securitate with similar service of intelligence of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955-1989, part I”, in *Archives of Totalitarianism*, Year XXIII, N° 86-87, 1-2/2015, p. 127.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 127.

⁵ Bulgarian Archive of the Ministry of the Interior, Sofia, Fond 2, Record 1, File N° 1345, „Report from Gen. M. Spasov on Multilateral Security Meeting in Bucharest”, March 12, 1958, in *C.W.I.H.P.* (Cold War International History Project).

⁶ Bulgarian Archive of the Ministry of the Interior, Sofia, Fond 2, Record 1, File N° 1339, „Report on Visit to Romania on Counterintelligence Issues”, March 23, 1959, in *C.W.I.H.P.*

⁷ Romanian Intelligence Service, *The White Book of the Securitate*, vol. III, doc. N° 13, 16, 18, Bucharest, 1995, pp. 154-156.

After escalating tensions between Romania and the USSR as a result of the assassination attempts on Dej⁸, a program of massive security and military cleansing has been initiated, which will be more intense after 1961. Year 1961 was the last time the Securitate sent personnel to study in the USSR, until then the training courses followed by future Romanian officers at the Felix Djerjinski Institute of the KGB being of notoriety.

A document attesting the escalation of disagreement between the Securitate and the KGB is the discussion between Alexandru Draghici and Piotr Ivanovici Ivașiutin, the deputy of the KGB president. On P.I. Ivașiutin's statements insisting on a better collaboration between the Securitate and the KGB against the espionage conducted by the adversary block, based on the agreement between the Romanian side and the Soviet side, by the voice of Vladimir Efimovici Semiciastnii (KGB president 1961-1967), A. Draghici felt the need to intercede and say that the relation between the two institutions is strong, specifying that "the materials we send to you daily and our work prove it." The same Draghici firmly affirms that he disagrees with the inequality between the institutions, given the willingness of KGB to know in detail the Romanian agentura. As a reply, Ivașiutin stated:

"See, Comrade Draghici, for so long I told Zaharovski: what do you need for the conspiratorial names of the friendly countries' agents? How important is the information coming from Popescu or other names of your agents? Is not it enough that it comes from the RPR Ministry of the Interior? He did not want to listen to me. That does not mean we have evidence of your agents. We do not have this, and I would propose that a delegation from you come to us and to check each case individually".

The same document presents Draghici's disagreements with the large number of Soviet officers maintained by USSR in the vicinity of the Romanian State apparatus, since they were no longer useful and when consulted on certain issues their only answer was "vașii delo"⁹.

⁸ Larry L. Watts, *With Friends Like These...The Soviet Bloc's Clandestine War Against Romania*, english translation by Camelia Diaconescu, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2011, p. 33, 235, 511.

⁹ National Central Historical Archives (N.C.H.A.), Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party Fund (C.C. of R.C.P.), Administrative-Political Section, File N° 13/1962, tabs 2-6. See also: National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (N.C.S.S.A.), *The Party and the Securitate. The history of a failder idle (1948-1989)*, doc. N° 91, Bucharest, Florian and Luminita Banu (eds.), Iasi, Editorial Demiur House, 2013, pp. 351-355.

The conflicts between the Romanian and the Soviet side became more acute in 1962, when Dej and Alexandru Drăghici made the decision to create a "small group of officers", a "core" of counterintelligence and counterespionage officers to deal with "The identification of the Soviet agentura in Romania"¹⁰. The idea of creating this group to deal with the Soviet agents in Romania had been put into practice in a sensible way after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania. The work of this team was perfectly conspicuous, not even the Department of Counterintelligence within the Securitate knew of its existence¹¹.

As mentioned above, Romania could not have supported its security and intelligence agenda if Moscow had not been involved in extra-block events, in this case the Cuban Missile Crisis. The issue of recruitments made by PGU (Pervo Glavnoe Upravlenie, Central Directorate I - Foreign Intelligence, Soviet Espionage, 1954-1991) and GRU on the territory of Romania was brought to the discussion between Dej, Bodnaras and Ceausescu, on the one hand, and Khrushchev, on the other hand, following the visit made by the latter to Romania in 1962. Following this episode, Khrushchev ordered the other security and intelligence services from the Soviet block to limit their cooperation with similar structures in the RPR to exchanges of general, itemized information that would not be in the benefit the Romanian state¹². Dej's reaction was almost immediate and consisted in the formalization of the counterintelligence "core" within the Counter Intelligence Directorate, expanding its activity against all agenturas of the socialist countries¹³. Subsequently, this group of counterintelligence officers will form the future MU (Military Unit) 0110¹⁴.

On May 13, 1963, Dej made the decision to answer Vladimir Efimovici Semiciastnii (KGB director 1961-1967) following the 1962 warning of the latter, motivating to the KGB director that:

*"given the current circumstances, the maintenance of the two councillors in the service of the Ministry of Interior is no longer necessary and that, in the future, cooperation between the two ministries will take place only at the highest level"*¹⁵.

¹⁰ Cristian Troncota, *The Duplicious: a history of security and intelligence services of the communist regime in Romania: 1965-1989*, second edition revised and added, Bucharest, Elion Publishing House, 2014, p. 25

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 25-26; Larry L. Watts, *op. cit.*, 216.

¹² Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare*, Siracusa, Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972, p. 146.

¹³ Cristian Troncota, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27; Larry L. Watts, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-219.

¹⁴ Between 1969-1978 it was named M.U. 0920/A, then from 1978 to 1989 M.U. 0110. The M.U. was led by Aurel Mircea 1963-1965, Constantin Iosif 1965-1978, Victor Neculicioiu 1978-1989.

¹⁵ N.C.H.A., C.C. of R.C.P. – Writing Section Fund, File N° 10/1963.

After the "April Declaration of 1964", an accelerated dissemination of the document took place throughout the Romanian administration, with the obvious purpose of demonstrating that URSS had intervened strongly in the Romanian internal affairs. Massive purges of security, militia, and army personnel have been conducted, based in particular on ethnic and professional criteria. Drăghici ordered the heads of the central units of the Securitate to limit the flow of information to the Soviet councillors since 1962, thus removing them from the informative activity.

The arrival of Leonid Ilici Brezhnev as Secretary General of CC of PCUS (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) on 14 October 1964 constituted an opportunity of which Dej took advantage of to request the withdrawal of the last Soviet advisers from Romania. After several exchanges of telegrams between the heads of the two homologous security and intelligence structures and after the unannounced visit of Semiciastnii and Saharovski in Bucharest (November 1964), it was concluded that USSR must withdraw its last advisers from Romania in December 1964¹⁶.

The withdrawal of Soviet advisers on security and intelligence issues since 1958 and culminating in 1964 must be carefully considered. The political - strategic movements of Communist leaders are not entirely original, but they have changed the security architecture in Central and South - Eastern Europe. What's more, the question is why should the Soviets give up so easily to the Romanian counsellors? The answer may also come in the context in which, prior to the withdrawal, large spy networks had been created to form "underground" channels of communication with Moscow. Therefore, the phrase "we just left to stay" can be supported. Here are some other things to be mentioned at least: the Securitate's institution was gradually expelled from the transformation program of KGB initiated between 1962 and 1964 in the other Warsaw Treaty countries, and in 1965 Romania was left out of the war strategy of the Warsaw Pact¹⁷.

Regarding Romania, although it did not recognize the creation of GDR (German Democratic Republic), the closest contacts during Dej's leadership were with STASI. In addition to the kidnappings of Aurel Decei and Oliviu Beldeanu, the Securitate collaborated with STASI on several levels, from exchanges of information on Romanian refugees from the GFR (German Federal Republic) to information exchanges concerning the operative technique. Near the "Declaration of April 1964" there were two bilateral meetings between the leaders of the two security and intelligence institutions.

¹⁶ Cristian Troncota, *op. cit.*, pp. 33.

¹⁷ Larry L. Watts, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

Thus, in 1962, Erich Mielke¹⁸, director of STASI, accompanied by Markus Wolf¹⁹, the director HV A. (Hauptverwaltung A.-Aufklärung, East German Central «espionage» Administration) followed by a return visit by a delegation of DFI (Directorate for Foreign Intelligence, the correct name is Directorate A - External Intelligence or Directorate I, after reorganization, between 1951 and 1963) led by Nicolae Doicaru accompanied by the Director of the Department for Operational Techniques of the DSS in April 1963. Both visits were made on the background of the STASI's initiative to establish "ways of contacting other communist secret services, trying to identify forms of technical and operative collaboration"²⁰. An indication of the high degree of collaboration between Securitate and STASI is revealed by the existence of the Securitate Task Force in East Berlin, whose members from 1950 to 1960 functioned as officials of the Embassy of Romania in East Berlin. Two things draw particular attention to the Security Task Force: 1) all actions were approved and supported (probably logistic n.r.) by STASI ; 2) the degree of collaboration was so great that the Task Force was named, according to the archives of STASI, the "Romanian Group" or "Romanian Friends"²¹.

Information exchanges between the Securitate and similar structures in countries with the same political regime remained high until Dej decided PRR to follow another course on the evolution of the political system. The "New Policy" in Bucharest could not to affect the Securitate's cooperation relations. A series of events conducted by RWP (Romanian Workers' Party) have made the Securitate to be sidelined by "partner" services. Romania's opposition to WTO decisions coupled with a series of pro-Western diplomatic actions and the removal of the last Soviet councillors (December 1964) from the PRR have not been left unanswered. The exclusion of the Romanian state from the large socialist information community was made gradually, first on the order of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev given to the socialist countries to limit their co-operation with Romania in the field of espionage, then to eliminate the Securitate from the coordinated program of active measures initiated in 1965 by the KGB from Lubianka²².

After 1964, information exchanges will not disappear, but they will be more sporadic. After Romania's enrolment on a different line of foreign policy, the first exchange of information was between DSS and KDS. Thus, on

¹⁸ Erich Fritz Emil Mielke, chief of STASI between 1957-1989.

¹⁹ Markus Johannes Wolf, chief of HV A. between 1953-1986.

²⁰ Stejarel Olaru, Georg Herbstritt, *Stasi and the Securitate*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2005, pp. 66-67.

²¹ *Ibidem*, 288-289.

²² Ladislav Bittman, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-146.

28 October 1965, an exchange of letters between the Ministers of Internal Affairs of the two countries, Cornel Onescu and Angel Solakov, provided information on the actions of OTAN on the European continent²³. Then a request from Minister Solakov on certain Italian citizens was addressed on 9 January 1966 to Cornel Onescu²⁴.

Moscow order on restricting information sharing with R.S.R. is also revealed by a report of the KGB in 1967. The document mentions the low degree of cooperation with the Romanian Security, limited to minor exchanges of information. Romania was so marginalized that the Soviets preferred to re-establish contacts with the State Security Ministry of DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)²⁵.

The arrival of Nicolae Ceausescu at the head of RCP (Romanian Communist Party, 1965-1989) meant a continuation of the foreign policy started by Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej. The way of national communism chosen by SRR (Socialist Republic of Romania, 1965-1989) culminated with Ceausescu's intervention to condemn the invasion of WTO troops led by USSR in CSR. Once this moment passed, the situation inside the communist block against the unaligned position of the Romanian state has been relieved. The framework for the resumption of some forms of bilateral cooperation between the Securitate and the homologous services of the Warsaw Pact has been created. The year 1968 constituted a moment of profound reformation of the Securitate, with extensive transformations taking place inside the institution. The most significant aspect is highlighted by the reduction of the informational network (including informants, collaborators, residents, meeting host houses and conspirators) from a total of 118,952 on January 1, 1968 to 85,042 on December 20, 1968²⁶.

The movement of troops on Romania's borders after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" led Ceausescu to take preventive measures to defend the country. One of these measures consisted in the resumption of sensitive relations with former secret services. The last multilateral meeting on security and intelligence matters took place between December 8 and 11, 1970 in Budapest, on external intelligence

²³ Bulgarian Archive of the Ministry of the Interior, Sofia, Fond 1, Record 10, File N^o 338, „Correspondence between Gen. A. Solakov and Gen. K. Onescu on Acquired Intelligence Information”, December 22, 1965, in *C.W.I.H.P.*

²⁴ Bulgarian Archive of the Ministry of the Interior, Sofia, Fond 1, Record 10, File N^o 338, „Letter from Gen. A. Solakov to Gen. K. Onescu on Information on Italian Citizens”, January 09, 1966, in *C.W.I.H.P.*

²⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 5, d. 3., II, 1-14, „The KGB's 1967 Annual”, May 06 1968, in *C.W.I.H.P.*

²⁶ A.N.C.S.S.A., Documentary Fund, File N^o 88, vol. 3, tabs 13-14.

matters²⁷. During the meeting a number of issues were discussed, among which the most important ones were: the need to create a unique centre where data about the personnel, the agentura and the legends used by the adversary services should be available; linking partner countries' foreign residences in order to obtain a fast management of operational problems; creating a single coordination centre for setting out the main directives for achieving common objectives²⁸. Other documents related to the multilateral meetings in which our country took part do not result from uncovering the archive documents.

At bilateral level, the best cooperation of the Securitate was with STASI, diminished considerably after 1973. A remarkable episode happened on March 18, 1971, when, contrary to all protocol matters, Nicolae Doicaru, arriving from Copenhagen, made a stopover in East Berlin where he had a meeting with Erich Mielke²⁹. The conversation between Doicaru, head of Romanian espionage and his counterpart, Markus Wolf, highlights the ridiculous situation created by Doicaru himself in the failed attempt to regulate the forms of bilateral collaboration between the two external intelligence services.

During this time KGB concluded collaboration protocols with all the other socialist services except SRR, reaching the point where, through a collaboration protocol dated December 6, 1973, the KGB would be allowed to recruit East German nationals for fulfilling the missions, situation in which STASI had to provide ongoing contacts³⁰.

There was a "friendship group" within the socialist camp with which Moscow has developed much closer relations based on the unconditional submission of Communist leaders of those countries to Moscow. GDR, CSR, HPR, PRB, PPR (Polish People's Republic) "benefited" from a positive image in front of the Kremlin, in contrast to SFRY, PRA (People's Republic of Albania) and SRR. The actions of KGB at regional or international level against specific objectives benefited from the broad support of intelligence services of WTO member countries. As the relationship between SRR and the other WTO

²⁷ Florian Banu, *op. cit.*, p. 74. According to other sources, HV A. has bilateral cooperations relations with all WTO counterpart services and at the multilateral level at a four years interval, the last such meeting took place in East Berlin in 1988. Romania was not invited at that meeting instead Cuba was. See also: Paul Mandrell, „Cooperation between HV A. and the KGB, 1951-1989”, in *German Historical Institute Bulletin*, Richard F. Wetzell (ed.), Supplement 9 (2014), p. 173.

²⁸ A.N.C.S.S.A., Documentary Fund, File № 16124, vol. 7, tabs 196-197.

²⁹ Stajarel Olaru, Georg Herbstritt, *op. cit.*, doc. nr. 7, pp. 288-299.

³⁰ BStU, MfS, ZAIG 13.730, pp. 1-15, „Agreement on Cooperation between the Stasi and the KGB, 6 December 1973”, December 06, 1973, in *C.W.I.H.P.*

member states deteriorated, KGB took the decision to coordinate a program of anti-Romanian active measures, largely based on disinformation. Among the informative adversaries who have acted against the Romanian state, the best known are KGB, ÁVO/ Hungarian³¹ ÁVH and STASI through HVA due to their representativeness through the Hungarian and German communities in our country, used as a front for their operations³².

Romania's relationship with other WTO member states has constantly deteriorated since 1965. The incontinence of Moscow's orchestrated actions against the Romanian state materialized, first of all, in the program of active measures. These were focused on two aspects: on the one hand, they aimed to isolate Romania internationally and to create the image of "Soviet Trojan horse" in the West and in the Third World countries, and on the other hand it was hoped to create dissension between the members at the top of power³³. Besides these aspects, some states had independent reasons to act in Romania. Alongside Bulgaria and Hungary who had territorial claims, GDR conducted hostile actions against the Romanian state because the Bucharest authorities refused to recognize the breakup of Germany. The ruling circles in Bucharest had concluded, through secret negotiations, a treaty with GFR³⁴.

The bilateral relations between SRR and USSR worsened even further after the defection of General Ion Mihai Pacepa (July 1978). In the late 1970s USSR made the decision that PGU to transfer Romania from Department XI - "Links with the Socialist Countries" to Department V (dealing with some NATO member countries, Switzerland and the other two "rebel" states of the Soviet Block, Yugoslavia and Albania)³⁵. There is no information to confirm whether at Moscow's order or not, but also the other Warsaw Pact partner countries have taken similar actions against Romania. Archival documents, for example, show that HVA transferred Romania among the countries belonging to Group C alongside the same Yugoslavia, Albania and distinctly from PGU, China³⁶.

During the 1970s, the relationship between DSS and KGB remained at an almost constant level. Although the Romanian side did not share the same visions with the Soviet leadership, the Romanian political squad eschewed a

³¹ After the Revolution of 1956, the institution of Security was abolished by János Kádár, Hungary become the only state member of the W.T.O. who did not have intelligence services, this structure's skills being passed under the Hungarian Ministry of Interior.

³² Larry L. Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

³³ Christopher Andrew, Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*, New York, Basic Books, 2005, p. 290.

³⁴ Stajarel Olaru, Georg Herbstritt, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

³⁵ Christopher Andrew, Vasili Mitrokhin, *op. cit.*, p. 500.

³⁶ Stajarel Olaru, Georg Herbstritt, *op. cit.*, 102.

free escalation of tensions with the USSR. Until 1975 DSS has collaborated with KGB in order to unmask and compromise Richard Wurmbrand, a character conducting a campaign of ideological diversion against the socialist countries and, in particular, against USSR³⁷. Then there was an exchange of information in the "Usatiuc" and "Covalciuc" cases, to which two exchanges of information were added by the transfer of two sets of 12 documents each sent by KGB to DSS, the first on some aspects of the political-military evolution in America, Asia and Africa, and the second, dated March 3, 1972, including information on European countries³⁸.

SRR continued to conduct some forms of collaboration with other socialist countries in a reduced pattern. For example, on August 20, 1974, a "Convention between the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania on Governmental Telegraphic and Telephony Encrypted Communications" and an additional protocol "Instructions for technical maintenance and exploit of the governmental telegraphic link between Prague and Bucharest" were concluded³⁹.

There were small and intermittent exchanges of information with PPR and HPR, cantered on support for informative-operative pursuit of some people, exchange of information on some countries in the adversary camp and mutual transfer of operative technique⁴⁰.

Since 1975, there has been a shift in security and intelligence cooperation between SRR and all the other "fraternal" states. Distancing occurred especially after the signing of the Final Act of CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) on August 1, 1975, when Romania's role was visibly diminished throughout the process of the Conference through the concerted active measures conducted by Moscow. In a KGB report about the new directions of US policy regarding the European socialist countries it is

³⁷ Florian Banu, „From collaboration to isolation. The relations between the Securitate with similar service of intelligence of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955-1989, part I”, in *Archives of Totalitarianism*, Year XXIII, N° 88-89, 3-4/2015, part II, pp. 80-83.

³⁸ A.N.C.S.S.A., Documentary Fund, File N° 13134, vol. 28, tab 166, 201.

³⁹ The Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes of the Czech Republic, *Cooperation in the Eastern Bloc 1948-1989: documents on bilateral cooperation*, declassified 01.01.2008. Within this project a range of electronic documents are available on collaboration between socialist countries' intelligence services. Information exchanges and cooperation between CSR and SRR are reduced to only two documents, unlike the collaboration with GDR, where 102 documents are available. Within the same project in the section dedicated to "International Cooperation in 1989", CSR had collaboration protocols with all services in the Eastern Bloc, especially with KGB., except for the SRR Securitate.

⁴⁰ Florian Banu, *op. cit.*, part. II, 84-86.

shown that Romania continued to be a source of concern for Moscow because of the contrary positions within WTO and the independent foreign policy line. The same documents mention that Vice President George W. Bush's visit to Romania has strengthened Romania's sense of independence and strengthened the personal authority of Nicolae Ceausescu⁴¹.

During the year 1976 there were exchanges of operative information with HPR regarding the West German citizen Rott Risard and the Polish citizen Rott Honorata. The request came from the SB through a telegram issued on March 4, 1976, requiring the informative - operative supervision of the two⁴². Towards the end of 1976, a delegation of the SB lead by Colonel Stanislaw Liskowski (Director of the Technical and Operational Department), Colonel Dionizzi Makzak (deputy director of the Operational Technique Department) and First Lieutenant Wlasislaw Novosad (translator) arrived in Romania for exchange of experience. The visit had the following objectives: 1) organizational structure and general problems on the technical - operative line; 2) visiting laboratories and production sectors within the Special Unit "P" and some exploit sectors within the "T" Special Unit; 3) presentation of OT (Operative Technique) carried out in the Special Unit "P" and discussions on them; 4) Visit of "T" compartments within county inspectorates; 5) exchange of equipment and documentation. DSS has sent free of charge a set of four elements comprising OT and the afferent documentation to the Polish delegation. In the relations plan of the Romanian Ministry of the Interior for 1977 were foreseen: the visit of a delegation of four specialists and a translator in the HPR at the beginning of 1977 and a visit by a Polish delegation to SRR in the same year⁴³.

In the 1980s there were also collaborations with the Hungarian security and intelligence services. Thus, on May 25, 1975 a delegation from the Special Unit "R" went for exchange of experience in the HPR. In January 1976, a meeting was held between representatives of DSS with Hungarian counterparts at CBCC (Common Border Crossing Point) Bors where the Romanian side handed OT equipment to the Hungarians. The Hungarian services asked the Romanian services for informative - operative information on two Hungarian citizens who met on Romania's territory with an American citizen⁴⁴.

⁴¹ BStU, MfS, ZAIG 7168, pp. 1-11, „KGB Report on New Elements in US Policy toward the European Socialist Countries”, March 31, 1984, in *C.W.I.H.P.*

⁴² A.N.C.S.S.A., Documentary Fund, File N° 10782, vol. 10, tabs 46-48, 52.

⁴³ Ibidem, tabs 181-190.

⁴⁴ A.N.C.S.S.A., Documentary Fund, File N° 10782, vol. 11, tabs 61-64, 69, 83-89.

In 1976, OTTC (Operative Technique and Transmissions Commandment) visited SFRY, HPR and USSR⁴⁵.

Latest information exchanges of DSS with similar structures from WTO, recorded in official documents, refer to a visit to Sofia, on July 4, 1985, of a Romanian delegation composed of Iulian Vlad and Gheorghe Andreescu, where discussions took place on the exchange of information on the movement, on the territories of the two countries, of persons associated with Arab terrorist organizations. Vladimir Todorov and Martin Petkov, both from PGU, took part in the discussions⁴⁶. In 1986, a collaboration protocol between DSS and KDS on the exchange of information and the taking of the necessary measures with regard to acts of terrorism was signed⁴⁷.

In the early 1980s, the position of KGB towards Romania has worsened, the Romanian state being characterized as an enemy state by both USSR as well as the other states in Soviet orbit. The "privileged" relationships between Bucharest and other capitals in the West and the Orient, especially Bonn, Washington and Beijing, worried the Kremlin leadership in an excessive manner. Moscow has sent clear directives to other fraternal states to retain maximum discretion in the execution of operations against Romania. Indeed, after the invasion of CSR, Moscow was careful to dissimulate misunderstandings with Bucharest. This is understandable since there is interest in the "Trojan Horse" thesis succeeding in the great Western chancelleries, while avoiding tactical countermeasures. Neither did Nicolae Ceausescu venture to upset USSR, as evidenced by the large number of double agents unmasked by Romanian counter-intelligence and sanctioned only by retirement or sending back "into production."

Through a document issued by the KGB in 1984 it was shown that Moscow initiated a series of bilateral and multilateral co-operation within the WTO informative community to which SRR was not invited because of Ceausescu's behaviour. The "quarantine" imposed on the Romanian state by USSR and its allies were part of the KGB-GRU plans of active measures as a counter-response to the dissidence displayed internationally by the authorities in Bucharest.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, vol. 11, tabs 289.

⁴⁶ The Committee for Disclosing the Documents and Announcing Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to the State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Army (C.O.M.D.O.S.), Documentary Collections. *The Bulgarian State Security and the Intelligence Services of Eastern Bloc Countries (1944-1989)*. Bulgaria, Sofia, 2015, doc. nr. 271, pp. 1523-1529.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, doc. nr. 272, pp. 1530-1533.

Conclusions

The low level of collaboration between the Department of State Securitate and similar structures of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries was not beneficial for the evolution of the Romanian institution after the change of the political regime in 1989. Documentary material available to research reveals a sinuous character with periods of bi- and multilateral cooperation coupled with inefficiency of the Department of State Securitate with homologous security and intelligence services. The inter-agency intelligence in Romania can be periodized as follows: an incipient phase (1945-1960) in which a "fraternal" cooperation was attempted, characterized by common operations and conscious exchanges of information; a period of tension (1960-1970) as a result of Romania's condemnation of the invasion of the troops of Warsaw Treaty member countries in Czechoslovakia, where information exchanges were more sporadic; a period of resuming collaborations at the level of the socialist block following the East-West (1970-1975) rebound when a closer approach to Romania was attempted; the last period that corresponds to the last communist decade finds the Department of State Securitate in an almost total isolation, which will be to the detriment of the Romanian intelligence services after 1989. I consider it plausible that the Department of State Securitate was unable to cooperate with the Soviet services around the events of December 1989 due to the fact that until then they were informative opponents.

Romania had a reaction to the Soviet-coordinated informational aggressions. I refer here to intelligence structures set up specifically for conducting actions to counteract informational aggression. Within the Romanian security and intelligence structures, an internal counter-intelligence service will be set up against the socialist countries, which will later become an independent military unit. In addition, in 1969, a Disinformation Service will be set up, 11 years after the establishment of a similar structure in the USSR. These two Romanian structures are real mechanisms for counteracting the informational war against Romania. I consider that through the scientific approach I have reduced the blurriness of this professional structure, whose activity has been for a while confined by people under its leadership. The decision to set up such an intelligence structure is the best example to characterize the degree of cooperation and friendship between the Securitate and similar services in the socialist countries.

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