REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING - INSTITUTION OF DIPLOMACY AND ORDER & SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

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Abstract

After 9/11, intelligence has become a valuable product for small and large states to share or trade for power and small benefits in the international system. The EU and NATO share a sort of interdependence in significant number of frenemies, security risks and missions. However, empirical evidence shows that despite common threats and enemies, some states engage in intelligence sharing to affect positive change and reduce uncertainty, while others calculate and withhold intelligence either from fears of being passed on, irrelevant or low priority threats, or underdeveloped strategies to shape the future outcomes. Since the sharing process is intermittent and resembles puzzles with bits and pieces, what strategic value does the sale of intelligence have for the seller and the receiving state? To what extent does the sharing process enhance order and diplomacy versus alienation? Sharing intelligence is a practice of cooperation, but how is intelligence actually shared or sold, how much does it cost, what are the benefits of sale, and who bears the cost in the international society? These are interesting questions to explore on the role of intelligence in fostering international order and the contemporary security dilemma when engaging with the current transnational threats. This paper investigates whether regional intelligence sharing with the US enhances diplomacy and order in the European context or leads to possible security dilemma.

Keywords*: intelligence sharing, strategic value, cooperation, security dilemma.*

Introduction

In the intelligence sharing process, what is considered valuable information or valuable intelligence?[1] The era of new threats demands new

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[1] Information is not intelligence. Intelligence is the finished product resulted from the processed information that went through the intelligence cycle.

thinking, technologies and methods of intelligence collection and analysis, as well as new arrangements for intelligence sharing. Since 9/11, the world of intelligence is in continuous flux of transformation, adapting to "changes in the security environment, the political situations of various states, and the public pressures placed on the decision-makers to produce more population inclusion and security provisions."[2] As time progresses, the process of intelligence sharing seems to evolve and transform into an institutionalized norm of cooperation with rules and principles between small and large states. Theoretically, the intelligence sharing process is helping states define, understand and predict new threats and challenges within the international society. Practically, however, threats are multiplying, security budgets are increasing while fear and terror continue to invade the current security environment. Who determines the value of the information, how is intelligence transacted by states, and who benefits from intelligence transaction are procedural questions with important implications for academics and policymakers interested in assessing global security.

Although with the passing of time, states have increased intelligence sharing through the creation and implementation of various technologies and arrangements, when it comes to what is shared i.e. information or intelligence, the current literature does not provide an explicit understanding on the value of the information that is supposed to be shared or transacted with other states. Nor is there an explanation on what impact or value shared information has in the regional and global security context. Do states gather information for the pure sake of collection and sharing? In an era of proliferation of unknown threats and enemies, one may be tempted to say, "Yes!" Countries concerned with the amount of information collected, national security budgets and global security benefits question the purpose of information collection and sharing in context of producing sound policy. When pressed to assess the role of New Zeeland within the Five Eyes system, the Internal Affairs Minister, Peter Dunne underscored:

> *If we're collecting all this stuff holus bolus, the first question is why.* If the answer is 'because that's what Five Eyes says we should do and we simply hand it over to somebody else… that should be a proposition the (Intelligence Security Committee) must want to give some consideration to whether or not that's what we want (my emphasis).[3]

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[2] Olli J. Teirila, "Small State Intelligence Dilemmas: Struggling between Common Threat Perceptions and National Priorities," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, March 2015, Vol. 28:215-235.

[3] David Fisher, "Dunne: Inquiry must look at spy practices," *The New Zealand Herald*. 7, March 2015.

The question on the value of information collected is important for academics, as well as states in the evaluation of return investment on the relationship between intelligence sharing process and the enhancement of global security. The purpose of this paper is to explore the concept of intelligence's strategic value in the sharing process and focus on when and how intelligence gets an assigned strategic value. Moreover, the analysis delves into how intelligence sharing is an institution of order and diplomacy, as well as a form of insecurity in the contemporary international society. The paper will proceed first with a discussion on the exchanging of valuable and non-valuable information. Then, will focus on how intelligence sharing creates order and security dilemma for small states. In closing, it will discuss how intelligence sharing creates norms with rules and principles that mimic a full-fledged institution of diplomacy.

Sharing Intelligence - Trading Reciprocally Valuable Information for Information and Intelligence

Opinions in the intelligence sharing literature are divided over the extent to what and how information is shared. Scholars argue that information is traded for other information in 'simple' or 'complex' frameworks that enhance cooperation, as well as increase a security dilemma for both small and large states.[4] Jennifer Sims suggests that states barter intelligence using various costs and benefits including intelligence and political support, military assistance, intelligence dependency, political fallout, deception and embarrassment. In her view, the bartering process creates a security dilemma (a false appearance of transactional symmetry) when one side of the arrangement gets less than they put in. "Over time," Sims argues, "true gains in the trading process should be assessed, especially when the amount of value gained from the intelligence transaction is not equal - when one is getting more value than one gives in an exchange, should be a red flag for the responsible intelligence manager," because this is an indication of intelligence dependency and a false appearance of symmetry (Sims 2006:198).

A military and security policy professional argues that states cannot be relevant in the intelligence sharing process if they have no meaningful information to offer.[5] Captain Olli J. Teirila suggests that, in order to get

[4] Jennifer Sims, "Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,* August 2006, Vol. 19, Issue 2, pp.195-217.

[5] Olli J. Teirila, "Small State Intelligence Dilemmas: Struggling between Common Threat Perceptions and National Priorities," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. March 2015, Vol. 28:215-235.

prominence within the intelligence sharing framework, smaller states such as Finland "should have information to exchange with other countries' intelligence services in order to get something in return for itself" (Teirila 2015:228). Colin Murray claims that, even in context of special agreements such as the Five Eyes, states share continuously relevant information, but a transactional dissymmetry arises when states refrain from sharing everything with every member of the agreement mainly because of levels of classification and states special interests.[6] Regarding states special interests, studies have uncovered that states engage in intelligence sharing for both individual and collective benefits.[7]

James Walsh argues that intelligence sharing is a form of hierarchical cooperation reflecting both, states who control the process, draft rules of compliances and practices, and subordinate states who conform to the hierarchy in exchange for various benefits including "shared intelligence, foreign aid and military protection from external threats"(Walsh 2010:5). In light of these asymmetric transactions, some intelligence practitioners seem to suggest that despite costs and subcontracted intelligence collection agreements based on barter and hierarchy, states will still benefit from the sharing process even if they do not get immediately anything in return.[8] For example, a small state with an opportunity to reach other states or international organizations such as NATO or the IMF with information, and then having them follow that information with policies, in the world of intelligence, that will be considered a big gain.[9] In the intelligence sharing process, what is then considered valuable and non-valuable information and who determines the value of the information? For example, within the Five Eyes Framework, the United Kingdom may decide to share information on how many people use social media inside the UK. This information may be very valuable for member states interested in social networking, personal profiles, and so on but, may have no or less value for countries outside the Framework. Thus, context and threats characteristics have capacity to influence the value of the shared information.

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[6] Colin Murray, "What the Manchester attack leaks mean for the UK-US intelligence-sharing relationship," *The Conservation Media Group*, 26 May 2017. Available at: https://theconversation.com/what-the-manchester-attack-leaks-mean-for-the-uk-us-intelligence-sharing-relationship-78415. Last Accessed on August 19, 2017.

[7] Adriana Seagle, "Intelligence Sharing Practices Within NATO: An English School Perspective," *Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.* May 2015, Vol. 28: 557–577.

[8] Anonymous comment on the intelligence sharing process.

[9] Anonymous comment on the intelligence sharing process.

Scholars and practitioners alike suggest that valuable information comprises data that originates from a verifiable original source, and may be put to use or have potential to be used by the policy-makers. Jeffrey Richelson for example, assesses intelligence and its *value in relation to dissemination*. He claims that, "the greater the dissemination of the information, the greater the difficulty to judge the value of that information" (Richelson 1990:315).[10]This implies that in the world of intelligence, less valuable information is considered to be recycled information or information that comes from the second, third or more sources. Additionally, Irena Dumitru (2014:572) clarifies that valuable information is information collected on targets in which "the sources and methods of collection remain *unknown to the targets*" (my emphasis).[11] Cultural nuances and language skills capabilities seem to add value to the information at the beginning of the exchange. An emphasis on the veridicality of evidence indicates information coming from technology and human sources is considered, strategic, valuable and influences immediately a security protocol and/or policy. An example illustrating the trickle down approach of valuable intelligence is the incident of March 2017, when global media announced that the US banned electronics from the cabins of trans-Atlantic flights coming from the Middle East and North Africa citing "continuing threat to civil aviation."[12] The first valuable information regarding this incident has been exchanged several years earlier in 2014, when electronics were required to be screened separately and in some cases powered on to prove that they were real.[13]

> This morning, a new request to those traveling to the US, make sure electronic devices carried on board can power up. The fighting in Syria and now Iraq has alarmed American officials. Both countries have become a training ground for Jihadists, some from America and the west with a passport, which could allow easy access to flights. TSA is asking some of the 250 international airports with direct

[10] Jeffrey T. Richelson, "The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation," *The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 1990, Vol. 4, Issue 3, pp. 307-323.
[11] Irena Dumitru, "Building an Intelligence Culture From Within: The SRI and Romanian Society," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, May 2014, Vol. 27:3, 569-589.
[12] Kaveh Waddell, "Abu Dhabi to Los Angeles: 17 Hours without a Laptop," *The Atlantic*. March 21, 2017.
[13] "New Airport Security Measures TSA Taking Closer Look at Electronics," *ABC News: Good Morning America*. July 7, 2014.

> flights to the US, to ask some passengers to power up cell phones, tablets, and computers. If that device doesn't power up, it won't go on the plane. Why? The worry is that bomb makers could be hiding explosives or components in those devices.[14]

When assessing the value and the impact a piece of information can have for a security policy one can assert that, in the contemporary period, big national and global security policy changes happen with very little notice, based on exchange of intermittent and small pieces of information that cannot be immediately or thoroughly verified. Also, despite long existing partnership, in the intelligence sharing process, small states may attempt to renegotiate how they transact valuable information with comparably larger states. An example of this complexity includes the media speculation that soon after taking office, the US president might have leaked information obtained from Israel to Russia. When pressed for an answer, former Israeli national security adviser, Uzi Arad lamented that in the sharing process, countries assume risks and benefits.

> Every nation considers many possibilities when sharing intelligence with another country, and that the more people they share with, the more their intelligence can be misdirected…the idea that the Trump Administration would share information with Russia that would find its way to Iran is a long shot…Russia could penetrate the US intelligence system using its own strong spying tactics…we also have rotten apples, others do too, *and you factor in [these considerations] when deciding to share intelligence, even with an ally* (emphasis mine).[15]

The Israeli official underscored the fact that small states participate in the intelligence sharing process consciously aware of the risk that the information they share may be compromised. The visit of the Russian delegation to the White House and the ensued dissensions over disclosing classified information to Sergey Lavrov is an illustration of compromising the intelligence sharing source, the methods of collection and the levels of classification. Pressed by media, the U.S. president disclosed that he shared

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[14] "New Airport Security Measures TSA Taking Closer Look at Electronics," *ABC News: Good Morning America*. July 7, 2014.
[15] Yonah Jeremy Bob, Michael Wilner, "Trump won't leak Israeli intel to Russia, but Mossad might tread lightly," *The Jerusalem Post* online edition. February 6, 2017.

information with the Russian foreign minister due to concerns for humanity's safety and global security. "I wanted to share with Russia (at an openly scheduled W.H. meeting) which I have the absolute right to do, facts pertaining… to terrorism and airline flight safety ... plus I want Russia to greatly step up their fight against ISIS & terrorism," he tweeted.[16] According to a former U.S. official cited by the *Washington Post*, disclosure as such affected the future of the relationship with an intelligence sharing partner.

> President Trump revealed highly classified information to the Russian foreign minister and ambassador in a White House meeting last week. Trump's disclosures jeopardized a critical source of intelligence on the Islamic State.
>
> The information the president relayed had been provided by a U.S. partner through an intelligence-sharing arrangement considered so sensitive that *details have been withheld from allies and tightly restricted even within the U.S. government* (emphasis mine).[17]

Interestingly, after the oversharing incident, political officials and media have debated endlessly over the classification and ownership of the "code-word information," instead of focusing on the benefits of disclosing information for the preservation of individuals' safety; whose lives may have been spared from an unimaginable destruction. It is important to note that although in May 2017, the media continued to obsess over "safeguarding secrets" dilemma and disclosure of classified information, the information about the use of laptop computers on trans-Atlantic aircrafts appeared in open sources several months before it was publicly released, and had already influenced homeland and global security policies.

Who gains what from the disclosure or leak of intelligence? One may speculate that because of declassification, the U.S. actually saved money and took control over the message and the dissemination of information without asking a small country for permission. It is no secret that the U.S. is emphatically dedicated to collecting and classifying information. Annually, the U.S. spends billions of dollars to keep every *sneeze* and basic information secret. "It could be the name of a source, a method of collection that's still

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[16] Demetri Sevastopulo, Katrina Manson in Washington, and Mark Odell in London,"Donald Trump defends sharing terrorism 'facts' with Russia," *The Financial Times*. May 16, 2017.
[17] Greg Miller and Greg Jaffe,"Trump revealed highly classified information to Russian foreign minister and ambassador," *The Washington Post*. May 15, 2017.

in use or an agreement with a foreign government that still needs to be protected" said John P. Fitzpatrick, head of the Information Security Oversight Office, which oversees the government's classification effort.[18] Another potential reason for disclosure may be to probe the validity of the existing information. There is no doubt that such information impacted financially the U.S. national security policy domestically, as well as internationally through intelligence and military operations in Syria and Iraq. In line of this argument, Sims also claims that states sometimes chose to reveal sources and methods of intelligence gathering in order to strengthen their influence (Sims 2006:197).

A challenge intrinsic to the asymmetry of information transactions pertains to the fact that global threats are relevant to the international community, yet not all members of that same community participate in implementation of information sharing policies or in generating initiatives to eradicate these same threats. For example, even though the self-declared Islamic *state* poses a common threat to the global community, some states seem to abstain from sharing pertinent security information with each other for fear of: (a) jeopardizing mutual trust, (b) revealing the information's source, (c) endangering ongoing cooperation with an ally, or (d) preventing the detection of "future" threats. As noted by the *Washington Post*, "the information released by the U.S., was so sensitive that it had not been shared with American allies and that circulation had also been tightly restricted within the U.S. government."[19] Is this an error of communication or a form of intelligence sharing politicization? Some speculate that, the U.S. president was not aware of the source of the information because he was just briefed on the issue, not on the source or the method by which it was obtained.[20] Yet, this indiscretion is illustrative not only of a "safeguarding secrets" dilemma, but also of a potentially severe fracture in the international community of intelligence transactions. Israeli officials refrained from making further comments reiterating the fact that Israel is not a member of the U.S. led coalition fighting the Islamic state, but is an active actor with enhanced

[18] Scott Shane, "Cost to Protect US Secrets Doubles to Over $ 11 Billion Dollars,"*The New York Times*. July 2, 2012.
[19] Cited by Demetri Sevastopulo, Katrina Manson in Washington, and Mark Odell in London, 'Donald Trump defends sharing terrorism 'facts' with Russia," *The Financial Times*. May 16, 2017.
[20] Oren Liberamann, "Israel may have to withhold intelligence from US, ex-Mossad boss Warns," *CNN Wire*. May 17, 2017.

capabilities of HUMINT and TECHINT who covertly shares info about threats with the U.S. and other coalition members.[21]

To complicate matters, the veridicality of information transactions comes under suspicion when information cannot be immediately verified and states use the opportunity to sabotage each other's political and economic interests by advancing their own interests. Then, leaks by accident occur to probe the veracity of the information in the public domain, control the message or let others know about the existence of certain information. Intentional and accidental leaks are also part of the intelligence sharing transaction process and may contribute to the information sharing dilemma. The news that the self-declared Islamic state acquired the capability to use sophisticated explosives in laptop computers on Middle Eastern airlines was met with skepticism by those affected who questioned whether the ban was in the name of security interests of the U.S., economic protectionism, or in the interest of some other actor interested in advancing a new piece of technology as a protective device of global security.[22]

Sharing Intelligence – The Strategic Value of Intelligence

When, in an intelligence security transaction, does information acquire strategic value for the seller and for the receiver? Some scholars suggest that a piece of information, acquires strategic value when for obtaining this information a country involves cost, technologies and countermeasures strategies.[23] The literature on the strategic value of intelligence is scarce. Yet, strategic value per se is a multidimensional concept linked to power, security and geopolitics. Likewise, some states are inclined to view the strategic value of intelligence in terms of maritime military capabilities and a balance of power.[24] By and large, the use of strategic intelligence in policymaking is intermittent, and some practitioners attribute this to the scarce production of strategic intelligence citing lack of expertise to produce it and disinterest of consumers to demand it. Others attribute the reorientation from strategic intelligence toward tactical and operational intelligence to limited

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[21] Cited by Demetri Sevastopulo, Katrina Manson in Washington, and Mark Odell in London, "Donald Trump defends sharing terrorism 'facts' with Russia," *The Financial Times*. May 16, 2017.
[22] "Was Israel behind US laptop ban on Mideast airlines," *Al Jazeera English*. 17 May 2017.
[23] Griffith, Ivelaw L., "Caribbean geonarcotics.(Caribbean Security On The Eve Of The 21st Century)(narcotics traffic)', in *McNair Papers MNP, SS33*, Issue 52-55. 1 October 1996.
[24] Nazery Khalid, "With a Little Help from My Friends: Maritime Capacity-building Measures in the Straits of Malacca1," *Contemporary Southeast Asia ICSA 424*, Volume 31, Issue 3. December 1, 2009.

time available, the volatility of the security environment and the proliferation of risk.[25]

How does this impact national security policy? An informal survey of intelligence practitioners conducted by John Heidenrich reveals the convoluted meaning of strategic intelligence. "Hand someone a report on a foreign-related topic and describe it as "strategic intelligence" Heidenrich says, "and, then ask the recipient to explain the term "strategic intelligence" and how the report qualifies…a typical reply, after an awkward pause, has been that strategic intelligence is information about countries, or about nuclear forces, or perhaps a long-range forecast or…I don't know."[26] As Heidenrich defined it, strategic intelligence "pertains to strategy" and is "knowledge about obstacles and opportunities" obtained from multiple insights in the areas of politics, economics, engineering, language, history and culture.

It should prove interesting to learn via empirical studies when in the sharing process, the knowledge or information exchanged is labelled *knowledge of strategic value*. Hypothetically, some proponents of strategic intelligence may suggest that knowledge or information gets strategic value when it is used as a rationale for the creation and implementation of a strategy, such as "a grand strategy," or "a national security strategy." Some of these conceptions may come from experts in the fields of History, Political Science, Cultural Studies, Languages, World Religions, and so on. Still others may claim that lately the US Intelligence Community transacts more tactical (information for the battlefield) intelligence than strategic intelligence because of consumers' high demand of tactical intelligence and lack of expertise in areas dealing with religion, culture, history, corruption and civil affairs.[27]As indicated, strategic value of the information or intelligence can be linked not only to geopolitics, but also to intelligence cooperation and conflict resolution efforts. Essentially, information or intelligence seems to gain strategic value when states use it to influence policy development and implementation. Other scholars may also argue that

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[25] George Cristian Maior, "Cunoasterea strategica in era globalizarii," in George Cristian Maior (editor), *Un Razboi al Mintii. Intelligence, servicii de informatii si cunoastere strategica in secolul XXI*. Bucuresti: Editura Rao, 2010, p. 46.

[26] John G. Heidenrich, "The State of Strategic Intelligence. The Intelligence Community's Neglect of Strategic Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol 51, No.2, 2007. Available Online. Last Accessed August 25, 2017.

[27] John G. Heidenrich, "The State of Strategic Intelligence. The Intelligence Community's Neglect of Strategic Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol 51, No.2, 2007. Available Online. Last Accessed on August 25, 2017.

even though after 9/11 the exchange of intelligence intensified, the quality of US security and foreign policy remains unaltered simply because policymakers are not eager to read or use strategic intelligence to inform policy development and implementation process.[28]

Intelligence Sharing - Small States and Security Dilemma

What is geographically a small state in the international society is not disputable. However, when considering the UK and Israel within the international community, the conception of a small state is less about geography and more about the power of its military and its intelligence capabilities to influence international relations. Doubtless, Europe is a collection of small states in geographical terms. What country gets the rank of "small" or "big" state in the intelligence sharing process is contingent upon the state's strength or capability to influence the sharing agreement and subsequently the international community through the amount and significance of information offered, as well as the frequency of transactions and the quality of the information at hand. Jonathan Alford comments on the security dilemma and the small states' ranking; and further argues that collecting, analysing and managing any amount of information and intelligence for the sake of procuring national security is difficult for small states because they have to invest in technology for collection, storage and analysis of germane information (Alford 1984:379). During the Cold War, some states boasted on their geographical advantage. Presently, however, geographical advantage of a small state is only an asset with potential for creating a security dilemma when a small state entrusts its own security or seeks security protection from great powers. Geographical position according to Alford, does not offer more than *a site* for a big power to project "a position of military advantage" somewhere else: "Great powers at war, will defend small states only if it is in their strategic interest to do so" (Alford 1984:381). How do states know what is in their strategic interest if policymakers do not use strategic intelligence to influence foreign policy decisions is a matter that requires further exploration.

During the recent NATO Summit, the US president delivered a speech which provides an insightful perspective into how great powers may respond to contemporary security challenges of small states when pressed by financial

[28] Marrin, Stephen, "Why strategic intelligence analysis has limited influence on American foreign policy," *Journal of Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 32, Issue 6, 2017.

constraints at home. The theme of "America First" considered in the context of NATO's Article 5 concerned many NATO members since its first allusion in 2016, prompting the media to report headlines such as: "In NATO Speech, Trump is Vague about Mutual Defence Pledge," "Trump says US may not automatically defend NATO allies under attack," "Donald Trump Sets Conditions for Defending NATO Allies Against Attack," and "Trump finally commits to defend NATO allies."[29] A possible realist or Waltzian interpretation of the current situation within the international political system would imply that security is scarce and knowledge is expensive for states to share and to acquire. The American president announced publicly that NATO suffers from "chronic underpayment," even after states committed to allocate 2% payment in their latest agreements. The English School perspective on international relations and regional international society suggests small states ought to adopt a solidarist direction to enhance their common values and aspirations toward ensuring their own security within the creation of their own institutions, such as that of NATO.

Fairness in payment for collective security prompted NATO members such as Romania for example, to commit 2% of its GDP for national defence. Yet, some interpret this allocation toward small states' common security not as a reaction to the views from the US president, but rather a response to Russia's aggressive foreign policy. "We need a serious posture on deterrence, since Crimea is being militarized by Russia, and this can be used as a platform for power projection not only into the Black Sea, but to the south eastern Mediterranean," commented a NATO member.[30] In this current transactional environment, small states may have to re-examine and re-structure the nature and extent of their involvement with greater states. In like manner, small states may up their contributions to enhance their importance in relation to greater states and their strategic interests. Foremost, small states may consider the extent to which greater states may commit to their survival in case of military conflict.

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[29] Michael D. Shear, Mark Landler and James Kanter, "In NATO Speech, Trump is Vague about Mutual Defense Pledge'. *The New York Times*. 25 May 2017. Justin McCurry. 2016. "Trump says US may not automatically defend NATO allies under Attack," *The Guardian*. July 21, 2016. David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, "Donald Trump Sets Conditions for Defending NATO Allies against Attack," *The New York Times*. July 20, 2016. Gregory Korte, "Trump finally commits to defend NATO allies," *USA Today*. June 9, 2017.

[30] Interview with Romania's Ambassador to the US, George Maior cited by Paul Mcleary, "NATO Spending, Romania Steps Up," *Foreign Policy*, May 3, 2017.

A careful review of transactional patterns of intelligence toward security within the international society reveals that the geographical size of the state does not matter as much as the behavior of the state and whether or not the state is democratic and relentless in pursuing common security interests. Predicaments for small states may arise from domestic weaknesses when setting up germane allocations within their budgets, strengthening democratic institutions, and preserving their social and political stability. Over a longer period of time, these weaknesses have the potential to erode and impact the strength of partnerships, and reciprocal trust from greater states. To complicate matters in this transactional framework, some authors indicate that small states may also be pressured by the international community or some of the greater states to release information that they are not ready to release. Other authors further attest that small states succeed by sheer persistence. For example, during and after the Cold War, Denmark managed to remain engaged in the intelligence transactional processes through "consistency, stubbornness, and expertise; earning the title of nuclear negotiator in Europe."[31]

Another predicament facing small states is recognizing and balancing both domestic and international developments and having logistical resources to deal with transactional issues. Olli J. Teirila mentions budget constraints and the proliferation of threats within the small states.[32] Using Finland as an example, Teirila discusses the domestic security predicaments some Eastern European states face between assuring high military budgets focused on collecting and sharing defence intelligence, as well as logistically being pressured to modernize national intelligence systems to keep up with domestic extremism and international society demands. A major contributor to small states security predicaments in Eastern Europe is the land grabbing threat coming from states with aggressive behaviour like Russia. As events continue to unfold within Russia, it is clear that the international society ought to focus more on the creation of the new norms and codes of conduct to regulate such menacing behaviour coming from greater states, like Russia. So far, this type of behaviour is enhancing the arms race for NATO member states, further having deleterious effects on flora and fauna through NATO's

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[31] Vaidotas Urbelis, "The Relevance and Influence of Small State in NATO and the Common Foreign and Security Policy," *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review*, 2014-2015, Vol. 13.

[32] Olli J. Teirila, "Small State Intelligence Dilemmas: Struggling between Common Threat Perceptions and National Priorities," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. March 2015, Vol. 28:215-235.

deterrence and reassurance exercises. Foremost, this behaviour is disrupting the peaceful order of the international society.[33]

Diplomacy, Intelligence Sharing and Order Within Contemporary International Society

The post-Cold War world order as some rightly assess it, is in crisis with no specific norms to deal effectively with Russia's invasion of Crimea.[34] To contrast this threat, however, intelligence sharing transactional patterns evinces promise for a different type of enhanced cooperation among concerned states. But for this cooperation to be successful, it must be based on mutual trust and common security values by which participant states are commonly known friends and former enemies.[35] Hedley Bull writes about diplomacy and international order in a way in which "diplomacy includes both the formulation – gathering and assessing information on the international environment, and the execution of a state's foreign policy through cooperation, communication, persuasion and coercion"(Bull 1977:158). In his view, diplomacy is about tact and subtleties to minimize friction. Intelligence sharing-based transactions are a function of diplomacy toward equanimity: "while each country seeks to deny other countries some information about itself, it also wishes to impart some information" (Bull 1977:164). In the contemporary international society, the practice of intelligence-based transaction includes collection and sharing of strategic information not only about states, but also about groups and individuals through special envoys, special military attaches, journalists, and other representatives. All these entities provide constant flow of collection and sharing of strategic information.

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[33] Jen Judson, "Building readiness: Romanian base gets an overhaul to strengthen NATO Forces,"*Defense News*. July 14, 2017. "Cutting a huge chunk of the hill-roughly 153 cubic yards of soil-in order to clear space for proper sightline between tanks on the range and the moving targets." "…a torrential volley of destruction…By the end of nearly an hour, the hillsides smoked from the unleashing of artillery, mortars, rockets and fire from tanks and combat vehicles as well as helicopters and fighter jets from Romania, the United States, Croatia, Armenia, Montenegro - the newest NATO member and Ukraine." Cited in Judson, "Multinational live-fire exercise lights up Romanian countryside in show of force," *Defense News*. July 18, 2017.

[34] Michael S. Kochin, "Transformations of World Orders: Lessons from Kissinger and the English School," Available online in *Academia.*

[35] Michael S. Kochin, "Transformations of World Orders: Lessons from Kissinger and the English School," Available online in *Academia.*

Based on Bull's definition of diplomacy, intelligence sharing is an essential feature of diplomacy and order within the international community. Intelligence sharing creates new norms of cooperation and mimics an institution of diplomacy within the international society. Intelligence sharing forges bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations linking intelligence organizations within and between states not only according to states interests dictated by their resources and position within the international system as realists, such as Kenneth Waltz may suggest, but also according to states and organizations perceived security interests, values and opportunities, as the English School claims.[36] Intelligence organizations represent states not people, and in some intelligence sharing frameworks, relations are highly institutionalized through agreements and operate under mutually created and agreed upon rules and conventions (i.e., Five Eyes, NATO, EU, etc.). The institution of intelligence sharing is internationally recognized by states and is institutionalized through a web of operating centres or hubs which resemble state embassies dedicated to codification - cooperation of intelligence organization and intelligence organization under auspices of a director not an ambassador e.g., European Union's Intelligence Analysis Centre-INTCEN. The empirical tableau suggests also that, the intelligence sharing negotiation process may be both intermittent yet continuous; implies rules, framework agreements and allegiances to both the intelligence organizations and to the state.[37] Intelligence organizations have overlapping interests and the function of the intelligence sharing is to communicate information or intelligence within the international society and between one political community and another.

In retrospect, sharing intelligence or information exchange solidifies states relationships. A valuable piece of intelligence is collected and shared within the international society for the purpose of creating common rules or policies to preserve the society, its institutions and security. A piece of information becomes valuable when it is used immediately in policy to stop common threats to security. Value to the information is given first by actors who decide to collect, those who collect, process, and disseminate the information, as well as by the context and threats characteristics. Intelligence

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[36] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill. 1979.
[37] Mary Manjikian, "But My Hands Are Clean: The Ethics of Intelligence Sharing and the Problem of Complicity," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol 28, Issue 4, 2015. Stephane Lefebvre, "The Difficulties and Dilemmas of Intelligence Cooperation," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,* Vol. 16, Issue 4, pp. 527-542.

sharing can effect positive change within the international society. Further, withholding or intermittent release of intelligence due to concerns for protecting sources and methods of extrication, for example, may prevent the proliferation of some threats, but it may also disempower or alienate efforts for providing for global common security. Due to unpredictability and volatility of threats in the international security environment, the governing principle of intelligence sharing as an intrinsic feature of diplomacy ought to serve as a guiding principle for understanding threats and for preserving common security values and efforts by the international community to quench these same threats. This method may prove more advantageous than relying or endorsing secrecy of sources and methods for gathering strategic information.

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