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CONTENT

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

INTERPRETING OSINT DATA: WHAT HISTORY IS FREELY TEACHING US ABOUT ONGOING EVOLUTIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Florin DIACONU*

Abstract

The text focuses the attention on some major aspects of the ongoing strategically significant events and trends in the East China Sea and South China Sea (trends and events extensively covered by a lot of OSINT data), and evaluates the increasing tensions in these regions of the Pacific Ocean in a way which is deliberately taking into account what history is massively and freely teaching us. As far as the author is concerned, the more and more obvious and ambitious Chinese plans and actions in both seas are a direct and almost unavoidable consequence of a quick and massive evolution (or change) of the power status of China. At this very moment, Beijing is deliberately attempting to reach a more globally influential power status – that of world power, and in such a situation the attention paid by China to the Word Ocean and to the strategically significant routes leading to the open seas is larger than ever before in Modern Times. In a way or another, Chinese actions are nothing else but a renewed version of some well-known episodes in world history – those which have previously led other actors of the international arena to a more globally influential power status, by means of developing naval power and of gaining more free access to the World Ocean. In such a context, the United States is also deliberately trying to protect, according to a strategically legitimate, strong and long national tradition, the complete freedom of navigation, and the stability of the regional balance of power in both seas. Quite clearly, the strategic interests of both China and the U.S. are, in both seas we are speaking about, vastly different ones, and on a well defined collision course.

Keywords: power status, world power, sea power, World Ocean, strategic confrontation, China, the United States, the Pacific Ocean, regional balance of power, strategically significant routes, freedom of navigation, OSINT.

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At this very moment, China and the United States (together with regional allies of the US in the Far East and South-East Asia) are, quite clearly, on what we could legitimately call "collision course" in both the East China Sea and South China Sea. Along the past few months, a lot of *open sources* are reporting a lot on events and trends in the area which are significant for our debate: China is deliberately enlarging some tiny islands and reefs, in order to "build" larger islands, able to support large military airfields and other technologically advanced military facilities, including very powerful radars (Watkins, 2016, February 29); Beijing is also deploying in the region we are speaking about significant military contingents, including naval units and aircraft (Cohen, 2016, May 15); and China is also trying to push international bodies of all sorts officially recognize its "legitimate" sovereignty rights in the region (Blanchard and Petty, 2016, July 14), also trying to deny the U.S. warships and airplanes the possibility to freely move in the *international* waters China is openly claiming and in the airspace above them (Martina, Torode and Blanchard, 2016, May 11). We also know that South China Sea has a *very* important strategic value: roughly 33 % of the international trade in Asia and almost 50 % of the oil Asia needs are regularly crossing *this* very sea, which sooner or later – some authors are openly stating – *has* to be dominated, sooner or later, by China, *if* Greater China is to be established; and also that China is deliberately attempting to dominate all surrounding seas, in order to revive the system of borders (and areas of direct domination) in the era of the maximal development of the empire (Kaplan, 2012, p. 298-299). More than this, we also know the ongoing events and trends in the South China Sea are not at all accidental and / or without roots in the more or less recent history: almost 10 years ago, in 2007, for example, Beijing had "established the new Sansha municipality in Hainan province, which has jurisdiction over three islets that Vietnam claims in the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos" (Jacques, 2012, p. 377).

What history is teaching us about increasingly ambitious actors on the international arena

Along many centuries, any serious attempt aimed at getting an increasingly influential power status on the international arena has been – almost automatically – leading to an increased effort of the state we are speaking about to expand its influence in larger and larger regions of the World Ocean. In this context, we are to say that any state "that… has easy access to the high sea itself" obviously has a "strategic value of its position" which is "very high" (Mahan, pp. 31-32). We also know that "naval might has been one of the factors which has enabled individual states to advance into the ranks of the great powers" and "moreover, history shows that those states which do not have naval forces at their disposal have not been able to hold the status of great power for very long" (Gorshkov, 1974, p. 3-5)

In the end, we are speaking about a basic rule anyone can easily understand: a globally significant power status directly means increased capabilities of pursuing interests (some of them vital ones) not only immediately beyond the borders, or in the continental region the state we are speaking about is placed, but on other continents as well. Practically, *world power status* (an exceptional status very few powers ever enjoyed – Wight, 1998, p. 62) necessarily means the ability to plan and reach strategically significant goals *anywhere* – or almost anywhere – in the world. But open seas and oceans represent roughly 70 % of the total area of the world, while continents and larger or smaller islands, put together, represent only the rest, which means only 30 % of the total area of our planet (Gorshkov, 1974, p.5). In such a situation, when a state is more or less deliberately "jumping" from a *regionally* significant power status to a *globally* significant power status, it has to: *a. strongly and quickly develop its naval capabilities; b. strongly enhance its presence in larger and larger regions of the World Ocean; and c. identify and implement solutions aimed at controlling – or, in case of need, opening – strategically significant routes directly leading to open seas and oceans*.

In order to accomplish such significant geo-strategic goals, several methods have been successfully used along the more or less recent stages of the world history. The first of them is deliberately *enhancing naval capabilities of all sorts*. From this very perspective, *any* actor really interested in gaining global power status *has* to have a more powerful Navy than before (and, more generally speaking, a larger naval power than before[1]). And a powerful Navy means at least two complementary evolutions: more combat ships, and also increasingly technologically advanced (or combat worthy) ones. This very logic is present in *many* occasions. Let us take into account, for example, the notorious and very significant case of Great Britain. Along less than one century and a half (from the late 1680s to 1815, at the end of the First French Empire), the total number of its wooden battleships sharply increased, from 100 to more than 200 (see *Table 1*), while in the case of *all* competitors London was more or less directly confronted with, the total number of the ships of the line clearly grew smaller. In order to better understand the meaning of this set of figures, let us take into account that the total number of large combat ships used to control the World Ocean stays almost the same along almost 150 years (355 ships in 1689, and 359 in 1815), but the share of

[1] In this context, *naval power* has at least two constitutive elements: the *Navy* (naval armed forces) and the *merchant marine* (vitally useful for large scale international trade).

this total represented by the ships of the line of the Royal Navy sharply increased, from roughly 28 % to almost 60 %). All these figures, put together, are allowing us to understand that, in spite of some losses along intense wars, the *Royal Navy grew two times more powerful along less than one century and a half* (if we are speaking about its capital ships), which is a really *impressive* pace of development of vital combat capabilities.

***Table 1*: Total number of major combat ships (ships-of-the-line) of the significant naval powers on the world arena, 1689 to 1815** (Kennedy, 2011, p. 110)

	1689	**1739**	**1756**	**1779**	**1790**	**1815**
Britain	100	124	105	90	195	214
Denmark	29	-	-	-	38	-
France	120	50	70	63	81	80
Russia	-	30	-	40	67	40
Spain	-	34	-	48	72	25
Sweden	40	-	-	-	27	-
Netherlands	66	49	-	20	44	-

Up to a certain point, *Germany* has been, in a quite recent past, a very potent example of the same sort. Until the end of the 19th century, its Navy was quite small, aimed mainly at properly defending the limited length of its coastlines in the Baltic Sea against some regional threats. Later on, when Germany deliberately started planning and implementing policies aiming a more visible global power status, the situation dramatically changed. *Along a few years (less than one generation), the Second Reich designed and built a large and very modern battle fleet*. In order to better understand this situation, let us take into account the basic figures offered by a very serious and broadly comprehensive history of naval warfare (see *Table 2*). Along a very limited amount of time (only slightly more than two decades and a half, between 1882 and 1908), the total number of the German capital ships increased two times, the total number of cruisers increased more than two times, and the total number of smaller combat ships (torpedo boats and destroyers, at least some of them ocean going vessels) grew more than 11 times larger.

***Table 2*: The German Navy – number of combat and support ships, 1882 to 1908** (Pemsel, 1975, p. 316)

Year	Capital ships (ironclads, later on ships of the line)	Heavily armored monitors to defend the coastline	Cruisers of all sorts (including armored ones)	Torpedo boats and destroyers	Auxiliary ships
1882	12	1	18	11	14
1908	24	8	38 (8 of them armored)	128	20

More recently, the *Soviet Union* also offered a third very potent example of the same sort, in which a strongly "boosted" power status of the country is accompanied by (and, up to a certain point, made possible by) a significant and continuous growth of the Navy. In the case of the USSR, we are speaking about total number of ships, but also about more and more active / aggressive operational and strategic plans, and also about increasingly feasible naval technologies, accompanied by pouring a lot of resources into transforming a "brown-water Navy" into a really potent "blue-water Navy" (see *Table 3*). In this case, we are also speaking about clearly complementary trends: the significant development of the power status of the Soviet Union (from regional / continental *great* power status to superpower / *world* power status, in the context of the Cold War and of efforts aimed at challenging the exceptional power status of the United States) was clearly accompanied by (and, up to a certain point, made possible by) the massive development of the Soviet Navy. Along slightly more than 20 years, from 1952 to 1974, the number of the Soviet cruisers (all of them large, ocean-going ships) grew more than two times larger, from 15 to 33 units. The number of destroyers (almost all of them large, ocean-going vessels) also grew significantly larger, from 90 to 150 units. The total number of submarines did not grow, but in 1974 almost a third of the submarines in the Soviet Navy were nuclear propelled ones, with a practically unlimited range, clearly able to reach *any* region of the World Ocean. And, up to a certain point, the very evolution of the Soviet Navy from a mainly defensive role to a globally capable political and strategic tool is strongly illustrated by the sharp growth of the total number of auxiliary vessels, able to support the deployment of Soviet ships to areas of the World Ocean *far away* from the shores of the USSR. Along these two decades, the total displacement of the combat ships of the Soviet Navy sharply increased, from 1.0 million tons to 2.1 million tons, while the total displacement of the auxiliary ships in the Soviet Navy also grew almost five times larger, from 0.3 million tons to 1.48 million tons (Pemsel, 1975, pp. 318-319).

***Table 3*: The Soviet Navy – number of combat ships of different types and of auxiliary ships, 1952-1974** (Pemsel, 1975, pp. 316, 318-19).

Year	**Battleships**	**Cruisers**	**Destroyers**	**Submarines (conventional and nuclear propulsion)**	**Amphibious ships**	**Auxiliary vessels**
1952	3	15	90	400	120	60
1974	-	33	150	390 (120 of then nuclear propelled)	160	330

And, in the end, the very evolution of the *U.S. Navy* – at this very moment the mightiest in the world – is another very potent example vividly illustrating in which way a strong naval force is a must whenever we are speaking about *real world powers*, those actors of the international arena with interests almost everywhere in the world, and with military capabilities enabling them to protect these interests even in very remote areas of the World Ocean (see *Table 4*). In this case, along less than 15 years (from 1938, the year immediately before the moment when World War Two started to 1952, a few years after the moment when NATO emerged), the number of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers grew more than 20 times larger; the total number of U.S. Navy cruisers and submarines grew roughly two times larger, while the total number of American destroyers (all of them ocean-going ships) grew almost two times larger. But the sharply increasing *global* role of the U.S. Navy, vital in maintaining and boosting the global political, strategic and economic role of the U.S. on the world arena is strongly made clear by the vast increase of the total number of auxiliary vessels of all sorts – from 100 to 850. More auxiliary ships means, in the end, a more potent logistic support system, allowing different squadrons, battle groups and individual ships of the U.S. Navy to be fully capable of operating, without any major break, very far away from national oceanic borders. The vast increase of the U.S. Navy as a support (or enhancer) of the *global power* (and later of *superpower*) status of the U.S. is also illustrated by the evolution of the total displacement of the ships we are speaking about: in 1938, all combat ships of the U.S. Navy put together had a total displacement of 1.4 million tons; 14 years later, the total displacement of the American combat ships was almost 3.5 times larger, already reaching 4.69 million tons (Pemsel, 1975, p. 318).

***Table 4*: The U.S. Navy – evolution of number of combat and auxiliary ships, 1938 to 1952** (Pemsel, 1975, p. 316, 318)

Year	**Aircraft carriers**	**Capital ships (battleships, battle cruisers)**	**Cruisers of all sorts**	**Destroyers (all of them ocean-going)**	**Submarines**	**Auxiliary ships of all sorts**
1938	5	15	34	221	90	100
1952	102	15	72	385	207	850

Brief presentation of the current stage of evolution of China's naval power

In a way or another, recent and ongoing evolutions of China's naval capabilities are strongly resembling the basic logic of the episodes briefly presented along the previous pages: we are clearly speaking about a sharp increase of the total number of combat and auxiliary ships China is able to deploy, and also about a significant amount of technological modernization of naval vessels. In this way, *a larger and more modern Chinese Navy emerges*, quite clearly an enhanced tool able to support more and more visible *global* ambitions of the political leaders in Beijing.

A few decades ago, in the late 1980s, a very reliable author is openly stating, continental China has already started to quickly and significantly expand its naval forces. Such a policy was one of the strategic tools aimed at eliminating what some called "strategic encirclement" (Kennedy, 2011, p. 397) of the country. In order to become stronger in strictly naval terms, China was already designing and building new types of ocean-going warships, including mode modern destroyers, escort ships, and also fast attack boats. Its conventionally propelled submarine fleet also grew larger and larger (107 units in 1985, the third such force in the world). The first really large missions far away from national shores took place in 1980, when no less than 18 combat ships sailed along a route 8,000 nautical miles long, in the Southern Pacific. The same author is also stating that, since 1982, China started to test a new generation of submarines armed with nuclear missiles (Kennedy, 2011, p. 399), and also that, in spite of really significant efforts, the Chinese Navy was not – at least at *that* very moment – a real "blue-water" one, able to successfully operate, in case of need, far away from homeports, anywhere on the World Ocean (Kennedy, 2011, p. 400).

Almost three decades later, in 2015, the Chinese naval power was already larger – in strictly quantitative terms – than that of *any* of its neighbors on the shores of the East China Sea and of the South China Sea. In a more detailed way, last year China had 303 combat ships of all sorts – 79 large surface combat ships[2], plus 107 small combat ships, plus 53 "amphibs" (amphibious ships), plus 64 submarines of all sorts (including almost two dozen nuclear ones), while the second-largest naval power in the region, Japan, had only 67 combat ships – "46 x Large Combatants", plus "0 x Small Combatants", plus "3 x Amphibs", and "18 x Submarines" (U.S. DoD, July 27,

[2] Frigates or larger – destroyers, for example.

2015, p. 12). The same text is openly stating: "China is modernizing every aspect of its maritime-related military and law enforcement capabilities, including its naval surface fleet, submarines, aircraft, missiles, radar capabilities, and coast guard. It is developing high-end technologies intended to dissuade external intervention in a conflict and designed to counter U.S. military technology. Although preparation for a potential Taiwan conflict remains the primary driver of Chinese investment, China is also placing emphasis on preparing for contingencies in the East and South China Sea. China sees a need for the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to be able to support China's "new historic missions" and operational tasks outside the first island chain with multi-mission, long-range, sustainable naval platforms equipped with robust self-defense capabilities", also adding that "although quantity is only one component of overall capability, from 2013 to 2014, China launched more naval vessels than any other country in the region. The PLAN now possesses the largest number of vessels in Asia, with more than 300 surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships, and patrol craft" (U.S. DoD, July 27, 2015, p. 10).

Even more recently, in June 2016, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report prepared for members and committees of the U.S. Congress was openly stating "China is building a modern and regionally powerful navy with a limited but growing capability for conducting operations beyond China's near-seas region", also adding that "observers of Chinese and U.S. military forces view China's improving naval capabilities as posing a potential challenge in the Western Pacific to the U.S. Navy's ability to achieve and maintain control of blue-water ocean areas in wartime – the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War" (O'Rourke, 2016, p. i). This text is also listing, with really significant details, some already operational results of the Chinese efforts aimed at developing their Navy and which, put together, are shaping the grand design of a "blue-water Navy" able to act more and more globally, actively supporting the Chinese bid for getting, maintaining and consolidating *world* power status. The report is openly stating "China's military (including naval) modernization effort has been underway for about 25 years", and "observers date the beginning of the effort, to various points in the 1990s", while "design work on the first of China's newer ship classes appears to have begun in the later 1980s" (O'Rourke, 2016, p. 5). The report is also stating "in general, China's naval modernization effort to date has appeared focused less on increasing total platform (i.e., ship and aircraft) numbers than on increasing the modernity and capability of Chinese platforms. Changes in platform capability and the percentage of the force accounted for by modern platforms have generally been more dramatic than changes in total platform numbers", also adding that "in some cases (such as submarines and coastal patrol craft), total numbers of platforms have actually decreased over the past 20 years or so, but aggregate capability has nevertheless increased because a larger number of older and obsolescent platforms have been replaced by a smaller number of much more modern and capable new platforms" (O'Rourke, 2016). Later on, the same report lists, very clearly, some missions Chinese Navy is preparing for. At least three of them are really important for our debate here: "defending China's commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), such as those linking China to the Persian Gulf"; and "displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific"; and "asserting China's status as a leading regional power and major world power" (O'Rourke, 2016, p. 7). The text we are speaking about is also listing new ships (or new ship types) the Chinese Navy is building and operating in order to consolidate its more and more extended capabilities and strategic responsibilities: a. *new non-nuclear submarines*: "China since the mid-1990s has acquired 12 Russian-made Kilo-class non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs) and put into service at least four new classes of indigenously built submarines" (O'Rourke, 2016, p. 12); b. *new nuclear propelled submarines, armed with ballistic missiles* – those belonging to the JIN class, plus plans of "developing and fielding its next-generation SSBN, the Type 096, over the coming decade" (O'Rourke, 2016, p. 18); c. *aircraft carriers*: "on September 25, 2012, China commissioned into service its first aircraft carrier - the Liaoning, a refurbished ex-Ukrainian aircraft carrier, previously named Varyag, that China purchased from Ukraine as an unfinished ship in 1998"; we also know "the Liaoning is conventionally powered, has an estimated full load displacement of almost 60,000 tons, and might accommodate an eventual air wing of 30 or more aircraft" (O'Rourke, 2016, p. 19); China is also planning to build "its first domestic aircraft carrier" soon, and later on to "build multiple aircraft carriers over the next 15 years" (O'Rourke, 2016, p. 21); d. *new ocean-going destroyers and frigates*: "China since the early 1990s has purchased four Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia and put into service 10 new classes of indigenously built destroyers and frigates", including "guided-missile" ships (O'Rourke, 2016, p. 26); e. *cruisers*: plans to "build a new cruiser (or destroyer), called the Type 055, that might displace roughly 10,000 tons. China is the only country known to be planning to build a ship referred to (by some sources at least) as a cruiser. (The U.S. Navy's current 30-year shipbuilding plan includes destroyers but no cruisers)" (O'Rourke, 2016, p. 27); and f. *a new class of large amphibious ships*: "China has put into service a new class of amphibious ships called the Yuzhao or Type 071 class. The Type 071 design has an estimated displacement of more than 18,500 tons, compared with about 15,900 tons to 16,700 tons for the U.S. Navy's Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry"; such ships, the report is stating, openly quoting a text made public by ONI, the U.S. Office for Naval Intelligence, will provide "considerably greater and more flexible capability for "far seas" operations than the older landing ships" (O'Rourke, 2016, p. 38).

But all these significant developments have a really limited meaning, if the growing Chinese Navy is not enjoying a greater degree of free access to the World Ocean. When we are speaking about *this* very problem, it is very easy – simply by means or carefully watching the map – to understand the *all* the three seas on the Eastern border of China are, in a way or another, almost landlocked geographic entities: Korean Peninsula, Japan, the Philippines and Malaysia are, up to a certain point, large natural barriers denying the Chinese any chance to easily and freely reach the Pacific in any circumstances we can imagine. Most probably, Beijing is even more worried by the very fact that all four countries listed above have *extensive* strategic ties with the U.S., at least three of them being main regional partners of the U.S. in the Far East. *In order to get the guarantee of a really free access to the World Ocean, China is most probably attempting to transform at least some of the surrounding seas into "Chinese lakes'; or, better said, into seas fully or completely dominated by Chinese forces*. In strictly geo-strategic terms, such a behavior is strongly resembling what Germany did in World War One, when Berlin tried a lot to forcefully open the routes leading to the Atlantic, or to go beyond the limits of the North Sea, also partially "landlocked" by Scotland, Norway and Iceland. For Germany, lack of access to the World Ocean generated a lot of negative consequences (Renouvin, 2001), and the greatest sea battle of World War One, that at Jutland / Skagerrak has clearly been a deliberate attempt to eliminate the British control of the routes leading to the really open seas, to crush the Royal Navy and "perhaps control the North Sea" (Potter, 1981, p. 207), thus gaining, *if* possible, completely free access to the World Ocean.

Some very brief conclusions

In our opinion, the strategically significant ongoing evolutions in the South China Sea and, up to a certain point, in the East China Sea can be more easily and soundly evaluated by means of using several "layers" of concepts – *very solid intellectual tools* enabling us to better understand a lot of facts present in various OSINT sources. In our opinion, one of the most useful – and clearly one of the strongest – interpretations of the ongoing events in both seas listed above is one placing the concept of *strategic interest* at the very core of our debate. According to such a vision, ongoing events in South China Sea have a lot to do with an obvious strategic Chinese interest: that of getting, by any means, completely large-scale and free access to the World Ocean, by fully controlling the area we are speaking about. If free access to the World Ocean is missing or is limited, in different possible (and more or less probable) circumstances, the real meaning of the visible and massive development of the Chinese Navy as *truly global* tool might be seriously limited or even completely jeopardized, and *Beijing simply does not want to accept such an outcome in any case*.

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FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A CASE STUDY*

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Abstract:

The article aims to investigate the main direction of Serbian foreign policy in the post-Milosevic period. The article argues that Serbia was confronted with a negative external image, which emerged after the crimes against humanity that occurred in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, during the conflicts that marked the dissolution of this multi-national federation. The article shows how Serbia overcame this negative perception through a pragmatic pro-European policy and intelligently used the 2015 migration crisis to show a new face to European leaders. Moreover, the article shows that Serbia is trying to keep a balance between Russia and the EU, but that this balance is increasingly precarious.

Keywords: Serbia, Russia, EU, foreign policy.

Serbia's foreign policy

The internal and international context which serves as a basis for analysis of the Serbian foreign policy suffered significant changes over the previous 20 years. Different actors and systemic units that can influence the Serbian foreign policy suffered significant transformations, both concerning their strategic objectives and interest as well as regarding policies and actions. The relevant main contextual variables which account for the Serbian foreign policy in the last two decades are:

1. External variables

- The re-drawing of European map
- The dissolution of some actors and the emergence of some new ones
- The failure of Western governments to handle conflicts
- The lack of common European policies and coherent strategic objectives concerning the Balkans

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- The strong dependence of the Balkan, Central and Eastern European states of the decision-making context and the external capabilities of important players (the EU, the US, The Russian Federation).

2. Internal variables

- Political chaos both concerning ideologies and at the individual level (personalities were strongly connected to Milosevic's inheritance).
- Internal difficulties concerning governance and international reputation as a viable and autonomous partner.
- Failed or anemic institutional reforms.
- The involvement of Yugoslav intelligence services in the conflicts from the 1990s and the involvement of former officers in important public/private structures, where they could influence state reforms.
- Systemic corruption and organized crime (developed especially during the war years).
- An anxious society regarding Serbia's territorial integrity and feelings of frustration concerning the different labels attached to the Serbian people – xenophobic, ultra-nationalist, aggressive, focused on the past.
- The personalization of foreign policy and the lack of a strategic vision accepted by all parties.

Analysis bases

One of the most frequent analysis frameworks employed to understand Serbia starts from a bias which the last century did nothing but confirm. The myth of "ancestral hatred" in the Balkan area is based on the unscientific views of Robert Kaplan who, in 1993, published Balkan Ghosts (2005). In this work, he argued that the peoples of the Balkans are "unusually savage and inclined to violence" Even if the thesis of Balkan violence emerged in works previous to those of Kaplan, entering classified CIA reports in the 1950s, Kaplan's work, published in 1993, inflamed the official rhetoric of leaders such as John Major, Bill Clinton and even the EU mediator for the region, David Lord Owen and spread an image of a violent, hateful Balkans among the public opinion.

If, in the last years of the XX century, the topic of "violent and ultranationalist Serbs" was revived, the second decade of the XXI century introduced a new variable in the attempt to understand Serbia's foreign policy behavior: Serbia's alleged closeness to a revived Russia. In addition to their inability to find a solution to the issue of Kosovo, Europeans and Americans were particularly about Serbia's economic and political opening towards the Russian Federation.

When attempting to understand the Serbian foreign policy, one must not forget that Socialist Yugoslavia adopted, even since 1948, a foreign policy which tried to balance between the two large political and military blocs. **Yugoslavia, together with other non-European states formed the Un-aligned movement[1]. Serbia will always employ a form of non-alignment and will undertake cost-benefit analysis when attempting to achieve national interest objective. Serbia will befriend those who will support is economic and social development.**

The main lines of analysis

WHAT IS SERBIA?

This article does not aim to undertake a historical approach to Serbia, but only to describe its main characteristics, as a unit – a state actor of the international system.

The disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia led both to a change in the region's geostrategic position and to a need to re-define the states' foreign policy objective. In the case of newly emerging states, one can state that foreign policy changed radically. The recognition, according to international treaties, of a sovereign state, represents an essential aspect for understanding the field of foreign policy and international relations.

The war and the years of reconstruction had diverse consequences on Serbia, both concerning the country's image abroad and on the way that the Serbian state functioned:

- independence
- new borders
- the emergence of new neighbours on those borders
- the initiation and development by neighbours of new and previously impossible forms of cooperation, considering Serbia's image during the war
- the effort of fighting the image of an aggressive, warlike, criminal Serbia, as seen by the international community in the 1990s
- the loss of territory
- the presence of foreign troops on the country's territory
- the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo and the increase of frustrations at the national level, the anxiety of political elites and the population concerning the future of Serbia as a nation (Dollard, 1939; Berkowitz, 1969)
- the reform of state institutions

[1] Founded in Belgrade in 1961, by states which refused to take part in the two blocs

- the reform of the defence and security sectors
- legislative and strategic reforms
- the difficulty of rejecting personalized practices in foreign policy and of the nationalist speech and behavior
- the change of generation, the change of mentalities in order to succeed in changing organizations and institutions

In order to answer the question of What is Serbia and where does it lie in the international system (both from a geographic and a hierarchic point of view) in the international system? we must consider the following directions for analysis:

1. From a geographic point of view, Serbia is located in a politically unstable region, deeply affected by the problems of massive migration. From a geopolitical perspective, Serbia, as well as other states in the region are located in an area of confrontation between East and West,
2. Serbia is trying to obtain a honourable position in the European system, sometimes using the Kosovo issue as a means to negotiate. From a hierarchical point of view, Serbia "missed the start" towards democratization. However, the last two years proved the capacity of the Serbian nation to coalesce popular will and of its elites to overcome their nationalist anxieties.

WHERE IS SERBIA TODAY?

Concerning military security, the Balkan region is currently consolidated. The security vacuum created through the dissolution of the Yugoslav state system does not exist any more, but the region is today rather divided than connected:

- political division – the "Western Balkans" term was created by the international community to distinguish between countries in the region: Slovenia, which is now considered as a part of Central Europe, Bulgaria and Romania, current members of the EU and NATO;
- the Kosovo issue is a priority of the EU and Serbian foreign policy, as well as that of other powers having security interests in the region: however the issue is far from being solved;
- the inheritance of the regional wars and conflicts, as well as the international demonization/victimization of the parties involved, as well as the consolidation of perceptions formed during conflicts still affect regional relations;
- obvious differences between the states regarding their stages of euro-Atlantic accession.

At the same time, one can see that, taking into account the latest international events (the migrant crisis, the Russian military intervention supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime, the terrorist attacks in Paris, the terrorist attack (Stirile Protv, 2015) on a Russian airplane travelling from Sharm el-Sheikh to Sankt Petersburg), a worse security situation in the Western Balkans is not impossible.

In this regional context, one needs to mention that Serbia expressed its intention to join the EU and NATO, thus marking its re-integration in the international community. This took place in November 2000, on the occasion of the Zagreb Summit, which marked the beginning of a new age of regional cooperation and reconciliation (European Commission, 2000). Formally, the negotiations for the accession of Serbia to the EU began on the 21st of January 2014, with the first Intergovernmental conference on Serbian integration.

Concerning Serbia's NATO membership, this is not on the list of Serbian priorities, as a simple cost-benefit analysis (Petrovic, 2007) can show that neither the Serbian elites, nor the population are willing to go through the long road of NATO accession.

Serbian foreign policy

Main foreign policy actions

Within the first half of 2015, Serbia was considered a regional actor having a incoherent foreign policy, which varied, according to context and own interests, between East and West.

At the same time, the political developments of the past months showed that Serbia is capable of approaching its international situation in a realistic and pragmatic manner. Thus, the effort of regaining its international credibility was maximized during the migrant crisis through giving up nationalist and xenophobic discourse. As opposed to other states in the region, Serbia turned aut to have a tolerant and "European" action in the migrant crisis. Serbia continued its policy of diplomatic balancing between its internal needs and the legacy of collective memory and the need to adopt a rational behavior on the global arena (B92, 2015a).

The European political crisis caused by the inability to offer a unitary response to the migratory waves offered an initial advantage to Serbia, which allowed it to have leverage in Berlin. The pragmatic but deeply humanitarian approach that Serbia took in the migrant crisis turned it into a accepted discussion partner, which was seen as "respected and capable to efficiently solving the problems at hand" (B92, 2015a).

Despite not being part of the European Union, Serbia undertook the obligation of hosting refugees/migrants, as part of its "constructive" approach to foreign policy (Mediafax, 2015).

A first effect of the “unexpected” coherence in the Serbian foreign policy was noticed in the 2015 European Commission report on Serbia. The introduction of the document showed “Serbia remains faithful to the strategic objective it undertook to fully join the EU…it implements an ambitious political and economic agenda and successfully finalized the requirements of the action plan. Serbia is playing a constructive role in the region. It fulfils its obligations for the normalization of relations with Kosovo …and played a role in handling the migrant crisis…as well as actively contributing in the regional and international cooperation fora” (European Commission, 2015) .

At the same time, pro-European Serbian Prime-minister, Aleksandar Vucic undertook, in November 2015, a visit in the Russian Federation, where he met Dimitri Medvedev, Vladimir Putin and other representatives of the Russian government, presiding over the official opening of the Russia- Serbia business forum.

Vucic stated, in the beginning of the visit “(…) We are grateful to Russia for the help it offered us in the UN Security Council, in UNESCO[2] and in other international organizations, as well as for the way it helped us in our efforts of preserving territorial integrity and indivisibility” (B92, 2015b). The international recognition of the Serbian change of vision came through its inclusion in the UNESCO executive director’s office, when the UN was troubled about including Kosovo as a full member of UNESCO.

Prime-Minister Vucic declared, in a interview with Russian news agency Sputnik (Sputnik news, 2015) that “the EU would have granted Serbia a maximum grade in foreign policy if not for special relations between us and the Russian Federation and Serbia’s refusal to impose sanctions on the Russian Federation”.

On the other hand, in a speech addressed to the National Assembly (Tanjug, 2015), Vucic declared “I will fight until my last drop of energy so that Serbia goes forward without ever being in danger of going back to the past”, and demanded the Serbian political class a rational and reasonable debate without the “empty and falsely patriotic speech” which characterized the 1990s.

Even a partial analysis of Serbian foreign policy can show that its main coordinates are gliding between East and West that it aims to regain international credibility and to join the European Union.

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[2] In October 2015, an ample Serbian diplomatic process took place to stop Kosovo’s attempt to join UNESCO. On the 22nd of October, in Paris, on the meeting of the UNESCO executive committee, the vote was equally split (14/14).

Doctrines, strategies and actions – regarding security and defense

From a strategy and doctrine point of view, all states in the Western Balkans elaborated their own defense and security doctrines. Even if these documents are inspired by their Western counterparts, their adoption showed a trend towards the normalization of the region. On the other hand, Serbia, as well as other neighbouring states need to overcome the moment of "technical" perceptions on security and the security environment and to try to "assimilate" the necessary values to place these documents in a normative framework.

We do not aim to initiate a detailed analysis of the ways to elaborate and operationalize the Serbian security and defense strategies. We believe that foreign policy represents the projection of a connection between national interests and universal/national values. Thus, the following works are recommended reading for detailing the Serbian foreign and security policy:

- Ejdus Filip, Savkovic Marko, *Emergent Concept of National Security Policy in Republic of Serbia*, în Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs;
- Seroka J., *Serbian National Security and Defense Strategy: Forever Wandering in the Wilderness?*, în The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol.23, pp 438-460, editor Routledge;
- Jelena Radoman, *Serbia and NATO, from enemies to (almost) partners*, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2012;
- *Serbia, Foreign Policy and National Security Yearbook*, Strategic Information and Developments, International Business Publications, USA;
- Filip Ejdus *The Brussels Agreement and Serbia's National Interest: A positive Balance Sheet?* Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Belgrade office, Analysis www.kas.de.

Foreign policy decision-making

The president of the Republic of Serbia does not have foreign policy prerogatives, but only represents the country abroad. The construction and the foreign policy decision, as well as the selections of state instruments to achieve them is the responsibility of the government.

At the same time, international analysts were very preoccupied by the presence of Serbian troops in the 9th of May 2015 Moscow parade and interpreted the gesture as a defiance against the West. A realistic analysis of the event shows that the official Serbian foreign policy is based on pragmatism and ambiguity (considering that the president, Tomislav Nikolic, decided to send the soldiers in his capacity as supreme commander of the armed forces), especially given that Serbia undertook common military exercises in the NATO-Partnership for Peace framework. In 2007, Serbia proclaimed its military neutrality through appealing to the "collective memory" and the benefits it previously obtained as a non-aligned country. Moreover, any analysis concerning the military dimension of Serbian policy had to consider that, until now, Serbia has been completely dependent on Russia regarding military technology and that it participated in NATO exercises with Russian material (Balkan Insight, 2015).

On the 7th October 2015, the Serbian president congratulated Russian president Putin on the occasion of his birthday. Even if this is an official message, where the exact wording is less important, this message means much more than can immediately seen "Mr. Putin, your internal leadership and the way you are pursuing your foreign policy objectives show steadiness and wisdom. You represent a tower of strength and support for us, Serbs, a far less numerous people occupying a country far smaller than Russia. Due to a combination of circumstances we are required to apply a double standard in our policy. From the bottom of my heart, I wish you happiness and success in your activity" (Predsednik, 2015).

If one appealed to political psychology and role theories in the analysis of foreign policy, we could say that the main Serbian political personalities are playing a common tune where each is meant to represent a different part in Serbia's road between Russia and the West. The Vučić – Nikolic[3] duo took up the pro-European tune, but gave it different nuances according to the international context and a pragmatic anchor in the Serbian cognitive and affective patterns.

At the same time, Serbia is expanding is pro-Eastern orientation to include China. Within the context of the visit that Vučić will undertake in China, the Chinese ambassador to Belgrade, Li Manchang, stated (Beta, 2015) on the 18th of November 2015 that "the Serbian government has a wise foreign policy (…) each foreign policy has better and worse parts, none is perfect, but I have a deep respect for the way that the Serbian government takes foreign policy decisions". The words of the Chinese ambassador regarding China having a close friend in the EU when Serbia will join, one can see that the bilateral relationship will be deepened for the benefit of both states and Serbia will be supported in its goal to join the EU.

[3] Alternatively, the former Serbian president, Boris Tadic, even if he was always considered a pro-Western politician argued for Serbia keeping an equilibrium between the EU, the US and Russia.

Conclusions

In the Balkans, no wars are local !

The New York Times, 7 April 1999

As mentioned before, the variable that can affect the whole pattern of analysis of Serbian foreign policy is the domestic one. Even if, in this moment, the behavior on the international stage is predictable, any internal change (government, elites, social movements) can introduce a new degree of uncertainty. In this moment, Serbia's European future depends, in addition to international events and developments, on the state's capacity to give up the "clan-based politics", which relies on patronage power relations, corruption and ethnic collectivism. Serbia finds itself, today, before a paradoxical situation[4]: the main demand of the EU to Serbia is to build, inside, a solid democracy, a solid economy and a state based on democratic institutions and values. On the other hand, the EU admission and the European discipline would ensure a much faster development of the rule of law and democracy (Timmins and Smith, 2010).

The existence of common objectives of former Yugoslav states will ground future good relations. In 2015, Serbia made significant progress in improving its relationships to its neighbours. Building a foreign policy and developing bi and multilateral relations from common efforts and objective to combat common threats and risks (terrorism, all kinds of traffic, organized crime, massive migration, radicalization) will contribute, on the long term, to the stabilization of the Balkans.

A few strategic aspects need to be monitored in the near future, in order to have a better understanding of Serbia's foreign policy:

- The influence of public narratives on threats and the increase in popular distrust about the interests of the great Western powers in the region (a wider attention need to be grants to the Russian-influenced media and to opinion leaders that can be directed from outside Serbia).
- The continuation of the current behavior within the OSCE and the development of the same constructive role in other regional organizations
- The development of better relations with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, but also the continuation of the constructive dialogue with Croatia and Bosnia – Herzegovina. Within this context, official persons with a inflammatory

[4] A similar situation was recorded during Turkey's accession negotiations. Within this context, the last-minute change of the EU's approach to Turkey (the re-opening of negotiations on the background of the migrant crisis and the Syrian conflict) proves that morality in international relations is implemented differently by different states and that states can modify the behavior of other states when they can.

rhetoric appealing to the "religious and cultural inheritance" of Serbia must be monitored.

- Concerning relations with the EU, Serbia will continue to strengthen its relations with Germany, as, according to the Belgrade officials, Germany holds the key to Serbian accession in the Union. Serbia will try, as much as possible (without endangering its relation with Russia) to align its policies with the EU.

Overall, any analysis concerning the Serbian foreign policy and its international behavior will need to account for the fact that these are intrinsically connected with the national issue and aim, more or less explicitly, to influence the situation in Kosovo in the advantage and according to the Serbian national interests. On the other hand, the European Union states would have to reconfigure their approach and their interests to Serbia, giving credit to the political will manifested towards democracy. An increased trust by the neighbors and European states will lead to increased trust by the population in political elites.

All of Serbia's foreign policy priorities have to be analyzed in a wider framework which includes cost-benefit analysis and to directly consider national, economic and security interests understood through national identity, cultural and historical legacy, without abusing the nationalist rhetoric.

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS: THE CASE OF SERBIA*

Valentin STOIAN*

Abstract

The article discusses the developments of the domestic political stage of Serbia during 2000-2016, analyzing the way in which these impacted the Serbian foreign policy. The article argues that the pro-european versus nationalists cleavage, which was specific to the 1990s and 2000s decreased in relevance after the reforms undertaken during the presidential terms of Boris Tadic and the adoption of a pragmatic and deliberately ambiguous by all Serbian political forces. The article identifies three crucial periods in Serbian domestic politics: 2000-2004: - the period of instability after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, 2004-2012: the presidential terms of Boris Tadic, 2012-2016: ex-nationalists come back to power - The presidential term of Tomislav Nikolic. The article concludes that the political positioning of the main Serbian parties tend to converge, while Serbia is pursuing two major foreign policy objectives which seem to be mutually exclusive: keeping Kosovo as part of Serbia and joining the European Union.

Keywords: Serbia, domestic politics, Kosovo, European Union.

Introduction

The current article analyzes the relationship between Serbia's domestic politics between 2000 and 2016 and its foreign policy. The article argues that Serbia has overcome the period of ethnic nationalism as a meaningful political force and adopted a pragmatic internal and external policy, both concerning its relationship with the European Union and with the Russian Federation. This development is presented across 16 years, showing how the nationalists' loss of power and the long rule of pro-Europeans (2004-12) radically changed the main political forces on the Serbian state. Thus, the cleavage between nationalists and pro-Europeans which predominated in Serbia between 1990 and 2000 became less and less relevant, as former nationalists discovered the advantages of the pro-European position, while the pro-Europeans realized, while in power, that while the Kosovo issue still

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exists, one can draw advantages from a realistic relationship with Russia. All these developments took place on the background of deeply personalized politics and consolidating democratic institutions.

Serbia's internal politics between 2000 (the removal from power of Slobodan Milosevic) up to 2016, as well as its influence on the country's foreign policy can be understood only if one comprehends two characteristics of Serbia. Firstly, Serbia was part, during the period that is studied, of two federal states, which were made of the same component units, but were differently organized. During 1992-2003, Serbia, made up, together with Montenegro, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (or "small Yugoslavia", which emerged after the secession of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). This was a federal union, where Belgrade represented the main driving force and had been built to serve the dominant personality of the time: Slobodan Milosevic. Between 2003 and 2006, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was **transformed into a much looser confederation, called Serbia and Montenegro** (Nations Online, n.d.). This was also dissolved in 2006, as the two states became independent (BBC News, 2006) (the first constitution of independent Serbia was promulgated then). Until 2006, a different federal level with separate institutions existed, which also played a part in Serbian political events, as some of these centered on struggles for federal-level institutions.

The second aspect that needs to be considered is the organization of the government of Serbia. This is a semi-presidential republic, having a president similar to that in Romania. According to the 2006 Serbian constitution, the president of Serbia is in charge of representation, sanctioning laws, appointing ambassadors, nominating people for positions, granting amnesty and medals. Similarly to Romania, the president of Serbia has the right to nominate a candidate for being prime-minister, after consulting with Parliamentary parties (a candidate which needs to be voted by the Parliamentary majority) and to return, one time, a law to Parliament for re-examination. It is also important to mention that the term of office of the President of Serbia is five years while that of the National Assembly (the Serbian Parliament) is four (Serbian Constitution, 2006).

The third aspect that has to be mentioned is the high **degree of personalization** of Serbian politics. Unlike consolidated democracies, where stable rules and procedures clearly limit the extent to which persons can act, Serbian politics is exactly the opposite. Rules are created according to the needs of persons. This can be observed through the volatility of political parties: these appear and disappear according to the popularity of a leader, while politicians leave a party and form another, leading to the disappearance of some parties at the end of an electoral cycle. Moreover, one can find it hard to identify a regular pattern of action (ex. regular elections, stable political parties which permanently confront each other in elections, institutions that survive for long periods of time – making predictability impossible).

Furthermore, the constant use of early elections, both for the presidency and for Parliament also proves a high degree of personalization.

The fourth dimension of Serbian politics is **the national problem**, which is generated by the ambiguous status of the province of Kosovo and by the different opinions that Serb politicians have on this problem. After the 1999 conflict, the province of Kosovo (primordially inhabited by Albanians) became a United Nations protectorate, while in 2008, it proclaimed its independence from Serbia (BBC News, 2008). This was recognized by only a part of the EU member states and categorically rejected by Serbia, Russia and China. This influences the different positions of Serb politicians to the Kosovo situation (from arguing in favour of accepting independence to desiring military intervention in order to recover the province) (Ramet, 2011), the Serbian policy towards the Serbian minority in northern Kosovo and the relations between Serbia and the EU or Russia.

Serbia's ambitions of joining the EU is also confronted by the lack of a coherent policy of the Union towards Kosovo (as only a small part of the member states recognize the province's independent status), as the main UE states demand, informally, that Serbia recognize the independence of Kosovo. On the other hand, Serbia finds in Russia a partner to cooperate on concrete aspect. Russia provides Serbia with the required economic help, in exchange for economic and political cooperation. Analyzing the 2000-2016 period, one cannot speak of a Serbian drift towards Russia, but of a **deliberately ambiguous (which avoided concrete proposals and offered only general desiderata)** (Clark, 2012), **adopted by all political parties, which alternated between accepting the conditions of the EU and a pro-Russian policy (Petrovic, n.d.)**. This ambiguous policy aims at three desiderata which are impossible to attain at the same time: keeping Kosovo in Serbia, joining the EU and maintaining good relations with Russia. Selecting feasible desiderate depends on Serbia's internal clarification.

According to the internal development, the political history of post-Milosevic Serbia can be divided into three different periods:

2000-2004: - the period of instability after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic;

2004-2012: the presidential terms of Boris Tadic;

2012-2016: ex-nationalists come back to power. The presidential term of Tomislav Nikolic.

The loss of power by Slobodan Milosevic and the succeeding instability

The fall of Slobodan Milosevic occurred after the "bulldozer revolution" of 5th October 2000. The events took place in the context of Milosevic running for the presidency of Yugoslavia (he had been the president of Serbia between 1991 and 1996 and then the president of the FRY between 1997 and 2000). Aiming to hold on to power, Slobodan Milosevic engineered a vote in the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, which amended the constitution regarding the way the federal president was elected (previously, the federal president used to be elected through the vote of the Parliament- after the amendments, the president would be selected through a popular vote). The changes were carried through with the violation of all norms of parliamentary procedure (OSCE, 2000).

Although the presidential term of Milosevice was not expiring, he summoned early presidential and parliamentary elections, under the new Constitution, on the 24th of September 2000. These elections were described by the OSCE as "deeply flawed" (OSCE, 2000) (in favor of Milosevic), but still resulted in a first-round victory by the opposition's (the Democratic Serbia Alliance) candidate, Vojislav Koštunica. When the Serbian Constitutional Court rejected this result and requested the organization of second round, massive street protests emerged (which involved a protester, the driver of a truck, which was later confused for a bulldozer – later resulting in the moniker "the bulldozer revolution", driving his vehicle through the main gate of Serbian State Television) (Balkan Insight, 2010). Protests including tens of thousands of participants led to the Constitutional Court accepting the result and to the resignation of Slobodan Milosevic.

Serbian politics traversed a period of extreme instability between 2000 and 2004, resulting in the inability to formulate concrete and coherent policies on any front. Thus, the wide coalition of parties and associations grouped under the name the Democratic Serbia Alliance (made up of two main parties – the Democratic party led by Zoran Đinđić and the Democratic Party of Serbia led by Vojislav Koštunica) won both the presidential elections of September 2000 and the parliamentary ones in December 2000 (obtaining a majority of about 64%) (OSCE, 2001), leading to the appointment of Đinđić as Serbian prime-minister. However, the component parties prove incapable of governing together, leading to the full disintegration of the alliance in less than three years.

At the end of 2000, the Yugoslavian political landscape showed Vojislav Kostunica as the federal president (represented the Democratic Serbia Alliance), while at the level of the Serbian republic, the parliamentary majority is held by the same alliance. However, the president of Serbia remains Milan Milutinovic, a Milosevic associate, who had obtained this position after Milosevic had become the president of the RFY in 1997. Milutinovic served his term until 2002, but underwent political marginalization. Upon the expiry of his term, he surrendered to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and was tried for war crimes, but acquitted in 2009 (BBC News, 2009).

The most important political events of the 2000-2004 periods are the disintegration of the Democratic Serbia Alliance due to the differences between Koštunica and Đinđić on the extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to the

Hague, in order to be tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The first, a moderate nationalist objected to this step, and withdrew his party from the governing coalition (BBC News, 2001) when PM Đinđić took this decision in secret (the decision was announced to the public only after having been carried out under a strong pressure from Western countries and without having a clear legal provision) (BBC News, 2001). The Democratic Party of Serbia's exit from the governing coalition led to a parliamentary conflict between the two parties, as Đinđić argued that the Democratic Serbia MEPs were elected with an imperative mandate and were forced to remain under the umbrella of the Democratic Serbia Alliance, under the penalty of losing their seat (Cvijic, 2008).

Furthermore, during 2002-2004, no less than three presidential elections for the position of president of Serbia take place (2002 September and December, 2003 December), all of them failing due to specific demands introduced by the electoral law. The position was temporarily filled after the expiry of Milan Milutinovic's term and his surrender to the ICCY. Thus, the electoral laws inherited from the Milosevic regime demanded an attendance of no less than 50% in both rounds. After the failure of the September 2002 elections, this is removed for the second round of voting, but kept for the first, leading to the annulment of the next two rounds of elections. The attendance threshold is removed completely only for the presidential elections of June 2004 (Cvijic, 2008).

A second crucial event during this period is the assassination of Zoran Đinđić on the 12th of March 2003 in central Belgrade. He was assassinated by a group which included former members of Milosevic's secret police and people involved in the Serbian criminal networks. The murder was ordered by Milorad Ulemek, a former head of a special police unit during Milosevic and carried aut by his deputy, Zvezdan Jovanovic. These were supported by ten other persons (The Telegraph, 2007). The murder of Đinđić was planned by nationalists fearing extradition and by members of organized crime, tempted by his anti-crime offensive.

At the end of 2003, Serbia carried out parliamentary elections. The Radical party of Serbia, led by Tomislav Nikolic (a Serbian nationalist) obtained most of the parliamentary seats, but the government is formed by Vojislav Koštunica and by his Serbian Democratic Party (in March 2003, the RFY became Serbia-Montenegro and Kostunica, the RFY president since 2003 was replaced by Svetozar Marovic). This government was composed of several parties (in addition to the DPS, other smaller parties were coopted: the G-17 plus movement, the Movement for the Renewal of Serbia and the Movement for a New Serbia). Even in this situation, Koštunica's cabinet remained a minority one and required the support of the Serbian Socialist Party, Milosevic's former party.

The presidential terms of Boris Tadic

Between 2004 and 2012, a series of crucial events radically changed the Serbian political landscape, such the 2006 dissolution of the Federation with Montenegro, the adoption of a new Constitution in the same year (the first Constitution of independent Serbia), the Kosovo declaration of independence in 20087, the furthering of the peace process in 2008 and the war in Georgia.

Boris Tadic was elected president of Serbia in June 2004 (Balkan Insight, 2012) (defeating Tomislav Nikolic, the candidate of the Serbian Radical Party), in the first successful presidential election after the loss of power by Slobodan Milosevic. Tadic was Zoran Đinđić's successor at the leadership of the Democratic Party, and he won the 2004 elections promising that he will continue the democratization, Europeanization and modernization of Serbia, which his predecessor had begun. Tadic was seen as a pro-Western politician, and was supported directly by the European Union in his 2008 reelection campaign (the European Union postponed the signing of a political agreement with Serbia, which included the liberalization of visas, commerce and the participation of Serbia in educational programs until the second round of Serbian presidential elections, which also pitted Tadic and Nikolic. The delay aimed to indicate a strong European support for Tadic (Cvijic, 2008). He was reelected president in 2008 (the first elections for the presidency of Serbia as a separate state, which were taking place under the new Constitution), defeating, once again, Tomislav Nikolic (Balkan Insight, 2012).

Concerning the government of Serbia, this was led between 2003 and 2008 by Vojislav Koštunica, who led two separate cabinets. The first Kostunica cabinet lasted until the 2007 Parliamentary elections, which although, once again won by Nikolic's Serbian Radical Party, led to the creation of a new coalition between Tadic's Democratic Party and Koštunica's Democratic Party of Serbia, having the latter as Prime-Minister. The first Kostunica government collapses in 2008, after the proclamation of Kosovar independence, which led to a powerful rupture in the leading coalition in Serbia. Tadic's reelection, as well as the desire of his party to sign the EU Association Agreement (considering that several EU states recognized the independence of Kosovo) led to Koštunica's resignation. The latter, a moderate nationalist, believed that given the situation, any agreement with the EU represented a betrayal of Serbia's interests. This led to early parliamentary elections, which resulted in collaboration between Koštunica's Serbian Democratic Party and Nikolic's Radical Party, which was deeply opposed to any agreement with the EU. On the other hand, while rejecting Kosovo's independence, Tadic argued that

Serbia's best policy is to first join the EU and then argue for its case from the inside (BBC News, 2008).

The 2008 parliamentary elections were won by the "European Serbia" Alliance, which was dominated by Tadic's Democratic Party. The appointment of Mirko Cvetković as an independent prime minister to lead a Democratic-party dominated cabinet, allied with the Serbian Socialist Party of Ivica Dačić, led a period of political calm (2008-12), when Tadic's pro-European direction predominated (Ramet, 2011). Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY intensified, as the Serb government transferred Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs during the Bosnian war (BBC News, 2012).

Serbia's main problem between 2008 and 2012 was to find equilibrium between the ambition of becoming a EU member state and keeping its territory intact. Although Tadic was a strong pro-European, he refused to recognize Kosovo's independence and ambiguously balanced between Russia and the EU, also attempting to find support from EU politicians that do hold the same position on Kosovo, including the former Romanian president, Traian Băsescu. Although Tadic's Serbia took advantage of Russian support in the issue of Kosovo (Vladimir Putin states that supporting Kosovo's independence is immoral and illegal) (People's Daily Online, 2008),, it undertook only economic collaboration with Russia (Serbia participated in the failed South Stream project), and refused to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Petrovic, n.d).

The most important event after 2008 was the beginning of the economic crisis, which strongly affected Serbia and determined the government to undertake measures aimed at macroeconomic stabilization. At the beginning of the economic crisis, Serbia found itself having weak economy due to having had unsustainable growth between 2000 and 2008. Thus, Serbia suffered a massive economic downturn during the wars which led to the collapse of Yugoslavia, which was later followed by a visible but unsustainable growth in the post-Milosevic period. Serbia's two main weaknesses were the fact that economic growth was based primordially on consumption and the exposure of the banking system to foreign investments, thus generating strong dependence on the capital flows from Western banks (Bartlett and Prica, 2012; World Bank, 2012). According to studies, this pattern was repeated across several countries, as the reforms demanded by the EU, IMF, European Central Bank led to the differential integration of the region's economies in the Western capital flows. The degree of an economy's integration with Western capital flows influenced the intensity of the shock felt. States closer to the EU (such as Romania and Bulgaria, which were already members) were more affected by the shock than those less integrated (such as those only starting convergence reforms, as Serbia) (Bartlett and Prica, 2012). The most important conduits for transmitting the Western economic shock was the pull-out of Western banking capital from the local subsidiaries, which led to significant contraction of credit and the consumption. This was coupled with decreased demand from Western markets, leading to lower exports. On the other hand, the shock was diminished by the fact that Serbian banks were exposed relatively little to risky credits, as borrowing was expensive, unlike in the United States or Western Europe.

The main economic indicators of Serbia for 2008-2014[1]:

Year	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**
GDP increase (%)	5.4	-3.1	0.6	1.4	-1	2.6	-1.8
Evolution of Foreign Direct Investment (% of the year before)	-12.69	-35.4	-30.7	101.4	-56.08	66.5	
Unemployment rate (% of population)	18.1	13.6	16.6	19.2	23	23.9	
Rate of exports (% of GDP)	29.1	26.8	32.9	34	36.9	41.2	44.3
Industrial production (% of previous year)	4.4	-5.3	0.1	3.8	2.4	4.2	-7.1

As can be observed from the analysis of the main economic indicators, Serbia's economy contracted significantly in 2009, leading to the increase of the rate of unemployment. A decrease of GDP, Foreign Direct Investment and industrial production can be observed, leading to a decrease of the standard of living. Over 2009-14, one can observe that indicators began an upward trend, without reaching their previous levels (such as economic increases of 5%)(World Bank, 2012). The unemployment rate continued to be a problem, coupled with the large number of people employed in the informal economy.

The Serbian government and the Serbian Central Bank aimed to maintain investor confidence in the Serbian economy, to keep as much cash in the local banks, to stimulate SMEs which produced goods for export, to better spend the state budget and to better collect taxes (Serbia Against the Economic Crisis, 2009; Calhoun, 2010). The government signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF worth 402.5 million Euros (thus granting the Serbian state a space to keep the trust of foreign investors and to maintain macroeconomic stability), increased the upper limit for state guaranteed deposits to 50 000 Euros, eliminated tax penalties for late payments and accepted delays on taxes due, in exchange for paying previous debts, offered capital for export activities and financial support for certification of products on external markets, supported producers to find new export markets in

[1] Data compiled from the website of the World Bank, data.worldbank.org, Bartlett, Prica „The Variable Impact of the Global Economic Crisis in South East Europe",

countries where the impact of the crisis was more limited, limited the increase of salaries and of personnel expenses in the state sector, instituted procedures to recover debts owed to the state by bankrupt firms, limited the compensations to managers of state companies and the expenses of these companies and stopped employment in the state sector (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2008).

The measures adopted by the Serbian government immediately after the crisis led to a fluctuating evolution of the economic indicators, followed by economic recovery. On the other hand, an analysis of the social protection measures adopted in the post-crisis period showed the elimination of the last remnants of social support which the Serbian government possesses. The economic increase in the years 2010-14 was based on recovering foreign investment and the development of a new export-based economy. Moreover, with the exception of 2014, the industrial production increased significantly. The latest visit by the IMF, aimed at evaluating the state of implementation of the stand-by agreement, led to positive comments on the decrease of budgetary deficit, the decrease of the unemployment rate to 17.9% in the second trimester of 2015 and general macroeconomic stabilization. The IMF delegation requested the continuation of the process of restructuring the energy, gas and infrastructure sector (B92, 2015). However, throughout the crisis, unemployment benefits decreased: both the number of beneficiaries and the average sum offered. Alternatively, the government opted for measured to increase employment such as the “first chance” program (aiming to employ young people in firms, having their salaries paid by the state for 6-12 months)(European Commission, 2011) and the funding of public works. Social security for the poorest remained low, while child allowances (as had been reformed in 2002, to make them more means-tested) were not changed. To reduce the budgetary deficit, the Serbian state reduces social security contributions, in a situation in which a greater number of people were exposed to poverty risk.

Post-Tadic Serbia: the rise of power of Tomislav Nikolic’s former nationalists

Convinced of his own popularity and aiming to help his party, Boris Tadic resigned as president of Serbia in Aprilie 2012 (BBC News, 2012), aiming to organize parliamentary and early presidential elections together. Tadic faced Nikolič for the third time in 2012.

Tomislav Nikolič started his career as a politician in the Serbian Radical party, which espoused ultranationalist views. The Serbian Radical Party was led by Vojislav Šešelj and collaborated closely with the Serbian Socialist Party of Slobodan Milosevic during the latter’s reign. After Šešelj’s extradition to Hague to stand trial for war crimes, the leadership of the Serbian Radical Party was taken over by Tomislav Nikolič, who ran as the party's candidate in 2004 and 2008. Considering the disintegration of the anti-Milosevic coalition and the struggles between the Democratic Party led by Đinđić/Tadic and Koštunica's Democratic Party of Serbia, the corruption of these parties and the decrease of the living standard, the Serbian Radical Party consistently won the plurality of the mandates in the Serbian National Assembly (2003, 2007), yet had its access to government barred by the coalition of the other parties (Cvijic, 2008).

A conflict between Šešelj (in his Hague detention) and Nikolič led to the resignation of the latter from the Serbian Radical Party and the establishment in 2008 (after the loss of presidential elections) of the Serbian Progressive Party. This took up moderately pro-European views (preferring to collaborate with conservative-nationalist parties in the EU, such as the Freedom Party in Austria), but also signed a collaboration pact with Vladimir Putin's United Russia Party. Nikolič contested the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections as leader of the Serbian progressive party (SNS).

What was expected to be a new Tadic victory turned into a surprise defeat, as Nikolič won the majority in the 2012 presidential elections (BBC News, 2012). Moreover, the Serbian Progressive Party, together with its allies, under the name "Let's make Serbia work" won parliamentary elections and formed a coalition government with the Serbian Socialist party. Upon assuming the presidency, Nikolič resigned as head of the SNS and was replaced by Aleksandar Vučić (former minister of communications during the Milosevic period, a position he employed to forbid the broadcast of Western TV stations). During 2012-2014, the government of Serbia was led by Ivica Dačić, head of the Serbian Socialist Party (seconded by the President of the Serbian Progressive Party, Aleksandar Vučić as first-deputy-prime-minister and Minister for the Struggle against Organized Crime and Corruption) (Freedom House, 2013).

Unhappy with a junior role in the government and taking advantage of a wave of popularity, the Serbian Progressive Party initiated early parliamentary elections in April 2014. These represented the first opportunity where a party single-handedly obtained the absolute majority of mandates in the Serbian Parliament. The victory of the Serbian Progressive Party led to a new coalition government (although the formation of a coalition was not necessary) between it and the Serbian Socialist Party. Vučić and Dačić changed places in the government (the first was now prime-minister while the second became vice-prime-minister and Minister of foreign Affairs) (National Democratic Institute, 2014).

Although the Serbian Progressive Party was believed to be supported by Russia (opposing Tadic's pro-Europeans) and fears existed of a potential reversal of Serbia's European road, this did not happen. Alternatively, the policy of deliberate ambiguity regarding the EU, Kosovo and Russia continued. The Dačić government signed the Bruxelles agreement with the Kosovo authorities, accepting to withdraw the funding of northern Kosovo's mainly Serb municipalities, in exchange for offering larger powers to these municipalities by the Pristina authorities (Freedom House, 2014). Serbia vehemently denied that this would represent any form or recognition of the independence of Kosovo. This allowed Serbia to continue its EU accession negotiations. Moreover, the preparation for this agreement, led to the first direct contacts between Serbia and Kosovo after the 2008 declaration of independence. These contacts occurred both at the level of prime-ministers (Ivica Dačić and Hashim Thaci) and of presidents (Nikolič agreed to talk directly with the Kosovar president Atifete Jahjaga) (Balkan Insight, 2013).

Concerning relations with Russia, Tomislav Nikolič refused to recognize the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and stated that he recognized the UN agreed borders of Ukraine. At the same time, Tomislav Nikolič accepted that his country's policy goals are to not upset Russia, which protects Serbia at the UN, but also to continue the process of joining the EU (Mitrovic, 2014). On the other hand, the Serbian president deepened the financial and energy cooperation with Russia, given that a large part of the gas distribution networks had been sold to Russia during Tadic's term (Kremlin News, 2013). Before the Crimean crisis, Nikolič stated that "We want Serbia to be a supporter of Russia in the EU" (Abrahamayan, 2015). A large part of the Serbian transport infrastructure has been modernized and is owned by Russia. Moreover, a humanitarian Russian-Serbian center operates in Nis, which is suspected to be a Russian military base. Another indication of Serbia's ambiguous policies is its having signed an agreement with NATO (A Individual Partnership Action Plan) in January 2015 (Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). This showed its desire to develop long-term, stable relationships with the Alliance, without becoming a member. However, Serbia also organized common military exercises with Russia in November 2014. When asked about these exercises, the Serbian Minister of Defense stated that they do not represent any special event, as "thousands of exercises take place all the time" (Radio Europa Liberă, 2014).

April 2016 occasioned a new round of early elections called by Vučić, which led to a resounding victory by SNS (48,25% of the vote, 138 of the 250 seats in the National Assembly) Smaller parties obtained far fewer votes (Serbian Socialists, 31, Serbian Radical Party 23, Democratic Party 17) (B92, 2016a). This led Vucic to aim for a single-party government, stating that his will not form a coalition with the Serbian Socialist party, which is poised to "stab him in the back" (B92, 2016b). Despite this statement, the government formed in August 2016included the Serbian Socialist Party, with Ivica Dacic as first-deputy-prim-minister. On the occasion of his appointment, Vucic reaffirmed Serbia's European path (B92, 2016c).

Conclusions

To conclude, one can say that the Serbian foreign policy did not vary significantly after the transfer of power between "pro-European" Tadic and the "nationalist" Nikolic, but continued the deliberate ambiguity (one has to mention that, in his statement when receiving Tomislav Nikolič in the Kremlin in 2012, Putin addressed the Russian-Serbian economic cooperation and asked Nikolič to send greeting to Boris Tadic, seen by Russia as a "partner")(Kremlin News, 2012; The Telegraph, 2012). Any failure in its relations with the EU determines Serbia to "run to the arms of Russia", but any success in its attempt to join the EU requires painful concessions on the issue of Kosovo. Serbia maintains relations with Russia in order to put pressure on the EU and to weaken is positions on Kosovo. On the other hand, the Ukrainian crisis can force Serbia to renounce its ambiguous policy, as Russia's actions determine a clearing of the European situation.

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SECURITY CULTURE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAMS' CONTRIBUTION TO ESTABLISHING THE SECURITY CULTURE OF POST-1989 ROMANIA

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Abstract

The end of the Cold War prompted the recalibration of the concept of security, the theoretical debate ending by the assertion of the multidimensional perspective on security at the international level. Embracing this new viewpoint on security was imperative for the Romanian process of democratization. This change entailed also the need to create a new security culture, a difficult task undertaken too late by the Romanian authorities, situation caused by the delaying of the transition process itself, until 1996. Therefore, this paper aims, firstly, to clarify the concept of security culture, focusing on how it is defined by academics at the national level and, secondly, to identify the contribution that the academic programs of security studies had in spreading the knowledge and information related to security, essential elements of the formal dimension of security culture. The lack of research material has imposed an explanatory and exploratory approach, rather than a critical one, the analysis being carried out in a multidisciplinary perspective, using both sociological and educational sciences frameworks. The analysis results showed a certain consensus on the level of definition, the security culture being understood both as a product and as a process. However, during the first post-communist decade, the security culture was perceived primarily as a process (of creating a legal and institutional framework), without taking into consideration the importance of the security culture as a product embedding democratic values (information, knowledge, behavior), vital for the functioning of the institutions involved. It's only starting from 2010 when we can assert that the theory of interdependence can be confirmed, because the security culture as a product and as a process begins to generate itself mutually from its two aspects, leading to a more open attitude of the society towards security, a more visible desire for information and a strengthening of the legal and institutional framework. The introduction of security studies in the university's curriculum has contributed and will contribute more significantly in creating the security culture at national level primarily through the dissemination of information and knowledge regarding this field. Also, the security studies programs will lead to the familiarization of the civil society with the subject and will help in removing the negative connotations that security has acquired during the communist regime. Lastly,

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they will support new emerging professions in the labor market, by offering the necessary expertise.

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War brought many changes in the international security system's configuration. The fall of the Iron Curtain affected also the theoretical field leading to a new understanding of the concept of security. Until that moment the concept was seen only in military terms. Attempts to expand this concept were also made in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which, in the Helsinki Final Act from 1975, has structured its interests in the so-called baskets. This baskets included issues related to political, economic, military, environmental, and societal security.

Considering the configuration of the CSCE, and the lack of conceptualization of the multidimensionality of security, we can affirm that its objectives have been achieved only after 1989. With the fall of the communist regimes, CSCE's activities were unlocked and, thanks to the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Waever, Wild, 1998, p. 2), security has been recalibrated from a theoretical standpoint. The academia has adopted this constructivist vision of the concept. Today both academicians and practitioners are operating with this latest understanding of security. More than for other European countries, for former communist countries the incorporation of a new perspective on security within the society (perception, norms, and institutions) was more difficult. The difficulty resulted from the significantly different manner of perceiving it, but also because of a solid security culture, based, however, on values and principles contrary to liberal democracies.

It is also the case of Romania, for which establishing a new security was a difficult task, undertaken later, situation caused by the delay in launching the transition process until 1996. The higher education institutions, through academic programs in this field, were among the actors who have actively participated in the process of establishing a new security culture for the post-communist Romanian society. Therefore, this scientific approach aims, firstly, to clarify form a theoretical point of view the *concept of security culture*, focusing on how it is assumed by the national academia. Secondly, we intended to identify the contribution of university security studies programs in spreading knowledge and information, essential elements of the formal dimension of the security culture.

This research project is legitim and relevant from a scientific point of view, given the superficial approach of the concept by the specialized literature, observation issued from the prior research undertaken, the present approach is legitimate and pertinent. Furthermore, if we take into consideration the fact that the only references about this subject were identified at governmental and / or non-governmental organizations level, we consider that applying this concept to the Romanian society is even more scientifically deficient. In addition, we believe it is important to analyze also the contribution that the university security studies programs have in the process of establishing a solid security culture in the today's Romanian society.

Taking into consideration all the above, we will approach the concept of security culture through the concept of culture aiming to apply its characteristics on our study object. Once the conceptual clarification is achieved, we will go further to the identification of the manner through which the security culture how it is materialized in Romania. The approach of this topic can be defined as being multidisciplinary, since it combines two theoretical frameworks, one belonging to sociology and the other to education sciences.

Thus, at the level of theories about culture, we can identify many viewpoints which are, to some extent, divergent. Karl Marx in classical sociology and Pierre Bourdieu in recent sociology believe that culture is a product of society, ie, in relation to society, culture is seen as a dependent variable. Emile Durkheim asserts an opposite vision considering culture, in the same relation, as an independent variable, arguing his opinion by stressing the fact that culture determines changes in the social structure, influencing its fulfillment.

Currently, the neo-liberal paradigme stresses that sociological model of the division between culture and society is replaced by a model in which the relationship between the two is one of interdependence (Williams, 1992, p. 12). Presently sociology operates with this perspective, arguing that organizations and institutions generate frameworks for cultural convergence. Furthermore, the same view stresses the idea that they shape the beliefs and mental models that receive, reproduce and transmit cultural configurations. However, thei meanings are contingent because institutions can fix and reproduce only certain meanings, to the exclusion of others. Therefore, the international academia talks about cultures (associated with a dynamic circulation of objects, ideas and practices on a global scale), and not about a unique culture (Appadurai, 2011, p. 282).

As a result, despite the integration process and the generalization of the perception on security culture on international level, under the impact of a more accelerated globalization process, we cannot talk anymore about a unique culture, but about shared values and harmonized interests, which presents particularities from one culture to another. Considering that a global security culture does not exist, we can rather talk about a national security culture which, although influenced by the integration process, presents its own characteristics.

Peter Katzenstein's vision falls under the same paradigm. He argues that the security environment in which the states are involved is largely cultural and institutional. He believes that the international system can be perceived as a society in which states, in order to participate, must adhere to the rules and regulations imposed in a variety of fields. However, in the end, the states' policy reproduces and rebuilds the cultural and institutional structure. Accordingly, the interests in the field of security are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors. (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 8).

From the methodological point of view, this article is based on the qualitative method, more precisely on the analysis of primary sources (laws, rules, reports, strategies, regulations at national and / or international) and on content analysis, in an attempt to exploit the very few available secondary sources. We should mention that, while working to this research project, the main difficulty and limitation was the lack of relevant secondary sources (specialized literature in the field), which would have imposed a critical approach. As a consequence, our approach will be rather exploratory and explanatory.

The first part of this project will be dedicated to the conceptual clarification of the term security culture, using for this purpose the concepts of culture and security. The second part will consider the security studies, their evolution as academic study programs and their contribution in establishing the security culture within the post-communist Romanian society.

Security culture: assuming a working definition

As previously stated, the conceptual clarification of the term *security culture* will be made by using two other concepts, *security* and *culture*, which requires also attention. The validity of the analysis result depends on their correct understanding.

Security

Like other concepts pertaining to security studies, the term *security* is among the concepts on which hovers ambiguity because the lack of a univocally accepted definition. Moreover, in theory, security is differently perceived by theorists, according to the paradigm which they claim. The option for a theory or another will have influence also on the pragmatic level. This option is reflected in the mannerin which the state chooses to pursue their security objectives in relation to the general trend and the dynamic of the security environment.

Etymologically speaking, the notion of security has its origins in the Roman Empire during the reign of Emperor Hostilian, for whose empire goddess *Securitas* ensure the protection and welfare. Securitas meant freedom against threats. One of the earliest definitions of security which presents a character closer to general understanding belongs to Arnold Wolfers, who believes that "in an objective sense security measures the absence of threats to acquired values, and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked (Wolfers, 1952, p. 485)". We note that, traditionally, the concept of security has been understood only from the military standpoint, referring mainly to the balance of power in terms of military power (Smith, 2002).

This view has been dominant until the end of the Cold War when realism theory in international relations seemed to become obsolete. The fall of communist regimes made room for the institutional liberalism paradigm of liberalism which has been competing with the realism it since the '70s. The identification of the multiple dimensions of security was made even before its conceptualization, during the drafting of the Final Act of Helsinki and the inauguration of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Within this framework, the multidimensionality of security was revealed for the first time. Thus, the CSCE's activities were organized taking into consideration the social, economic, political and environmental security issues.

The conceptualization was subsequently performed in 1983 by Barry Buzan, but has gained popularity only after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Copenhagen School members (Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde) proposed a constructivist approach which defined security by the presence of the awareness of threat to the existence of a valued reference object strongly (Buzan, 1983, p. 78).

Emma Rothschild explains how the concept of security has expanded. The author identifies four development directions:

- Down, from the security of nations to group and individual security;
- Up, from the security of nations to the international system's security;
- Horizontally, because different entities design differently the security and/or insecurity status. As a consequence, the development of the concept from a strictly military meaning to the political, economic, societal and environmental ones resulted;
- In order to ensure security, the forth direction political takes into account the political responsibility. We observe a multidirectional diffusion, from the nation state to international institutions (up), or to local and regional governments (down), but also side-scattering, to NGOs, public opinion, media and abstract forces acting on the market (Rothschild, 1995, p. 55).

Emma Rothschild explanation is conclusive for understanding the complexity of security concept, as well for developing security strategies.

As such, the definition of national security in *the Romania's National Security Strategy* uses the universal perception on security, being connected to the Euro-Atlantic approach. The document presents national security as "a condition for the existence of the nation and of the Romanian state which has as baseline the national values, interests and necessities. National security is an indefeasible right that stems from people's full sovereignty, being based on the constitutional order and being achieved in the context of regional, Euro-Atlantic and global security ".

However, in current use another definition of national security was spread, namely that "national security represents a set of politico-diplomatic, economic, military, ecological measures aimed at ensuring state independence and national sovereignty, territorial integrity, internal constitutional order and productive vitality of its system of values" (Bidu, Troncota, 2005, p. 15).

These two definitions revealed two main features of the current perceptions on the security concept - universality and multidimensionality. Taking into account Romania's membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures, creating a national security framework will be made considering the aspect mentioned above. We believe, however, that its reification to institutional, legislative / regulatory and affective level will depend to some extent on the cultural factor, affecting both security and culture.

Culture

The security culture represents the main subject of this article. However, for a better understanding of the concept and for a better identification of its constitutive elements materialization, we have considered as being necessary to firstly clarify both determinants. Therefore, we will go further by addressing the second element, namely the culture.

Etymologically speaking, the word culture comes from the Latin *culture* that for the Romans meant farming. Cicero's passion for philosophy led him to classify this science as a culture of the soul. The meaning that he attributed was later adopted and semantically expanded, reaching the general sense that culture represents the cultivation of human values, the development and the emancipation of the soul. A new sense of culture is attached with the spread of the phrase attributed to Voltaire, *cultivons notre jardin*. The main idea was that of cultivation of the mind, of the reason and of the human values. This new sense acquired by culture was the one imposed and dominant in the 19th century.

Culture can be defined as the sum of behaviors, beliefs, values, attitudes and ideals learned and shared by all members of a group or society, guiding its social or personal life.

We have to specify that when we talk about culture, we talk about both human material products (physical products) and immaterial ones (values, symbols, norms, customs, and institutions). However, the inclusion of products in culture is preceded by going through a process of objectification, transforming it into an object that can be put into circulation.

We stated above that we cannot talk about a single culture, but about cultures, and this is because to every human society pertains a distinct type of culture. Material and immaterial cultural objects acquire different meanings from one society to another, managing to influence both the behavior and the way of thinking. Moreover, they pass through another filter, an individual one. Personal subjectivity plays an important role in the selection of information and in its interpretation based on various schemes. Pierre Bourdieu identifies another factor that influences the way in which the individual relates to the cultural space, namely the membership to a certain social class, causing different attitudes, such as compliance, innovation or adaptation (Bourdieu, 1997).

Taking into consideration the neo-liberal paradigm and the ongoing process of integration generated by the acceleration of globalization, we see that contemporary society is one of the organizations, one in which the main trend is to coordinate the individual efforts to achieve a common goal. If we remember Peter Katzenstein's argument, namely that the environment in which states interact is particularly cultural and institutional, we have to recognize that during this interaction, which is multidirectional, the cultural changes that are happening are firstly adapted to the society who takes them over, and then internalized.

Security culture

Having the determinants well calibrated, we will address now the *concept security culture,* very often used both in the security strategies (on national or organizational level) and in mass media. It should be noted that in the specialized literature, the concept has been much less examined and its operationalization has been superficial.

According to some authors, the concept has been launched during the Cold War, following the development of the nuclear industry. By that time, the concept reffered to risk reduction and standardization of rules and practices in order to eliminate hazards. Other authors attribute this concept to George Robertson, former NATO General Secretary (1999-2004) who made it core value of the North Atlantic Alliance (Neculai, 2006, p. 528).

In Romania, the concept began to gain notoriety after 2000, following the inauguration of the Security Culture Promotion Center in September 2003, being subordinated to the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) and to the European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management (EURISC) and the inclusion of this concept in legal documents such as the *National Information Security Doctrine*, in the *SRI Strategic vision 2007-2010* and in the *National Defense Strategy* (2008).

However, its definition is vague. If we refer to the international specialized literature, we can be guided by the work of Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*. In his work the author seeks to analyze the implications of culture and identity on national security in the context globalizing processes. The subject of this paper is centered on security culture and on how it is articulated in the Romanian post-revolutionary society, the likeness with the work cited above consisting in the approach of the subject in the same globalized context.

Regarding the concept's definition, within the national level we have identified several definitions mostly coming from the organizational side, and less from the academia, were the specialized literature is not yet very well developed. Thus, one definition can be found on the online platform of the Center for Promotion of Security Culture, which, in *Small Dictionary of Security Culture*, defines the concept as being "a modern institutional approach that promotes security issues; knowledge of public political, military, economic, societal and environmental emergencies; all concepts, ideas and information regarding the values, interests and national security needs from which the citizens dispose; ways of developing necessary attitudes, motivations and behaviors for the defense and protection of the individual, group and state against vulnerabilities, risk factors, threats, state of danger or potential aggression, and their promotion in the domestic and international security".

Another definition of security culture is found in the *SRI Strategic Vision 2007-2010*. According to it, security culture represents "the promotion and the consolidation of democratic values through the development of a common understanding of the challenges and opportunities in national security field related to the Romanian state and society".

The third definition of security culture is found in the *National Defense Strategy* from 2010. According to it, the security culture represents the totality of "norms, values, attitudes and actions that determine the understanding and assimilation of the concept of security and of other derived concepts from national, international, collective security, insecurity, cooperative security, security policy etc.".

These three definitions, although not explicitly, refer to the impact that changes in the security environment can have on national security, either theoretical ("political, military, economic, societal and ecological public emergency" - referring to the multidimensional concept of security," the understanding and assimilation of the concept of security" - as formulated by the Copenhagen School and as imposed on international level) or pragmatically ("vulnerabilities, risk factors, threats, state of danger or potential aggression ") as a result of the integration process in the context of accelerating globalization.

There is however a definition that distinguishes itself from the others, coming from the academic field. It is a definition in which the implications of globalization are expressed explicitly. The addition to the attribute *Romanian* make us think about the existence of a proper pattern of security culture: "Romanian security culture represents the totality of knowledge, society and state structures and the political factor related to integration, stability and development embodied in the material and spiritual values achieved in the national and international practice and applied in concrete dynamic conditions that exist and develop within the supranational and/or interstate relations".

The inventory of the security culture definitions formulated at national level revealed a consensus on both its perception as a product and as a process. These definitions highlighted three common elements that define the security culture: knowledge (meaning information) about security capturing the clear, objective image of reality; policies and security strategies as a result of creating a subjective image of reality; material and spiritual objects as a result of knowledge and the creative process at individual and state level.

From all the above we can determine a certain degree of awareness regarding the impact of the international security environment on the actors involved in different types of relationships within it. We have also observed the focus on the national interest and national security, which are however achieved as the result of the implication at international level. As such, we will be interested to look at the extent to which the post-communist Romania assimilated the democratic principles and practices and how they were reflected in building a Romanian security culture.

Security culture likewise political and civic culture is a mass culture, belonging to society thoroughly. It is not only the appanage of those people working in the field, but we admit that they are the first who has to possess it, since they are the main responsible for perpetuating it, playing the role of catalysts. Moreover, institutions can be tailored only from the inside in order to answer to the security environment's exigencies. This can be achieved by the ability of individuals to rethink both the frame and the substance of the problems hence the need for a solid education in the field. We shall note that to the political elite level both reproduction and circulation phenomenon are manifested. Given that any of its members can become a participant or a decision-maker within these institutions, we conclude the necessity that the entire society to benefit from this type of education.

Knowledge and information in the field of national security. The contribution of security studies

An important element of security culture consists of the assimilated information and knowledge by civil society. During the communist regime, the education system had a controlled and centralized character. The political control was manifested both in the access to higher education, in the elaboration of syllabuses, in recruiting the teachers, in obtaining the financial means, in the institutional management, faithfully following the model imposed by the Soviet Union (Udrescu, 2011, p. 37). At that time, education was a tool of the state to create the New Man, by promoting proletarian and communist ideology. This task was successfully completed, given the fact that even today the Romanian education system it's not completely detached from the communist legacy.

In January 1990, authorities began the depoliticizication of the education system, but the legal vacuum that characterized the early years of Romanian democracy had as a consequence the regulation of the education system only by government decrees and ministerial orders. Five years after the fall of the communist regime the first law of education was adopted. The law has been the subject of numerous amendments leading in 2011 to the adoption of a new education law. The first decisions taken by the authorities aimed at creating new universities, higher education funding, new regulations for the recruitment of students, teachers and faculty staff (Udrescu, 2011, p. 37).

Subsequently changes aimed to the access to education, to the increase of the number of universities, the establishment of private universities, the diversification of the fields of study, the use of new media, the implementation of international mobility programs (Udrescu, 2011, p. 37) were achieved. However, the security field was ignored for a long time. Likewise political and civic culture, security culture must be assimilated by society as a whole, not just by some interest groups or closed bureaucratic institutions, as was the case during the communist regime.

We consider education as the main pillar because it allows national security and defense to properly respond to the new challenges of the security environment. Therefore, it's necessary that through education and scientific research, the Romanian education joins the EU model of education.

In the Romanian academic curriculum, security studies as an independent study program was introduced very late, what we believe induced the hindering of the process of establishing a security culture in the post – 1989 Romanian society, the formal dimension concerning the spread of information and knowledge security being neglected.

In what follows we will address the evolution of security studies as a field of study, the uncertainty surrounding them and also the inauguration and the inventory of the undergraduate and post-graduate study programs in Security Studies nationally.

Security Studies, a controversial field of study

Security Studies is a relatively new research area, appeared within the American academia after the Second World War. Since then, the autonomy and research object of the security studies have been widely debated, without reaching a consensus in this regard.

Perspectives on security studies varied depending on how the security was essentially perceived. This has triggered also debates on the autonomy of security studies in the field of scientific research. Thus, realists have attributed as study object the military aspects, the Marxists considered them superfluous since for them the economic reasons were the ones that had the power to configure the international system, while the social constructivists approached them rather from a sociological point of view. The change occurs after the fall of the Iron Curtain, when the Copenhagen School's perspective on the multidimensionality of security was imposed (Buzan, 1991, p. 19). However, the relation and even interdependence with other field of studies left the debate open.

As a result, even today, within the international academia, security studies are considered to be essentially a subfield of international relations (Collins, 2010, p. 2), an autonomous field (Williams 2008, p. 5) or a field which was autonomous at its beginnings, but which gradually has been absorbed as a subfield of international relations (Buzan, Hansen 2009, p. 3). The consequences of this lack of consensus regarding the autonomy of security studies are experienced on the undergraduate and post-graduate study programs, as well on the manner on which the curriculum is configured. This is a valid observation at least for the Romanian society, as we will show in the following. Of course, we ca add to this situation the lack of academic experience due to their late introduction as an academic study program.

Security Studies in Romania

In Romania there are 56 state universities and 36 accredited private universities. However, in the country there are only four undergraduate programs in security studies and eleven post-graduate study programs.

Regarding the undergraduate programs in security studies, the first university which launched such a program was the University Lucian Blaga of Sibiu, in 2009, within the Faculty of Social Sciences, as a specialization in the field of political science. Since 2012, the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, provides students with an undergraduate program in security studies, also as a specialization within the field of political science.

The third program of security studies at undergraduate level is offered, from 2013, by the University Babes Bolyai of Cluj-Napoca, the Faculty of History and Philosophy, as a specialization within the Faculty of History, the program being taught both in Romanian and English language.

The fourth undergraduate program in security field of study is provided by the Faculty of Security and Defense of the National University of Defense Charles I. Although a mainly military higher education institution, the university has opened its doors to civilians interested in the subject, offering an undergraduate program in security and defense, included in fundamental field of study of military and intelligence sciences.

Following the inventory of these programs, we find, first, their insufficiency and their late inclusion in the academic curriculum, which limits the access to those interested in training in the field, thus affecting the building of security throughout society, the insufficient staff with relevant expertise being the main cause.

Moreover, the analysis has highlighted the ambiguity regarding the perception of security studies as a field of study. In none of the Universities, security studies are not considered autonomous field, but are perceived as subdomains or specializations. What is even more interesting is how they are subordinate to different domains as political science or history, which entails the formulation of heterogeneous study programs, with specific approaches issued from the domains to whom are subordinated.

The differences are even more pronounced in the curriculum at the Faculty of Security and Defense, where the perspective is predominantly military, the disciplines belonging especially to military sciences.

Master's programs, although numerous, are facing the same problem, but the fact that master's programs are post-graduate, specialization programs, the multidisciplinary aspect is justified and even encouraged. In the field of security studies we can find master programs like *Security Management in Contemporary Society, Security and Diplomacy, European Integration and Security Studies, Defense Diplomacy, International Relations. Security Systems, Security and International Relations, Security Studies, Security and Defense, Management of National Security Intelligence and Intelligence Management in Counterterrorism*.

The research in the security field of study is also encouraged, but currently is also insufficient. Besides the educational institutions were created numerous specialized centers on issues related to security. We mention here the Center for Promotion of Security Culture, established in 2003, the Centre for Defense and Security Strategies Studies, established in 2000, Centre for Research and Public Security Studies, Center for Applied Strategies, Center for Advanced Strategies, the latter being established after 2010. Under the aegis of these centers workshops, conferences, courses are organized, introducing to the civil society security related issues.

Also, in addition to these centers, we have to mention the existence of academic publications as Romanian Journal for Intelligence Studies, Strategic Impact, Military Magazine for Management and Education, Studia Securitatis, or non-academic journals and periodicals such as Intelligence or Military Observer.

Why do we need to include security studies in higher education curriculum?

The necessity for introducing security studies in higher education curriculum derives firstly from the reconceptualization of security and from its understanding from a multidimensional perspective. Thus, no longer the exclusive appanage of military science specialists, encompassing now economic, cultural, social, political and environmental aspects, security requires a deep understanding regardless the field of activity of the individual. At the Romanian society, the introduction of security studies program is of utmost importance, given the recent past, undemocratic, and lack of expertise in security based on democratic values. The building of security culture in the post-communist Romanian society largerly depends on that. It is necessary that generations are educated from the beginning in the of a security culture adjusted to the new realities.

Moreover, the inclusion of such study programs is justified by the emergence of new professions, thus coming to meet the market demands for specialists in security field, by giving them the necessary expertise. We are talking about profession such as security manager and negotiator and other occupations proposed to be included in Romanian Occupations Classification (COR), without forgetting those such security political analyst, internal affairs attaché, magistrate for public order and safety, security adviser for organizations. The professionalization of the security studies is sought as a consequence of the exigencies expressed on the labor market level. At the research's level, security studies are necessary due to the emergence of new research directions, such as European governance, security governance, unconventional risk factors, Romania's security policy, ecological, economic, geopolitical and geostrategic security, security and insecurity in ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary societies, international organizations management or European political integration**.**

Conclusions

For this study we have considered as being necessary to undergo a conceptual clarification of security culture and of the manner in which it is understood at national level, using in this purpose the concepts *culture* and *security*. In terms of security, at least conceptually, theoretically, Romanian society has acquired ownership of the term, as it was imposed internationally after the Cold War, being recognized both its universality and multidimensionality.

Regarding the security culture, we found that there is a certain consensus on the definition, security culture being perceived both as a product and as a process. The definitions have revealed three common elements - knowledge, policies/strategies and objects of material and spiritual recovery as a result of the first two. Also we could determine the impact that the international security environment had on the involved actors. We have also noted the focus on the national interest and on national security.

If the legislative and institutional reform started visibly late, the providing of information and knowledge in security field to civil society was even more delayed. Incidentally, even today is still deficient, although we note the emergence of numerous initiatives in this respect, with the ultimate goal of creating a true security culture based on the democratic principles and values. It requires efforts from both the institutions and the civil society to reach this goal. Institutions must open their doors, and civil society must abandon the prejudices and the skepticism still existent, because only by doing so we will reach a security culture in the true sense of word.

During the first post-communist decade, security culture was perceived primarily as a process (creating a legal and institutional framework), without taking into account the importance of security culture as a product (information, knowledge, behavior) of utmost importance for the proper functioning of the concerned institutions. Only from 2010 we believe that the theory of interdependence can be confirmed because security culture both as a process and as a product begins to generate mutually. We thus observe a more open society towards security, a greater desire for information and an strengthening of the legal and institutional framework.

The introduction of security studies within the higher education curriculum has contributed and will contribute significantly in building the security culture at national level primarily through the dissemination of information and knowledge regarding this field. This will lead the civil society to become familiarized with the subject and to remove the negative connotation that security has gained during the communist regime.

Moreover, security studies will provide the necessary expertise, both theoretically and practically, supporting the labor market demands for new professions.

The difficulties in achieving this scientific project consisted in the lack theoretical information, which imposed an approach exploratory and explanatory rather than a critical one. This project can be seen as a starting point for further research in the field of security because security culture became an increasingly used concept and, maybe in the future, will become an analysis tool for the various phenomena involved in security. The study also provides insight on the security studies as a (sub) field and as a national post-graduate and undergraduate study program, direction that can be developed in the future.

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INTELLIGENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE LIAISON: A PRIMER

Adam D. M. SVENDSEN

Abstract

This article, through adopting mainly a briefing and review approach, provides several insights into the phenomenon of foreign or international intelligence liaison as it occurs in the early twenty-first century. Building in a 'research retrospective' manner on 10 years of research conducted by Adam Svendsen, the article examines how international intelligence liaison can be, first, conceptualised, and then, second, analysed. By way of granting insights into its core characteristics, a multi-level approach towards its evaluation is presented, followed by a systems approach towards its analysis, including referencing system of systems dynamics. Before coming to some overall conclusions, involving examining the question of whether there is an increasingly challenging future for international intelligence liaison, key processes closely associated with international intelligence liaison are detailed, namely discernible regionalisation, globalisation and professionalization trends.

Keywords: intelligence liaison, international, globalisation of intelligence, information.

Introduction

Adopting largely a briefing and review approach, this article provides a brief introduction to the phenomenon of *foreign* or *international intelligence liaison*. Mainly, it draws on a range of different research conducted on intelligence liaison to date, including some insights into how international intelligence liaison can be effectively evaluated.[1]

An overview is possible. As argued before elsewhere: 'The term "intelligence liaison" is expansive. It offers synonymy with the interchangeable terms "intelligence cooperation", "intelligence sharing", "intelligence pooling",

[1] To enrich their overview, readers are directed to consult the sources and 'reference libraries/lists' provided within all the works cited throughout this article.

"intelligence alliance", "intelligence collaboration", "intelligence integration", "intelligence fusion", "intelligence access" and "intelligence exchange".'[2]

Furthermore, a general definition of 'intelligence liaison' that provides at least some beginning, workable insights, is that it consists of:

> *relevant communication, cooperation and linkage between a range of actors, usually at (but not limited to) the official intelligence agency level, on intelligence matters – essentially exchanging or sharing information, particularly of military and/or political value, and which especially (and purposefully) relates to national (extending to global, via regional) security. It also includes: usually secret (covert and/or clandestine),* [(and frequently, although not exclusively)] *state activity conducted by specialized 'intelligence' institutions to understand or influence entities.*[3]

Analysis has even been extended to both identify and declare intelligence liaison as an 'essential navigation tool', helping defence and security (including law enforcement) practitioners find their directions and pathways through contemporary contexts of globalised strategic risk (GSR) and during the burgeoning conduct of operations, which are often multi-functional in their nature (MFOs), extending at times to being 'special' (SpecOps/SOs).[4]

More specifically, '*international* intelligence liaison', when taken in its more precise technical detail, 'is further divisible into: (a) bilateral – two parties involved; (b) trilateral – three parties involved; (c) multilateral – when four or more parties are involved (even if interacting on a 'hub-and-spokes' basis…); and (d) plurilateral.' The last category of which 'can be bilateral to

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[2] A.D.M. Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.12.

[3] 'Intelligence liaison' as defined in Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, p.13 - Private and non-state actor contributions are additionally included in the definition cited above. For the applied use of intelligence liaison, see also A.D.M. Svendsen, 'NATO, Libya operations and intelligence co-operation – a step forward?', *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, 13, 2 (December 2011), pp.51-68, and his, 'Sharpening SOF tools, their strategic use and direction: Optimising the command of special operations amid wider contemporary defence transformation and military cuts', *Defence Studies*, 14, 3 (2014), pp.284-309.

[4] A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Intelligence Liaison: An essential navigation tool', in J. Schroefl, B.M. Rajaee and D. Muhr (eds), *Hybrid and Cyber War as Consequences of the Asymmetry* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang International Publishers, 2011).

multilateral, but between *different forms* of parties, such as the European Union (EU) and the USA (a supranational entity and a state, respectively…).'[5]

Underscoring its significance, the long-standing phenomenon of international intelligence liaison has grown exponentially in the early twenty-first century.[6] Closely following behind that observable 'curve' of events and developments, the literature focused on evaluating international intelligence liaison has grown equally substantially and diversely.[7]

Indeed, today that literature has become sizeable enough so that we can viably attempt, albeit in very beginning manners, to 'schoolify' (assign through grouping into different 'schools' of literature) the different approaches evaluations adopt.[8] This work is undertaken alongside further extending our efforts towards 'theorising' international intelligence liaison, so that improved understandings are better realised.[9] Attention is now turned to the key aspects of international intelligence liaison.

Core characteristics:

As witnessed over several years, naturally there are many ways that the complex phenomenon of international intelligence liaison can be

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[5] Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, p.101; J.I. Walsh, *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); R.J. Aldrich, 'International Intelligence Co-operation in Practice', ch.2 of H. Born, I. Leigh and A. Wills (eds), *International Intelligence Co-operation and Accountability* (London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2011).

[6] See, e.g., as introduced in A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Connecting intelligence and theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations', *Intelligence and National Security*, 24, 5 (October 2009), pp.700-729; for greater insights into the history of international intelligence liaison and for cases of its past use in previous eras, see, e.g., A.D.M. Svendsen, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method out of Mayhem* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), esp. pp.36-37, and his '1968 – "A year to remember" for the study of British Intelligence?', ch.14 in C.R. Moran and C.J. Murphy (eds), *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945* (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2013); A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Intelligence Liaison', *Intelligencer* - Journal of the US Association of Former Intelligence Officers - AFIO (May 2015).

[7] See, e.g., as discussed in Svendsen, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation*, pp.69-70.

[8] See, e.g., *ibid.*, esp. pp.74-80.

[9] See, for example, as introduced in several of the sources cited throughout this article; see also, e.g., A.N. Seagle, 'Intelligence Sharing Practices Within NATO: An English School Perspective', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 28, 3 (2015); W.R. Curtis, 'A "Special Relationship": Bridging the NATO Intelligence Gap', *MA Thesis* (Monterey, CA: US Naval Postgraduate School - NPS, June 2013).

conceptualised and then evaluated.[10] Here in this brief article, first, a 'multi-level perspective' is adopted. This is followed, second, by a 'systems approach' towards its evaluation.

[10] See, notably, J.T. Richelson, 'The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 4, 3 (Fall 1990); J.J. Wirtz, 'Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 6, 1 (1993); H.B. Westerfield (ed.), *Inside CIA's Private World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995) and his 'America and the World of Intelligence Liaison', *Intelligence and National Security*, 11, 3 (July 1996); M.S. Alexander, 'Introduction: Knowing your Friends, Assessing your Allies – Perspectives on Intra-Alliance Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security*, 13, 1 (Spring 1998); D. Stafford and R. Jeffreys-Jones (eds), *American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939–2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); M.M. Aid and C. Wiebes (eds), *Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War: From Cold War to Globalization* (London: Routledge, 2001); R.J. Aldrich, 'Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances', *Harvard International Review*, 24, 3 (Fall 2002); C. Clough, 'Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 17, 4 (2004); S. Lander, 'International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17, 3 (October 2004); R.J. Aldrich, 'Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation', *International Affairs*, 80, 4 (2004); W. Rees and R.J. Aldrich, 'Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?', *International Affairs*, 81, 5 (2005); J.E. Sims, 'Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 19 (Summer 2006); R.D. Steele, 'Commentary: Foreign Liaison and Intelligence Reform: Still in Denial', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 20 (2007), pp.167-174; D.S. Reveron, 'Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror', *Orbis*, 50, 3 (Summer 2006) and his 'Counterterrorism and Intelligence Cooperation', *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, 1, 3 (Summer 2008); A. Svendsen, 'The Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11: Frameworks and Operational Parameters', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 21, 1 (March 2008), his, 'The Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11: The Optimization of Intelligence Liaison Arrangements', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 21, 4 (2008), and his 'Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations'; A.D. Clift, 'The Evolution of International Collaboration in the Global Intelligence Era', ch.13 in L.K. Johnson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); E. Aydinli and M. Tuzuner, 'Quantifying intelligence cooperation: The United States International Intelligence Behavior (USIIB) dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, 48, 5 (September 2011); D. Munton and K. Fredj, 'Sharing Secrets: A Game Theoretic Analysis of International Intelligence Cooperation', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 26, 4 (2013); J. McGruddy, 'Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International Oversight', *Journal of Strategic Security* (2013); J. van Buuren, 'Analysing international intelligence cooperation: institutions or intelligence assemblages?', ch.7 in I. Duyvesteyn, B. de Jong and J. van Reijn (eds), *The Future of Intelligence: Challenges in the 21st century* (London: Routledge, 2014), and his 'From Oversight to Undersight: the Internationalization of Intelligence', *Security and Human Rights* (2014), pp.239–252; J.I. Walsh, 'Intelligence Sharing', ch.30 in R. Dover, M. Goodman and C. Hillebrand (eds), *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies* (London: Routledge, 2014).

Adopting a multi-level perspective:

Sophisticated approaches towards analysis (answering the 'what is it?' question) and assessment (addressing the 'so what?', 'why?' and 'what does it mean?' queries) frequently adopt a 'multi-level' line of work. These efforts are most notable in the field of War Studies and there is no exception when also evaluating international intelligence liaison.[11] For instance, as already discussed at length elsewhere and summarised here:

> *Discernible within intelligence liaison relationships, extending to the globalization of intelligence, are eight different, yet interrelated, levels of activity and experience. They each offer many different insights, and can hence be subsequently used for analysis purposes. Ranging from 'high' and 'macro' to 'low' and 'micro', these levels comprise: (i) the ideological level; (ii) the theoretical level; (iii) the strategy level; (iv) the policy level; (v) the operational level; (vi) the tactical level; (vii) the individual (as 'professional') level; and (viii) the personal level. These levels ... should be kept in mind.*[12]

A multi-level perspective is additionally helpful when analysts of international intelligence liaison are modelling and are - at least attempting to - theorise the phenomenon. In value terms, that last theorisation work is undertaken for providing, amongst many aims, improved knowledge and practical guidance, such as to both operators and other decision-makers beyond.[13] Further efforts are required.

Advancing a systems approach towards evaluation:

As international intelligence liaison is such a far, wide, and deep-ranging phenomenon - eluding simple, quick and easy characterisation - it also responds well to being evaluated both systematically and systemically. Particularly, this is when it is taken as a 'whole', in more holistic-extending manners towards its comprehensive unpacking.

Adopting a systems approach is valuable. Indeed, as previous research has presented: 'The anatomy of intelligence liaison can be conceptualized as having eight closely interrelated, systemic attributes or variables.' These, in turn, are then listed as consisting of:

1. *internal influences/factors;*
2. *rationale;*

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[11] See, for instance, references to 'levels of war' in J. Ångström and J.J. Widén, *Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War* (London: Routledge, 2015), esp. p.203, col.2.

[12] Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, p.12.

[13] See, for example, efforts as illustrated in Svendsen, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation*, p.64; see also R.J. Aldrich, 'US–European Intelligence Co-operation on Counter-Terrorism: Low Politics and Compulsion', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 11, 1 (February 2009).

3. *types and forms;*
4. *conditions and terms;*
5. *trends;*
6. *functions;*
7. *external influences/factors;*
8. *effects and outcomes.*

And, perhaps, '[m]ore fundamentally, these eight attributes or variables provide useful criteria that can be employed for benchmarking and theory-testing' purposes, including for better meeting management, accountability and oversight aims.[14] As the overall 'age of systems' continues to unfold in contemporary circumstances and is readily anticipated to continue into the rapidly advancing future, those systemic attributes or variables (as presented above) benefit well from being further explored and then harnessed in their detail.[15]

Not least for the analyst of international intelligence liaison, they serve as 'analytic filters to accept and, through exposing limitations and parameters, reject at least aspects of the other bodies of theory and approaches consulted. This process of theory-testing is an effective way of trying to better explain the phenomenon of intelligence liaison, and to better answer the general question of *why* it occurs.'[16] Both the improved analysis and then management of risks is equally advanced.

Moreover, since international intelligence liaison is not subject to being a 'single' system in its composition, developing 'system of systems' (SoS) or 'federation of systems' approaches equally have relevance both to it and to the work that concerns it (its tasks). For example, this can be most clearly demonstrated with reference to the use in intelligence domains of (amongst others): PMESII - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information/Intelligence and Infrastructure components (as used, for instance, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - NATO); PESTLE - Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal/Legislative and Environmental (as employed in EUROPOL); STEEP - Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental and Political (as frequently adopted in business/commercial/private sector companies and other 'business intelligence' contexts); HSCB - Human, Social, Cultural and Behavioural; and DIME -

[14] Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, p.99.

[15] See as detailed in section '3.0 Unpacking the eight attributes of intelligence liaison: A quick reference' in Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, pp.100-107.

[16] *Ibid.*, p.100; see also Svendsen, 'Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations', pp.725-727; J.E. Sims, 'A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics', ch.4 in G.F. Treverton and W. Agrell (eds), National Intelligence Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); for more of a specific case study-orientated approach, see D. Munton, 'Intelligence Cooperation Meets International Studies Theory: Explaining Canadian Operations in Castro's Cuba', Intelligence and National Security, 24, 1 (February 2009).

Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (as both, at least on occasions, drawn on in the US Military).[17] Simultaneously, many *processes* are involved, as the next section examines further.

International intelligence liaison processes:

Akin to several other phenomena, international intelligence liaison and its associated 'business' (activities, interactions, and so forth) is also subject to undergoing many processes. Again, this characteristic allows for a diverse range of guiding and framing theories to be drawn on during its evaluation, for example including evolving 'business process management' (BPM) approaches.[18] In this section, three major international intelligence liaison processes have been highlighted for their further examination below: i) 'regionalisation'; ii) 'globalisation'; and iii) 'professionalisation'.

i) 'Regionalisation':

When increasing wider trends relating to international intelligence liaison are opened up for inspection, areas appropriately rationalised as the 'regionalisation of intelligence' emerge. That last process is perhaps manifested most notably in Europe, with at least aspects developing in other regions, such as Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.[19] Relating to Europe, as has been argued:

[17] A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Advancing "Defence-in-depth": Intelligence and Systems Dynamics', *Defense & Security Analysis*, 31, 1 (2015), pp.58-73; A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice: Enhancing "macro" to "micro" systems thinking via "System of Systems" dynamics', *Defence Studies*, 15, 2 (2015), pp.105-123; B. Connable, *Military Intelligence Fusion for Complex Operations: A New Paradigm* (Washington, DC: RAND, 2012); A. Dupont and W.J. Reckmeyer, 'Australia's national security priorities: addressing strategic risk in a globalised world', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 66, 1 (2012).

[18] A.D.M. Svendsen with M. von Rosing, H. von Scheel, A-W. Scheer, et al., 'Business Process Trends' chapter in their (eds.), *The Complete Business Process Handbook: Body of Knowledge from Process Modelling to BPM*, Volume 1 (Burlington, MA: Morgan Kaufmann/Elsevier, 2014), from p.187; see also B.S.C. Watters, 'The Utility of Social Science and Management Theory on Military Operations: of Portacabins and Polo Fields', *Defence Studies*, 11, 1 (2011).

[19] For 'regionalisation of intelligence' trends discernible in other regions across the globe, see, for example, references to ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) in Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, esp. on p.39, 81 and 93; see also P. Chalk, 'China, the United States and their future influence on the ASEAN community', *The Strategist - AUS* (16 March 2015); P. Parameswaran, 'Malaysia to Host New Conference to Tackle Islamic State Challenge: ASEAN states and dialogue partners to participate in two-day meeting', *The Diplomat* (8 October 2015); A. Panda, 'India and Pakistan Are Set to Join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. So What?', *The Diplomat* (7 July 2015); in Latin America, Z. Shiraz and R.J. Aldrich, 'Globalisation and borders', ch.27 in Dover, Goodman and Hillebrand (eds), *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, p. 270; in the Middle East, A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Developing international intelligence liaison against Islamic State: Approaching "one for all and all for one"?', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (2016).

> *[D]uring the early 21st century, we have witnessed, in general, greater intelligence cooperation in Europe. ... The enhanced intelligence cooperation in Europe has been most focused on the issue of counter-terrorism. This was catalysed especially in the wake of high-profile terrorist atrocities – notably the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks and the 7 July 2005 London bombings... Other issues that have spurred closer regional intelligence and security cooperation, such as confronting transnational 'organised crime', civil protection and crisis management concerns, have also formed important priorities.*[20]

Furthermore, continuing the demarcation of longer-ranging trends:

> *In Europe there is the development of an ever-more complex web consisting of a plethora of variously overlapping international intelligence liaison arrangements. Collectively, these provide a form of regional intelligence coverage and intelligence and security reach, resulting in the delivery and production of effects and outcomes that can, in turn, today, be regarded as being generally satisfactory. How the arrangements and their associated networks overlap and complement one another is important, accounting for the connections, and notably the 'disconnects', that publicly come to our attention.*

Through strategy/policy-lenses, however, the conclusion still resonates that 'Room for tidying remains', with there being ample scope for further movements to be advanced within this domain of intelligence activity into the future, as the recent horrific terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015

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[20] A.D.M. Svendsen, 'On "a continuum with expansion"? Intelligence co-operation in Europe in the early Twenty-first Century', ch.8 in C. Kaunert and S. Leonard (eds), *European Security, Terrorism, and Intelligence: Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan/Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics Series, 2013), p.185; see also the sources listed in ibid., pp.203-214; also published as A.D.M. Svendsen, 'On "a continuum with expansion"? Intelligence cooperation in Europe in the early twenty-first century', *Journal of Contemporary European Research (JCER)*, 7, 4 (December 2011); for other recent treatments of European-related intelligence cooperation, see also R.J. Aldrich, 'Intelligence and the European Union', ch.44 in E. Jones, A. Menon and S. Weatherill (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), from p.627; B. Fägersten, 'European intelligence cooperation', ch.8 in Duyvesteyn, De Jong and Van Reijn (eds), *The Future of Intelligence*, his 'EU doesn't need a CIA - but better intelligence would help', *EurActiv.com* (16 October 2015), and his 'Intelligence and decision-making within the Common Foreign and Security Policy', *European Policy Analysis* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, October 2015).

reinforce.[21] When overlaps are better taken into account, the 'regionalisation of intelligence' trends are not alone, also extending further into more 'globalised' realms.

ii) 'Globalisation':

Although remaining somewhat contested with regard to intelligence, 'globalisation' has many meanings in the international intelligence liaison context. The analytical challenge is to adequately cover all of the dimensions involved and to suitably delineate their associated implications, without getting more distracted by overwhelming noise. Ultimately:

> *manifest as a proactive response to the familiar general long-term historical trend, recently more rapidly accelerated, of: (i) 'globalization* writ large*' (essentially what we generally understand by the term 'globalization'…); and (ii) the impact of 'globalization* on *intelligence' – most notably the influence of all of globalization's well-known 'nasties', felt especially post-1989 and after the Cold War…; (iii) the 'globalization* of *intelligence', occurring especially in the early twenty-first century and post-9/11, can be discerned…*

Moreover:

> *Arguably the most direct manifestation of 'intelligence* and *globalization', including delving most deeply into what globalization means for intelligence, the globalization of intelligence is emerging through the mechanism of enhanced international intelligence liaison, together with being facilitated by the developments occurring both within and beyond those arrangements. This process includes factors such as 'intelligence and security reach dynamics' … and developments extending beyond merely the regionalization of intelligence processes, including overlapping with 'glocalization'* [(where the 'local' and 'global' connect, frequently messily)]*…*[22]

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[21] Svendsen, 'On "a continuum with expansion"? Intelligence co-operation in Europe in the early Twenty-first Century', p.186; M. Banks, 'EU calls for Europe-wide intelligence agency', *Defense News* (23 November 2015).

[22] Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, p.xxi; see also R.J. Aldrich, 'Intelligence', ch.16 in P.D. Williams (ed.), *Security Studies: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2012 [2ed.]), his 'Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem', *Intelligence and National Security*, 24, 1 (February 2009), his 'Beyond the Vigilant State: Globalisation and Intelligence', *Review of International Studies*, 35, 4 (October 2009), and his '"A Profoundly Disruptive Force": The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization', *Intelligence and National Security*, 26, 2 and 3 (2011); see also further review and discussion in A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Special Issue on "The CIA and US Foreign Relations Since 1947: Reforms, Reflections and Reappraisals," ... Section I: Challenges and Reform', *H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable Reviews*, III, 6 (December 2011), esp. pp. 26-36; G. Hastedt, 'Book Review: *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, Adam N.[(sic.)] M. Svendsen. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, 238 pp.', *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 21, 2 (June 2013), pp. 125-6; Shiraz and Aldrich, 'Globalisation and borders'.

And, while some substantial research has been undertaken into UK and US intelligence and security activity in recent years, what has been confronted has not only been largely an 'Anglo-American' story. Other countries across the World are simultaneously involved.[23]

iii) 'Professionalisation':

Perhaps most controversial in relation to international intelligence liaison activities is the claim that 'a process along the lines of "professionalization" can be identified effectively in this realm of intelligence activity…'[24] Furthermore, 'In its overarching nature, the process of the professionalization of intelligence cooperation can be clearly characterized as being mixed and uneven…'[25], with the argument that 'both structural and cultural dimensions are clearly involved during the process of "professionalization"'; and that those dimensions can be empirically observed within the domain of international intelligence liaison, as well as when examining the intelligence-related contexts beyond.[26]

Again, contemporary international intelligence liaison is clearly being shaped by some interesting, debate-provoking trends. These are deserving of further analysis and consideration, such as through the employment of more specific case studies.[27] In overarching terms, striking effectively balanced

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[23] For more of an 'Anglo-American' focus, see R.J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001); A.D.M. Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11* (London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010), and his '"Strained" relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American intelligence and security co-operation', ch. 8 in S. Marsh and A. Dobson (eds), *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives* (London: Routledge/Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics Series, 2012); P.H.J. Davies, *Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective* (Praeger Security International, 2012 [2vols]); M.S. Goodman, 'Evolution of a Relationship—The Foundations of Anglo-American Intelligence Sharing', *CIA Studies in Intelligence*, 59, 2 (2015; UNCLASSIFIED). For a focus beyond merely 'Anglo-American' intelligence and security worlds, see R.J. Aldrich and J. Kasuku, 'Escaping from American intelligence: culture, ethnocentrism and the Anglosphere', *International Affairs*, 88, 5 (September 2012), and P.H.J. Davies and K.C. Gustafson (eds), *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013); Z. Shiraz, 'Drugs and Dirty Wars: intelligence cooperation in the global South', *Third World Quarterly*, 34, 10 (2013).

[24] Svendsen, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation*, p. 3.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[27] For the value of adopting a case study approach in this area, for instance with historical examples of intelligence liaison, see, e.g., D. Munton and M. Matejova, 'Spies without Borders? Western Intelligence Liaison, the Tehran Hostage Affair and Iran's Islamic Revolution', *Intelligence and National Security*, 27, 5 (2012), pp.739–60; R.E. Bock, 'Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation, 1941–45: Normative Insights from the Dyadic Democratic Peace Literature', *Intelligence and National Security* (2014); see also, E.J. Haire, 'A Debased Currency? Using Memoir Material in the Study of Anglo-French Intelligence Liaison', *Intelligence and National Security*, 29, 5 (2014), pp.758-777; A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Painting rather than photography: Exploring spy fiction as a legitimate source concerning UK-US intelligence co-operation', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 7, 1 (March 2009), pp.1-22.

conditions of '*optimised (intelligence and security) reach*' in intelligence enterprises (missions and operations), including liaison relationships, emerge as key.[28] Some overall conclusions are now presented.

Conclusions: An increasingly challenged future?

As has been demonstrated above, many different criteria can be deployed relating to international intelligence liaison in present contexts, as well as being relevant to intelligence and its associated enterprises, and their subsequent evaluation, more broadly. Those analytical distinctions are helpful for management and governance, such as:

1. What are the differences between 'information' + 'intelligence';
2. the type(s) of intelligence involved – SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT, etc.;
3. the different forms intelligence can take – is it 'raw' or 'finished' and 'processed' intelligence, 'single-source' or 'all-source', analysis ('what is it?') or assessment (UK) and estimate (US) ('what does it mean?') product?;
4. (a) purpose: what is it needed for – 'strategy' and 'policy' or 'tactical' and 'operational' purposes? + (b) Relevance: Thereby, is it operationally-viable, actionable and 'serious' intelligence, or is it more 'sanitized' intelligence, in order to better protect sources and methods, for strategic and decision-making purposes?;
5. how is the intelligence access, sharing or exchange occurring – is it *ad hoc* (conducted on a 'need to know' basis) or more regularized and institutionalized (conducted on a 'need to share and pool'/'use' basis), formal or informal?;
6. when is the intelligence access, sharing or exchange taking place – for instance, is it *a priori* (before events, in an attempt to pre-empt and prevent them) or *post facto* (in the context of post-event investigations);
7. where is the intelligence access, sharing or exchange taking place – for example, is it in an organization at headquarters level, more in the field in 'operational commands', and is the location equipped with 'Sensitive Compartmentalized Information Facilities' (SCIFs), if such distinctions exist (e.g., in the NATO context)?

[28] A.D.M. Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*, esp. p.110.

Specific details soon acquire enhanced importance, and, clearly, many challenges concerning international intelligence liaison exist.[29]

As a coda, with the cascades of Edward Snowden-related so-called 'revelations' - revealed through the high-volume of previously secret intelligence material he has leaked to the international media since June 2013 - many of those international intelligence liaison considerations listed above can be expected, at their least, to be revisited. This is together with some challenging 're-balancing' within international intelligence liaison relationships being both demanded and, to some degree, anticipated into the future.[30]

Regardless of whether or not more specific international intelligence liaison relationships are subjected to further adjustments in their details, many calibration and configuration constructs do continue to retain their value for meeting most constructive optimisation requirements. Especially, this is as the essential phenomenon of international intelligence liaison persists overall for enabling defence and security (including law enforcement) practitioners to most viably accomplish grander strategic ends and missions. Ideally, this is realised as successfully as possible in the increasingly globalised environments in which they work and have to engage. Yet again, necessity concentrates minds and efforts.

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[29] This list is substantially based on that published in Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror*, pp.41-42.

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THROUGH INTELLIGENCE TOWARDS KNOWLEDGE, THROUGH KNOWLEDGE TOWARDS STRATEGIC DECISION

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Abstract

The complex security environment, the speed at which events unfold, as well as the ever shorter time dedicated to making the strategic decision are indicators of the need for a new intelligence formula, able to generate strategic knowledge, based on integrated formulae, a mixture of "innovation networks" and "knowledge clusters".

The intelligence-academic–business axis should include also "media- and culture-based public", so as to benefit from society's comprehensive knowledge.

The cooperation framework could be built on creating a set of communication tools shared by all participants, establishing and pursuing priorities, developing rapid response mechanisms and analysis platforms, willingly allotting the necessary time for such efforts, as well as bolstering trust-building networks.

Keywords: *intelligence, strategic, knowledge society, collaborative, decision*

Introduction

Contemporary society evolutions, seen as an antechamber of the future, shed a light on a complex and dense picture of knowledge pushing human ability to perceive and understand close to biological and intellectual limits.

More clearly, scientific breakthroughs, discoveries, inventions, or innovations in all sectors and social layers have triggered in the past decades a change of reality, a shift in individual and institutional rhythms, as well as an intensification and speed-up of processes.

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Particularly, an enhance in information dynamics has a direct impact over the perceived reality increasingly described as dim and even bewildering, affecting, thus, the ability to analyze and make decisions of both ordinary citizen and decision-maker facing a strategic choice.

The radiography of the international political scene, however poor, reveals in dark thick lines the existence of unprecedented challenges facing all institutional stakeholders. They are generated by the need to respond rapidly, efficiently, and sustainably to risks, threats and opportunities which occur and develop as an immutable consequence of social, political, and economic interactions.

Therefore, resorting to theoretical or methodological tools concerning the security issue is no more an odd practice. As Copenhagen School observed even before the fall of Berlin Wall, a natural spread of legitimate strategic concerns over the global impact of daily developments or emerging phenomena trends called for the use of security-specific complex tools for evaluation and decision-making.

Dilemmas in making decision are not a consequence of information society. The past century saw an abundance of academic, philosophical or political debates which came up with many solutions. John Dewey and Walter Lippman, alongside Henry Mintzberg, Peter Drucker, James March or Peter Senge, just to name some of the well-known authors whose works focused on those issues, advanced solutions and models of acting in different circumstances, launched or criticized principles, methods, and organizational models deemed as timely or appropriate for different circumstances or political, social, and economic developments.

These scientific debates reveal as a common ground the consensus on the fundamental role of data-information-knowledge sequence in the activities related to the decision-making process.

For an analyst, Sherman Kent's work is undoubtedly indispensable to naturally integrate intelligence development in the subsequently-agreed acceptance of indissoluble part of the security sector and at the same time as the foundation of knowledge for all institutional decision-makers.

"Intelligence is knowledge", a syntagm he coined in 1949, has marked and continues to creatively influence strategic thinking.

Its feature of visionary intelligence benchmark - as security activity - was certified by the organization and functioning results at the level of governmental institutions, especially the American ones.

In an era marked by uncertainties and concerns about the risk of copycat conflicts on a potential much grander scale, the adoption of a decision-making system based on the professional and strategic use of knowledge has been a historic success. The systemic and integrated approach has managed to maintain a balance, poor as it may be but quite stable, between the decisions of the two antagonistic ideological blocs – communist and capitalist – in a confrontation waged with the most large-scale and varied resources.

The success of the Western model can also be considered a result of its theoretical and practical mobility in the decision-making process, its much faster ability to adapt to the context and, last but not least, its tendency to criticize each element, either particular or general, of the mechanism or principles on which participatory democracy and capitalism are lying, as a prerequisite for change, improvement, and innovation.

The conclusions of the analysis of these models, the geopolitical context, and the new paradigm of the knowledge society are a building block for a vigorous interweaving of all areas of intelligence production, any decision being nowadays a product of a multidisciplinary, multisource, and integrated process.

Being Strategic in Information Age

Contemporary perspective on the meanings of "strategic" and the activities it refers to are various nowadays.

A brief however integrated theory says that the strategy encompasses a wide choice of approaches that Henry Mintzberg divided in five types, known as the 5Ps - plan, ploy, pattern, perspective, and position (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 11).

A comprehensive coverage of this concept supposes a set of extremely diverse and complex activities subdued to the notion of strategic.

Therefore, any strategic action assumes an analysis of data and information, which can be considered a specific form of research that addresses any issue at the level of breadth and detail in the description of threats, risks, and opportunities in a way which helps establish programs and policies (McDowell, 2009, p. 5).

In order to assimilate the overall significance and importance of studying and developing a proactive correlation among intelligence, knowledge, and decision, it is imperative to review current experience and theoretical perspectives.

Acceptance and integration into a modern theoretical and practical system is of a relatively recent date, as a result of the need to organize complex flow of activities in economy and, starting with Sherman Kent, in intelligence.

Thus, modern management theory, from the 14 principles of Henry Fayol to Frederick Taylor's scientific management principles or Peter Drucker's contemporary ones, is dwelling on the vital dimension of an all-encompassing assessment of realities and possibilities. This effort is indispensable to objectively ensure the need to efficiently allocate resources in the long run so as to guarantee the success of the organization – either economic enterprise, or institution or state entity.

In plainer words, the related processes, organizations, and infrastructures are designed and built so as to ensure the output necessary to support, by providing relevant knowledge, an efficient decision-making process resilient to the increasingly diverse challenges facing the contemporary society in the economic, political, social, technological or, in our case, security fields.

As more than one expert observed, the 21st century security environment "leaves intelligence organizations in the position of needing to embrace two distinct paradigms to accomplish their mission: the traditional puzzle-solving paradigm in the case of traditional state-based security threats, and a new adaptive interpretation paradigm to address transnational threats" (Lahneman, 2010, p. 212), which, in the past decade, have become increasingly visible on the international agenda and among national priorities, as well. Given the current circumstances, intelligence communities tend to become "a provider of knowledge" rather than "a producer of information" (Kerbel and Olcott, 2010).

An assessment of the chosen solutions highlights their diversity, transfer of expertise, and mutual influences among experts in areas until recently considered closed and self-sufficient. The idea of pluri-disciplinarity has, in the current context, a meaning far beyond occasional and rather experimental approaches of the 20th century. They turn into a philosophy that creatively influences the entire mechanism of education, research, and development of tangible or intangible assets, a category which also includes intelligence.

Therefore, we are witnessing concerted efforts of adaptation, development, and, not in the least, innovation, so that the solutions offered by intelligence as a whole were able to cover the entire need-to-know spectrum at all decision-making levels.

Decision-Making in Knowledge Society

In the contemporary security environment, a special emphasis is placed on the strategic perspective of decision-making process and, consequently, knowledge.

The speed-up of economic, political, technological, and social process transforms even the meaning of notion of strategic. Although still valid at doctrinal level in many domains, it becomes increasingly clear that major cleavages occur in projecting, decision-making, and implementing strategic perspectives due to the shrinking capacity to objectively manage the system flows within action plans.

Under these circumstances, intelligence plays a fundamental and challenging role: the production of strategic knowledge on new coordinates. For the state intelligence organizations, it became clear that strategic intelligence cannot but appeal to the full range of available resources and all relevant expertise to support the decision-making process by creating a knowledge base to substantiate the transformation and progress of society.

Political and social transformations, as well as making society aware of the need to preserve the current model of civilization were arguments in favor of reshaping the security environment. Matters may become more complex considering that, in terms of security, certain entities can be both friends and foes, depending on their area of interest.

These changes are triggered by the new typology of risks, but also security interests of the decisions and their actions.

Apart from objective measurable elements influencing decision-making process coordinates, another factor increasingly difficult to manage adds up: the time.

The hectic pace of events puts pressure on both the analyst and the customer/decision maker.

The analyst must constantly adapt the discourse according to developments, ending in some cases to be overwhelmed.

On the other hand, the decision-makers are nudged by the need to know and are always concerned that they lack all available information they might need when undertaking appropriate measures.

This is the reason why the world witnesses an unprecedented boom of requirements generated by the increasing need for analytical materials meant to allow the immediate dealing with any challenge (Betts, 1978, p. 61).

In such conditions, the role of security intelligence is decisive since the expertise pragmatically proves that the resources earmarked for impeding the emergence of a real threat are significantly reduced than those for mitigating the potential effects of those threats.

This reality stands for the shift in customers' interest from explicative descriptive intelligence to estimative intelligence that forecasts developments in areas of interest.

Being aware of the theoretical and practical deadlock of contemporary analysis, particularly due to the devastating negative effects of failing to come up with good predictions (as in the case of 9/11 attacks or the economic crisis), the intelligence community spearheaded reform measures.

The first and most advanced in this regard was the US intelligence community which theoretically and practically relied on a collaborative approach for sharing information and expertise among its different agencies (500 Day Plan for Collaboration and Integration).

If the topics of interest range from nuclear missile technologies to pandemics – not to mention the emerging issues – it becomes clear that a single structure cannot have the necessary expertise. Furthermore, current analytical challenges are less constrained to a paradigm specific to an area of interest, often resorting to multiple disciplines and various areas of expertise, developments that make almost impossible for a single analyst to achieve a strategic assessment.

From Lone Analyst to Community of Analysts

Sharing knowledge and creating optimal conditions for trading opinions, as well as shortening the hierarchical chains to minimum, have the effect of removing some of the bureaucratic short circuits, streamlining the intelligence process, and filling gaps in knowledge in a relevant domain by engaging the whole available human capital, establishing a common language extremely important in simplifying the intelligence process, and clearly specifying the need for turning customer's feedback into a norm.

On the other hand, William J. Lahneman stated that an intelligence community needs to remain a hierarchical structure able to generate or access collaborative networks whenever an inter-disciplinary analysis is required.

Such networks should integrate OSINT through analysts and experts from private entities (Lahneman, 2010, p. 204).

Furthermore, an appropriate response to topical issues requires that the efforts to find solutions to those challenges should be accompanied by strengthening knowledge and galvanizing the adaptability and creativity as supporting factors of the analytical process.

Still in its early stage within intelligence communities, *outsourcing* could be an answer to the unprecedented amount of information, hitting a level that makes impossible the traditional management of data and, implicitly, intelligence flows.

Objectively, it is practically impossible for an analyst to tackle alone and highly professionally all the challenges arising in many areas that have become of interest in the current security context.

The solution of creating a partnership between intelligence structures and academic milieus has gained increasingly more grounds of late, so that, building on the responsibility to achieve the common welfare, they approached together a series of security challenges targeting niche areas or supposing access to fundamental research.

A cooperation formula aimed at extending knowledge necessary to decision making, known under the name of Triple Helix, became more evident in the 1990s. The concept as defined by Henry Etzkowitz and Loet Leydesdorff during 1993-1995 entailed, in a well-known formula since that moment, the idea of a creative interaction among government, academia, and business based on interdisciplinary principles in order to share and, if necessary, produce knowledge for progress. Formulated first as a driving factor in business intelligence policies, Triple Helix formula quickly emerged as an appropriate solution to any organizational model aimed at producing knowledge.

Henry Etzkowitz synthesized the essence of Triple Helix model in 10 propositions which galvanized many of the processes associated with the development of the knowledge society in the contemporary matrix shaped by information technology (Etzkowitz, 2003, p. 296).

For example, Etzkowitz stated that initiatives arising within a Triple Helix interaction become innovation policies, a conclusion which can be extended to any intelligence domain, nationally and beyond. This can be achieved through the optimal use of innovation and fundamental knowledge resources available in academia, efforts to meet the market interests of industries, preoccupations to social needs, and design and implementation tools of the existing government policies (Etzkowitz, 2003, p. 296).

Perhaps the most representative assertion in Henry Etzkowitz's research, "capitalization of knowledge occurs in parallel with cogitization of capital", characterizes best knowledge's role within the decision-making process in contemporary society, where efficiency is the supreme value of assessing social efforts in Capitalism.

Overcoming the profit-oriented thinking as the expression of successful strategic efforts seems to be possible through a broader approach that would see civil society as a weighting element.

Thus, Triple Helix model is innovatively upgraded through the emergence of "Mode 3", as its creators Elias G. Carayannis and David F.J. Campbell called it. It essentially represents a mix of "innovation networks" and "knowledge clusters" that can serve as the basis of a mechanism for fostering a set of hybrid goods equally or distinctly public/private, tacit/ codified, tangible/virtual in a knowledge economy, society, and polity (Carayannis and Campbell, 2009, p. 202). As an expression of this system, the two postulated the idea of a Quadruple Helix to integrate, beside the above-mentioned formalized intelligence resources, a heterogeneous and unstructured helix called "media-based and culture-based public" (Carayannis and Campbell, 2009, p. 206).

The attractiveness of the architecture proposed by Carayanis and Campbell lies in the possibility to integrate and exploit a significant quantitative and qualitative expertise and innovation potential, which the authors called "creative class", in the common effort to develop a knowledge society.

The variety of the resource, its nonconformist and sometimes anti-cyclical nature can generate difficulties in exploiting its innovative capacity.

On the one hand, it is difficult to integrate values which are non-institutional by definition, freelancers, or even critics of the system into bureaucratic mechanisms.

On the other hand, too much autonomy could generate timing mismatches in critical situations, under the pressure of rapid sequence of events, due to inability to acquire the critical mass of knowledge necessary to make proper decisions.

Even in these circumstances, the Quadruple Helix model can be a source of inspiration for the implementation of a dynamic and comprehensive support formula for the decision-making process that would put together national knowledge resources.

In our opinion, this direction has the ability to provide solutions to support recent theoretical developments of strategic analysis, which suppose the introduction of some elements assessing uncertainty-induced risk (Kotler and Caslione, 2009, p. 73), by using the extensive knowledge base of the society.

The thorough study of theoretical inputs concerning the theory of knowledge is mandatory for any strategic intelligence provider, category which includes security services as well.

The replication of a formula that integrates national strategic knowledge resources is, amid information society and current geopolitical developments, a first-rate necessity.

The added value gained from setting up a national intelligence community is an argument in support of the idea that the approach was useful and should be extended by including the other helices proposed by researchers.

Decision-makers need all available knowledge and national creativity resources to become effective and proactive nationwide and competitive worldwide.

A flexible formula that includes experts from all academic, government, and business milieus or civil society can be achieved by a joint, conscious, consistent, and willingly assumed effort.

The development of such a system is difficult, given that it involves the instrumentalization of communication in a language shared by all participants, identification and pursuit of priorities, establishment and implementation of rapid response mechanisms and complex analysis tools/platforms, voluntary allocation of time resources, maybe on already-established crowdsourcing principles, the development of trusted networks.

Each of these steps is difficult to achieve and extends over a long period of time. But it is very important to understand the urgent need to translate current exploration efforts, benevolent and constructive as it may be but still experimental, into sheer actions. And now it's time to get started.

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THE LONG ROAD FROM SECURITY TO INTELLIGENCE. CULTURE, NEW CONCEPTS AND PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract

All the new risks and threats to the national security have caused each society to reconsider the general human values, values that represent a bridge between states and nations. Following the threat of the Sovietic bloc, the Western world, and beyond, has defined its main risks, dangers and threats to the national and international security taking into consideration both the major changes in the security environment – increased international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – and the political, economic and social development of Western countries.

Thus, the project aims to determine the role and importance of the existence of a security culture within any society, and to show, at the same time, how this culture has transformed under the influence of globalization and not only, from the concept of security to the concept of Intelligence. Furthermore, I will emphasize the role of Intelligence within society and to point out how society as a whole, and Intelligence organizations in particular, had to adapt to the changes that have shaped the world in the past 20 years.

Keywords: security culture, intelligence, globalization, concepts, risks, dangers, threats.

Introduction

The world is now in a new millenium, in which the new risks and threats to security triggered a reconsideration of the general human values that bind together states and nations. Following the threat of the Soviet block, the Western world, and beyond, has defined its main risks, dangers and threats to the national and international security, both in terms of changes in the security environment - increased international terrorism, proliferation of

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weapons of mass destruction and decay of states – and in terms depending on the state of political, economic and social development of Western countries.
In this context, the complexity of the concept of security has been particularly highlighted, whose representation is influenced by social change. Thus, not only does the concept apply to many dimensions - military, political, economic, social and environmental - but also in the study of security it is necessary to take into account the local, social, cultural and historical context of the reference object of an analysis. We can say that the security status of individuals should be the starting point of any study in this area, regardless of the level of analysis (national, zonal, regional or global), as the human kind represents the vital element of all forms of social organization, and the degree of achievement of their security is reflected in the security of the group to which they belong (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1984, book I, chapter 1).

The most important security threats, such as those mentioned above, have causes related to the individual's sense of insecurity caused by: the degradation of the human condition, disparities in economic development both between individuals and between countries and regions, the struggle for power, divergent interests manifested from the individual level to the level of alliances, etc. For these reasons, it is obvious that we can not talk about achieving the state of national/zonal/regional/global security within environments in which the individual does not feel protected. If an individual is threatened, then both the security of the group to which he or she belongs and the security of other related communities are threatened.

Security, security culture – conceptual limits

Security has its own development, a specific legislation, a stable target, stability and an adequate support. As an actional element, security is the ability of a system to preserve its functional characteristics under the action of destructive factors or factors that can cause such mutations, as to become dangerous to the environment or health of humans who are in the risk zone (Buzan, 2000, pp. 15-23).

Until the 1980s, in the field of international relations there was no coherent school of thought that could develop the concept of security, concept that had a subsidiary role in geopolitical analysis, being developed mainly in the military, in the strategic studies and related to the main concepts which are developed in schools of international relations (Buzan, 2000, pp. 23-25). The current context of the notion of security leads to the analysis of the quality of a phenomenon/ process/ product/ system in terms of their stability.

Security, thus, becomes the main determinant element of quality, leading at the same time to the recognition of the crucial role of risk, resulted from the dynamic of actions, risk that may be accepted (tolerated) or cleared (treated) judging by the cost that may be incurred (Buzan, 2000, pp. 25-37).

Security, in general, can be approached in a variety of perspectives. The theoretical analysis of the concept developed by representatives of the Copenhagen School (B. Buzan, Bob McKinlay) presents factors from five main sectors which affect human security, namely: military, political, economic, social and environmental. Another important factor contributing to security that should be taken into account in the analysis is represented by the performance of a state government, on which depends the degree of development of a country actually depends.

By culture, in general, one can understand a collection of beliefs, norms, habits, attitudes, rules and common practices for a particular organizational group. If we refer, however, to attitudes, rules and practices of an area, then we talk about culture within that particular area (Banks, J.A., Banks, & McGee, C. A, 1989, http://www.carla.umn.edu/culture/definitions.html).

In this context, it can be said that security culture is a sum of values, norms, attitudes and actions that determine the understanding and assimilation of the security concept and of other concepts related to it: national security, international security, collective security, insecurity, security policy etc.

In the process of developing ways to create and promote a culture of security at the level of individuals, it is important to take into account the values a society has developed in time. In a world characterized by conflicts and asymmetrical threats, it is very important to respect the values of a society, because they play an important role in the development of mankind. A viable security environment can only be obtained by respecting the values, all values in fact. We should also mention that we live in an informational society, a technologized era, which has different rules for manifestation from those we already know, and international security is no longer influenced by classical determinism (Schreier, 2010, pp. 37-40).

In order to conclude, we can say that security culture concerns the ways to approach things, concepts of organization members, attitudes, opinions, traditions, perceptions, ideals and ethical standards, in terms of security. Specifically, if we refer to the attitudes towards risk, to the rules and practices used to minimize its effects, then we will talk about security culture.

Trends in the development of security culture

The changing trend of the security culture in contemporary society is natural, since the climate that stimulates development, and the large scope of socialization, both are the result of scientific and technical progress and set new values and assumptions. As a consequence, the retention for a long time of some concepts/beliefs/rules which have had a beneficial effect can, in fact, turn into a hindrance for the development process, prejudices or rigidity.

In a highly competitive environment, resistance to change turns a beneficial condition into an unfavourable one, and positive culture into negative. Although changing the culture of security is generally unbearable for members of an organization, it is necessary and possible for the survival and development of the organization, because only a sustainable yet flexible culture ensures competitiveness and youth.

The main elements of a security culture

Risks, dangers and threats to global security and stability have diversified, although some of their forms of expression were more difficult to detect in a period of time which could enable effective counter actions. The current situation requires new techniques for monitoring and evaluating the sources of instability, while establishing and developing adequate capabilities of responding in time and space.

The effects of globalization began to be felt. After a considerable period of reflux, the world economy revived. The flow of goods and investment, technological development and progress of democracy have brought more freedom and prosperity to people. In this context, transnational threats (terrorism, drug and strategic materials trafficking and migration, organized crime), began taking advantage of the permeability of borders; for this reason they were more likely to spread on a global scale. The fight against them has become a new and unique component of globalization. In this context, state defence against risks, dangers and threats needs to be carried out both traditionally, by individual policies and strategies, and through collective forms of action, permanently adapted to the characteristics of the security environment in progress (Schreier, 2010, pp. 39-46).

Beside risk factors, security may be affected by domestic vulnerabilities, which can take different forms. The main weaknesses may consist of: lack of resources allocated to the public security and defense institutions, social inequities, proliferation of underground economy and increased corruption, economic crime, disturbing public order, the possibility of producing an environmental disaster, natural disasters, hazards, maintaining a low level of information infrastructure and migration, all this can take a mass scale in case of socioeconomic phenomena and unruly processes (Schreier, 2010, pp. 39-46).

Due tot the globalization process that has rapidly spread all over the world, the importance has shifted from the collective security to the individual, as a member of society, whether national, zonal or international. Globalization increasingly brings into discussion more problems whose solution refers to aspects of the human sphere of life.

The human dimension of contemporary society is becoming more and more important. All actors on the world stage are aware of the importance of achieving and maintaining a stable international security environment. Both states and national and international organizations realize that in order to be assured, security must be performed both ways - internal and external, given the fact that security is firstly built from the inside to the outside. A state can not be the guarantor/provider of regional security if it is not stable and secure inside, if it is not able to provide security for its citizens. In this case, a very important element is the communication and cooperation between the state and its institutions, on one hand, and the state and civil society, on the other. Most times, moral support and permission granted by the state society is vital (Schreier, 2010, pp. 55-63).

On this coordinate we can include the necessity of creating and promoting a security culture among the members of a society. In this type of culture are included elements related to the existing security environment, internal and external risks and ways of action to prevent/ mitigate them. In this context, we conclude that shaping a strong security culture is utterly necessary and this is, at the same time, an indicator of a healthy, prosperous and functional society. Taking into account the benefits of a strong security culture, the state must constantly engage, through its institutions, in informing society on relevant issues and developing a strengthened security culture of the population.

From security culture to Intelligence culture

Statistics show that at the dawn of the 3rd millennium the number of conflicts between states has considerably reduced, but the number of ethnic conflicts and asymmetric actions has increased. In addition, there have been numerous other outbreaks of conflict, such as the lack of water resources, states which have lost control of their national territory, borders between countries that do not correspond to ethnic or historical boundaries, etc. No one can say that today's world is a safer world, a world where almost all events are directed towards the peace and welfare of all inhabitants of the planet.

Although traditional threats have been reduced, what happened on September 11, 2001 proved that the world is more unstable than we could imagine. In the globalization era, when the permeability of borders is growing, alongside with the development of new technologies arise more ways to put them to the wrong use. Especially after 2000, official statements do not always correspond with the true intentions of states. In many countries, even among those having a developed economy and consolidated democracies, the official power does not overlap totally with the real power. Large and powerful interest groups, transnational organizations are exercising de facto leadership, leadership which should belong to those elected bodies, apparently democratically voted (Treverton, 2003, pp. 11-13).

Amplification of threats, such as asymmetric threats, including terrorism which is the most relevant and the most common, implies taking preventive measures. A state needs information which can enable it to take justified decisions in order to maintain and improve its security. Informational activity (or intelligence, as it is being increasingly addressed in recent years) is vital to national security, and the above presented information supports the need for a sustained intelligence activity. Since the armed forces, in the classical meaning, have reduced their power, the role of intelligence is increasing significantly.

New features of the socio-political and economic crisis require a new approach in the intelligence activity, approach that may prevent political and professional shortcomings which have a negative influence. We speak of a need for change, for completing a journey towards a new ethic of the intelligence activity, in order to cope with the rigors of our modern world. A body of information serves a particular entity decision. In order to fulfil its tasks, the information entity, no matter the name, collects data to obtain the necessary information for decision-makers. So, the entity of information must handle a specific domain, which means knowledge. In order to know, one is supposed to take particular action to obtain information, and in order to act, a specific plan is required. From this description it appears that intelligence activity, in the broadest sense, requires knowledge (what, for whom, for what), action (how) and organization (who). Although it can be analyzed separately, these three components are tightly linked (Barger, 2005, pp. 24-31).

For this reason, an integrating approach of the intelligence activity, in order to optimize this process, is essential. Starting from the definition of intelligence in a broader sense, as based on the aforementioned components – knowledge of what is significant, methods to obtain the necessary data and transform them into information, and organizational structure for accomplishing the first and second components – the development of a theory about intelligence activity will be based on a systemic approach of the activity itself, taking into account all the components mentioned above and the factors influencing them (Barger, 2005, pp. 24-31).

Revolution of the Intelligence concepts

Informational activity, or intelligence, plays a crucial role in achieving security. Intelligence helps maintain peace and order by reducing the risk of international conflict, being, at the same time, a support for diplomatic and military efforts to stop the spread of unconventional weapons. Also, intelligence plays a key role in the defense and protection against terrorist threats, transnational crime and other sources of violence.

Intelligence is necessary to detect the aggressive intentions of a foreign enemy and to define them, such as indirect aggression or preparation for the next step in intensifying the threat. In short, it takes intelligence to prevent threats before they escalate. Prevention requires decision makers to assess threats, decide the inevitability of conflict and make decisions for defense. Policy makers need to judge the level of risk to which the nation is ready and decide when an action will take place, taking into account both costs and consequences. It becomes imperative that intelligence services should anticipate the needs of those who will make the decision at the political level (Schreier, 2010, pp. 64-68).

The profound changes in the international security environment have had an impact on all areas of life, including intelligence activity. In this respect, in the next period the need for a revolution in the field will be felt. It is not a revolution in technology, cars, technic, software or speed. It is a revolution in concepts. So far, for 50 years, the information revolution focused on the letter "T" (technology) of the binomial IT field. The new revolution in information focus on "I" and considers the meaning and purpose of information. And this leads quickly to redefine the tasks at using information and to redefine institutions fulfilling these tasks (Voicilă, https://andreivocila.wordpress.com/2010/10/06/de-la-cultura-de-securitate-la-cultura-de-intelligence/).

Conclusions

The models used in intelligence activity during the Cold War no longer meet the current requirements. It is necessary to develop a new model to obtain a leverage in the fight against both threats and non-traditional methods and sources. This is possible by identifying and developing new business concepts and new information ethics of intelligence.

The old model of threat, globally and especially within the great powers, highlights strategic nuclear forces and conventional ones, that were in connection with a government, that had hierarchical operational structure, that were linear in development. They were used according to the well-known and accepted rules of employment and doctrine, they were relatively easy to detect and track in the making and were supported by intelligence means generally recognized (Schreier, 2010, pp. 55-63).

In contrast, the new threat model is, in general, non-governmental, unconventional and nonlinear, random dynamic and nonlinear in incidence, with no constraints or rules of engagement. It does not have a known doctrine, it is almost impossible to predict and is supported by criminals, drug traders, terrorists, corrupt people, extremists and religious fanatics, xenophobic, mercenaries etc. Today, the model is defined by a single generic word, asymmetric (Schreier, 2010, pp. 55-63).

The old model of intelligence relied heavily on secret and technical and very expensive collection technique, given the so-called enemy states. The new model of intelligence must include and manage the information boom and, in particular, the boom in multilingual digital information, while managing the knowledge in the field by direct observation of reality.

The link between understanding threats and force structure is based on formulating and validating a new conceptual architecture that will integrate, when needed, classic elements, but that will march towards the development of new concepts, more suited to the security environment of the present and the future, which has an amazing dynamic.

Today, ethno-nationalist conflicts (state against nation) represent more than 50% of all confrontations, ethnic or tribal conflicts and anti-regime wars (state against insurrection) – over 15%. State against state conflicts represent less than 10 % and wars of decolonization and genocidal wars complete the rest up to 100 % (Voicilă, https://andreivocila.wordpress.com/2010/10/06/de-la-cultura-de-securitate-la-cultura-de-intelligence/).

Therefore, a new approach to intelligence activity that should be a well-thought and balanced change in terms of opening the passage from secret to public, from the traditional military concern to non-traditional security factors including water, energy, food, diseases and sustainable development, from current monitoring to historical and cultural contextual analysis, from the fragmented community of secrecy to a network that is able to exploit information distributed. Above all, the new approach to intelligence activity is comprehensive, reliable and relevant to the challenges of all forms of threat, especially to non-traditional forms. The new approach to intelligence analysis can provide a decisive asymmetric advantage in local, national or regional non-traditional threats. The road to a new ethic of intelligence is a strategy to be followed.

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INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS EMERGED FROM SOCIAL MEDIA PHENOMENON

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Abstract

Real-time communication, as an effect of large scale usage of computers along with easier access to a very fast evolving technology, led to the evolution of common threats to the national security of a state and the expansion of new ones. Extremist organizations seized the opportunity and developed new methods of spreading the propaganda. In this way, their goals are much easier to achieve, generating insecurity to any state, organization or community.

The emergence of social media simplified the methods of social connection between individuals. The members of extremist groups took advantage of this opportunity, which allows them to communicate and plan future actions much easier than before, adding consistency, expansion and coercion to their groups.

More than that, social media even marked the organization of modern terrorist groups, organized in separate cells which can be easily merged to achieve a goal. Different terrorist cells can communicate in order to exchange their practices and experiences, to get in contact with one another and to recruit new members. In this way, many common strategies appear, much better planned and with a greater force of action. Intelligence services' work to prevent threats to national security generated by extremist and terrorist groups is much harder given the context, because their reactions must be quick, well dimensioned and efficient in order to counteract these groups' actions.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the important role that social media can have in broadcasting extremist protests, adding coercion to extremist groups and rapidity to protest expansion through on-line propaganda. I will also explain how terrorist organizations use social media to connect anonymously, how members spread their ideas to recruit people in a faster way than in the past and also how they plan terrorist attacks much easier. An

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intelligence service can mine social media and use data to counteract risks and threats to national or regional security, generated by the actions of extremist and terrorist groups, such as protests, terrorist attacks and extremist propaganda used to recruit adepts and to advertise.

Keywords: *Intelligence analysis, social media, national security, opportunities*

Introduction

The first decade of the 20st century marked major changes in computer technology evolution. This evolution emerged much faster than in other domains, because a period of a few years can bring significant changes. In the last years, technologic advances, as a consequence of research, substantially permitted the development of possibilities regarding gathering data from open sources. People communities around the world have bought cheap technology and now they are connected to internet. Communication systems were integrated to computers and the interaction method became simpler. The exchange of information has happened in real time and the quantity of data registered an exponential growth.

Real-time communication around the Globe and a cheaper technology bought by people from different communities, with internet access, caused the emergence of new risks and threats to a state's national security. The plans of terrorist groups can be easier achieved and the impact on the society is bigger and much probable, causing insecurity to any state or structure of major importance to the state. The internet offered the possibility of creating blogs, debate forums or internet pages where specific themes are discussed. In this way, social networks emerged and were used by more and more people, becoming a simplified method to get in touch one with another, much faster and easier in comparison with last decade. This advantages are also being used by members of extremist groups to communicate fast and to plan different actions, consistency, expansion and coercion being added to these groups.

More than that, social media influences even the organization of modern extremist and terrorist groups, organized in cells that can merge very fast to achieve an organizational objective. Practices of different groups can be shared, contacts between members can be established and the recruitment process can be easily developed. Common strategies emerge, with a greater force of action if applied, making harder and harder the work of an intelligence service to prevent violent reactions and terrorist attacks. The reactions of intelligence services must be prompt, quick and efficient, achievable only if intelligence services adapt to this new situation. One of the solutions is to gather intelligence from social media, here being included blogs, social network profiles or forums with extremist or terrorist content. This action is very difficult, because data gathering from social media must not affect the right and liberties of any citizen.

An intelligence service can use data gathered from social media, analyzed by analysts using specific criteria, to counter risks and threats to national security, generated by extremist and terrorist organizations that now activate even on the internet. An intelligence analyst can use a wide range of opportunities, derived from the knowledge possessed, to streamline gathering and selection of relevant data or to present the final analysis to legal beneficiary. For better accuracy and more relevant intelligence analyses, an analyst must realize that the constantly changing security context generates constant obstacles in understanding of the phenomenon. Therefore, he must constantly try to overrun the difficulties and challenges for the analytic process.

Social Media – OSINT in intelligence

Given the fact that the internet is global, interactive, flexible, resourceful, dynamic, rich in information, relatively cheap compared to other means of mass communication, but also that it opened new ways of communication, collaboration, socialization, interaction and coordination between users, more and more applications and Internet services have been developed, in order to support users' needs, actions and accessibility to a more and more diverse audience (Ella Ciupercă, Cristian Ciupercă, Cristian Niță, Mihaela Stoica, 2011, p. 14). Research about the internet's ascension revealed two distinct functions of it, one of communication and transmission of information and the other one of medium for the users' social manifestation. The first component is one of interest to the intelligence services because it includes online mass-media, with multiple advantages, but also disadvantages. But the social manifestation function it ensures is a less debated subject, whose utility is less known.

The means of communication which are part of the Web 2.0 category are: blogs, social networks and streaming sites through which people can send different types of content, like texts, audio files or videos. These collaborative platforms are continuously changing, they appear or disappear according to the needs of those who use them, gain followers or lose users. But the fundamental idea remains always the same, no matter the shape it takes: creating an opportunity for the individuals to affiliate themselves to a community or to create the basis for a new one.

The multitude of platforms and on-line instruments which grow and ensure the sharing of information represents the definition of what social media means, and its dominant characteristic is the possibility it offers to share text messages, photographs, audio files, videos and other types of content between internet users. The websites which allow the creation of social networks are services based on internet connection which offer the individuals the opportunity to build a public profile for themselves, to make a list of other users with whom they share common passions and also to see the members of other groups with common elements. Platforms like Twitter, Facebook or LinkedIn have led to the birth of online communities where people can share information with others as they please.

Social media is not designed to be static, it is a virtual environment constantly evolving in order to fulfill the individual needs of internet users, which vary from maintaining the connection with old friends, knowing new people, socializing, sharing photos, videos or ideas. In the case of many social media component sites, participants are not seeking primarily to meet new persons, but to communicate with those who are already part of their extended social network, more exactly with their friends' friends.

The far superior ability to communicate and stay informed, compared to using traditional means, grows the capacity to influence in the virtual environment, and then it is transposed in the real, actual environment of action and reaction. Social networks analysis is about understanding the relationships built in the virtual environment, which, combined with the other data offered by the users, builds a definition of themselves and their ways of action. Personality traits, education, ethnicity and social class of the users leave their mark on the way people relate to each other and help identify action patterns. Relationships can refer to friendships between different persons, the feelings that appear between them, the influence they have on each other (voluntarily or involuntarily), trust or distrust, tolerance, sympathy or conflicts. Even if similar age, nationality, ethnicity or other common elements between people tend to bring them closer and facilitate their bonding, the complexity of internal dynamics of virtual communities and social networks created this way allow the mixing of similarities and differences.

After all, new media are the ideal place to promote an idea, a project or an initiative. But, besides the functions these platforms were created to fulfill, namely those of socializing, representing an easy, fast and cheap way to keep in touch with persons you know around the globe, they have started being exploited for criminal purposes. Some of these crimes are against national or even regional security and, implicitly, fall into the intelligence services' area of expertise of prevention and counteraction. Given this, the necessity of monitoring social networks and analyzing risky tendencies against social welfare arises. Thus, social networks have become a propitious environment for spreading extremist ideas and radical Islamic propaganda.

Social Media as a way of spreading terrorism

The blend of particularities and the possibility to influence in the virtual environment has attracted the attention of terrorist groups, which take advantage of what 21st century technology can offer to potential militants. When social media didn't exist, a terrorist had to travel to one of the terrorist organization's bases to learn how to build or detonate a bomb. Now, profiles of some terrorist organizations can be found on Facebook or Twitter and provide, besides their propaganda, the necessary instructions, if the one who is interested talks to certain members and subsequently receives access to private forums.

Individuals and groups used social media and the internet to radicalize and then to plan and prepare attacks. Hussain Oman, one of those who planned the terrorist bomb-attack in London, confessed that he was influenced by videos available on the internet, which contained scenes of the war in Iraq. Khan al-Khalili, one of the authors of the attack in Cairo in 2005 downloaded the fabrication instructions of the bomb from a jihadist site.

Twitter is considered the social network with the highest level of terrorist messages content. Terrorist or extremist organizations use it to post links which lead to websites with the same type of content, where more detailed explanations about certain subjects of interest can be found, that would cause the Twitter page they would be posted on to be closed. This is the case of the English written magazine „Inspire" and the site which takes over part of the content of this magazine, „The pocketbook of a lonely mujahedin". It offers instructions for building a bomb, similar to the one used in the Boston attack on 15th April 2013 and appeared two weeks before it. Almost at the same time, the Al Qaeda Airlines magazine showed up, written in both English and Arabic, and it includes detailed explanations about how hydrocyanic acid is prepared and what are his lethal effects when used in offices buildings or embassies.

In March 2013, Al Qaeda from the Islamic Maghreb launched a Twitter account which raised 5500 followers in the first month. Through this account, Al-Qaeda follows in turn the Twitter accounts of the terrorist organization in Somalia Al-Shabab and that of Al-Nusra Front in Syria. Furthermore, Al-Nusra follows the activity of a rebel group in Alep (http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/27/world/rivers-social-media-terror/).

Al-Shabab is another terrorist group which profits from the advantages social media offers. Besides recruitment, the social network Twitter was used by Al-Shabab to claim the attack which took place in the West Gate Mall in Nairobi. A group of armed militants entered the building and opened the fire, shooting deadly at least 67 persons. Other few hundreds were hurt. The target was the mall because it was believed that the owners were Israelis. People who were close by started posting on Twitter, immediately after the attack occurred, details about they thought had happened. Initially, in the first few minutes, there was a total confusion, but it was sure that something bad happened when the Ministry of Interior in Kenya posted on its official Twitter page a message to warn the people to stay away from the mall. The NTV Kenya journalist, Smriti Vidyarthi, was the first one who told those who followed her on Twitter that there were armed men in the building, information which was subsequently confirmed by Kenya's Ministry of Interior and the police inspector David Kimayo. The terrorist attack was claimed by Al-Shabab through its tweets, promising that they will also post a video of the attack, which was actually done a few hours after sharing the comment.

The West Gate mall attack wasn't the only event that Al-Shabab terrorist made known using Twitter. The attacks in Mogadishu as well as the attempt to assassinate Somalia's president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud were also published on the terrorist organization's official page.

An ex-leader of the terrorist organization Al-Shabab, Ahmed Abdi Godane, the one who admitted the connections between his organization and Al-Qaeda and who had joined the global war, wanted a new operational structure. The recruiters couldn't be older than 30, had to have connections in the democratic countries and speak well foreign languages, for a better influence on young people. Probably this new generation will use more and more social media as a means of propaganda and recruitment.

Social media has become a vital instrument for modern terrorist organizations, being seen as a "show-window" from where terrorists can choose their next followers. This way, the first stage of the recruitment and of the process of influencing towards activities specific for terrorism is fulfilled, because, in the recruitment process, a physical contact between people is necessary. A "mentor" with whom frequent dates in a mosque, university or high school are set is always present and plays a key role in inducing a violent mentality.

Even if it is or if is not necessary a physical contact between the sympathizer of the ideas spread by terrorists through social media and a member of the terrorist network, in order for the process to be complete, there are some certain advantages that social media sites offer to terrorist organizations. Social media creates more radicalization opportunities, it offers the opportunity of fast dissemination of information, it accelerates the radicalization process and it supports communication in the virtual environment.

Social media as a way of spreading extremism

Social media is not only used by the radical Islamic groups, for them to organize easier and commit terrorist attacks. The role social media had in protests and revolutions has enjoyed media attention during the last few years, because social media networks constituted in the virtual environment have made organizing protests and the regime changes occurred after a lot easier.

The Moldovan revolution, which happened in 2009, the Arab Spring revolutions and the protests in Iran can be called the "Twitter revolutions", because it was through this social network that the protesters managed to organize much easier, the conflicts escalated and politic regimes were taken down. The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt are considered the biggest in amplitude and more challenging for the world order existent at that time (Maksim Tsvetovat, Alexander Kouznetsov, 2011, p.14). Twitter, as well as Facebook, were used for organization, communication and finally, protest campaigns in public places.

In an interview from January 2007, posted on YouTube, the US president Barack Obama has compared social networks with universal freedoms, like that of speech. The point is that social media itself doesn't instigate at riots, it only offers the necessary means to revolutionary groups to minimize the costs of participation, organization, recruitment and training. But, as any means of achieving a goal, social media also has its strong and weak spots and the inherent efficiency, whose intensity varies depending on the capacity of the leaders to use them efficiently and on the users' degree of accessibility (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110202-social-media-tool-protest).

The ability to amplify remote and weakly organized protests into revolutions capable of changing politic regimes comes from amplifying the weak ties set between people. A weak tie is a relationship which doesn't involve sentimental attachments or it does to a very small extent, and reaches a consensus on the rules which guide the community those people are a part of. It also involves low frequency communication, meaning that the persons are not synchronized in transmitting and receiving data, because of the small amount of time invested in the relationship. Still, weak ties between users have proved themselves to be very powerful, capable of bringing people closer and mediate the transfer of information. Different opinions which inevitably occur inside a community are accepted by the members linked by this kind of tie, without creating conflicts, but it is very probable that the information carries a strong personal mark or/and it is not reliable. But the connections created are broader, between users who don't know each other personally.

The theory according to which there aren't more than 6 degrees of separation between any two persons, no matter the place they are in, is not always true. Not all members of a group have remote connections, which you can reach in maximum 6 degrees of separation, but those who have are enough to transmit the flow of information from a group or even a single member of it to other persons from different parts of the world. If the groups are situated in a narrower geographical area, it is possible that less than 6 steps are enough. In combination with the speed of disseminating information, the fast cohesion reached by a group of protesters can be understood, taking as example what happened in Moldova in 2009, the events included in the Arab Spring in 2011 and the protests in Ukraine which took place in 2013.

a. The revolution in Egypt

On 8th June 2010, Wael Ghonim, an executive member of marketing at Google, found a picture of Khaled Mohamed Said while he navigated on Facebook.

He was disfigured as he was beaten to death by the Egyptian police. Ghonim's age was close to the one of his compatriot, Khaled, and he considered it necessary to make his story known so that a case like that, in which he himself could be involved, wouldn't happen again. Animated by these thoughts, he created a Facebook page named "We are all Khaled Said" and wrote a book entitled „People's strength is bigger than that of those in power: a biography". The Facebook page, as well as his book, explain the power of influence that social media has and the author instigates people to protest through the ideas it evokes.

In the first two minutes from the creation of the page, 300 people have joined his cause. And after three months, the number rose up to 250.000. The virtual community ended up protesting in the street, at first marching without chorus, ad then culminating with massive protests in the Tahrir Square, situated into the center of the capital city Cairo, being the reason wh Hosni Mubarak resigned from the leadership of Egypt in February 2011. Ghonim, the author of the page, was arrested during the protests and after liberation he became one of the most prominent voices of the Arab Spring.

Approximately 100 million people live in the Middle East, aged 15-29, lots of them educated but unemployed. Only a part of them have internet access, for example, in Egypt, only 13,6 million people could access the internet in 2008, a pretty big number compared to the one in 2004 – 1,5 million people. The growth of users' number was substantial between 2004 and 2008, and taking by example the planning of the Egyptian revolution through social media, the social networks and blogs became an instrument of expressing young people's discontent. In the case of the revolution in Egypt, also, the years of constant repression suffered by the Egyptians, the economic instability and people's frustration were the reasons which led to the revolution breaking out.

Facebook wasn't the only social network used by protesters to communicate and organize themselves, even if it was the first one used by Wael Ghonim to commemorate Khaled Mohamed Said. After winning adhesion in the virtual environment and the protests in Tahrir Square, Twitter played a very important role in the future of the revolution, the same that Facebook had in 2010.

A big part of the content distributed on Twitter (messages, photos, videos) doesn't become "viral" – distributed and redistributed until it reaches a big number of individuals. The case of the protests in Egypt is different from what happens to the majority of tweets because users started sharing posts that people they trusted also shared. A small number of persons were capable to generate a vast response from other persons belonging to groups in which ideas similar to theirs were shared. Some of the groups were located in Egypt, others in the United States, and others in France and had different discussion topics which ranged from the movements that security troops did to finding a toilet near the Tahrir Square.

b. The revolution in Moldova

On the morning of 6th April 2009, the central Election Committee announced the preliminary results of parliamentary elections from April 5th. After processing 96.51 percent of votes, the Communist Party had 49.94 percent (meaning 60 mandates), Liberal Party 12.82 percent (meaning 16 mandates), Liberal Democrat Party 12.27 percent (meaning 14 mandates) and The Alliance Our Moldova 9.83 percent (11 mandates). First public statement made by prime-minister Vlad Filat was in the evening of 6th April, in a press conference, in which he mentioned the disapproval of results. After that, he mentioned the organization of peaceful protests in the country. The activists and other opposition leaders used text messages, blogs and social networks to organize the peaceful protests announced by Vlad Filat.

Facebook and Twitter facilitated the gathering of young people unsatisfied with the election results in the capital Chisinau. Social media played a major role in the protests, even if the number of internet users was only 850 000 at the end of 2009, which means 19.7 percent of the total population of the country. This percent is smaller in comparison with western countries, in the same time period (71 percent at the end of 2010), but the rate of Twitter messages was approximately 200 at every 20 minutes. Each tweet was marked with the hashtag #pman, an acronym from the Square of Big National Assembly, the biggest square from Chisinau. This is not the only case when a hashtag helped young people to attend a protest, sparked by an idea. A similar situation was registered in Greece, when the hashtag #griots was attached to messages transmitted on Twitter. Used in a search, #pman revealed accurate results about all messages and comments in connection with the rioting provoked by the election results.

Protests started peacefully, leaded by the non-governmental organizations HydePark and ThinkMoldova and the main purpose was to light candles near the Square of Big National Assembly. After that, protesters formed a chain in front of the Election Committee building and in front of other governmental buildings. In a short period of time, peaceful protests became violent. Natalya Morar, one of the leaders of NGO ThinkMoldova, added on her blog details about rioting, degenerated from peace to vandalism through social media. She and other five activists had intense on-line activity, spreading the idea that protest would be organized on 6th April 2009. They managed to convince over 10 000 people to attend protests in Chisinau. All of them used Twitter, Facebook, personal blogs, emails and text messages on mobile phones.

Even if the revolution from Moldova was called "Twitter revolution", it was not the only social network that played a major role. Facebook was also one of them, according to Vasile Botnaru, the director of Radio Free Europe – Chisinau office, because the sites of local press and opposition parties could not be accessed during protests. Also, mobile networks were shut down and signal was not transmitted in Square of Big National Assembly zone, Facebook remaining to only tool of communication.

In the night of 7th to 8th April, approximately 200 persons, including the ones under the age of 18, were arrested in the capital. According to the press office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, after midnight, a big number of protesters attacked economic agents and broke the windows of the shops. Police had to intervene and to maintain the order authorized the usage of rubber bullets. Later that night, tens of young people were beaten in the Square or in police stations. Valentin Boboc died after he was beaten by the police. In the papers was also written about other young people beaten to death, but the investigation hadn't confirmed any connection with 7th April protests. In the morning of 8th April, even if in the center of Chisinau were no longer protesters, the building of presidency and the one of government were surrounded by police officers carrying shields. In order to maintain the safety, local authority forces were deployed even to the building of parliament.

In 2012, after three, years, authorities hadn't established who was to blame for violent protests from 7th April 2009, for the destructions produced or for the beating of young people. But a thing is certain: social networks Facebook, Twitter and blogs played a major role, adding solidarity and a plus of information to young people, who wanted to attend protests because the results weren't fair in their opinion. Some of the internet networks were shut down during protests, mobile networks suffered the same limitations, and the press and TV stations weren't transmitting something about the protests, social media was the only instrument which permitted the broadcast of objective information.

c. London protests

On 4th august 2011, Mark Duggan, who lived in Tottenham, Great Britain, was shot deadly by a police officer during an operation. The policeman tried to arrest him in the north part of London, but Mark Duggan resisted and he died on the spot in the crossfire that resulted. According to police officer Rachel Cerfontyne, member of the "Independent Commission for Evaluating Complaints against the Police", this kind of event is very rare and it involves the population's concerns about the way the police took action. During the immediately started investigation, there were identified the first contradictory opinions referring to how the police acted and the way Mark Duggan was known in the community he lived in. A man declared for the paper London Evening Standard that he saw some police officers who shot a man while he was immobilised on the ground, and other witnesses said that there was actually a crossfire. These opposed opinions were very important during the protests, being highly discussed on the social networks.

On 6th August 2011, a group of protesters headed to the police station in Tottenham to ask for justice in the name of Mark Duggan's family. Two police cars, a bus and a shop were vandalized and set on fire, after the peaceful protests degenerated. The initial situation was misrepresented and many versions of the confrontation between Mark Duggan and the policeman appeared, a woman who posted declaring that the man was not only shot, but also disfigured. After the first group of protesters marched into the street, organised by Mark Duggan's family and friends, messages encouraging people to protest started to be posted on Twitter.

The page "R.I.P. Mark Duggan" was created on Facebook on 6th August 2011, having approximately 35.000 followers, the majority of them aged between 18 and 24. The history of the events only shows one record, an invitation to protest on 13th August 2011, between 09:00-21:00, in front of all the police stations in Great Britain. The administrator of the account sent 592 invitations, and 207 people confirmed their participation at the demonstrations. 56 users weren't sure if they would attend the event or not. In the description of the event it is called for solidarity against police abuses, the principle of equal rights between people and in front of the law being invoked. There was also another link to another invitation to protest on 10th December 2013, shared the same day, meaning the date at which the verdict in the case of Mark Duggan's death was expected. People were called to a peaceful protest, with lighted candles in front of the police station in Tottenham. Approximately 4100 invitations were sent, and 227 were confirmed. On 7th August 2011, there was created another page named "Justice For Mark Duggan aka Starrish Mark. Sho! Sho", appreciated by almost 2000 persons, and users who discussed this topic the most were between 25 and 34 years old.

When the protests broke out, the police didn't have data and information about protests organized in the memory of the boy who died shot by a cop. The monitorization of these profiles on Facebook could offer useful information to the authorities who handled stopping the protests, because the places of the demonstrations, the hours, an approximate number of protesters, the nature of the protest and the demands were specified there.

After the protests broke out in Tottenham, in the last day, meaning 6th August 2011, the number of messages on Twitter rose to approximately 15000, as the violence rose too. The next day, the situation in Tottenham extended to Enfield, the number of messages on Twitter reaching 10000.

Between 8th and 9th August, the protests extended, both in other parts of London, but also in different cities of Great Britain. Social media was actually a speaking-tube for those in the streets to express their dissatisfaction with the police's actions against Mark Duggan, reflecting the size of the protests, the protesters' demands and the events produced. Besides this, many news about all the regions with protests were shared on Twitter during this time, reaching values as 10000.

The idea of blocking the access to social media in Great Britain during protests was also discussed, but a decision like this wasn't reached and the police didn't ask for it. More than that, the police in Manchester suggested it has control over social media through monitorization and posted on its Twitter account that they managed to identify someone who stole goods during the protests after the person posted on Facebook that he stole and couldn't be caught. Other two men, one in Northwich and the other in Warrington, were accused of using Facebook to encourage disorder and received a sentence of 4 years in prison.

Challenges and opportunities to analytic process conferred by the big amount of data from open source intelligence

The vulnerability to analysis errors, meaning false predictions, registered an exponential growth because of the dynamic of factors that generate insecurity. Even if data are complete and can assemble a context, by fulfilling the criteria established by an analyst, impediments still exist and can affect in a negative way the analytic process. Open source intelligence or OSINT, as they are designated in English literature, refers to a broad category of data and sources easy to access by those who are interested, in a permanent way. They are defined as the information offered by mass-media, studies made by academicians, official releases, studies, surveys or any other information that can be accessed by anyone. In this category are included data gathered from social media.

Open sources became more and more valuable to analysis departments of intelligence services, because intelligence generated is more important in quantity and quality then before. It offers the context elements necessary in understanding the whole problem faced. The emergence of informational era brought an overwhelming amount of data from open sources, which means an extra difficulty in selection.

By studying this aspects, emerges the necessity of a right mental model of an analyst and better analysis methods, with a bigger utility in sorting, selecting and organizing logically the amalgam of data ambiguous and contradictory. Secret sources continue to be as valuable as they were, by generating a plus of necessary knowledge to make a clear difference between propaganda and true intentions of an enemy, being a real help for analysts and beneficiaries.

After the relevance was identified, the next step that must be made by the analyst is to establish if the source of data can be trusted, a very difficult process because of the objective coercions represented by virtual anonymity – a different identity and a very big diversity of sources. On the other hand, there are subjective coercions that affect the work of intelligence analysts to evaluate an open source. In this category can be included terms established by beneficiaries, generated by a rapid need of intelligence analyses, necessary in the process of risks and threats management. The dynamic of insecurity factors causes big changes of context very fast, affecting the relevance and promptitude of intelligence delivered by the intelligence services.

The lack of adequate analysis instruments represents another difficulty in mining data from open sources, selecting the best ones, adapting them or creating new ones still remains a challenge. The big volume of data overwhelms intelligence analysts and their current work to search, examine and make connections.

Even if the big volume of data from open sources brings difficulties, intelligence obtained is an important element for beneficiaries, standing in many cases behind their decisions. OSINT is, in a specific way, more data filtered very carefully, selected, analysed and presented to a beneficiary at the right moment, in a similar way to other intelligence sources. Its role and potential exceeded the debate stage, at least theoretically, being known at this moment that open sources can provide the answers to many present challenges managed by intelligence services and their beneficiaries. (http://www.sri.ro/fisiere/studii/ATUURI_SI_LIMITE_OSINT.pdf).

OSINT analysis is an important strategic capability, providing the context of the risks and threats to national or regional security. The beneficiaries, after being briefed, can establish and, most of all, apply long term policies to have an advantage in front of competitors (George Cristian Maior, Ionel Nițu, 2013). Also, it can offer predictions about immediate effects of an issue, which means a better capacity of reaction and risk assessment. Intelligence analyses resulted can be merged with intelligence obtained from other sources, further used as raw data for multisource analysis, contributing to identification of general context components. It also simplifies the access to certain researches, from academies or other domains.

Conclusions

Social media offers an entire set of challenges and opportunities for intelligence services in their mission to maintain national and regional security or to reduce global threats. Opportunities come from databases created through usage of social media by a large amount of people, which can be accessed in real-time offering the possibility to use special analysis software to counter extremism and terrorism. In virtual space, the location isn't anymore a strategic advantage in the efforts to eliminate common threats. This aspect generates risks and threats to national security o any state in an equal way for everyone.

In this context, intelligence services must perceive in a correct manner the wide range of terrorism and extremism, obtained by members who use social media. Therefore, databases created by data from social media must be mined and the analysis methods improved. In social networks analysis, established on the internet, limits are reached very easily. Consistent improvement can be reached faster if special funds are assigned to buy the last technology used in this domain – supercomputers and special analysis programs, capable of dealing with the huge amount of data.

Intelligence gathered from social media, relevant for an intelligence service, called Social Media Intelligence, can offer useful knowledge about terrorist or extremist cell organization, about identity of members and sympathizers, including details about their future actions. The difficulty occurs when an intelligence analyst can no longer make a clear difference between real data and disinformation, generated by insufficient processing of databases, cognitive biases of each analyst or the usage of analysis softs or pieces of equipment that are no longer up to date.

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MENTHAL MODELS AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS – A SURVEY ON CORPORATE ANALIYSTS

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Abstract

While analysts are trying hard to minimize biases and errors, reality shows that many analytical products and forecasts made are not accurate. To understand some of the reasons that can explain analysis biases, we conducted a sociological survey having as our objectives identifying the extent to which different mental models are used in intelligence analysis, reviewing the associated issues that can occur in the process and assessing the impact they have on the quality of forecasts.

Keywords: intelligence analysis, mental model, research, information.

Only a few contemporary studies are based on results of scientific research which investigate, sequentially or not, issues connected to intelligence analysis. The main reason of such a situation is that the process of analysis is difficult to address due to the nature of this type of work.

However, unlike the poor data collection, nowadays many prestigious universities decided to involve intelligence experts in teaching courses on open source intelligence analysis and also a lot of private companies perform summaries and forecasts for government agencies.

In Romania there are only a few training courses for analysts, although their importance for company is bigger and bigger in the context of data Big Bang.

While analysts are trying hard to minimize biases and errors, reality shows that many analytical products and forecasts made are not accurate.

There are many opinions that today failures of intelligence analysis are generated not so much by the lack of data but by the deficient interpretation of them, by the faulty correlation of data and the errors in revealing their significance (Dumitru, 2009). So, the main problem in the current context seems to be the ability to decode and interpret available data by the analyst.

To understand analysts' barriers in making things right, psychologists have identified a number of subjective reasons that could determine errors such as the existence of prejudice, the illusion of causality, lack of a proper mental model etc. Moreover, it is important to consider external factors specific for the analytic work context such as time pressure, flow of information, insufficient data, etc. therefore it is important to understand what is the strongest category of variables generating errors and how to act to reduce or eliminate them?

To find some answers, we conducted a sociological survey with the goal to identify the extent to which different mental models are used in intelligence analysis, the associated issues that can occur and the impact they have on the quality of forecasts made.

The Methodology of Research

In this regard, we applied a questionnaire to a group of 30 analysts in an economic unit. 20 of them are female and 10 male, with different ages and work seniority, as below.

Table 1: Analysts work seniority

Work seniority	1-5 years	6-10 years	11-15 years	16-20 years
Percent	43,33	23,33	20	13,33

Table 2: Analysts age

Age	21-30 years	31-40 years	41-50 years
Percent	30	46,67	23,33

Discussion and Results

Survey data analysis revealed that 1/3 of analysts work alone, while most of them agree in statements that teamwork generates better results. Regarding allegations intensity, analysts with lower work seniority (1-10 years) claim effectiveness of teamwork in a greater extent than others (11-20 years).

Table 3: Analysts work manner

Work manner	Alone	Teamwork with other analysts	Teamwork with analysts and other experts
Percent	33,33	60	6,67

However, people opinions are that teamwork generates bigger errors than those of individually carried analysis. In the same way, analysts are more discontent with analytical product when they work in team. Also they change their opinion on an analysis already performed more rarely in conditions of individual effort (see Table 4).

Table 4.Effects of work manner on analytical products (percents)

		What is your preferred work style?	
		alone	In team with other analysts
Have you ever made errors in your analysis?	often	-	5,6
	rarely	30	55,6
	very rarely	40	38,8
	never	30	-
Analytical product was different than the desired one?	very often	10	-
	often	-	33,3
	rarely	60	33,3
	very rarely	30	27,8
	never	-	5,6
Did you changed your opinion on analysis after handing it?	often	10	-
	rarely	10	33,3
	very rarely	20	55,6
	never	60	11,1

Also, the percentage of analysts who work in teams that construct analytical products ignoring relevant data and information is significantly higher than the percent of those working alone (see chart 1).

Chart 1. Analysts that made analysis ignoring relevant data or information (percents)



So despite the prejudice that "more minds are better than one", research results show otherwise. It seems that people in group may lose important details, the manner of interpreting information is interpreted do not please everyone and the level of satisfaction on the final product is quite low.

Also, those who work alone take greater account of the views of their heads when they are contrary to their ideas and they believes that analysis errors are due to a lesser extent to conflicts with superiors (see Table 2).

Table 5. Relationship with heads vs working manner (percents)

		Working manner?	
		Alone	Together with other analysts
Did you consider your head'opinions when they are against your own ideas?	Very rarely	-	5,6
	Rarely	20	38,9
	Often	40	44,4
	Very often	40	11,1

		Working manner?	
		Alone	Together with other analysts
Conflicts with bosses determine analysis errors?	Very rarely	50	22,2
	Rarely	20	27,8
	Often	20	50
	I do not know	10	-

On the other hand, those who work in teams accept contrary opinions to a lesser extent but they justify more potential errors through conflicts with bosses.

There is a balanced distribution of responses regarding using the same analysis model. Thus, regardless of their work manner, the number of those who consider that a small and very small number of analysis errors are determined by the use of the same mental model is relatively equal to the number of those who believe that using the same model generate a large and very large number of errors (see chart 5).

Chart 2 5. Analysts perception that errors arise because using the same model



This balance is broken when analyzing *the lack of a mental model* variable. In this case, those working in teams agree more than those working alone that errors are generated by the lack of a mental model (chart 3).



In fact, the situation is clearer examining the correlation between working manner and the existence of a mental model: those who work alone rather not use a mental model of analysis while than those who work in teams use a model to a greater extent (chart 4).

Chart 4. Do you have a model for analysis ?



While, apparently, things are very clear: half of analysts use a mental model, half did not, the implications of using a mental model are more important (chart 5).

Chart 5. Do you have a mental model for your analysis ?



Implications arising here can be summarized as follows:

• Those who use an a mental model for analysis are dissatisfied with the quality of their analyzes (demanding) than those not using that;

• Those who use a mental model often changes their views on an analysis after they handed it compared with others that are more consistent with their own views;

• Those who use mental model are more precise comparing with the others (they do not identify imaginary correlation between variables);

• Those who use a mental model are more flexible examining information from many perspectives;

• Those who use mental model commit bigger errors in the analyzes they conduct.

Table 6. Pro and cons of using a mental model for analysis

	Pro	Cons	Nonsignificant correlations
Use of mental model for analysis	*1. Analysts are more exigent with their own work.* *2. Analysts examine data from more perspectives* *3. Analysts identify more rarely inexistent correlation.*	*1. More often they change their own point of view after handing an analysis.* *2.They commit more errors.*	*1. Confirming the forecasting* *2. Oversizing of negative data* *3. Comparing with similar analysis*

Initial forecasts tend to confirm themselves both for analysts that use or do not use a mental model (chart 6). Also, there are no differences among analysts regarding the temptation to overestimate the negative information or to relate to similar analysis conducted in the past.

Chart 6. Have your forecasts ever confirmed ?



Interesting to be highlighted is the fact that the percentage of those who use a mental model increases with age, the fewer users of a mental model having less than 5 years of working experience (table 7).

Table 7. Using a mental model

		Do you have a mental model in doing analysis?	
		yes	No
Age	21-30 years	33,3	66,7
	31-40 years	42,9	57,1
	41-50 years	71,4	28,6
Work experience	1-5 years	30,8	69,2
	6-10 years	71,4	28,6
	11-15 years	50	50
	16-20 years	50	50

It is interesting to notice that analysts who not always follow the same steps in doing analysis consider that the lack of a model can determine more errors (chart 7).

Chart 7. Lack of an menthal model can determine analytical errors?



Do you follow the same steps doing an analysis?

The situation is more balanced in terms of the lack of methods: those who follow the same steps in analysing data have the same opinion as those who do not have a certain path in their analytical job.

Broken down by age and seniority, those who do not follow the same steps are mostly in the age group 21-30 years and with a work experience of less than 5 years (Table 8).

Table 8. Same analytical steps

		Doing an analysis do you follow the same steps?	
		Yes	No
Age	21-30 years	22,2	77,8
	31-40 years	42,9	57,1
	41-50 years	42,9	57,1
Work experience	1-5 years	23,1	76,9
	6-10 years	42,9	57,1
	11-15 years	50	50
	16-20 years	50	50

Therefore young people do not have a mental model and not follow the same steps in making a comparative analysis while those more experienced have such a model and they also have the ability to use them differentially depending on the complexity of the analysis stages. Still the young people consider in a greater extend that the lack of an analysis model and methods causes errors.

Analyzing the subjects' responses on listing the steps used in the analysis of intelligence, most of respondents have outlined a model that would include the following steps:

1. Reading the available data and information;
2. Center analyzed risk or problem;
3. Identify what elements are missing and are problematic;
4. Clarification / supplementing data by appealing to other sources;
5. Shaping assumptions;
6. Recognizing conflicting information and eliminate peripheral arguments;
7. Reconciliation of data and building arguments;
8. Developing scenarios of possible developments;
9. Drawing conclusions.

As regards the methods, only 16.7% of analysts responded they are using mostly a certain technique, but when they were asked to mention it, it resulted a limited number of methods (competing hypotheses method, scenarios method, brainstorming and content analysis).

Chart 8. Are your forecasts usually confirmed ?



According to the respondents, there is no significant difference between those who use or do not a certain mental model and the quality of their forecasts (chart 9).

Chart 9. Do you have a mental model for your analysis ?



Did your forecasts confirmed?

When the forecasts were disproved, the most common causes of such a situation concerns:

- Insufficient available data;
- The existence of contradictory data;
- Mismatch correct information;
- Lack of experience in forecasting;
- Not understanding the depth of the phenomenon;
- Invalidation of initial data;
- Poor communication routes with other departments;
- Competition for information between the sides;
- The credibility of the source;
- Changing of the situation as a result of unforeseen developments;
- The emergence of unknown variables to forecast moment;
- Insufficient attention paid to all available information;
- Lack of sufficient time allotted to the forecast.

Therefore, the variables are subjective and objective, ranging from the quality and volume of information at their disposal to lack of time. To check the consistency of subjects answers, we asked analysts to specify the ways in which they could avoid errors and increase the quality of their analyzes and forecasts:

- Establishing reasonable terms;
- Meetings with analysts from other units / institutions;
- Constant feedback;
- Exchanges of "best practices";
- Easier access to information;
- Specialization in one area;
- Increase the level of expertise and culture;
- Constant documentation on the development of the field of competence;
- Organizing working groups;
- Mentoring by people more experienced in the field.

Finally, I attempted to identify the subjective perception regarding the role of analyst. While they feel themselves insufficiently valued by their colleagues, analysts consider their role to be of an extremely high importance in the unit.

The role of the analyst is to give added value to information and to transform data into meaningful messages relevant to corporation plan. The analyst developed analytical products to support managers decisions.

Conclusions

Significant items arising from the interpretation of data are:

• Teamwork generates greater errors in analysis and analytical discontent with the product are higher compared to the situation in which people work individually. It seems that working in teams can cause losing of important details regarding the way information is interpreted and the level of satisfaction on the final product is quite low.

• Those who work alone rather not use a mental model of analysis than those who work in teams.

• Those who use a mental model are more dissatisfied with the quality of their analyzes, they use to analyze information from several perspectives and identifies more rarely inexistent correlations comparing with the others. Instead, they commit greater errors in the analyzes they perform and change their views on analysis more often after they handed it compared with others that are more consistent with their own views.

• Forecasts made tend to confirm themselves both for those who use or not use a mental model in analysis.

• Young people rather do not have a mental model in an analysis compared with the older and more experienced. Still they consider that such a lack would generate errors. In other words, those who use models and methods of analysis considers that errors are only partially generated by the lack of such a habit, while those who do not use them considers that the lack of errors and methods are strongly correlated.

Still it is important to understand that nowadays the work of analysts is vital, as he is the one who gives added value to information by transforming data into meaningful products relevant to corporation objectives.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION ANALYSIS IN/FOR BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

Loredana IVAN*

Abstract

Intelligence in general and intelligence analysis in particular are present in the institutional area, as well as in that of the business environment, for both areas being common the stages and, respectively, (an important part of) the analytical tools used.

The distinction between the uses of intelligence is given by the means of obtaining the informational assets and the precise scope of the information analysis.

Keywords: Benchmarking, Data Mining, Business Intelligence, Knowledge Management

Introduction

Intelligence, as actionable information needed and produced to support decision making process, is the result of information gathering information, processing, evaluation and creating the intelligence product, Information analysis and intelligence are stages of various areas of socio-economical life, from the institutional-governmental environment - ministries, authorities, national structures or intelligence departments - to the business environment or even the academics. The distinction between the uses of intelligence is given by the means of obtaining the informational assets and the precise scope of the information analysis.

National intelligence structures obtain information from public or regulated sources and also secret sources and aim to assist the decision making in the process of managing the public institutions that beneficiate from this type of information, by law.

Entities that act in the business environment are preoccupied to obtain and fructify all sorts of advantages, which allow them to be competitive. Thus, they use various tools to learn about the characteristics of the markets and competitors. In this way, information is considered a production neo

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factor, which, correctly used, enhances classical production factors. The legality characteristic is important in this field, all information used being of public sources.

The academic circles have the purpose of academic research and are orientated, mostly, towards unrestricted information (open source, public source etc.). Research is a field where owning information is crucial. To know competitors' results in advance, to foresee an outcome or anticipate market tendencies for new technologies are challenges for private intelligence environment.

In conclusion, all categories of information users mentioned have a determinant factor, the profoundly human need of anticipation. Since old times, people have tried - with their times instruments - to learn about the future or, particularly for the business environment, to identify and use as many benchmarks on their competitors as possible. The drop of uncertainty level creates comfort and, why not, properly managed, may bring profit. Information on competition moves was, is and most probably will be valued by those who work in economy.

Related to the concerns of the business environment entities to use intelligence practice, to grow and maintain competitively is already understood the fact that in an economy that rapidly globalizes, systematic information gathering and analyzing definitely ensures a durable competitive advantage (*Guide pratique...*, 2006, p. 5).

The need for intelligence in the economic management appeared as a consequence of continuous diminishing of the amount of time used for decision making process, but also of the need to think out action directions, starting from plausible scenarios. Correctly knowing the situation of the business environment and analyzing, in real time, the implications of competition's moves are important premises for reducing risks or growing opportunities, even though they imply complex and rapid correlations.

The use of intelligence activities represents a perspective of business approach that is widely distributed. It has been practiced, for many years, in countries like Japan, Germany, Great Britain, USA or China (*Journal of Intelligence Studies in Business* 1, 2011, pp. 61-75), and the process itself is named *competitive intelligence*.

Concept delimitation

The existent confusion in the circles concerned with the *competitive intelligence* issue, from professional discussions to the academic debate, makes necessary a short presentation of the distinction between this and other areas or adjacent, complementary or independent activities, which process or use data and information: Benchmarking, Data Mining, Business Intelligence, Knowledge Management and Economic Espionage.

- *Competitive Intelligence (IC)*

Treated as a tool designed to increase competitive skills, IC contributes to the continuous upgrading of the quality of products, services and solutions offered by companies and, at the same time, has an important role in the improvement of the innovation process. Opportunities for gaining advantage over competition are created if several questions (like how/where does the adversary improve his business, when will the adversary's next product be launched, what are the role and place of information in competitors' strategies etc.) get clear and sure answers, through specific information management, based on verified procedures, tools, methodologies and abilities - through a IC process.

There are several definitions of this concept, depending on the historical moment or geographic space when/where was formulated. The first documented study on the use of intelligence methods was carried out by Pinkerton (1969) and it depicts, in detail, the way a Midwest company conceived a system in order to get marketing information. It is the most detailed study of the beginning of IC. Other significant articles in that time were published by Guyton (1962), Kelly (1965), Greene (1966) and Aguilar (1967). All works from the early period were orientated on gathering information for marketing, thus not justifying the names of "Intelligence", "Business Intelligence", or "Marketing Intelligence". Michael Porter's "Competitive Strategy" was a critical point in time, when the analysis of the industry and competitors replaced the simple finding of an existent situation with the beginnings of the predictive analysis.

Of the relevant definitions of the IC spectrum, those which underline the characteristics of this process and/or its connections with intelligence analysis hold our attention.

R. Brody (2008) defines IC as "the process through which the companies gather actionable information on competition and competitive environment, which, ideally, they use for planning and decision making process to improve their performances".

According to the site of SCIP (http://www.scip.org/) organization, IC represents "the method of ethical and moral gathering, analyzing and distributing information on the competitive environment, opportunities, vulnerabilities and competitors' intentions from the business environment. Education in this field improves managers' skills as well as that of the superior managers to face risks, to solve threats from competition, to anticipate market opportunities, to sustain or earn a market advantage".

According to S. Sharp (2009, p. 214), IC "represents the opposite of bad news. It is the best information you can have, no matter if it fits or not to the company's intentions, because it represents reality and, thus, it offers opportunities." The IC process depicted by S. Sharp (Data-Information-Analysis-Intelligence-Decision-Action-Results) is accepted by most authors and it reflects similarities with the intelligence process used by public institutions.

V. Ivan (2014, p. 164) considers IC as a "systematical, ethical and legal process of gathering from public sources data and information regarding competitors' capabilities, as well as technological and marketing tendencies, followed by information analysis, potentially actionable information production and dissemination (intelligence), for the purpose of ensuring competitive advantage, use of opportunities and avoiding marketing surprises".

Today, IC is spread in all modern economies, being part of the activity of multinational companies, sports clubs (http://www.atiner.gr/papers/SPO2012-0262.pdf) and nongovernmental organizations.

The model is the same as the one used by governmental intelligence agencies: planning, gathering, processing, analyzing and dissemination. Of course, this is, like any other model, a simplification of reality, having, in fact, a multitude of feedback "curls" between its elements.

The professionals in this field talk about creating capabilities or competences, meaning that this tool is seen as a capital per se, an intangible asset, being impossible to regard it as a simple consultancy or training tool. Its role is to create added value in the business process and functions. Thus, intelligence actions as a key element in conceiving strategies, by reducing uncertainties from the phase of collecting and validation of information that serve as an input for strategy formulation. In this way the decision making process has a realistic and dynamic fundament, on an operational and tactical level, as well as from a strategic point of view.

- *Benchmarking*

Benchmarking represents estimation, assessment of a company's performance or of a piece of its activity. Benchmarking may or may not be followed by changes of some organizational components.

Benchmarking can be reduced to a simple comparison between its indicators or may be extended to the study of methods, common laws and practice used by competitors with performances in the respective field. Often, it is not limited to information on direct competitors, but searches for innovation beyond the field's limits. Mostly, it aims similar developments from other companies and, mainly, the implementation of best practice for obtaining a good performance.

Benchmarking is a management tool, capable to allow the reducing of costs and enhancing technical-economical performances, mainly by imitating good practice in a field. Equally, its sphere can exceed the isolated case of a single firm, to a particular branch in the economy or a national economy, global economy, research system, in which challenges claim developing policies that allow governments to identify and follow world-wide, where there are the most efficient conditions that ensure economic, scientific and social mechanisms and measures that lead sustainable development of society policies (http://www.ttonline.ro/sectiuni/management-calitate/articole/308-ce-este-benchmarking-ul-i-cum-poate-deveni-el-un-instrument-managementul-unei-firme).

Although IC and benchmarking have the purpose to enhance competitively of the company, their respective methods and results are different. Benchmarking uses economic performance indicators, being limited to that area, while IC is bound to supply that information. Benchmarking is used in intelligence analysis, first, for the general cognition of competitors and that is why the two are part - full, benchmarking being included in the IC sphere.

- *Data Mining*

Data Mining is a (numeric, digital) process of automatic scaling, with the help of specialized algorithms, of a data base, with the purpose of identifying patterns which can sustain the development of models. The increasing data volume and, especially, the data and data relations' complexity significantly reduce the possibility that the man, even with the help of the most performant reporting and visualizing tools, could discover connections between different events "packed" in the data that we can store in unprecedented systems. Performant *Data Mining* solutions automatically identify and verify connections between correlated events or elements of correlated events.

Being a process of big data quantities and extracting relevant information of it by using mathematical and statistical methods. *Data Mining* is commonly used by organizations which are specialized in information about companies and by financial analysts. In addition, it is more and more used in the scientific field for extracting information from big data volume, generated, for example, by modern experiments (http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/).

In conclusion, *Data Mining* refers to the search of patterns in structured numerical data, with the help of information technology and, in the planning of economic resources it consists in the statistic and logical analysis of big data volume about transactions, but, also in the search of patterns that can help the decision making process. The relation between *Data Mining* and IC is one of independency.

- *Business Intelligence*

It represents a development of *Data Mining* process, keeping its main characteristics. Advanced algorithms are used for obtaining information regarding the company's activity. By contrast, IC refers, mainly, to the activities the competitors of the company, in the external environment. Business intelligence is more an "internal affair", in a way that it concerns interdepartmental activities, the analysis of material and informational flows and the modalities to improve the activity. The paperwork "*Business Intelligence Roadmap*" (MOSS L. T.; ATRE S., B, 2003) presents Business Intelligence as an "architecture and a collection of applications and integrated operational data bases, as well as of helping decision making systems, which supply to the business community (a.n. to the management) an easy access to business data."

Business intelligence is an iterative process, because it starts from the operational environment (inputs, processes, outputs); the decision/making person uses decision helping systems to extract data from the data storage facilities; by having these information, a decision-making person can elaborate action plans. As follows, *Business intelligence* is complementary to IC in knowing one's own company.

- *Knowledge management*

It refers to the management of organizational knowledge about the external and internal environment of the company, entailing the efficient use of information which is necessary to the current decisions or to the strategical planning for improving performances. Without an adequate knowledge management system, the information gathered in IC process would be used only for immediate decisions (tactical level), depriving the management of the company of an important resource, necessary for long and medium term planning (strategical level). Thus, the knowledge management processes get IC products and instils them into the company's informational circuits, as well as in the knowledge/data base. The relation is one of mutual support, each activity using the other one's products.

- *Marketing*

It is the function and, also, the process of an organization/economic entity, which, by scientific methods and techniques, allows the systematical identification of needs, specifications and wills of the target public, for the purpose of fulfilling those with products and services.

The means in which a company knows and adapts the specifications of the (internal and external) environment are scientific methods and techniques at the intersection of economy, sociology, psychology, economic history, anthropology etc. Marketing is orientated towards the client and its preferences, as well as towards market tendencies, which don't necessary depend on buyer's rationality (fashionable colors, materials, technologies etc.).

IC appeared as a marketing necessity to beneficiate of estimations, data not being always available. Later, IC got new utilities and its own identity. In conclusion, we may say that the two activities are complementary for knowing the business environment, marketing aiming, mainly, the clients, and IC competition.

- *Economic espionage*

Often, IC is mixed/assimilated with economic/industrial espionage, which is totally wrong. Gilad and Gilad (GILAD Benjamin; GILAD Tamar, 1988, p.36) consider that IC "has no connection with industrial espionage. Industrial espionage is an illegal way of obtaining a temporary advantage over competition", According to *Le Petite Larousse,* industrial espionage represents "gathering information from the industrial environment" (not being specified whether illegally or legally) "especially those information about fabrication methods" (*Le Petit Larousse,* Encyclopedia). In turn, all IC definitions specify that it is a legal activity, a monitoring of the organization's external environment, with the purpose of gathering relevant information for the decision making process. Contrary to espionage, IC is a legal process that allows obtaining white and grey information, not black[*]. In other aspects, the similarities are significant. Besides the secret information gathering methods, collecting information, processing, analyzing and producing intelligence, have, in large, the same content.

Characteristics of information analysis in/for business environment

In general, analysis implies the use of analytical techniques and methods on a group of data and/or information, that the resulting intelligence product having an added value (an information born from the analyst's judgement) and being useful to the beneficiary's decisions.

The same as in institutional/governmental intelligence, business environment information analysis uses technics and methods in processing available information, with the purpose of obtaining new information - with added value (intelligence) - and potentially actionable for the beneficiary.

According to one of the categorizations, the analytical tool contains two types of methods and technical - quantitative and qualitative - both being equally used, in the governmental area and in business environment.

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[*] White and grey information is public, free or have conditioned access (cost money, need special approval, available only for members of specific associations etc.). It is thought that it represents 70% and, respectively, 20% of the total information on a market. The 10% left, called black information, is secret.

Quantitative methods imply quantifying the factors that are introduced in the analysis and imply the use of bureaucratic, statistical, accountable systems etc. for the evaluation of the available data. Quantitative analysis significantly relies on mathematical approach and computer technology and, although the model is built up by the analyst, the subsequent processing are done by the software.

On the other hand, the qualitative methods have strong connections with the qualitative research and allow a very coherent involvement in the empirical reality and with the "subjects" of the research/analysis and with the scientific explanation.

Related to the temporal evolution dimension, business environment information analysis has several distinctive elements, depending on the exact moment we refer to.

In the '90s, in general, the methods and techniques used were tributary to the Porter model:

- the analysis of competitors' objectives (case study), the analysis of competitors employees (case study), costs analysis (quantitative/ accountable), financial analysis (quantitative/accountable), development and available resources (case study), production capabilities used by the competitors (case study) - Gordon (1989);
- chronology, SWOT analysis, benchmarking - Fuld (1995);
- analysis-synthesis, case study and benchmarking - Dutka (1998);
- industry analysis (case study) - Burwell (1999);
- industry analysis (case study), marketing analysis (case study), competitors' analysis (case study), competitive benchmarking - Cook and Cook (2000).

After 2005, the tools extended with risk analysis (Carr, 2006), with the analysis-synthesis on operational, tactical and strategic levels (Fleisher and Bensoussan, 2007), risk analysis (qualitative approach), and early warning - combination of quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis (Fuld, 2010).

At the same time, a distinction should be made between analysis methods and technics and the final product, which is the intelligence product containing the results of one or, many times, several analysis.

In a study made by SCIP in 2006, it is said that 58% of the analysts frequently use the analysis of competitors and 47% use SWOT analysis. Only 16% of them use scenario analysis and just 13% make profiles of the competitors' management (*State of The Art: Competitive Intelligence*, SCIP, 2006).

The main products that IC offers to the beneficiaries contain more and more sophisticated analysis and modern methods and techniques are part of the analysts' tools.

For the characterization of a complex situation, such as a company on a certain market, complex analysis is needed which should include quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. In the beginning, simple qualitative methods were used, such as analysis-synthesis and case study, now there structured methods and technics are used and the tendency is to make quantifications which allow informational analysis of data and their storage in a way that makes them easy to use in time.

The cybernation of information analysis activities and of those of learning and perfecting analytical methods* offers an interesting vision for the fields possible perspectives.

Conclusions

Intelligence in general and intelligence analysis in particular, are present in the institutional area, as well as in that of the business environment, for both areas being common the stages and, respectively, (an important part of) the analytical tools used. The distinctive elements are the purpose and the sources/the modalities of obtaining information.

In a more and more globalized economy, obtaining/having a competitive advantage represents a major benefit for any economic entity (no matter if it belongs to the state or totally has private capital). In this context, in the business environment (at first, in the western area and later in other places, including, relatively recent, Romania) the necessity of using intelligence activities became more and more obvious.

It is apparent a necessity to deepen what Competitive Intelligence represents or the newer Economic Intelligence - as an IC practice on a state level - in the academic environment, to create a specialized body which should support the competitive skills of the Romanian firms and economy.

Recent studies show that, for most multinational companies that activate in Romania, there are specialized IC departments, in the Romanian firms the concept being almost completely unknown. We may speak of an informational asymmetry, which is averse to the inland factors of production.

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HISTORY AND MEMORY IN INTELLIGENCE

LIFE IN CEAUȘESCU'S WORLD IN 1977 – WITH THE SECURITATE EVER PRESENT

Helmut Müller-ENBERGS*

Abstract

On 6 July 1971, Ceaușescu announced his Chinese influenced intentions to the members of the political Executive Committee. The "Cultural Revolution" which he now sought to bring to Romania, and which would subsequently put its stamp on the cultural climate of the Seventies in that country, represented the purposeful annihilation of all artistic and cultural life. In its stead, popular culture was preferred. 1977 was a year characterised by manifold insurrections by writers, artists, ethnic minorities and social subcultures such as the miners in Romania. In the end, the Conducător and his Communist Party used the Securitate as an instrument to rid themselves of their adversaries.

Keywords*: Ceaușescu's World, 1977, "Cultural Revolution", Securitate.*

Introduction

It is often said that Mao Zedong's (1893–1976) China inspired Nicolae Ceaușescu (1918–1989) (Kunze, 2009, p. 188). The younger Romanian statesman – a full quarter century younger than Mao – travelled in 1971 to the People's Republic, which at that time was shunned by the socialist camp in Europe. There, the "Great Helmsman", as he is often dubbed, was trying to cement his power within the Chinese Communist Party as well as in the whole of the country with his ruthless "Cultural Revolution". This was, to be sure, no minor undertaking. The Chinese Party's own newspaper, "Red Banner", sung the following paean: "The great Cultural Revolution is a revolution which has claimed the hearts of mankind. The revolution fulfils the fundamental political desires of all men, underscores their convictions, blazes the trail that they have already travelled upon or are about to travel: It represents the entire history of revolution in China. This is the most monumental societal cataclysm ever seen in the history of mankind. This will be the touchstone for a whole generation of

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steadfast Communists" (Li, 2010, p. 99). Soon, in China, two thirds of the officials in the Politburo, in the Central Committee, but also in the provinces, were to be discharged from their posts. Then came the destruction of cultural traditions, artefacts and rituals, the humiliations, the persecutions, and the harassments within society (Plänkers, 2010) – the dictatorship of the Dictator. This all seemed to have mightily impressed the 53 year-old Ceaușescu.

On 6 July 1971, Ceaușescu, the Secretary General, announced his Chinese influenced intentions to the members of the political Executive Committee. The "Cultural Revolution" which he now sought to bring to Romania, and which would subsequently put its stamp on the cultural climate of the Seventies in that country (Langer, 2010, pp. 18-30), represented the purposeful annihilation of all artistic and cultural life. In its stead, popular culture was preferred. The State Committee for Culture and the Arts was now placed directly under the thumb of the Central Committee. Henceforth, "politico-ideological ideals" should seep into even the most minute capillaries of Romanian culture, artistic freedom was to be confined within the Marxist-Leninist cage, and the Stalinist rallying cry of "Fight cosmopolitanism!" was to resound from every corner (Weißgerber, 2010, pp 181–184).

Ceaușescu effected the ultimate climate change: the balmy political spring of the 60's was transformed into an icy Romanian Winter. "Liberalist, petty bourgeois and anarchical nonsense" were to be vigorously fought (Kunze, 2009, p. 190; Dalos, 2010, pp. 205–238). What was perfectly legitimate yesterday was now past tense. In that yesterday, to quote the German weekly *Der Spiegel*: "Theatres featured Western playwrights such as Sartre, Miller, Osborne and even the native-born playwright of the Theatre of the Absurd Ionesco; Romanian publishers printed books by Kafka, Proust and Joyce. Cinemas and television showed the latest films by Fellini and Antonioni – a rarity even in the rural areas of Western Europe. A guest performance by Louis Armstrong in 1966 was the inspiration for the establishment of a Chair for Jazz Music at the Conservatorium in Bucharest" (*Rumänien. Stumpfer Kampfgeist*, 1971, p. 132).

Caught up in this maelstrom was Ana Blandiana (*1942), at the time of that legendary jazz concert by Louis Armstrong mere 24 years old. In 1964 she had published "First Person Plural" (Persoana întâia plural), followed by a volume of poetry called "Achilles Heel" (Călcâiul vulnerabil) (1966); "The Third Sacrament" (A treia taină) appeared in 1969. She studied philology in Cluj (Klausenburg), completing her degree in 1967. It was during her time as editor of the magazine "Student Life" (Viața Studențească) and then "Amphitheatre" (Amfiteatru) that she got caught up in the Romanian Ice Age after 1971 (Blandiana, 2014).

Official censorship in Romania from then on was not given the enlightened misnomer “Cultural Revolution” as in China, but the rather more poetic name “Advancement of the Ideological Consciousness in the many-faceted Socialist Society” (Windgassen, 2002, p. 136). And it was within this new climate that Blandiana published her next volume of poetry with the astutely political title “October, November, December” (Octombrie, Noiembrie, Decembrie).

Gone were the days of Cultural Thaw, that had begun when Ceaușescu, a long-serving official, was nominated to be the new First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party (Partidul Muncitorilor din România - PMR) on 22 March 1965, voted in as expected four months later. The loyal bonds to Communism were evident then in the new party name Partidul Comunist Român (PCR).

A scant two year later, on 9 December 1967, the Party anointed him Chairman of the State Council, erasing the long-standing separation of powers as Ceaușescu assumed at the same time the role of Supreme Commander of the Romanian Armed Forces. Now all power was concentrated in a single hand – his hand. In 1974 (ratified 1975) he reached the pinnacle of political possibilities as State President. But an over-arching title that would adequately reflect his power was needed. And a worthy appellation was soon found in “Conducător”, which in German would be equivalent to the notorious “Führer”, or in Italian, the equally portentous “Duce”. It fell to writers, poets and songwriters to enhance the aura, whose most dramatic form culminated in the hagiographic “Son of Suns” (Kunze, 2009, p. 273).

This was the constellation before Ana Blandiana published her volume of short stories “The Four Seasons” (Cele patru anotimpuri) (1977). What options remained open for Romanian intellectuals at that time? The easy way out was to submit, to conform, to take the back alley of opportunism. We will not be considering those options in our further exposition.

An atmosphere of dread encases Romania like a viscous syrup

What wonder then, that everyone wants to extricate himself from this morass. This overwhelming desire is evident in the tale of the Major General Ion Mihai Pacepa (*1928) of the Romanian Secret Police (the Departamentul Securității Statului). He had been State Secretary in the Romanian Ministry of the Interior and Deputy Head of the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service („Departamentul de Informatii Externe“) since 1972, having direct access to the ear of Nicolae Ceaușescu in all questions regarding security. The then 49 year-old used his attendance at a state visit to Bonn, where he was to deliver a message to the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (*1918), to ask for asylum in the United States on 28 July 1978 (Pacepa, 1987). Pacepa was the highest-ranking Eastern European defector during the Cold War. He subsequently divulged all his secrets, and – as it was later viewed in Romania – contributed to the exposure of the criminal nature of the Communist dictatorship in Romania (Schwarz, 16 November 2013).

All this happened one year after Blandiana's manuscript of "The Four Seasons" miraculously survived the earthquake in Bucharest of 4 March 1977: it had been on the desk of an editor at the Bucharest National Publishing House, yet survived intact after the collapse of the entire building. The earthquake left more than a 1,000 citizens dead, over 10,000 injured, and caused more than 30,000 buildings to collapse. In its trail it left more than that number homeless (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 7 March 1977 and 29 March 1977, p 8).[1] The catastrophe precipitated a wave of donations from the East as well as from the West of millions of dollars (Meier, 12 April 1977, p. 8).[2]

However, the secrets divulged by Pacepa didn't at that time fit into the political calculations of the West (His autobiography appeared nine years later in Washington DC.).[3] The reason appears in hindsight to be obvious: At that time, Romania offered the West a „spanner'' to pry open the seemingly monolithic world of Socialist Europe.

The inviting gestures made by the West to the Soviet powers, which were also intended to appeal to the Western public, and which Ceaușescu had himself solicited, were countered in Romania with a tightening political hand. One example of his contradictory actions is highlighted in the fact that in March 1977, he encouraged a closer co-operation with the European Community (EC), in order to further détente between East and West, especially as, in his own words, the EC has established itself as a historical "reality".

[1]A contemporary account of the earthquake can be found in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 7 March 1977, p. 1: *Schicksalsschlag*: "Only the earthquake 1940 in the vicinity of Vrancea was minimally stronger: that was 7.3 on the Richter scale, the Bucharest quake measured 7.2"; p. 7, "Herd in großer Tiefe. Wissenschaftler: Heftiges Nachbeben nicht zu befürchten` and "The earthquake is a national disaster for Romania. The resulting damage is even greater than the previous floods"; p. 7, 'It is to be expected that there are still survivors under the rubble. After more that five days some rescued. Romania not expecting further quakes".

[2]Retrospectively, Viktor Meier's reporting delivers a remarkable survey of the tensions plaguing 1977, so it remains an indispensable tool in reconstructing the complex problems of tat year.

[3]Regarding Ion Pacepa Cf. Dennis Deletant, (1995), *Ceaușescu and the Securitate. Coercion and Dissent in Romania. 1965–1989*, New York; Jefferson Adams, (2014), *Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War and Beyond. The Making of the Contemporary World,* London/New York, p. 61; Ion Mihai Pacepa, (2014), *Moștenirea Kremlinului. Rolul spionajului în sistemul comunist de guvernare*, Bukarest; Nigel West, (2015), *Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence*, Lanham, p. 259; Arch Puddington, (2015), *Broadcasting Freedom. The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, Lexington, p. 240.

Paul Goma case

Meanwhile, those who rebelled openly could expect to feel the full brunt of repression by the Secret Police, which could ultimately lead to exile. That was the fate allotted to Paul Goma (*1935). While still a pupil at school, he spent a week in jail in Sibiu (Hermannstadt), because he had expressed sympathy with the anti-Communist Resistance. As a student he belonged to the inner circle of the Bucharest student movement which sympathised with the Hungarian Uprising 1956; for that he was imprisoned and later put under house arrest. Ten years later, he attempted to resume his studies, which he had to soon abandon under pressure.

Yet he remained utterly loyal to the principles of the Prague Spring (1968). His novel with the sly title "Ostinato", meaning "stubborn", "pertinacious", and in musicology a persistent repetition of a motif, could not be published in Romania, but was later published in German by Suhrkamp (Goma, 1971). But his political fate culminated in the year 1977 with his expulsion from the Romanian Writers' Union, and in November that year, his exile in France (Olărescu, 2008; Petrescu, 2014, p. 396; Breban, 2014).

Together with others, Paul Goma had campaigned for an international conference for the "Protection of Human Rights" in an open letter which was sent to the attendees of the follow-up to the Helsinki Conference regarding European Security and Co-operation beginning June 1977 in Belgrad. The letter was unapologetically frank: "Regardless which participating nations might have committed crimes against humanity, we protest against all forms of psychological, moral and intellectual repression in political prisons, camps, so-called mental clinics, in new or old gulags, in which violence and lies trample upon liberty and dignity" (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 February 1977, p. 2).

Unmistakeably clear was also the reference to "contemporary dictatorships", whereby in Romania neither freedom of speech, nor freedom of the press, nor freedom of conscience, nor the inviolability of the individual, nor the privacy of post and telecommunications were respected. "Dignity and Liberty are spoken about throughout the world. But how many people in all those countries where freedom and human dignity actually exist know that there are countries in which people are chained for life to the land they were born in?... How many people know that […] there are still places on earth where free expression is violently repressed? We see it as inadmissible that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation be extended to human rights" (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 February 1977, p. 2). These statements retain their validity even today.

However, for Paul Goma these refreshingly clear and courageous words meant that he was robbed of any further possibility of having an effect within the dictatorship. His courageous stance led subsequently to his being imprisoned (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 April 1977, p. 2), and then later to his exile, meaning that he could only – rather ineffectively - excoriate the dictatorship from afar. It also led to defamatory statements made by Ceaușescu such as those hurled at the "domestic dissidents" in February 1977 whom he denounced: "You can always find people who overstep the elementary boundaries of social co-existence, who are unwilling to work, to co-exist, who commit treacherous acts and betray their country" (Meier, 19 February 1977, p. 2).

Paul Goma wasn't alone in this ordeal; also the painter Carmen Maria Maniolu, part of the same artistic circle, whose name has faded from collective memory, suffered this fate. A leading figure in the Romanian human rights movement, she was nonetheless seen by the ruling powers as an "upper-class banker's brat" or as a "social parasite". She arrived in Paris in March 1977, but the road there had been long. She had already sought a way to leave Romania in 1974; she had written a justification for her desire to leave which was read in Radio Free Europe. She had called attention to mental institutions in Bucharest, Brașov (Kronstadt), and one near Timișoara (Temeschburg), where "members of the opposition" and "dissidents" were "reformed" accordingto Soviet ideals. Especially the situation for artists and writers had worsened considerably in the past few months (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 4 March1977, p. 2). Goma (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 March 1977, p. 1) voiced the same concerns that "dissidents" were being committed to Romanian mental wards.

With all this in mind, the cluelessness touted by quite a number of West German intellectuals about the status of Romanian literature when visiting the country is noteworthy. In this regard, the report of the German writer Hans Jürgen Fröhlich (1932–1986) (von Wilpert, 1988, p. 496), who had "travelled throughout Romania" in those crucial weeks, serves as an example (Fröhlich, 26 February 1977, p. 1). At the Bucharest residence of the then German ambassador - Erwin Wickert (1915–2008)(Killy, 1988–1991) - he spoke with Nichita Stănescu (1933–1983) (see more on Nichita Stanescu in Braga, 2002; Bârsilă, 2006), a poet "honoured with the Herder Prize, a publisher, specialist in German Studies, editor and writer, with whom we spent a long evening and an even longer night conversing. Our embarrassment, that we knew virtually nothing about Romanian literature (beyond a few poems by Eminescu, a handful of verses by Blaga, a couple of essays by Eliade; a bit more of Tzara and Ionesco), increased all the more as we discovered that our Romanian counterparts were well-versed in the entire German-speaking literary canon, from the Minnesingers to Hans Carl Artmann and Peter Rühmkorf. What can be the reason, the head of a publishing house, who was at the same time a member of the Central Committee asked, that Romanian literature is so little known in West Germany? My answer that the literature of other countries such as Italy was not as well known as it would befit did not satisfy him. So I brought in the argument that we have little contact: at the large literary events in West Germany one could meet Polish, Czech, Hungarian or Soviet authors, but rarely was a Romanian to be found. Yes, he conceded, that's true more or less, and we must change that in future" (Fröhlich, 26 February 1977, p. 1).

The propaganda bubble aside, of more interest is what Fröhlich innocently rattled off in regards to his knowledge of Romanian literature: Mihai Eminescu (1850–1889) was one of the preeminent Romanian poets, Lucian Blaga (1895–1961), a poet and philosopher, eked out his last days as a librarian in the local branch of the Academy Library in Cluj (Klausenburg), and the influential writer and philosopher Mircea Eliade (1907–1986) lived abroad since 1945, lastly in Chicago. The poet Tristan Tzara (1896–1963) also lived abroad as well as the reknowned playwright Eugène Ionesco (1909–1994).

To put in simply, the literary lights of Romania which Fröhlich had mentioned were either long dead or lived abroad. Fröhlich was not able to name any contemporary writers living in the year 1977 (beyond Stănescu, who was sitting before him), nor was he able to mention any of the writers caught up in the "Cultural Revolution" in Romania, nor even the circumstances under which these writers lived and wrote under Ceaușescu. He didn't seem to have a clue, an indicationof the lack of empathy for Romanian writers who did not bow to the Conducător.

And yet Fröhlich did feel the breath of the secret police down his own collar. He wrote: "At dinner with a writer, a young man who understood German suddenly sat down at our table, yet did not speak a word. I began to feel unsure of myself. I felt I was being observed, and began to watch my words. My earlobe itched, but I didn't dare scratch, because I felt that my 'overseer' (in case he really was so,) would think this was a pre-arranged signal between myself and the writer to change the subject. Our conversation stalled, and the digressions of the local writer into historical side-alleys was not really what we wanted to hear. I really don't know if my suspicions were warranted. But alone the fact that an inkling of a suspicion had crept into our behaviour and changed its course leads one to question what psychic and somatic effects are experienced by those who feel they are permanently being observed, because they are, in truth" (Fröhlich, 26 February 1977, p. 1). When alone the spoken word could present such a burden, how must it be with the written word, much less the printed word?

The problem of emigration and the pressure upon dissidents

While the pressure exerted by the Conducător to conform drove many to seek exile, at the same time he himself prohibited all means of escape. He used the opportunity during a conference after the 1977 earthquake to expound upon his views on this issue. The insistence upon a universal right to leave a country – including Romania – represented a serious interference in the internal affairs and the intrinsic rights of a nation. He welcomed the reunification of families beyond the country's borders, but emigration remained taboo. "The problem of emigration is a political issue for every nation and for international relations – and by no means a humanitarian affair", he declared. He interpreted the beckons received from abroad to emigrate as a "hostile action" (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 March 1977, p. 3). This hostility towards emigration included by no means only artists, but also minority groups within Romania; thus the ruling class used these pronouncements to extract submissivenessfrom their subjects. As a result, the Romanian Press Agency called upon ethnic Germans and Hungarians living in Romania to denounce emigration (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 April 1977, p. 5).

Practising Christians were also part of this bundle of those yearning to emigrate. However, whoever made his desire known, as had many a believing Christian, had to reckon with imprisonment. On Easter Sunday 1977 it was said that six Christians, amongst them three priests, were detained because they had publicly protested against the persecution of Christians. Long interrogations and beatings had proceeded the arrests, as experienced by the member of the Baptist Church, Pavel I. Nicolescu (*1936). There are indications that this wave of repressions included around a hundred Christians (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 April 1977, p. 6). What might at first sight appear to be singular incidents accumulate to form a picture which also includes writers in Romania.

For it was in that very Spring, in May 1977, that the long-planned National Congress of Romanian Writers was to haven taken place, when it was abruptly cancelled. That may have had to do with the events of the last week of April 1977, when the General Assembly of the Section of the Writers' Union convened in Bucharest – during which the palpable discord amongst the attendees erupted.

The pressure upon dissidents and the constrictions upon the writer Paul Goma were the two factors which had coloured the Conference from the start. The government wished to avoid an open confrontation at the

Conference at any cost.Butthe exclusion of Goma was on the conference agenda. He had announced in advance, in the event that he would be ousted from the Writer's Union and be arrested – which indeed occurred - , that he would go on a hunger strike. He also made clear in advance that any 'confession', which would subsequent to his arrest be made public, would have been extracted under pressure or invented.

Yet this was to be the conference where the reins upon the writers were to be pulled in ever tighter, especially as their contacts with Western journalists were considered most unwelcome. The government was especially keen upon coercing two signatories of the Goma Petition to retract their support – certainly not voluntarily. These were the literary critic Ion Negoițescu (1921–1993), who chose at the next opportunity to remain in Belgium, and later resided in Munich, Germany, and Francisc Munteanu (1924–1993) living at that time in Bucharest (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 April 1977, p. 5).

Of course, it was necessary for the government to go easy on the domestic pressure in order to maintain a more civil face for their Western counterparts. Included in this gesture was the amnesty granted soon after to 19,000 prisoners and the annulation of legal proceedings against a further 9,500 citizens (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 9 May 1977, p. 2). Paul Goma himself was released after four weeks (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 10 May 1977, p. 1).

Weakening the opposition within the writers' scene

Ceaușescu thought that these measures would suffice to weaken the opposition within the writers' scene, and so the planned National Writers' Congress could then be held as originally planned. The writer Viktor Meier (1929–2014), (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 July 2009, p. 4) who followed the developments in Romania over a number of years, made this estimate of the situation: "The impressions I have received are contradictory, especially considering that we are speaking of a whole complex of problems. No one has really understood why Ceaușescu suddenly reversed course, especially as he had just made amicable efforts to resolve the unrest regarding human rights". The about-face was particularly incomprehensible because just after the 1977 earthquake the contacts established between the Party leadership and the citizens had nurtured hope that a more liberal stance would prevail. And the follow-up to the Helsinki Conference to be held in Belgrade was soon approaching…

One explanation given was the characteristic impulsivity of Ceaușescu, another was the apprehension on the part of the State Police that this unrest could fester and become organised. All such stirrings for a countrywide 'oppositional movement' were, as far as they appeared at all, indeed nipped in the bud. Consequently, Ceaușescu could have shown a bit more sang-froid (Meier, 21 May 1977, p. 5). Meier appears to have hit upon a plausible explanation: "The main reason for the nervous reaction of the Party heads appears to be the connection between the human rights movement and those seeking to leave the country, especially at the most inopportune moment just after the 1977 earthquake (Meier, 21 May 1977, p. 5). Adding to these considerations was the fact that by mid-April 1977 almost 4,000 citizens of German background had emigrated, and scores had managed to leave the country through marriage with a foreigner. There upon Ceaușescu prohibited further emigration. And this was the precarious backdrop to the immanent Writers' Congress.

Everything hinged upon the speech of the Conducător: And he put a leash on the writers. He preferred to see Romanian Literature not oriented in the direction of Western freedoms, that is, in no way clinging to "diverse societal and philosophical concepts of human and civil rights" as found in the West. Moreover: "We desire a Literature that is actively contributing to forming the New Man, the human model of a Communist order" (Meier, 1 June 1977, p. 5). He demanded that Literature connect with traditions such as those which existed during the Stalin era in the form of "literary circles" or as those which prevailed in July 1971 as – and here he finally used the phrase – "a small cultural revolution". A "genuine" cultural industry should flourish. The necessary "self-control" was intended to be a government-directed self-censure. Accordingly, the long-serving Foreign Minister and writer George Macovescu (1913–2002) was appointed President of the Writers' Union. Furthermore, compliant writers such as Eugen Barbu (1924–1993) and Marin Preda (1922–1980) were also given key positions (Meier, 1 June 1977, p. 5). In an act of remarkable cynicism, the Central Committee of the governing party then decided to abolish "the centralised censorship of the news media and of literary productions" which had hitherto been in the hands of the State Committee for the Media and Publications as a form of "preventative control". In its stead, the party functionaries in the publishing houses and in the media were now deemed responsible, of course with the added admonishment, not to let anything contrary to socialist Romania seep through. This all amounted to a mere shift of responsibility for censorship (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 July 1977, p. 2).

The miners went on strike

But it was not alone the writers and the diverse minorities who made life hard for the Conducător. In addition, a further group within Romanian society aligned itself with those problems: a group, which had been hitherto considered the vanguard of the party. The workers in general, but particularly the miners had a different understanding of what a "cultural revolution" should be. This did not make the Conducător happy, especially as it was made worse by the fact that he had to interrupt his holiday in order to rush to the scene in the Romanian mining region in the southwest of Transylvania, to Valea Jiului (Schiltal), in order to personally take charge. But the miners booed him out and expressed their displeasure in other ways. The cause of this disruption was a change to the Social Legislation that resulted in deep cuts in sick pay and other benefits. The miners went on strike for several days in the mining areas in the Carpathian Mountains between Craiova (Krajowa) and Hunedoara (Eisenmarkt) (Meier, 12 August 1977, p. 3).

Already in June of 1977 there had been unrest in the large factories in Bucharest, in Galați in the western part of Moldova, in Pitești in Walachia, and in Brasov (Kronstadt), disturbances as large then as later seen in December 1989 towards the end of the socialist era in Romania. These disturbances incited other riots in early August of 1977 in Valea Jiului, which was of especial significance, as over 60% of the Romanian coal deposits were concentrated in that valley. The entire workforce of around 35,000 miners lay down their tools. The workers' unrest, which had started in the Transylvanian town of Lupeni (Schylwolfsbach) on 1 August 1977, reverberated throughout the region, reaching cities in the county of Hunedoara such as Uricani, Aninoasa and Petrila, but also Vulcan (Wolkersdorf), Bărbăteni (in Lupeni County), Paroșeni, Livezeni, Dâlj and Lonea. The strikers had occupied the factories for three days with the goal of negotiating directly with Ceaușescu. Even the use of water cannon by the fire brigade did not cool the heated atmosphere.

Members of the Politburo of the Communist Party, Ilie Verdeț (1925–2001) and Gheorghe Pană (*1927), tried their best to negotiate with the strikers on the following day, the 2nd of August 1977, but to no avail. Ceaușescu arrived in Lupeni on the 3rd of August, believing that with harsh words and some concessions he could restore order, but his efforts were in vain. Apparently, he threatened to bring in the military, which prompted a score of miners to read a letter from "Radio Free Europe" to the crowds.

After that, Ceaușescu then appeared to have made some compromises - work hours were subsequently limited to six hours - , but at the same time he designated the various coalmines as special access areas, put the military at readiness, and ordered the Securitate to penetrate the gang of conspirators. It was quite obvious to the locals what had transpired when leaders of the strike, such as the engineer Jurca and the head of the working unit Ioan Dobre, died soon after in motor accidents[4]. The miners appointed delegates from amongst

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[4] His real name was Costica Dobre. The Securitate released a false rumour of his death. However, in the 1990s he requested political asylum in the Uk and became an English citizen. Events are detailed in Ioan Velica, *LUPENI '77 REMEMBER*, Editura Info, Craiova, 2007.

their ranks to appeal to Ceaușescu in Bucharest to keep his promises. But the group of delegates was not received by Ceaușescu, instead they lost their jobs. As a result, strikes flared up again in October only to be quickly put down. Even worse was the edict that followed: around 4,000 miners and their families were banished from the region (Hausleitner, Oktober 1996, pp. 67–79; Hausleitner, 1996, p. 56). As a consequence, unrest quickly broke out in diverse other social groups – which was just as quickly extinguished.

Extinguished was also the friendly, warm lightcast upon Ceaușescu in the second half of the 60's. With a view to this frosty situation, it seemed necessary to proffer at least some sort of friendly signal – to those within and outside of Romania. So it was fitting that soon after, an article in a Romanian review of an historical institute closely tied with the Central Committee unexpectedly referred to "mistakes of the past" – and that the former Soviet one-size-fits-all model for the Eastern European countries was now considered "defunct". The new diction recorded the "tragic events in 1956 in Hungary", and –perhaps unconsciously referring to Ceaușescu's own dilemma – mentioned the "justifiable revolts resulting from the mounting discontent of the population and the misguided policies of the Rákosi-Clique". That put Mátyás Rákosi (1892–1971), who was Stalin's protégé in Hungary between 1949-1956, in the spotlight (see more in Applebaum, 20013).

Now Rákosi was lambasted for "overstating industrial production, for reductions in the living standards of the Romanian population, the disregard of the socialist rule of law, the loss of national independence, grievous abuse and disregard of the principles of equal treatment under the law and of the mutual respect in relations between socialist countries".

Contrary to the ironclad Soviet contention that the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 – in which Romania did not take part – was launched to crush the "counterrevolution", the cited Romanian review now stated that: "It must be emphasised that at that time there was no 'counterrevolution' and there was no danger of one occurring." On top of that, the various and diffuse paths to socialism were expressly outlined, citing the "example of Yugoslavia", of the "historical compromise" of the Italian Communist Party as well as the "Socialism with a national flavour" of the French Communist Party, as well providing a defence for the new phenomenon of "Eurocommunism" which had by no means trod a "heretical path", but rather showed the way to "freely chosen singularly national routes" (Meier, 9 September 1977, p. 4).

With this unexpected drumroll the Conducător showcased a clear break with the Soviet claim to leadership and thus made Romania again interesting for the Western sphere, perhaps also once again for the remaining intellectuals in Romania.

But this magic act was soon over. The Conducător continued to defend the previous Romanian industrialisation policies and criticised the blossoming affluence in the Romanian society (Meier, 15 September 1977, p. 5). Again, he interfered in the policies regarding ethnic minorities, for instance, when he ordered the further closing of German-language schools (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 16 September 1977, p. 2). And he intensified relations with China while again restricting foreign travel from Romania, even one year after the death of Mao Zedong (Meier, 17 October 1977, p. 12. In the end, Paul Goma used his liberty as an exile in Paris to demand the release of Romanian dissidents (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 25 November 1977, p. 1 and 12). But continued to insist upon the existing political principles and made a show of 'triumphalism' at the interim political convention (Meier, 12 December 1977, p. 6).

Conclusion

1977 was a year characterised by manifold insurrections by writers, artists, ethnic minorities and social subcultures such as the miners in Romania.In the end, the Conducător and his Communist Party used the Securitate as an instrument to rid themselves of their adversaries. For the writers this meant repression, arrest or banishment. How difficult it must have been for a writer to keep the balance between a morally upright stance, remaining true to oneself and one's ideals, and yet not falling victim to the manifold political and social pressures! Writing in Ceaușescu's world of 1977 is coloured by these strictures. One method of coping was using the escape route of the fantasy narrative, far away from the madding crowd of real-time threats, released into a world of images, visions and figures beyond the reach of reality.

Ana Blandiana lived at that time in Bucharest, working in the Library of Visual Arts after leaving her post as editor-in-chief of the review "Amfiteatru", where she had worked from 1975 to 1977. She had left that position when she could no longer endure the omnipresent political pressure. In addition, her husband Romulus Rusan had been trapped under the rubble of the devastating 1977 earthquake, then rescued. They both moved to the countryside, fleeing from the pervasive spirit of the Conducători to Comana, southeast of the Bărăgan-Plain. There, they both dedicated themselves mainly to writing. Ana Blandiana continued working on "The Four Seasons" – neither enroute to exile nor tracing the path of a civil servant – sparing herself for the moment, when all would be risked.

That moment came for her during the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, when she became the mouthpiece for the manifold oppressed. She used her voice sparingly, entering the fray only when everyone could hear her clearly – and everyone could understand her. The resulting "cultural revolution" was then at last one which captured souls, represented the political views of the citizens - and led to ground-shaking cataclysms never before seen in the history of Romania.

All this was completely different from the revolution envisioned by Mao Zedong and Ceaușescu. It was worth it, to have waited for the final, the real, the fourth season, which was to release Romania from the icy brace of Winter. And now they were all there: the miners, the writers and the ethnic minorities. At least in the beginning. Notwithstanding, it was possible in 1989 for a writer to write freely, now that Ceaușescu and his world of 1977 belonged to history.

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WHEN DAWN CAME, THEY... WEREN'T SLEEPING. "THE SOVIET PREEMPTIVE STRIKE" AND THE GERMAN REPLY OF JUNE 22, 1941 (I)

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Abstract

Despite the internal turmoil meant to strengthen the social, economic and political regime lay down in October 1917, after the end of the Civil War, the USSR continued to establish itself externally as a great center of power in the international relations arena, harboring immense geopolitical ambitions. The Moscow regime would gradually normalise international relations, after 1922, but without settling the debts of the Czarist state and without relinquishing its lead as a world revolution hub. On the one hand, the USSR will continue to maintain "normal" diplomatic and commercial relations with other powers and will also control the activity of communist parties in other countries via the Comintern, the ultimate goal of such parties being to destabilize the existing governments with which the USSR maintained "normal" relations. The pinnacle of this policy of "peaceful coexistence", inaugurated by the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918), was reached on August 23, 1939, through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union engaged until June 22, 1941 in a race against time in order to consolidate their political, economic and military positions in areas of peak strategic and geopolitical interest. Has June 22, 1941 sparked the early confrontation between the two geopolitical options that marked European and world evolution throughout the twentieth century? The answer to this question continues to breed numerous and fierce historiographical controversies.

Keywords: *Stalin, USSR, Hitler, Germany, the Red Army, Moscow, Berlin.*

Mobilizing for a "Grand Plan"

The Anschluss (March 12, 1938), the Munich Agreement (September 28-30, 1938), as well as the signing of the German – French non-aggression pact of November 6, 1938, by Georges Bonnet and Joachim von Ribbentrop, were interpreted by Moscow as being "a sign that Hitler was being allowed to

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have, more or less, his full swing in the East" (Werth, 2000, p. 95), thus, by the end of 1938 the risk of establishing an "imperialist front" against the USSR was quite tangible. Given such context, the soviets would be force to open to supplementing their openings towards Germany, and at the same time carrying out negotiations generated by the policy of collective security, with the Western democracies. On April 17, 1939, the soviet ambassador, seconded in Berlin, would disclose to the Secretary of State von Weizsäcker that the soviet policy "had never strayed from the right track" (Fontaine, 1992, p. 128) and that "Russia saw no reason to cease normal relations with Germany, relations which could be subject to a continuous improvement" (Fontaine, 1992, p. 128). After the dismissal of Maxim M. Litvinov, on May 3, 1939, from the head of soviet diplomacy and his replacement by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the two sides continued to explore each other with renewed intensity in order to conclude a non-aggression pact which would eventually be agreed on August 23, 1939. On the morning of August 24, 1939, the United States Ambassador in Moscow, L. Steinhardt, would message the State Department: „I have been informed in strict confidentiality that a full understanding was reached yesterday evening on the settlement of territorial issues in Eastern Europe, according to which Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and Bessarabia have been recognized within the sphere of vital soviet interests" (Ţurcanu, 2004, p. 179). On August 19, 1939, the French news agency *HAVAS* would publish a text received from Moscow, via Geneva, from an "absolutely trustworthy" source, which specified that on august 19, 1939[1] Stalin provided a statement before the Political Bureau, in order to motivate negotiations with Hitler[2] and the forthcoming conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. „We must do everything in our power for this war to last as long as possible, for the purpose of exhausting the two camps. Namely, for this reason we must agree to sign the pact proposed by Germany and to operate in such a way that this

[1] The French version of this speech text was translated and published in Russian, in Moscow, in 1994 (see: Bushueva, *Priklinaia – Poprobuite Poniat* in „Novy Mir", no. 12, 1994, p. 230-237). This document was found in the Center for the Preservation of Historical-Documentary Collections, formerly the Special Archive of the USSR, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1.223. T. Bushueva would confirm, in October 2002, during a phone conversation with David E. Murphy, former deputy and then chief of the CIA station in Western Berlin (1954-1961), that the Special Archive contained documents sent back to Moscow by the occupying Soviet Group of Forces in Germany. The Russian original, if it exists, has never been found.

[2] Russian historian V.I. Dashichev argued that V.M. Molotov state, on the night between August 23 and August 24 1939, that the excellent Soviet – German political relations of the time were due to Stalin's speech at the 18th Congress of the CP (b) of the Soviet Union in March 1939. Historian V.I. Dashichev wrote: "The decision on convening the 18th Congress was adopted during the Central Committee plenary of January 1939. Namely, the political line of the Congress was defined in January. Therefore, the radical U-turn in Stalin's policy concerning Germany occurred prior to March 1939" (Apud Ion Ţurcanu, *op. cit.,* p. 174).

war, once started, will continue for a long time. We will have to intensify our propaganda work in all warring countries in order to be ready at that point, when the war will end" (Petrencu (ed.), 2004, pp. 24-26), stated Stalin before the members of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CP (b) of the USSR.

The Soviet Union denied, on November 30, 1939, the existence of such a text and for many centuries even denied the very existence of a Political Bureau meeting on that day. Russian military historian, General-Colonel Dimitry A. Volkogonov only confirmed the fact that such a meeting took place 54 years later in an article of the *Izvestia* newspaper (January 16, 1993), making, on such occasion, serious and important decisions on the future development of international relations. The text sent by the *HAVAS Agency* accurately rendered Stalin's political reasoning concerning peace and war, in terms of accepting the German proposition given that it was essential for the future war to last as long as possible for the two camps to be exhausted.

The decisions made on August 19, 1939 would be embodied by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 23, 1939), the entry of soviet troops into Poland (September 17, 1939), the Soviet-Finnish war and the annexations occurring in the summer of 1940 (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and the province of Hertza), as well as in preparing what the Russian historiography following 1991 defined as the "Soviet Preemptive Attack", also known as operation "Storm"[3]. Referring to the existence of a USSR **„Grand Plan"** for war, historian Mark Solonin stated: „All versions of the Grant Plan coincide both in terms of content, as well as in terms of text formulation. Thirdly, all versions, without exception, represent the plan of an offensive operation beyond the USSR state borders, while Germany is invariably indicated as the main enemy. Military actions on its own territory weren't even assessed as possible scenarios in the unfolding of war events" (Solonin, 2012, p. 160).

[3] In *Krasnaia Zvezda* of July 30, 1993, the Ministry of Defense in Moscow confirmed the existence of a signal called "**Storm**", yet he provides a completely different explanation: "The *Storm* signal has indeed been established, but it means something completely different. Upon its receipt, the division commanders of the cover armies were to open the "red envelopes". These envelopes contained orders regarding the measures to be taken for occupying battle positions in order to repel the enemy offense, in case of aggression" (Apud Victor Suvorov, *Umbra Victoriei*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2013, p. 158). The USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal D.T. Yazov admitted in the *Voenno Istoriceskii Jurnal* (no. 5/1991, p. 13) that: „The preparation of initial operations was based on the idea of a strong response attack while subsequently transitioning to a decisive offense on the entire front. This plan was also subordinate to the strategic deployment system of the Armed Forces. Strategic defense and other offense variants were practically omitted from discussion" (*Ibidem*, p. 168). For Viktor Suvorov's views and their impact on the Russian and world public opinion, as well as for the opinions of historians and servicemen, see: Aleksandr Gogun, *1941. URSS ca agresor. Receptarea tezei în Europa de Est*, în „Magazin istoric", Anul XLV, serie nouă, nr. 6 (531), iunie 2011, pp. 5 – 8.

According to the statements of Viktor Suvorov, included in the volumes dedicated to the 1941 war, the effort to mobilize the economy and Soviet army for war had become obvious since August 19, 1939. One must mention that a consolidation process of the Soviet Government to the detriment of the CPSU had been carried out during the 1936 – 1939 period, as a consequence of developing the *Soviet Military and Industrial Complex***.** During the secret mobilization following August 19, 1939, the main focus was on developing the most technically complex troops and arms: tanks, airborne troops, artillery and aviation. The structures of future divisions, armed corps and armies were developed during the secret mobilization, without soldiers, at the time. On January 1, 1941, the Red Army comprised of 4,207,00 people, and by June 22, 1941, the Soviet military manpower had reached 5,500,000 people, along with the proper security, escort, frontier, operative troops, units and large units of commandos, fleet and aviation units of the NKVD. The Soviet President for the Industry of Defense of the USSR and of the State Planning Commission, Nikolay Voznesensky provided, on February 1941, a program for preparing the Soviet Union economy for war. This program included a summary of the following four points: „a) war with the Western capitalist countries is inevitable, thus measures were needed in order to prepare for the war; b) take all measures to strengthen the army; c) transfer the unsure population, as well as the industrial enterprises through the Western regions of the country towards the East; d) take measures to organize and develop industry and agriculture in Eastern USSR regions”[4].

By June 22, 1941, approximately 6,000,000 collective farmers and workers were evacuated from the Western regions of the USSR, being relocated towards the East, of which 200,000 people would be regimented yearly for the 20 soviet divisions in the Vladivostok region. A number of 20 cities of 150,000 workers each would be established in Central Siberia, while „stand-in industries” for the ones in the West would be created in the Soviet Far East, being represented only by buildings similar to the factories in the West, without installations, designed to house the installations in the West in case of evacuation. 60 mills were built for population needs and for developing a sugar industry to the East of the Ural Mountains.

Referring to the immense Soviet war effort, undistinguishable for many Western observers of the time, Viktor Suvorov believes that during the transition from secret to open mobilization, the active divisions of the Red Army did not intend to establish a border barrier and lay in waiting, therefore the final part of the mobilization operation did not aim a border deployment,

[4] Academia Română/Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, *Documente SSI privind spaţiul sovietic. 22 august 1939 – 23 august 1944*/ed. Cristian Troncotă, Alin Spânu, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 239.

but rather a devastating surprise offense (Rusnac, în „Magazin istoric", iunie 2011, p. 9–13). Whole generations of Red Army officers would train in the USSR Military Academies believing that the "side taking the initiative, aided by the element of surprise, oftentimes shatters the will of the enemy by these actions and creates better conditions for itself" (Suvorov, 1998, p. 104).

During the period following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the number of Soviet infantry divisions would rise to over 300, the number of tank divisions to over 100 and a further 10 artillery brigades for the Soviet General Command Reserve would be established, each comprising of two artillery regiments each with 66 mouths for every regiment, including 107 mm guns, as well as the 152 mm ML-20 and the 203 mm B-4 howitzer guns, reactive projectile launchers and BM-8 and BM-13 multiple launch rocket systems. During the 1939 – June 1941 period, the Red Army was equipped with a number of 82,000 state of the art guns and mine launchers, of which the 122 mm M-30 howitzer. By January 1, 1941, the Red Army was equipped with over 20,000 tanks, of which the majority were T-26 and BT light tanks, yet the full equipping of the 29 Soviet mechanized corps required a necessary of 3,654 KV tanks and 12,180 T-34 tanks[5].

Seeking Strategic Interests

The Red Army only entered Eastern Poland on September 17, 1939, according to the agreement of August 23, 1939, to provide protection for the Ukrainian and Belarusian brothers, as the note forwarded by Moscow to the Polish ambassador stated. In order to accurately define the demarcation line on Polish territory between Germany and the Soviet Union, von Ribbentrop made a second visit to Moscow (September 27 – 29, 1939). Pursuant to the new agreement, Germany would accept that Lithuania, placed under the sphere of influence of the 3rd Reich, would pass within the Soviet sphere, receiving in exchange from the Soviet sphere the Lublin region and the territory East of Warsaw. As the Western democracies and Germany engaged in what was called as the "Phoney War", on October 14, 1939, Stalin asked Finland to concede 2,760 square kilometers, offering in exchange 5,530 square kilometers, respectively the provinces of Repola and Parojorpi, so as to avoid Finland being used as a trampoline for a German assault on Russia.

The Soviet – Finnish war (November 30, 1939 – March 12, 1940) proved to be a useful opportunity to assess the fighting capacity of the Red Army, of its organization and mobilization, as well as of the ability to make the

[5] By June 1, 1941, the Red Army was equipped with 19,540 tanks (without taking into account the T-37, T-38 and T-40 light scout tanks) and 3,258 armored cars equipped with guns. 1,358 KV and 3,014 T-34 tanks would be built during 1941. In 1942, the Soviet tank industry would produce 24,718 tanks, of which: 2,553 KV tanks and 12,527 T-34 tanks.

"impossible, possible"[6]. The Soviet commanders, attending on April 17, 1940 a conference of the Soviet General Staff conference, underlined the fact that the ultimate victory in the war against Finland had already been too great and insisted that the battle organization needed to change, and the training and stimulation of troops needed radical improvements, the decision-making process required decentralization, various field regulations and manuals needed rewriting, considering the lessons of this war and what had already occurred on the fronts of World War Two. The deficiencies found during the campaign in Finland would also occur during the campaign in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (June 26 – 28, 1940). Considering what the Soviet/Russian historians define as the Soviet "preemptive attack", the two campaigns proved useful opportunities to assess the battle capacity of the Red Army[7].

Given the development of operations on the Western front, after May 10, 1940, the USSR managed to take control of the territories promised within the secret additional protocol, respectively to annex Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the Hertza Region (June 28, 1940), Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, therefore, by the end of this process, Stalin had recovered all the territories lost by Russia at the end of World War One, while "The Allies had paid – concludes Henry Kissinger – their final of a series of tranches from the expenses caused by the exclusion of Germany and the Soviet Union from the Peace Conference of 1919" (Kissinger, 1998, p. 324). The Vienna arbitration (August 30, 1940), the entry of German troops into Romania (October 12, 1940) and the assault of Italian troops over Greece (October 28, 1940) represented evident signals of the fact that the Axis had become extremely dangerous for the geopolitical and geostrategic plans of the Soviet Union. Signing of the Tripartite pact (September 27, 1940) was perceived as the event which was to become the most menacing to the security of the USSR given that Stalin was not even informed of such negotiations.

[6] Following the extremely tense discussions between Stalin and the head of the GRU, Aviation Lieutenant General Ivan Iosifovich Proskurov, on the one hand, as well as between the head of the GRU and the Soviet Generals who commanded the Red Army units during the Finland campaign (1939 - 1940), the subservience of GRU was transferred from the People's Commissar of Defense to that of the Soviet General Staff. See: David E. Murphy, David E. Murphy, *Enigma Barbarossa. Ce știa Stalin,* Editura Militară, București, 2013, p. 71 – 85.

[7] The OKW and OKH were taken by surprise when new units (80 infantry divisions, 80 infantry brigades, 10 tank brigades, and 25 cavalry divisions) of the Red Army appeared on the battlefield near Moscow, in December 1941. By April 1942, the Abwehr would identify 425 infantry divisions, 100 infantry brigades, 75 cavalry divisions, 60 motorized divisions and 80 mechanized brigades belonging to the Red Army, of which 325 large infantry units (250 divisions and 75 brigades), 55 cavalry divisions and 35 mechanized divisions were located on the Romanian-German front. German intelligence officers estimated that the Soviet aviation constantly disposed of 2,000 aircraft, although it had lost 400-500 planes on a monthly basis, while a number of 50-60 poorly trained ad organized divisions, of which 40 were located in the Rostov – Stalino region and 20 in the Moscow region were formed behind the front

The discussions between Hitler and his Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vyacheslav M. Molotov, in Berlin, during the November 12-13, 1940 period, represented a new German and Soviet version of the "Monroe Doctrine" for the whole of Europe and Africa, doubled by a division of colonial territories between them. "The so-called European balance of power – Staling argued, in July 1940, before Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow – did not only oppose Germany, but also the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet Union would take all measures to prevent the restoration of the old balance of power in Europe" (Kissinger, 1998, p. 327). In diplomatic terms, the "all measures" formulation also included the threat of war, which meant that the Soviet-German conflict was going into its final stage, which would also affect Romania, given the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of our country.

When he became aware of the prospects generated by the Soviet menace, Hitler changed Germany's strategic defense mechanism, preparing the counterattack which historians would come to name "the preemptive strike". On September 7, 1940, the head of the 3rd Section of the Abwehr (Counterintelligence) received a document from Hitler's Headquarters, with the mention "Top Secret" stipulating that "Our Eastern territories are to be occupied within the following four weeks by strong military troops. By the end of October, the orders marked on the attached map will already be carried out. These orders must not give Russia the impression that we want to launch an assault over the East. On the other hand, Russia will realize that the presence of strong and well trained German detachments in Poland and Bohemia – Moravia indicates the fact that we are ready at any moment to defend our interests in the Balkans from a potential Russian offense with strong military troops" (Bassett, 2008, p. 233).

The SIS informed the Government in Bucharest on the fact that, following the deployment of troops occurring in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, both during the legionary rebellion (January 1941), as well as thereafter, "one clearly observed the offensive preparations made by the Soviet Union for the purpose of occupying the whole of Moldavia and the rest of Bukovina" (Troncotă, în „Arhivele Totalitarismului", 1994, p. 94). Moscow's firm position in negotiating with Berlin was due to the fact that the Soviet General Staff had concluded the strategic deployment plan for the next stage, which included the execution by the Soviet forces of two strikes: the main one on the Warsaw – Berlin axis, and a secondary one, through Romania, to capture the oil resources and to go over the top in the Balkans. "We had applied a state of alertness since November 1940. Then, Pavel Zhuravlev and Zoya Rybkina initiated the operational file *(Liternoe delo)* entitled *Zateia (The Risk),* which collected the most important information on German movements against Soviet Union interests all in one place. This file was regularly presented to Stalin and Molotov and they would try to use the information in their policy to calm Hitler and collaborate with him" (Sudoplatov, 1995, p. 120).

Information Failure or Strategic Surprise?

The leaders of Kremlin received 84 warnings regarding operation "Barbarossa", Lieutenant General Philipp Ivanovich Golikov, who had become the head of the GRU by July 27, 1940, stated after the war that "the Soviet military intelligence tested and capitalized on numerous sources of classified information, including from Germany" (Petrov (ed.), 1968, p. 181), but which were not taken into account. The first warning came on August 27, 1940 from the GRU residence in Paris. "The Germans have renounced their offense against England. Apparently, preparations for such a situation are still carried out, yet they are meant to hide the movement of German troops towards the East, where a number of 106 divisions are deployed" (Murphy, 2013, p. 299), messaged the GRU officers to Moscow.

The GRU residence in Berlin sent 23 reports warning on the intentions of German preparations for an attack on the USSR. On December 29, 1940, the GRU source, codename *ARIETS* (Rudolf von Scheliha, councilor for the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs) informed on the fact that he had found out "from very high circles" that Hitler had ordered the beginning of preparations for war against the USSR which was to commence in March 1941. *ARIETS* returned with new information, in detail, on January 4 and February 28, 1941. "The assault commencement date was provisionally established for May 20. An envelopment offense is likely to be planned for the Pinsk area, with a force of 120 German divisions. One of the preliminary measures includes the deployment of Russian speaking officers and NCOs for various commandments. In addition, broad gauge armored trains are being built, similar to the Russian ones" (Murphy, 2013, p. 90), reported *ARIETS* on February 28, 1941. On May 9, 1941, Major General Vasily I. Tupikov, who was a military attaché of the USSR and legal resident of the GRU in Germany, communicated a possible Wehrmacht operation plan against the USSR, which showed that „the defeat of the Red Army would be completed within a month or a month and a half, with Germany reaching Moscow's meridian" (Murphy, 2013, p. 91).

Important information was also provided by the GRU residence in Helsinki which on June 15 and 17, 1941 communicated that the number of German troops in Finland was continuously growing and that the Finnish were increasing their military security measures. The GRU people in London, Paris, Vichy and from Switzerland provided extremely important and explanatory information on the Germans' offensive intentions. The GRU agents in Romania, *AVS* (*Kurt Völkisch*, press officer with the German Embassy in Bucharest) and *LTsL* (*Margarita Völkisch*), provided information on the fact that on March 1, 1941, "a lot of people were talking about an imminent German assault on the USSR" (Murphy, 2013, p. 98). The agent codenamed

KORF (GRU Colonel Mikhail S. Sharov, undercover as a representative of the TASS Agency) informed Moscow on the fact that a German major living in the house of a sub-source declared that the Germans had completely altered their plans and that they were heading East, against the USSR. On April 23, 1941, GRU was informed that the Red Army was to be demoralized right from the onset, from the first strike, and that "one or two aerial raid will prove Russia's inability…, at the start of the war, in May" and that „all would be over by June" (Murphy, 2013, p. 100). On June 7, 1941, the GRU residence in Romania messaged that: „The officers of the Romanian General Staff firmly argue that, pursuant to the unofficial statements of Antonescu, war would start soon between Romania and the USSR" ((Murphy, 2013, p. 101). The reports of GRU officers and agents in Prague, Sofia, Belgrade and Budapest completed the overview of the Wehrmacht's intention in relation to the Red Army and the fact that despite the events in Greece and Yugoslavia, "preparations for X-Day had not been abandoned, only postponed" (Murphy, 2013, p. 109). On May 5, 1941, Richard Sorge sent a message from Tokyo: „Germany will start the war with the USSR by mid-June 1941" (Murphy, 2013, p. 114), and on May 15 communicated the date of the German attack: June 20 – 22, 1941.

Foreign intelligence (NKGB) of the NKVD lack a unit to assess the information and distributed the information to receiver, each being tasked with assessing the reports and their implications for their field of activity and responsibility. In May 1941, after assessing the NKGB reports, GRU concluded that the number of German troops on the border was significantly increasing. GRU asked NKGB for improved accuracy in identifying the German units and the nature of their displacements. NKGB residencies, mostly from Germany, but also from the rest of occupied Europe provided numerous information on the German preparation to invade the USSR (Blaga, in „Historia", october 2011, p. 64 – 68).

On April 2, 1941, Harro Schulze-Boysen (codenamed STARSHINA in the NKGB files) informed Moscow that: „Aerial forces would focus their attacks on the railway nodes in central and western USSR, on the power plants from the Donetsk basin and on the air industry factories around Moscow. The air bases near Cracow, in Poland, would be the main starting points for the aircrafts targeting the USSR. The Germans believe that the weak point of the Soviet air defense is their ground support and hope that, through a few heavy bombardments of the airfields, the enemy's operations would quickly be thrown into disarray" (Murphy, 2013, p. 127).

Rudolf Hess's flight to Great Britain (May 10, 1941) completely dumbfounded the NKGB in Moscow, therefore the head of the Department for Germany within INO (External Intelligence) of the NKGB, Pavel M. Zhuravlev ordered his assistant, Zoya Rybkina "Message Berlin, London, Stockholm, America, Rome. Try to clarify the details of this proposal" (Murphy, 2013, p. 132). The Soviets seemed to be misinformed on Hitler's true intentions. However, the warnings regarding the imminent threat of a German attack had become overwhelming by the start of summer 1941. “I repeat: nine armies comprising of 150 divisions will begin their offensive in the early morning of June 22, 1941” (Murphy, 2013, p. 301), messaged Richard Sorge one June 13, 1941. On the same day, the GRU agent in Sofia, Boevoy, reported: „According to Zhurin’s information (member of the Bulgarian Superior Military Council), Führer decided to attack USSR until the end of this month” (Murphy, 2013, p. 301). Willy Lehmann, a GRU agent infiltrated within the Gestapo (codename BREITENBACH), informed, on June 19, 1941, that „his Gestapo unit had received an order according to which Germany would invade the USSR at 3.00 AM, on June 22, 1941” (Murphy, 2013, p. 129). On May 5, 1941, the NKGB residence in Warsaw, led by Peter I. Gudimovich (codename IVAN), informed that: „The military preparations in Warsaw and throughout the General Government were being carried out in plain sight, and that the German officers and soldiers were speaking with absolute openness about the imminent war between Germany and the Soviet Union, as if it were a matter already decided. (…) Between April 10 and April 20, German troops were driven eastward, through Warsaw, without respite, day and night” (Murphy, 2013, p. 134).

Highly relevant information on the German intent was also provided via the 2nd Counterintelligence Directorate branch of the NKGB as a result of observing activities and intercepting the communications the Axis’ diplomatic and military corps on a mission in Moscow. Furthermore, the 1st Department (Railways) of the General Directorate for Transportation (GTU) of the NKVD collected information about the German troops stationed in Poland, about their displacement directions and their deployment districts. GTU agents had identified a group of Ukrainian volunteers near Lublin, another regiment of volunteers undergoing training near Warsaw, the construction of new airfields, the traffic of special construction trains carrying construction materials and bomb squads, the arrival of French and Belgian rail tankers containing gasoline, the placement of fuel warehouses concealed in the woods near the border, as well as land triangulation activities before establishing the artillery firing positions. „Starting with June 1, 1941, all railway employees would be fired in Peremyshl and Zuraw; transportation services will be fully operated by [German] military units” (Murphy, 2013, p. 153), reported the Lvov District Directorate of the NKGB on June 12 1941, the source of the information being the work of GTU agents. The General Directorate of Border Guards (GUPV) of the USSR NKVD confirmed via numerous reports addressed to the higher forums in Moscow that the situation on the Soviet-German frontier is far from being calm. Soviet radio surveillance and airborne espionage had identified the inflow of German troops towards the Soviet border. Soviet intelligence services had recorded the fact that, between the end of August 1940 and mid-December 1940, the number of Wehrmacht divisions marching towards the USSR border had increased from 5 to 34.

By the end of February 1941, the number of German divisions had increased to approximately 70, reached 87 by May 1941 and decreased to 80 by June 1, followed by another increase to 123 by June 1941. No less than 80 German reconnaissance flights were conducted above Soviet territory between the March 27 and April 18 1941 period. On April 22, 1941, the Soviets officially protested against such provocative actions. Their protests were fruitless and, by the end of May 1941, another approximately 180 such flights were carried out, which allowed to Luftwaffe to complete the reconnaissance of each airport or military base in the Western Soviet Union.

On June 11, 1941, Stalin was informed that on June 9 the German embassy in Moscow had received instructions from Berlin to *„house"* secret documents (burning) and *„for the women and children to depart discretely"* (evacuation). On March 1, 1941, the USSR ambassador in Washington, Konstantin A. Umanski, received a summary of the information held by the USA Government in this regard. In April 1941, the American Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, again provided ambassador Umanski with the results of Japanese diplomatic communications decrypted, including a telegram from Moscow received on March 19, which reported a spectacular change in the Soviet-German relations, as well as two telegrams from Berlin which outlined Germany's preparations for war with the USSR. On March 22, the Soviet Government received a memorandum of the US Army Intelligence Service which predicted, based on the decryption of Japanese traffic, a German attack on the USSR within the following two months. Seven days after Hitler signed the directive authorizing the "Barbarossa" Plan, an accurate summary of the plan was included in an anonymous letter addressed to the Soviet military attaché in Berlin.

Marshal G.K. Zhukov recollects in his memoirs the fact that the head of GRU, on March 2, 1941, Lieutenant General Phillip I. Golikov provided the leadership of the USSR and the General Staff a report detailing the possible directions of German troop strikes in case of an assault on the USSR. GRU indicated May 20, 1941 as the date when the German offense would commence against the Soviet Union. „What we overlooked regarding our information - admitted Pavel A. Sudoplatov – was the qualitative force of the Blitzkrieg tactics. We believed that when the war would erupt, the Germans would first try to take possession of our regions in Ukraine, rich in food products and raw materials. We knew their military and strategic games, their strategy of requiring additional economic resources for a prolonged engagement. This was the grave mistake: the GRU and NKVD failed to warn the General Staff that the goal of the German army, both in Poland, as well as in France, was not to seize territory, but to destroy the military power of the enemy army" (Sudoplatov, 1995, p. 120).

Sir Alexander Cadogan, permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office informed Ambassador Ivan M. Maisky on June 10, 1941 on the recent redeployment of German forces in the East, providing the data and precise locations of each individual division. On June 13, 1941, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, summoned Ambassador Maisky to inform him that the reports obtained during the last 48 hours regarding the concentration of German troops could be aimed at a war of nerves or an attack against the Soviet Union. In April 1941, the Vice President of the Skoda factories, who had provided services for the GRU, reported, based on contacts with superior officers in the German army stationed in Czechoslovakia, a massive redeployment of the Wehrmacht towards the soviet border and that his factory had been ordered to cease the delivery of weapons to the USSR, because war had been scheduled for mid-July. „Although our intelligence discovered Hitler's intentions of attacking the Soviet Union – writes Pavel A. Sudoplatov – the reports were, to a certain extent, contradictory. They did not include assessments of the German tank or air unit potential, nor their capacity to break through the defense lines of the Red Army, deployed along the Soviet – German borders. Therefore, the force of Hitler's strike came as a surprise for our military leadership, including for Marshal Georgy Zhukov, head of the General Staff of the Red Army at the time, who admitted in his memoirs that he had not foreseen an enemy capable of launching a simultaneous large scale offensive, with tank formations, in several directions" (Sudoplatov, 1995, p. 120).

At the beginning of June, 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg, invited the USSR minister to Berlin, while on a visit in Moscow, during a private breakfast held in private at his residence. Ambassador von der Schulenburg would tell ambassador Vladimir G. Dekanozov: "It is possible that the current event is unique to the history of diplomacy, but I will disclose our number one state secret… Hitler made the decision to start the war against the Soviet Union on June 22. You may ask why I am doing this. I was raised in the spirit of Bismarck, who was always against a war with Russia" (Andrew and Gordievski, 1994, p. 187).

Despite all these warnings, the official relations did not cool. In January 1941, the Soviet Union purchased the Polish district of Suwalki from Germany for the amount of 7,500,000 dollars in gold, while in April 1941, the Soviet deliveries of raw material to Germany reached their pinnacle since the signing of the Ribbentrop – Molotov Pact: 208,000 tons of grain, 50,000 tons of oil, 8,300 tons of cotton, 8,340 tons of metal. The USSR also delivered 4,000 tons of latex acquired from the Middle East and shipped to Germany via the Trans-Siberian train. Marshal G.K. Zhukov would write the following regarding the *"surprise"* attack of the Wehrmacht: „The chief menace for us was not the fact that the Germans crossed the border in a surprise attack, but the fact that we were taken by surprise by the strike force of the German Army; that we were taken by surprise by their superiority of six to eight times our forces in crucial points; that we were taken by surprise by the momentum of their troops' concentration and by the force of their assault" (Simonov, K. *et comp.*, 1991, p. 51).

(To be continued)

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THE STUDY OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE, ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Abstract

Intelligence had a different importance in decision-making depending on the historical period of time we are referring to. Nonetheless, the study of secret intelligence for the historiographical development became more relevant in the past decades, after the end of the Cold War. With the study of intelligence, the historical perspectives and debates started to have different shapes and develop more complex conclusions, revealing, thanks to a more comprehensive analysis, aspects otherwise difficult to understand in the historical context. An appropriate example would be the study of the Second World War.

Keywords: *intelligence, historiography, decision-making, secret information, analysis.*

Introduction

We might consider the Second World War as an important inflection point in how intelligence was understood and used. Lessons of the use of intelligence and its importance in decision making were drawn after the war. Though it gained importance especially during the war, the meaningful role of intelligence in decision making and governance had not become obvious prior the Cold War.

Sherman Kent defined the concept of intelligence as knowledge, organization and process. As its role was to reduce uncertainty, and to understand the intentions and capabilities other states had, intelligence started to be an important asset for knowledge and analysis. The way intelligence communities were organized back then, had a great impact in the governance and therefore in the decisions as ''through the use of intelligence powers may gain greater knowledge of the international environment-and

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alter it'' (Ferris, 2003, pp.308-329). The outbreak, the evolution and the outcome of the Second World War taught us this.

We study the period that preceded the Second World War as a period of great uncertainty and unease when the decisions made had a great impact in the unfolding of the events. The world was living on different levels ideologically, politically, economically and therefore socially. The decisions required high levels of certainty and assurance. Secrecy had an important role to protect these decisions. Therefore, obtaining intelligence and assess it was a complex issue for the political and military authorities. With the unfolding of events, it got even more complicated. A great example of this is the Soviet Union who managed the best to maintain its military situation the most secret possible. To the extent that Adolf Hitler had no hesitation, regardless the caution of his closest advisors, to release the Operation Barbarossa in the summer of 1941.

Furthermore, with the outbreak of the Second World War, intelligence gained the right to be an active part of the decision makers unlike the period previous the war. The evolution and the importance intelligence gained during the Second World War proved that without it, a war is much more difficult to win, even impossible (a good example supporting this argument would be the break of the famous Nazi code, Enigma, with the further strategic consequences that followed). The ignorance of intelligence might have been among Hitler´s major mistakes in deciding his strategy.

The key aspect related to the intelligence of the Second World War was the way in which it was assessed. John Ferris explained that intelligence assessment in the period preceding the war and during it was essential in understanding the intentions and capabilities of both rivals and allies. Through a very interesting analysis of what he called intelligence failures, Farris pointed out the importance assessment has gained with the Second World War. He argues that the assessment failed because of different cultural, political and ideological reasons that should have not interfered in such important process. As they did, the outcome was violent, proving into a major war.

Regardless its importance and need of an accurate assessment, intelligence comes to take the place of the *missing dimension of the history,* as Cristopher Andrew described it. The secrecy surrounding the intelligence reports and analysis made the job of historians much more difficult before the declassifying of the most secret documents of the era. The mistakes in the assessment of these documents, or in the importance they were given have been better detected and the analysis much more thorough with the possibility of studying them. The relevance and the level of importance of each document were therefore better determined as the capabilities of the historians were increasing. Intelligence represented for a long time the missing dimension of the history and it might still represent it as not all the historiographical works take it into account as rigorously as they should so it could allow a more complete analysis of the era, the strategies and decisions of back then.

Connecting with the previous point, it is relevant to point out that the history is usually written by the victorious and the perspectives given will be always subjective. A careful analysis and study of the intelligence of the period will contribute to the debate in the history and to shape different perspectives of why and how the event happened. And by no means is the Second World War different. The state of our knowledge, until the documents of the era were available for study, had been controlled by the victorious´ perspective. Declassifying the documents and intelligence reports of the era not only gave us different options of analysis but also provided us relevant information related to aspects like Hitler´s judgement, his understanding of the events, the Japanese perspective and so on. It also provided us with valuable analysis and information of how the war was won by the Allies and how the political and military alliances were forged. Without any doubt, the study of intelligence raised the quality of the debate regarding the outbreak, the evolution and the outcome of the second major quarrel the World lived in the twentieth century.

Intelligence and the Second World War

Secret intelligence in the Second World War covers a wide range of documents from intelligence reports, assessments, conversations, correspondence and different types of diplomatic reports to agreements and memoirs. This wide range could make a good argument of why is the intelligence analysis so important for the understanding of an event such as the Second World War. Even so, this argument is not enough.

As Farris taught us, the history written before 1974 did not include the intelligence in its final analysis and narration. With the access, even limited, to secret intelligence documentation the perspectives of how, why and what happened changed and developed new theories. Intelligence was necessary for the formulation of the policies by the Great Powers starting with the 1930s. This argument supports the importance intelligence analysis had in the historical evolution. The intelligence gathered in this period of time became very relevant for the understanding of the progression of events leading to the major quarrel.

Richard Aldrich reminds us that with the input of the study of secret intelligence in the thirties and forties, the international history experienced a great development (Aldrich, 1998, pp.179-217). It is particularly important to understand the situation in which the information was analysed and which were the factors that influenced the statesmen to take the decisions they took and how they took them. By analysing this we have to consider the importance intelligence as knowledge had in the decision-making of the time. There is no surprise that the period preceding the Second World War, starting with the Great Depression, is a tense one and the tension begins to increase with the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of Germany in 1933. The unfolding of events after his placing in office took a different pace than expected. The Munich crisis of 1938 represents a special inflection point in the understanding of the outbreak of the Second World War and of the decisions made during it nonetheless.

It is also very relevant to mention the type of states and regimes the World was dealing with. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Militaristic Japan were the aggressive and revisionist powers that pretended to challenge the international order and shift it. Dealing with this kind of states within the international system, made the intelligence tool in decision making both gruelling and fundamental. Gruelling because obtaining the information was difficult in repressive states where the danger of being apprehended could have had perilous consequences. At the same time, it was fundamental as it was important to have the information at the right time in order to be able to act either deterring the aggressors or defending the State. All the same was the situation with the Soviet Union. Inversely, the revisionist powers, and especially the Germans and the Japanese, needed extensive information and a correct assessment of British, American and French intelligence in order to prepare their offensive plans and to anticipate potential reactions.

The importance of intelligence is related to the way in which it was assessed and how it was used by the decision makers. Both in the 30s and during the Second World War, intelligence had a series of "failures" that drove the situations into specific directions. But the failures we may consider are mostly failures of analysis and prediction of the enemies´ intentions than failures to detect or gather the information. Maybe one of the most important examples is the misperception of the intentions that both Germany and the two allied western powers, Britain and France, had in relation with the Polish crisis (Overy, 1998, pp. 451-480); this "failure" drove them all to war. The same situation was in the case of the failed prediction of the Pearl Harbour attack. Many examples could furthermore support this statement.

The assessment of the intelligence gathered is essential, especially when intelligence is an important tool in supporting the decision-makers. Robert Bowie´s and Andrew Marshall´s debate over the importance of intelligence in policy making focused on the assessment issue of the intelligence as a process. While Bowie defined intelligence as "knowledge and analysis designed to assist action", Marshall payed special attention to the "differences between the gathering and analysis of data, on the one hand, and making decisions partly by the use of such data, on the other" (May, 1984, p.3-4). What both come to say is that assessment is essential in shaping the policy and in making the decisions and it should be considered as a fundamental component of the intelligence cycle.

Intelligence assessment, as Marshall described it, may be categorized in relation with its aim. Thus, assessment can be used to foresee and prevent potential conflicts, compare capabilities and predict different contingencies, monitor current developments of developing conflicts and can be used to warn in case of imminent military danger (May, 1984, p.5). All these types of assessment were relevant in the outbreak, the evolution and the outcome of the Second World War.

The mistakes made in the assessment of the intelligence gathered and the failure of the statesmen into considering it objectively drove their decisions to disastrous outcomes in some situations. Peter Jackson considered this argument and developed the idea explaining that elements like racism (or ethnocentrism, as Ferris suggests), the tendency of projecting one´s own logic into others, known as ´mirror-imaging´, and the politicization of the decision-making process when taking into account the ideology, the bureaucratic political agendas and the imperatives of the domestic policies, damaged the assessment of intelligence during this period. Furthermore, this raised problems between the producers and the consumers of intelligence, without question (Jackson, 2000, p. 8). Ferris argues that ´the statesmen used intelligence to understand their environment and to alter it, and relied upon their own intuition rather than the estimates of their professional analysts´ as they were influenced by ideology and ethnocentrism (Ferris, 2003, p. 311). Therefore, the decision-makers were prevented to understand the different policies their counterparts would adopt and develop as a result of the ideology differences and difficulty in understanding.

Along with the intelligence assessment, the relation between policy and intelligence is fundamental in understanding the value that the study of intelligence brings. In order to develop their own policies, domestic or foreign, they must understand the policies that the other powers intent to develop. Ferris made a good point when he explained that the job of the intelligence services it is much more complicated than just gathering information. Ferris explains that internally, a government might have the same objective but the bodies composing that government might differ in the means by which they want to achieve those aims. This is why it is particularly important for the intelligence system to understand how the different governments work.

In the 1930s and furthermore during the Second World War, the intelligence services had a major difficulty in doing so. This might be attributed to the complex governments the revisionist powers had. The unpredictability of the decisions made by the Führer could be found among its own general staff and therefore even the best assessment might have failed. The faction between the Army and the Navy in Japan made the assessment much more difficult. Mussolini´s alliance with Hitler, his continuous swap of preferences and the different messages he was sending with his actions also made a tough case for the intelligence assessment. The outcomes tend to lead the powers to understand the intentions of the other powers in fragmentary way and in particular instances which makes difficult the decision-making.

Even though intelligence played an important role, it was not as important in the view of the leaders of the time as ideology was. Also the ethnocentrism and the misconceptions between the cultures made them push away intelligence assessment and prioritize other aspects, less relevant in fact. Britain and France did not take Hitler´s war scares or his faith and dedication to his ideology as serious as they should have or as intelligence indicated. The mirror-imaging was also a big mistake as the government systems were completely different in aims and approaches. The arrogance with which some of the leaders treated others had a tragic effect on the environment itself. The major problem was that these kind of misconceptions prevented the statesmen to understand each other´s policy, thus to predict the outbreak of the war. Hence we could agree with Ferris when he states that ´racists, social-Darwinists and Marxists-Leninists misconstrued liberals as thoroughly as the liberals misconstrued them´ (Ferris, 2003, p. 313).

Conclusion

The state of our knowledge before the thorough study and analysis of intelligence was conditioned by the perspective of the victorious. With the study of secret intelligence we have been able to apprehend and analyse attitudes, contexts and actions that previously had only been speculations. Without knowing them, the Second World War would have remained a major question mark in many aspects.

Studying secret intelligence gave the possibility of an extensive debate and different perspectives to take into account when analysing the origins and the outbreak of the Second World War. The debate enabled by the study of secret intelligence of the period also developed interesting tools to understand the conflict whose consequences are still felt.

Without the study of secret intelligence of the Second World War, we would have probably understood the importance of intelligence and especially of the assessment of intelligence much later. Hitler had decided at the beginning of 1939 to start the war but by no means had he wanted a European conflict of international amplitude. However, the Allies, convinced that the Nazi dictator was discouraged by the different methods used by them (diplomatic offers, economic, military, political concessions etc.) and doubting his determination and credibility encouraged involuntarily the major conflict. This could not have been understood without the comprehensive study of intelligence, as Richard Overy argues.

The brief reference to the Cold War is another argument in understanding the importance that the study of intelligence in decoding the ´true´ history of the twentieth century. The seeds of the global conflict unfolded after the peace-making appeared during the events that happened between 1939 and 1945. The decisions made by the great powers during the war lead to the so-called Cold War. This, as the global conflict mentioned previously, represents an important argument to support the relevance of a research and apprehended analysis of the secret intelligence of the previous century.

In 1989, the conflict, prolonged along so many decades ended, the victory being attributed, obviously, to the capitalist states. With the opening (still partially and very selectively) of the archives, the experts were able to develop a more thorough and realistic analysis of the World War. Nonetheless, we still do not have a complete perspective to determine to what extent its analysis represents the only perspective of the victorious. An important part of the secret intelligence of the era is still not accessible to public research; we refer, especially (although not exclusively) to the precious documents kept in the archives of the currently Russian Federation.

Again, the argument of the importance the thorough study of secret intelligence has is supported by the historical events and the posterior happenings. Historians like Richard Overy, Joseph Maiolo and Patrick Finney contributed to the understanding of this aspect.

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THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR – THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE OFFICE IN BUCHAREST (USAIS)

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Abstract

This material aims to present the activity and organization of the United States Information Office (or United States of America Intelligence Service - USAIS) in Bucharest at the beginning of the Cold War. The Information Office was an informative structure of the US State Department which was in charge of gathering information regarding the actions of the Soviet Union and the communist regime from Bucharest that were meant to lead to the communization of Romania. The Office was preparing general synthesis about Romania, and, implicitly about the communist camp. Various scattered and available information which existed in different public locations in Romania was collected, materials which were then sent to the American decision-makers in order to report in real time any discovered change which may have been of value to the USA security in the Balkans.

Keywords: *Cold War, espionage, Romania, United States, CIA, Frank Wisner, Frank Shea, Radio Free Europe*

The Information Office's leadership

By taking advantage of the Soviet invasion and the anticommunist orientation of the country, in August 1944 the structures of the American Informative Service rapidly established official relations with the defense and the security structures of the Romanian state, developing a close co-operation: *The General Staff of the Romanian Army, The Romanian Special Information Service* (SSI – Serviciul Special de Informații), *Prefectura Poliției Capitalei* (Bucharest), *The General Safety and The Gendarmerie*. In their return, the Romanian institutions decided to create some special bureaus that kept in

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touch with the American and British Mission, each having a representative staff who was fluent in English (ANIMV, FD 140, pp. 43-53).

However, the power seizure by the Petru Groza government and the decision to reorganize the Romanian Special Information Service (SSI) which took place on the 14th of March 1945, led to the aggravation of the American informative structures's situation from Romania. The networks and the agents, formerly created with hard work by Frank Wisner and his team, were compromised. The new leadership of the SIS reported to Groza Government: "Until the 6th of March 1945, the Americans have had the best elements of penetration in the Romanian objective, elements which they fully exploited" (ANIMV, FD 140, pp. 43-53). Consequently, it was necessary for Washington to rethink the organization of its informative agency on a new conceptual basis. The person who inspired and organized that agency was Colonel Walter Ross, known as being the head of the US intelligence community in Romania. The structuring of the informative departments was performed hierarchically among the two representations of the United States in Romania: the Military Mission and the Legation. Therefore, the first post-war organization of the American Informative Service from Romania took place within the Diplomatic Representation and the American Military Mission, according to the following structure: 1). The Intelligence Office – led by lt. George Bookbinder (or Bockbinder); 2). Counterintelligence Office – led by Lt. Col. Walter M. Ross* (ASRI, Dossier Fund no. 2595, p. 68) who was helped by Madison Louis[1]; and 3). The United States of America Intelligence Office (USAIS), structure also known as the Political Intelligence Service of the US Diplomatic Representation.

At the beginning, the United States Intelligence Service (USAIS) had few objectives, the most important one consisting in collecting information about the economic and political aspects, improving United States' image in Romania's public opinion through propaganda activities as well as monitoring the population's orientation. Since its inception, the Intelligence Service had undergone various organizational stages, during June, July, and August 1945. The leadership was appointed to Frank Shea, officer of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), who also carried out the job of press attaché of the Political Representation of USA within the American Military Mission in Romania. Bureaus were put at the disposal of the Office at the headquarters of the Political Representation of the Mission from Dionisie Street number 9[2].

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[1] W. Ross (officer of Office of Strategic Services - OSS) came to Romania in January 1945 as head of the US Intelligence Service (there is information that he might have arrived in Romania as far back as December 1944), he lived in Nicolae Filipescu street number 22, drove the Mission's car number 42; according to a character sketch of SSI (Serviciul Special de Informaţii din România): "He was influenced by captain Madison who was more intelligent".

[2] From October 1946 the Intelligence Service moved in Diana Street no. 12, where all the departments where reunited.

Frank Richard (Robert) Shea was known to be a journalist and magazine editor. He studied at the Universities of Maine and Boston, worked for a period of time for the *United Press* from New York as information deputy editor. In 1941 Shea became head of the Manufactures National Association publishing where he edited magazines about adjusting plants, war production etc. In 1943, he worked at the Office of War Information and then he worked in Cairo for one year as head of the information section of the Office of War Information. After the invasion of Italy, he was transferred to the U.S. Army's Psychological Warfare Branch as head of informative operations in Italy. Shea arrived in Bucharest on March 1945, had two daughters, his wife being a writer (ASRI, D. no. 2595, pp. 1-11).

Frank Shea's informative possibilities were quite large, he had relatives in Romania, knew Romanian well, assets used to travel a lot in the territory. In an American paper, Frank Shea appears to be "Allan Dules's man in Berne"[3] (Kirkpatrick, 1991, pp. 195-196). The information is reliable and completes the picture of Allan Dules's activity in Switzerland, whose focus was placed on our country as well. From his arrival, Frank Shea worked with George McDonald, with the aid of Florence (Chevy) Brown[4] (ASRI, D. no. 2595, pp. 1-11), cultural attaché and Helen Heyden, secretary. Tereza Mendel was the typist, and Mona Mavrocordat was the librarian. Other employees were Ion Comșa, Angela Lerianu, and Imperio Matheescu, all working at the American Military Mission in Romania, since October 1944, where they had been doing the Romanian press review in English and, at the same time, had been distributing the press material (ANIMV, FD 149). In September 1945, Serafim Buta (member of OSS) was called to the Office, and was assigned with the distribution of American documentary films brought into the country (propaganda). In December 1946, Frank Shea left the country receiving other missions (Shea will become CIA official in Switzerland, 1949-1950).

Following Shea, the leadership of the Office was ensured by interim George McDonald (December 1946 – May 1947). McDonald was born in New York and studied at different schools of arts. Professionally speaking, George McDonald was a commercial artist and advertising specialist, for many years dealing with such activities. He joined the Intelligence Office of War in 1945[5]. McDonald came to Romania in August 1945 as Frank Shea's deputy, at some

[3] In 16 November 1944, Robert Shea worked in France with David Kirkpatrick, having the mission to "hunt" Axis' agents.
[4] Florence F. Brown, adjunct head of the U.S. Information Office in Bucharest, came in the country in July 1945. During the war, she worked as a member of the United States Intelligence Service in North Africa, India and China. She studied at the University of California.
[5] George McDonald appears on the list of the OSS Stuff (CIA, December 2010).

point he was dismissed for economic reasons (around August 1947) but despite all these, he remained active. According to the SSI character profile, George McDonald was 40-42 years old, had mediocre education and general information, he didn't know any foreign languages, being in the United States government's service since the time of the war. He was aware of his low intellectual and cultural level, systematically avoiding contact with the Romanian intellectuals and officials. He had "close" ties with Fulvia Grigoriţa (Banu Maracine Street), a young swimmer, who, although known as his fiancée, appeared to have had different relations as well. George McDonald travelled around the country accompanying photo exhibitions, but because he couldn't speaking any other languages except for English and because he was very detached from the people he encountered, McDonald only established shallow connections, avoiding, if possible, contact with the Legation.

In January 1947, Donald Carl Dunham was appointed as head of the US Information Office in Bucharest but he came into office only in May 1947. He was 38-39 years old; he had a degree in literature, and was the son of a wealthy and respected family form Columbia, Ohio. Between 1930-1940, he worked in the US Diplomatic Service, having consular jobs in Berlin, Hong-Kong, Athens, and Aden. He resigned in 1940 to work at an important arts museum in New-York. In 1942, he was hired as editor of the weekly magazine *Life*, occasionally collaborating with *New York Herald Tribune.* At the same time, he lectured at the free *Coozer Union* University in New York, writing a memoirs book reflecting his life between 1930-1940, which was published in 1944 in New York and London. According to the SSI, the memoirs book "shows curiosity, intelligence, insight, synthesis and analysis power and a great knack for storytelling". Dunham rejoined diplomacy at the end of 1946, being appointed as head of the Information Office attached to the Bucharest Legation. According to his own confessions, during his stay in Romania he had an intimate relation with Nora Samuelly (see Dunham, 2000). Culturally speaking, SSI noted that Dunham had an unusual general knowledge, with a certain specialization in literature, psychology, philosophy and social science, artistic taste and strong interest in fine arts, developed analytical mind, psychological insight, sharpened critical eye with bitter and sour bursts against American civilization, against his colleagues and superiors he believed he was superior to (…).

The organization of the Information Office – the departments' structure, the staff's responsibilities, the salary and material basis

The organization of the US Intelligence office in Bucharest and the most of those presented below are based on different reports of the repressive organs of the Romanian state, especially those for the Romanian Special Intelligence Service (SSI), which the communist system took over in March 1945.

Once the preparations of the peace treaties advanced and they were signed, the Allied Control Commission's activity and the role of the American Military Mission in Romania should have ended. This is why, it was decided that the Information Office would be reorganized in order to compensate for the informative gap left by the Military Mission.

Thus, with Donald Carl Dunham taking the office, this meant the signal of transformations and instability for the Information Office[6]. The new chief's first intention was to assign Serafim Buta and place the Romanian press review under the Legation's Political Department control, both financially and functionally. The savings would be used to extend the library, to bring new documentary movies, and to assure that a few brochures on agriculture and public health from US would be published in Romanian. However, Donald Dunham's intentions had been temporarily encumbered by the Office's budgetary cuts from 1947-1948, as decided by the US Senate in July 1947. This measure first led to the pre-warning of some of the stuff who began to leave the Office, and then some of them were called back: Florence Brown, George McDonald, and Serafim Buta. Consequently, the Romanian press review came out sporadically, appearing only in August and September.

It is worth mentioning that the organizational transformations in Romania were part of a wider plan. The US Information Office from Romania was part of the *Office of Politics Coordination* (OPC) led by Frank Wisner (CIA), using as an umbrella cover the US State Department. Since OPC's main tasks were: propaganda actions, the economic warfare, preventing direct actions (sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolitions, and evacuation measures), subversive actions against the hostile states (including supporting clandestine resistance movements) and supporting indigenous anti-communist elements from the free world (http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000104823/DOC_0000104823.pdf), it is not difficult to deduce the nature of the activities conducted by the US Intelligence Office in Bucharest.

In the fall of 1947, a US Congressmen visit occurred which struck a deal with the Legation regarding the continuance of the press review writing, part of the Office's expenses being incurred by the very US Legation budget. After the US delegation's departure, the Press and Information Office's departments were reorganized as illustrated below:

a) *The library*, led by Mona Mavrocordat, with aproximatively 1200 books, 2500 brochures to lend, and subscriptions to about 160 magazines.

b) *The Documentary Movies Department*, led by Serafim Buta.

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[6] Donald Dunham was appointed *Public Affairs Officer* of the US Legation in Bucharest.

c) *The Press Department, which was* daily broadcasting the news from Washington – under direct supervision of Frank Shea – and the Romanian press review in English – under direct supervision of Ion Comșa. The Department also had the task of distributing media materials to applicants.

d) *Social and Cultural Department*. The department established the Office's connection with journalists, cultural figures, members of the "US friends" Society and YMCA members (*Young Man's Christian Association*), with Frank Shea as head of the department assisted by Florence (Chevy) Brown.

One of the Office's routine task was to prepare the general synthesis about Romania and, implicitly about the communist camp (Sherman Kent, 1949)[7]. Various loose and available information which existed in different public locations in Romania was collected, materials which were then sent to the American decision-makers in order to report in real time any discovered change which may have been of interest to the USA security in the Balkans. The American practice required that those newsletters included assessed information from: diplomatic offices in the territory, secret agents, business intelligence, news agencies. All of them were received by Washington, many of them being also sent to the *Library of Congress,* where there was a special department that made its own special country newsletters (Roger Hilsman[8], 1959, p. 190). At the same time the reception and multiplication of the radio news was organized in order to be distributed both in political and the Mission's circles and of the Romanian press.

The head of the Information Office: according to the new organization established by Washington, Donald Carl Dunham was leading the US Legation's Information Office's entire activity, was keeping in touch with the Legation's Political Department, he reported to the State Department about the cultural activities undertaken by the Office in Romania, as well as about the anti-American campaign initiated by the Romanian authorities at the press, radio, cinema, theatre, publishing houses etc levels, countersigned the weekly summery and recommendations for *Voice of the United States* radio station's program, ensuring the relations with the media, academia, intellectuals and the members of the "US Friends" Society (ANIMV, FD 149, pp. 5-11). Donald Carl Dunham also reported on the cultural activity undertaken by the USSR, Britain, France etc. in Romania. Other duties

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[7] The country newsletters were some reports systematically reviewed. They contained extensive information on political, economical, military etc. problems, and were prepared for every country in the world. A description of these newsletters can be found at Sherman Kent (1949).

[8] Roger Hilsman was an OSS-CIA officer in Burma (1944-1945), Great Britain (1950-1952), Vietnam (1962-1963).

concerned the organizing of the library's activity and that of the discs and documentaries stores, ordering of books, magazines, discs, and movies. In exercising these duties, the Office's head was assisted by the following departments and staff:

Secretariate: Nora Isabela Samuelly worked here, acting as secretary and typist. She typed mail and reports, but the ones which were confidential were ascribed to the Legation's American typists. Ion Comşa was another employee, secretary, and interpreter, whose tasks were: to translate and summarize the "Voice of America" radio broadcasts' in English, translate technical documents (laws, conventions, platforms etc), collect anti-American press materials , monitor the cultural activities conducted in Romania by other diplomatic missions and data centralization for the activity reports. Ion Comşa also monitored the Romanian press, verified the reasons for suspension or suppression of newspapers. He kept a record of the American statesmen whose speeches were censored by the Romanian press, and if so, indicated the censored pages.

The library: the job of head librarian was that of Ioana Mavrocordat. Her tasks were: the classification and the registration of the received books and periodicals, suggesting the purchase of new books and periodicals, the coordination of the discs and documentary department, collecting statistical data on discs and library's activity, preparing the music listening and documentary viewing schedule. Other employees included Sandra Zaharescu Caraman and Calliope Ghinopol (librarian assistants) who supervised the reading rooms, registered the borrowings, sorted out the books, periodicals, and discs.

The administrative department: was led by George McDonald. The job's ascription: staff's coordination, the maintenance of the necessary equipments for the Office (the building, furniture, cleaning, gramophones, cars, central heating, duplicating machines), the purchase of office supplies and furniture, carrying around different payments, bookkeeping of the service's accounting, organizing photo exhibitions and country tours, organizing receptions and decorating the ball rooms. George McDonald also held the job of Office's Head deputy, having the following subordinates: Aurel Samoil, typist secretary, fulfilled almost all the jobs that were the responsibility of his chief; Nicolle Toroceanu, phone operator; Vasile Covaci, day doorkeeper; Nicolae Drăguţ, night doorkeeper, Constantin Pellecudis, courier and a kind of "jack of all trades", handled duplicating machines, sorted out newspapers collections etc.; Victor Ardeleanu, idem; Petre Pavlicovschi, Marcelo Fabian, Gheorghe Balaş – drivers; Anastasia Ştefan and Silvia Pavel – care-takers.

The press department: the head of this department was Serafim Buta (sometimes, Jeronim), Romanian – born American citizen (press attaché, former employee of the Office of Strategic Services). The job's description was: receiving, correcting, censoring, and the multiplication of the daily newsletter sent by Washington, local media reading and writing the Romanian press review, issuing a weekly summary of the events and press comments which was passed to the "Voice of America" along with suggestions regarding the programs adaptation to the circumstances, organizing the English translation of the confidential documents for the Legation, the distribution of written materials, photos and magazines to the Romanian press.

Since the Romanian authorities suspected that the American Legation was monitoring and gathering information material on Romania's involvement in supporting world communism, at some point Buta's clandestine operation was given away because he requested some centralized information from the intern press regarding the support of the "free Greek government" (an action which proved the involvement of the Romanian communist regime in supporting the Greek communists, an action likely to incriminate the international regime[9]). Therefore, the SSI leadership recommended that: "The American Legation's actions are to be overseen very carefully, in all the possible developments, since we inferred from the surveillance of this covert activities that a great deal of importance is placed upon the political informative network" (ANIMV, *FD 149*, p. 39).

Serafim Buta was assisted by Angela Lerianu, chief translator, who: was monitoring newspaper articles and was sending articles and news information that were to be included in the Romanian press review to be translated or summarized, checked and corrected the translations, established the emergency order and the page layout, sorted out and distributed the press material, all these in accordance with the head of the department's directives. Other subordinates of Serafim Buta were: Silvya Placa, general translator, Ion Olănescu, translator, economic topics, Teresina Mendel, typist, was in charge of typing the Romanian press review, Irina Marinescu, typist, typed the English newsletter, Emil Homoceanu, Morse operator, received the English radio news, Oprea Ion wrote in shorthand the Romanian programs of the "Voice of America", worked from home.

Because of the connection to the editorial staff from the "Dreptatea" newspaper, or with Comșa Ion, George McDonald, and Constantin Mugur-

[9] See also the involvement of the Romanian Communist Party in illegal supporting the French miners, *France: Soviet Pressure; Communist Labor* (Secret), Weekly Summary Excerpt, 26 Nov. 1948; https:/www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/.

Brener, Serafim Buta was deemed to be the key element in the preparation of the political materials intended for Lt. Col. Albert Seitz[10] (Head of the Political Bureau of the American Military Mission). Until Roy Melbourne's departure[11] (October 1947), Serafim Buta often visited him to report on the collected political information. Buta was frequently reported at the US Legation, where he particularly met with Henry Leverich, the Legation's first counselor, Vaughn C. Ferguson, the Legation's second secretary, and with Parisella Henry, former secretary of Burton Berry (from May 1946, Parisella moved to the US Policy Mission). Though Buta's intellectual abilities were assessed by SSI as "poor", overall, his possibilities in gathering raw material on the public opinion trends in Romania were relatively high, being reported as receiving different visits, and therefore information, from the following sources: 1) Zaharnic, YMCA managing director, who because of his job was considered to be the collector of news and rumors from the members, 2) "US Friends" Society's members and leaders, who were in similar situations as that of Zaharnic, 3) the correspondents Williams Lawrence and Liviu P. Nasta from *New York Times* and Leonard Kirschen from *Associated Press* and 4) Journalists such as: Vernescu from „Căminul şi Femeia"; dr. Bercovitz, former chief of the „Liberalul" newspaper; Leon Proca (*alias* Carp) and Manoliu from the former „Dreptatea" (PNŢ); Zurescu from „Liberalul"; dr. Flavius from „Timpul" or Adrian Ranta from „Semnalul"; N. Carandino, Emil Serghie and T.T. Branişte, who were friends with Frank Shea.

During the time when he was a sergeant in the US Army and conducted missions in the country, Serafim Buta has made connections in the country, amid members of the "US Friends" Society's branches, among them being professor Borza from Cluj and a certain Popa from Olteniţa. Among Serafim Buta's intimate Romanian friends were Imperio Mateescu, his country relatives (Făgăraş and Dobrogea), various acquaintances made during his country travels, and various women, including Nina Mateevici and the famous singer Maria Tănase. Among the Americans, Buta was friend with Bruce Weldon (accounting clerk at the Legation, with whom he lived in the same apartment).

Referring to the indoctrination of the Romanian staff employed by the US Information Office, SSI reported the following findings: "The Romanian staff of the US Information Office does not exhibit a consistent and even political behavior. Contradictory attitudes appear which shows a lack of

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[10] In August 1944, Lieutenant Col. Albert Seitz conducted OSS operations in Yugoslavia supporting the Chetnik. See John Whiteclay Chambers II, *OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II*, U.S. National Park Service, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 360-361.
[11] Roy Melbourne – Diplomatic Advisor and Foreign Affairs officer.

training and of political education from the staff. (…) All the pieces of clue say that the staff was recruited only by taking into consideration the technical and administrative requirements of the Office's organization, on condition that that the Romanian staff would not create indiscretions to the authorities. In this regard, the organization of both the Office and the Legation is prepared in such a way that what stands as a secret action is given only to the American officials, and this is because both the Office's leaders and the Legation's diplomatic agents are very careful because they understand the Romanian authorities' vigilance" (ANIMV, FD 149, pp. 27-28).

In order to ensure connections with the exterior and the centre from Bari (Italy), even during Frank Shea's time, the American Information Service managed the installation of three transceiver stations:

1) Batiștei Street Station from building no 33, the unit being used for the air routing of the US Air Force, station led by a certain Lieutenant Samuel;

2) Oțetari Street Station from building no 3, station which served as connection to the military headquarters in Europe;

3) the high power station installed on 9th of March 1946 in the Stănescu Hotel building, primary used by the US Diplomatic and Policy Mission, became operational under the leadership of the engineer Emil Homoceanu assisted by Czech engineer Klapka.

The radio newscasts were prepared by Emil Homoceanu and daily retrieved by Sergeant Stiff in order to be handed over to Frank Shea. As a security measure, Colonel Pierson Andersen, head of the American Mission's Transmissions Department, gave orders that the broadcasts should be made on the 45-47 m wavelength, to avoid being detected (AN, PCM-SSI, D. 43/1946). At the Radio Department, adjutant lieutenant Constantin Francis was also chief, engineer by profession, assisted by Sergeant Dan Lee, a radio specialist. Among other officials of the Media Department, SSI notes also mention Sergeant Charles Welch, residing at the US training camp "Stănescu", American sergeant Greenby, the radio – telegraph specialist. On 29th January 1947, col. Lloyd, also arrived general inspector in the US Army, and his aide Lieutenant Schonmacker (ANIMV, FD 51 685, f. 5). Then the SSI reports highlighted that the Americans were involved in the clandestine radio transmitter problem. In August 1947, the Romanian Second Security Service (*Serviciul II Siguranță*) has compiled a dossier in which the American Mission was accused of supplying building parts, emission lamps, diagrams etc in order to create a valuable information agency, able to communicate in all circumstances the data required by the US Service. Moreover, the Second Security Service announced its superiors that it would make a penetration action [intro the US objective] through an informant who has a TFF – emission device and who was recruited by the Romanian Counterintelligence (*Cartea Albă a Securității*, Vol. I (SRI, 1997) -The White Paper on Security, pp. 386 – 387).

The Staff's wages: the US Information Office's employees received payments ranging from 4500 to 14000 lei (1 dollar USA=150 new lei, 1947). They were paid by the Legation, where a state wages was signed, next to each name the account number was added. The highest wage, 13000 – 14000 lei, was that of the translator Ion Olănescu, since he was the Legation's earliest employee (working here since 1927). Silvya Placa and Ion Comșa were next with 10500 lei each, Mona Mavrocordat and Angela Lerianu each with about 9000-9500 lei, Nora Samuelly and A. Samoil each with 8000-8500 lei, Emil Homoceanu, Tereza Mendel, Sanda Karaman, Calliope Ghinopol and Toroceanu Nicolle each with 6500-7500 lei, Miron Ionescu with 5000 lei, the doorkeepers and the drivers with 4000-4500 lei, and eventually the maids with 3500 lei each. Because the wages were insufficient, the Information Office asked the Center to raise them, but as the answer was being delayed, they resorted to additional "CARE" aid packages and cash loans. For example, during the 1947 Christmas, all employees received pricks between 5000 and 20000 lei, depending on their wages and family difficulties.

The Information Office's material basis: they also had: 4 cars (with registration numbers: 136, 370, 436 and 432 C.D), 8 cinema projectors, 4 electric gramophones, 2 matrix multipliers, 2 short films and slides automatic projectors, 3 radio reception devices "Hallicrafter" (large type) used by Donald Dunham, Serafim Buta and Emil Homoceanu and one "Hallicrafter" (small type) (ANIMV, FD 149, pages 11-28).

The Information Office's connection with the Romanian circles

The relations between the Information Office's American officials and the Romanian circles were limited to a few journalists and different intellectuals. As long as the Office was led by Frank Shea (summer 1945 – winter 1946), these relationships were methodically established. Frank Shea often organized dinners at home or at "Capșa" where he particularly invited N. Carandino (from *Dreptatea*), Emil Serghie (*Momentul*), I. Zurescu (*Liberalul*), T.T. Braniște and Al Coller (*Jurnalul*). Seldom did he invite I. Christu – Plenipotentiary Minister, Mihail Ghelmegeanu, Savel Rădulescu, Sebastian Șerbescu (*Semnalul*), Liviu P. Nasta (*Jurnalul*), Guy Pauker (*United Press*), Emil Ottulescu (lawyer), the Papacostea brothers, Mihail Romniceanu (former Finance Minister), professor George Oprescu, Ionescu–Mihăiești, Ciuca etc. Besides them, US and foreign correspondents and the Information Office's British, American, and seldom Romanian officials also participated at Frank Shea's dinners. The Office organized several large receptions, for instance: the Christmas of 1945 and the Epiphany (Boboteaza) of 1946, as well as the cinema avant-premieres in public halls, where tickets for the press and friends were distributed. In time, these presentations were canceled because of the censorship imposed by the communist regime.

During the period of time the Information Office was led by George McDonald as deputy (winter 1946 – spring 1947), the Office's social interactions gradually declined, even though attempts were made to maintain Frank Shea's tradition of organizing dinner with intimates. Florence Brown was the one who held several dinners always attended by McDonald and Serafim Buta. As the results were not at all encouraging, relationships went towards an end. Some causes that could be mentioned are: cuts in the representation funds, the dollar's purchasing power reduction, Dunham's desire to avoid political activities as well as the general political development (the United Nations Assembly, Maniu's lawsuit etc.).

In early 1948, the US Legation's Information Office's only connections to the Romanian press were:

1) the direct ones, maintained with the Bucharest newspapers, with the accredited journalists attending the library to ask for press material released by Serafim Buta's department: L. Paul (*Adevărul*), Munteanu (*Semnalul*), Paraianu (*Economistul*), Nedeleanu (*Universul*), Popovici (*Fapta*), Constanta Trifu (*Ultima Oră*), Pitar (*Finainţe şi industrie*), Vernescu – Wexler (*Femeia şi Căminul*), Duna (*Naţiunea*), Brumaru (*Scânteia*) and Focşăneanu (*Ziarul Ştiinţelor şi călătoriilor*);

2) The indirect ones, through American agencies and newspaper's correspondents who updated Donald Dunham and Serafim Buta on daily events: Williams Lawrence and Liviu P. Nasta[12] from *The New York Times* and Leonard Kirschen from *Associated Press*;

3) The sporadic ones, connections developed at the various receptions organized by the Ministry of Information, the Prime Minister or by the foreign legations (ANIMV, FD 149, pp. 29- 32).

Propaganda through exhibitions and movies. Since its establishment, the US Information Office organized various exhibitions on various themes. Among them was also the "Exhibition on Penicillin and Public Health" held by the Faculty of Medicine from Bucharest in the summer of

[12] Liviu Popescu Nasta, born April 1st 1891 in Braşov, was the Romanian correspondent of some influential Anglo-Saxon newspapers, preparing newsletters for Ivor Porter through whom he met Saint Brower, *New York Times*' Special Envoy. He introduced Nasta to Burton Berry, the American asking Nasta to prepare newsletters for the US Legation as well, handed to Roy Melbourne. Nasta was arrested by the communist authorities on 25th July 1949, died on 6th December 1956 in the Văcăreşti prison hospital, Nasta was information agent William Deakin's father-in-law, who became Winston Churchill's secretary.

1946, which was a real "success" among the Soviet Army personnel. In exchange for penicillin which was non-existent on the market, the Americans obtained various information from the Russian officers who treated their sexually transmitted diseases in the American consulting rooms. Under the pretext of observing formalities, the Soviets were interrogated by the US medical personnel regarding the full name of the unites they belonged to and the location of their headquarters[13]. The success in Bucharest was reported to USFET (*United States Forces on European Theatre*), the other states members of the Allied Control Commission being advised to initiate a similar program (about "The Penicillin Case" see: Van Rensselaer, 1997).

A few months later the *Tennessee Valley* Exhibition followed at the School of Architecture. In the summer of 1947 the "Agriculture in America" Exhibition took place, at the Academy of Agriculture.

SSI closely monitored the US events, reporting to the communist regime that the organized exhibitions had free entrance, were accompanied by documentary movies presentations, which consequently contributed in an effective way to the American propaganda. Such exhibitions were also organized in the country, especially in Ardeal (Transylvania), where the YMCA (Young Man's Christian Association) and the "US Friends" Society had branches. By taking advantage of these opportunities, George McDonald, Serafim Buta, Florence Brown, Constantin Zaharnic (YMCA) and Petre Grant (decorator painter) had the possibility to go to the country (ANIMV, FD 149, pp. 28-29).

In August 1946, SSI informed the communist authorities that the great American movie houses *Metro-Goldwin*, *Paramount*, *Universal*, *RKO*, *United-Artists*, *Columbia*, *20th Century Fox*, *Warner Bross* and *First National* formed a corporation to distribute the propaganda movies in Romania. Nicu D. Cazasis was appointed managing director of this corporation, owner of "RKO – Art Film", who, after 23rd August 1944 kept permanent contact with the American Mission from Romania where "he agreed to prepare weekly reports on the Soviet penetration in the Romanian economy and particularly in the movie trade" (ASRI, „D", 2595, pp. 317-318).

The Information Office's connections to the Department of State, "The Voice of America" and the "Free Europe radio station"

In addition to monitoring "official" activities, the SSI body also dealt with the Office's covert activity. In this respect, it is stated that "the

[13] On 14th May 1946, Lt. Col. MD. Carol E. Krichbaum replaced Lt. Col. MD Eisen, sent to the Martial Court for selling on the market a large quantity of Penicillin intended for the US Military.

Information Office's leader members created certain connections in the pro-British circles from Romania, among which they conduct a skillful propaganda campaign and lobby, in order to manipulate certain opinion trends in the country as well as to obtain the necessary information to inform the US Government, activity which involves the whole organization of the Office. (...) On the whole, the material collected through these infiltrations is sent in order to provide information the Romanian broadcasts of the *Voice of America* radio station [JBCREOLE – was the cryptonym used by the SSU/CIA for "The Voice of America", our note], broadcasts aimed against the political regime in Romania, the rest of the information being used by the Legation in writing reports for the Department of State" (ANIMV, FD 149, pp. 33-39). SSI stated that the US Information Office's department heads had, in one way or another, direct or indirect connections both with "The Voice of America" radio station in New York and with the Department of State. With the famous radio station the connection was made directly, whereas with the Department of State the connection was established through the US Legation.

CIA classified documents confirm that very important decisions were made in Washington during that time. The Office of Special Operations (OSO) and, afterwards the Office of Politics Coordination led by Frank Wisner, were ordered to directly and heavily engage in establishing and financing *the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.* (NCFE), a clandestine propaganda institution designed to plan and coordinate psychological warfare actions against USSR and the communist regimes in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania (http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000104823/DOC_0000104823.pdf). CIA reports are quite explicit, stating that: "*Radio Free Europe* broadcast policy aims to encourage the release from captivity of those people, the hope to regain national and all individual freedoms, the discouragement of the communist regimes and nomenclatures, the opening of communication channels with the imprisoned people beyond the Iron Curtain, as well as to transmit spiritual and Western democratic values to the states which hope to be free again" (http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000238874/DOC_0000238874.pdf).

Frank Wisner, a person who knew well the field and the players, had a key role within the *National Committee for a Free Europe* project. He showed that the *Radio Free Europe*'s policy's goal was to show to the Soviet satellite nations that the United States of America is the champion of democracy and the leader of the free world against communist totalitarianism. Through its broadcasts, Wisner continues, *Radio Free Europe* addresses to an audience that include about 69 million people, which, according to CIA's most accurate intel, has about 3.1 million receivers able to pick up the radio station on short and medium wavelength (http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/

DOC_0001137561/DOC_0001137561.pdf). Seven people were working at that time for the Romanian department of the "Radio Free Europe Station". The *National Committee for a Free Europe* Project had been designed as a form of anti-communist propaganda, which not only did not cease, but also intensified after the war. As early as March 1944, the OSS's R&A department warned that USSR's foreign propaganda broadcasts amounted to a total of 70 hours daily in over 25 languages. About 77% of their broadcasting time (50 hours) focused on the European countries, about 7% (5 hours) on North America, 4 and a half hours on the Middle East and about 3 hours on the Far East (www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/oss/).

NCFE started by implementing its objectives within the "Radio Free Europe Station" and "Radio Liberty" in Munich, an operation that was conducted by Wisner himself (McLuhan, *An Urgent Whisper*, 1950). There were also "Barbara" broadcasts which used a small mobile transmission complex located in a former *Luftwaffe* base in Lampertheim, West Germany. Among the first broadcasts of Radio Free Europe (RFE) were also those intended for Romania on July 14th, 1950.

According to Walter Smith, *Director of Central Intelligence,* the radio station's broadcast included news, information and policy analysis, designed to prepare peoples from the communist zone for the "D" day. The musical programs contained national creations of some composers criticized by the communist regime, especially folk music reminiscent of the days before the Soviet occupation. There were special programs for celebrating certain local heroes or prohibited historical events. The US current events were discussed within talk shows, being interpreted as viewpoints with a hidden meaning and significance that should stirred the interest of the population so that they could fight against communism. The religious programs spiritually supported and gave reason for the audience's resistance against Kremlin's atheist programs. RFE's one of the most dramatic activities was to denounce informants and traitors. People who collaborated with the communist secret police, who was responsible for arresting anticommunist fighters, were identified. As a result, communist informants were ostracized by their neighbors and community (www.foia.cia.gov/best-of-crest/CIA-RDP80B01676R0040000700328.pdf).

In august 1950, the radio station's broadcasts could have been heard in Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria as well. Four years later, a top secret Department of State report stated that the organizations: "The Free Europe Committee and Radio Free Europe Station are political instruments of propaganda and psychological warfare under CIA's control and the direct supervision of the US Department of State" (Cummings*, A Peek into the Intelligence Bordello of American Cold War Radio Broadcasting*, July 2009). In

1969 CIA described the two radio stations as: "The oldest, the largest, the most expensive, and probably the most successful undercover operations conducted against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (…) From 1949 until 1971 [when CIA stopped the financing] thousands of people worked for these radio stations, the American taxpayers paid over 465 million dollars, however the American government's real financial contribution remained to this day shrouded in mystery and intrigue" (http://www.historytimes.com/fresh-perspectives-in-history/20th-century-history/cold-war/).

Neculai Constantin Munteanu, aware of these realities, highlighted that, when it came to the information sources used by "The Free Europe", the diplomats from the US Embassy in Bucharest were by far the most important, and they were regarded by the radio station's management as: "The safest and most effective source whose data were used in the Romanian department's broadcasts without being checked first". According to Munteanu, another information gathering method was related to the frequent meetings between the radio station's collaborators and the American diplomats stationed in Romania among whom there was a "mutual advantageous" information exchange.

In terms of organization, the *National Committee for a Free Europe*'s activity was divided in six departments, all coordinated by Frank Wisner's OPC:

1) *Division of Exile Relations* (or *National Councils Division*) – a department which worked with the national "exiled" and refugees organizations from Central and South East Europe, whom it assisted and supported. Another task of this department was the training programs on various "issues", for these organizations' leaders.

2) *Radio Free Europe Station.*

3) *The Division of Intellectual Cooperation* – conducted various projects for the academia, cooperating with *Library of Congress.*

4) *The Research and Publications Service* – department where researchers coming from the USSR satellite states were employed, who, under the coordination on an US editorial staff: monitored, collected, developed, analyzed and disseminated various information of interest for peoples in the communist sphere (propaganda). The program had three components: news from beyond the Iron Curtain, mass-media contacts and newsletters in national languages.

5) *The Crusade for Freedom, Inc* – separated from the propaganda department, was responsible of organizing conferences, printing materials and disseminating movies.

6) *The General Administration* – dealt with identifying and recruiting the necessary staff for the Committee's various departments (http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000429923/DOC_0000429923.pdf).

Epilogue

On March 6th, 1950, the USA Government through US Secretary in Bucharest Rudolf Schoenfeld, addressed the Romanian Government asking for details about the reasons for closing the US Information Office in Bucharest. In response, the Government of the Romanian People's Republic's (RPR) stated that the US Information Office was established as US Legation's annex organization in Bucharest, providing books to certain Romanian subjects, "hostile elements to the Romanian people". On May 13th, 1950 Rudolf Schoenfeld sent a telegram to the US Department of State, where he presented the Romanian authorities' response regarding the US Legation's functioning issue in Bucharest:"In connection to the visa problem of the US Legation's staff, the RPR Government reminds the US Government that the number of the US Legation's staff currently present in Bucharest is several times higher than it had been before the war, given the fact that between 1936 – 1937 the US diplomatic personnel at the Legation in Bucharest consisted of 6 members, including the Minister accredited at the same time in Athens and Belgrade, where he also had permanent residence. Today, after the war, given that the majority of the US personnel should have left the country since the work within the Allied Control Commission had already finished, we acknowledge the fact that the US Legation's staff consists of 53 members. (…) Therefore, the large number of the Legation's members cannot be considered anything but a symbol of the hostile policy led by the US Government towards the RPR, which is manifested in espionage activities in which some members of the US Legation in Bucharest were involved, as proved by the high treason trials of the National Peasant Party's former leaders, of the Auschnitt – Popp - Bujoiu network, of the conspirator' gangs and of the American and British spies groups of the Information Office, who repeatedly tried to interfere in RPR's internal affairs by initiating some libelous attacks and providing official support to all the traitors who fled from the RPR and showed a hostile attitude towards RPR's interests both in the USA as well as in the United Nations. (…) For all these reasons the RPR's Government demands the US Legation in Bucharest to reduce its staff to a maximum number of 10 people, a number equal to the number of the members of the Romanian Legation in Washington". Signed: [Rudolf] Schoenfeld, Bucharest, May 13th, 1950 (http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/Edocs/1950v04/reference/frus.frus1950v04.i0015.pdf).

A month before, the trial of: "The traitors and spies group which have worked in the US and British Legation's Information Offices" had begun. The defendants were: Constantin Mugur, Anny Samuelly, Eleonora Bunea-Wied, Liviu Popescu Nasta and Nora Samuelly.

Referring to this trial, Frank Wisner's daughter Elizabeth Hazard wrote in her PhD paper that Anny and Nora Samuelly confessed to having known the details of the opposition leaders' evacuation plans and to having used their relationships to provide information on the Soviet troop movement to Burton Berry, Roy Melbourne and their successor Rudolf Schoenfeld. Anny Samuelly admitted to have been recruited to work for the British agent Ivor Porter, as early as 1944, and to have received from him small amounts of arms and ammunition which she hid for the resistance fighters. Both sisters admitted to have understood that the political and cultural general information they provided would have been used by the BBC and "The Voice of America" broadcasts for Romania. Donald Dunham, USIS's managing director, told Nora Samuelly that *The Voice of America*: "was an efficient weapon for encouraging illegal groups and causing riots in Romania" (Hazard, „Magazin istoric", no. 8 and no. 9/1996).

The indictment showed that the US and British Information Offices was the meeting place between the informative agents and the ones incriminated above, who served as Anglo-American espionage residents. According to the "Scânteia" newspaper, the Offices were accused of: "spying all the fields of the Romanian state's activity, everything related to the development of the democratic regime, to the acts of government, or to the country's organizational or security measures". There were accusations of undermining and even of violent overturning of the "democratic regime" established in Romania, organized activities guided and led by the chiefs of the Press and Information Offices and members of the Anglo-American Legations. Constantin Mugur and Anny Samuelly mentioned all the BIO's Chiefs (British Information Office): Ivor Porter, John Bennett, Francis Bennett Marchant. Nora Samuelly mentioned the ones of USIS: Frank Shea and Donald Dunham. One of the reports was prepared by Liviu Popescu Nasta, who might have given "political information about an attempted burglary of the British Labour Parties' units, action planned by Titel Petrescu and his henchmen". Constantin Mugur also confessed that in order to collect information: "Mr. Bennett also used the direct system for collecting information during his journeys in the country. I can give as an example in this regard the journey that John Bennett made by car in Transylvania to collect information in August 1947. After the journey, John Bennett prepared a report which he sent to London. Others members of the British Legation took such journeys. (…) The American Legation's spy Buta took such a trip as well" (*Scânteia*, no. 1.710 from 15th April 1950).

A special chapter of the indictment was named *Breaking the working class' unity*. Anny Samuelly and Liviu Nasta were nominated. Samuelly's statement highlights that John Bennett (who was the British Labour Government's representative) had three goals: 1) to have information as accurate as possible on the Romanian Social Democratic Party's activities, 2) to maintain a connection between the latter and the British Labour Party and 3) to prevent by all means its inclusion in the Romanian Communist Party (PCR). She went on with the following confession: "In Reşiţa, Bennett had long conversations with Iosif Musteţiu, Eftimie Gherman and other social democrats whose right-wing tendencies were known. In order to prevent the merger, in the summer of 1947 Bennett specially invited Morgan Phillips, the Labour Party's General Secretary, and Sam Watson, president of the British Miners' Union, delegating me as permanent interpreter. He introduced them to Titel Petrescu, Adrian Dimitriu, Eftimie Gherman, Hromadka, Musteţiu and others. During the conversations I personally witnessed as interpreter, Phillips advised them on the necessity for a more assertive attitude which should prevent the merger with the Communist Party. Titel Petrescu, Adrian Dimitriu, Gherman, Hromadka, Musteţiu assured Philips that they would fight in whatever way to prevent the merger from happening" (http://istoriabanatului.wordpress.com/2009/06/17/mircea-rusnac-un-proces-stalinist-implicand-agenti-imperialisti-evrei-si-social-democrati-resiteni-1950/).

Therefore the list of defendants presented by the prosecutor at the indictment contained a multitude of the diplomatic staff's names that were at that moment in Bucharest. Le Rougetel (former head of the political mission), General E.R. Greer (former Chief of Staff of the Military Mission), Ivor Porter (former head of BIO), Captain (Rhyt) Key, Robinson, Ramsden (former military attaché deputy), Hoggarth, Cleaver, Boodman, Kendall, Munro, Faure, Springfield, Holman (England's former minister in Bucharest), John Bennett (former head of BIO), Francis Bennett Marchant, Sarrell (former Special Advisor) were nominated from Great Britain. Burton Berry (former head of the political mission), Roy Melbourne (the Legation's former First Secretary), Henry Leverich (the Legation's former adviser), Donald Dunham (former head of the USAIS), Sam (Serafim) Buta, Kohler, Hale (?)[14], George McDonald. Pierre Boullen was added to this list, former French consul in Timişoara were named

[14] It is likely to be Lt. Col. Oron J. Hale mentioned by Interdepartmental *Committee for Acquisition of Foreign Publications*, Meeting of 16th March 1945, Confidential, approved for declassification on March 2008; Reproduced from MSS collections, Lib. of Congress; http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001524346/DOC_0001524346.pdf, accessed 11th December 2010.

From the America. Other names had already been "exposed" on other occasions, especially during the Iuliu Maniu and Popp-Bujoiu trials, such as: Thomas Hall, Ira Hamilton, Vaughn Ferguson, Sam Watson, Bill Young, John Lovell, Frank Shea etc.

The prosecutor's conclusion was as follows: "It is clear that we are not facing some isolated actions, but those of an organized work system within which it is difficult to tell where the diplomatic activity begins and where the espionage ends". In their turn, the officious newspaper "Scânteia" wrote: "Who were the active agents of the British and American Information Offices? Anny and Nora Samuelly, the offsprings of a banker and landowner; Eleonora Bunea-Wied a relative of the Hohenzollern leeches family and the daughter of the former King of Albania; Nasta, Deakin's father in law, the secretary of the wicked warmonger Churchill; Mugur, by all means greedy for fortune – all representatives of the reactionary classes in office, filled with the wildest hatred against the working people and against its democratic regime" (*Scânteia*, no. 1.720 from 27th April 1950).

The US Information Office's activity continued to be blamed and two years later a material entitled: *Collection of Materials Related to the Criminal Activity of the Imperialist Intelligence Services on the Territory of the Romanian People's Republic* was published, where the Bucharest authorities violently exposed the staged trials of the Romanian National Peasant Party's leaders as well as the "Auschnitt-Pop-Bujoiu gang of conspirators, spies and saboteurs", highlighting Frank R. Shea's role in the "act of sabotage against traitors and the plotters convicted in these trials". This material, published by the Political General Direction, the Romanian Ministry of Interior, accused the US Information Office that through the books, newspapers, movies, and other organized events reactionary concepts and racial discrimination had been spread which contained libels against freedom and peace-lover countries and peoples and had openly incited to war. That the political newsletter published by this Office has solely served these purposes. The investigations had established that the defendants, devoted to the Anglo-American imperialist interests, undertook, with the support of the Anglo-American Missions and Legations, an act of high treason. Anny Samuelly and Liviu Nasta have "confessed" that they had handed the Anglo-American Legations reports on the state of the front, the oilfields situation, briefings about troop movements and reactionary illegal organizations, information concerning the state's organization and the ministries' work etc. Nora Samuelly "revealed" that some of the information went "where it was needed" and the rest was used for "The Voice of America" radio station. Donald Dunham would have told her that "The Voice of America" is one of the means of maintaining the psychological warfare (*Culegere de materiale…* 1952, pp. 39-49).

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REVIEWS AND NOTES

Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA

John Rizzo, Scribner, New York, 2014, 320p.

Review by **Daniela BACHEŞ**

A must-read according to former CIA director George J. Tenet, the *Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA* is one of the many memoirs books that have been published within the last decade by former US Government officers having worked in the Intelligence field. However though, the value of this publication springs from the role its author had within the CIA throughout his 30-year long career as a lawyer and the agency's chief legal officer, which introduces the reader, whether that is neophyte, a professional or a scholar of Intelligence, to an organizational culture narrative.

Rizzo has been witnessing the evolution of the CIA and the American Intelligence community during the leadership of 11 directors and throughout key moments in the security and Intelligence modern history of the USA (from the Iran-contra scandal to waterboarding and enhanced interrogation techniques, the pre- and post-9/11 eras, and the decisions made by various presidents that marked the Intelligence-politics relationship).

His legal background provides an interesting testimony that can be used as a primary source for those who want to get a better insight into the organizational transformation of the CIA, especially with regards to the legal framework that shaped its public status. For "people are generally unaware of their own culture until they experience other cultures or are forced to make changes to their own"[1], Rizzo's insider perspective mirrors the CIA's self-awareness of its *raison d'etre* and *modus operandi* within the national and international security community, and the calling into question of its praxis that led to various public controversies at home and abroad.

The CIA, as many other Intelligence organisations, is a bureaucracy, which follows and supports decision-making and the country's interests, however though, crafting its own ways among political changes and shifts.

The presentation of the CIA's transformation is made through the lenses on an individual's career evolution. Nevertheless, Rizzo's commitment

[1] A. Balogh, Z. Gaal, L. Szabo, "Relationship between organizational culture and cultural intelligence", *Management & Marketing Challenges for the Knowledge Society* (2011) Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 96

to the CIA is an important filter to the events, people and significations he recalls, many times his judgements being framed by an institutional perspective built up all along its career as the "Company Man". The institutional relationships with the presidential administrations or the Congress inquiries, the public appreciations and the dialogue with national stakeholders, all are presented, explained and argued in favor of or against through the rather subjective lenses of a 30-year career lawyer in the service of a culture that has its own reasons and ways little accessible to outsiders.

Controversial and subjective, as well as revealing and instructive, the Company Man represents a guidebook in the Intelligence business and the culture of an Intelligence organization that negotiates its daily role, voice and actions both with itself and the many stakeholders it interacts with.

EU's *Security Union* Project

Daniela BACHEȘ

Since the 9/11 events, and especially starting with the 2004 attacks in Madrid, the European discourse on closer cooperation and intelligence sharing was present on the security agendas of EU leaders and MS policy makers. Yet, jihadists' movement(s) across Europe seemed to be one step ahead the national and European security and law enforcement agencies. For many theoreticians of security and Intelligence studies, explanations for limited cooperation reside, among others, in the traditional lack of confidence between states, the need of security services to protect their sources, or the competitive motivation of Intelligence organizations to preserve their informational competitive advantage.

However though, the last 2 years' terrorist attacks in Western Europe showed that the limits of coordinated fight against terrorism are also rooted in the institutional structure, as well as legal and regulatory framework that characterize national Intelligence communities. The EU security network relies on 28 national security communities, each of them being characterized by specific laws and practices that regulate the activity and interaction of Intelligence and law enforcement agencies within each country.

In March 2016, a day after the attacks in Brussels, but in the larger context of the threat that gained ground on Europe, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker called for closer cooperation between member states to address and combat terrorism. His proposal residing in the creation of a "genuine security union" to address "the fragmentation that makes us vulnerable" was building on some keys ideas such as the shared responsibility to provide security, the need of joint use of security tools both between member states and with Europol, and the force of cooperation to protect and secure European borders[2].

A couple of weeks later, a press release of the European Commission was announcing that steps had been initiated towards "the achievement of an

[2] Discours du Président Jean-Claude Juncker à la session plénière du Parlement européen sur la lutte contre le terrorisme suite aux récents attentats. (2016, April 12). Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-1369_en.htm

effective and genuine EU Security Union – building on the *European Agenda on Security 2015-2020*." A continuation of the former *Internal Security Strategy*, the new strategic document adopted on April 28th, 2015, represents a guiding framework to support EU MS' better coordination in ensuring security in the global context of rising radicalization, violence and terrorism. Without affecting the States' sovereign responsibility with regards to national security, increased coordination within a European framework becomes a need in the fight against transnational threats. As emphasized by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, *Law enforcement authorities in all our Member States should both 'think European' and 'act European', as internal security is a shared responsibility."*[3] Even more suggestive has been Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos, who expressed his convinction that "*The internal security of one Member State is the internal security of all Member States".*[4]

The Security Union project has been imagined as a framework for the internal security of the community, gathering law enforcement authorities from member states in order to prevent and fight threats posed by radicalization, returning foreign terrorist fighters and their supporters by "achieving breakthroughs in information sharing, boosting resources for counter terrorism, creating a genuine digital strategy and stepping up action to prevent radicalization."[5]

According to the "Towards a 'Security Union'. Bolstering the EU's Counter-Terrorism Response" EPSC Strategic Notes, the project of the Security Union is based on two key premises: "without security, there is no freedom" and "cooperation makes us stronger". According to this manifesto explaining Junker's design and role of the Security Union, "coordination between security services, police and judicial authorities, at the national and the European levels, is needed to reduce Europe's vulnerability to such risks."[6] The operational strategy proposed by the project of the Security Union is based on three lines of action aimed at creating joint capabilities and strengthening interoperability at the EU level: (1) targeted assessment and information sharing, (2) bolstering capacity to respond, and (3) managing by anticipation.

Yet, in the aftermath of Junker's announcement, reactions have been rather reticent about the new Commissariat, most voices considering it just another call for cooperation between MS to prevent similar deadly events

[3] European Agenda on Security: Paving the way towards a Security Union. (2016, April 20). Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1445_en.htm
[4] *Idem*
[5] Towards a 'Security Union' Bolstering the EU's Counter-Terrorism Response. EPSC Strategic Notes, Issue 12, 2016, April 20. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/pdf/publications/strategic_note_issue_12.pdf
[6] *Idem*

happening in the future, that lacks in adequate operational tools to effectively improve intelligence sharing or increase joint action.

Questioning about the Security Union increased at the beginning of August when Jean Claude Junker assigned the leadership of the newly created portfolio to Sir Julian King, UK's appointed commissioner after the Brexit vote. In a mission letter sent to King, Junker emphasized his future role in supporting the implementation of the European Agenda on Security, making him aware that "combatting cross-border crime and terrorism is a common European responsibility". The portfolio, and Julian King's work – if the European Parliament gives him a confirmation vote after the assessment that is planned to take place on September 12th – will be focused on the implementation of operational measures undertaken at EU level in accordance with the goals established by the 2015-2010 Agenda. Asked, during the hearing session, about his 2 priorities in the area of Security, King mentioned the strengthening of „our common fight against terrorism and organised crime, and the means that support them", and of „our defences against terrorism and organised crime, and to build our resilience."[7]

The Security Union's actional role in the fight against terrorism is shaped as a "contribution to national counter-terrorism efforts" residing in a coordination framework in accordance with the values of the European project, namely on cooperation grounds. Without having the force of a political establishment that moves security responsibility from national to supranational level, the Security Union is looking for greater integration and harmonization of best practices, capabilities and information that security agencies are working with, and are in need of to reduce the movement and actions of threatening factors to security within the EU borders.

[7] Julian King, ANSWERS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE COMMISSIONER – DESIGNATE, Retrieved from https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/c9fbef51-b1c6-4781-a8d9-f3cac635f800/FINAL%20written-answers-consolidated-King-07092016II.pdf

ACADEMIC FOCUS

Round Table
„Success and failure in the history of the 20th century Romanian intelligence"
April 20th, 2016

In the context of initiatives undertaken by the Romanian Intelligence Service to promote the security culture and develop openness towards the academia, the National Institute for Studies of Intelligence (NISI) organized under the aegis of the "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA) a round table entitled "Success and failure in the history of the 20th century Romanian intelligence", at the Academy on April 20th, 2016.

The event was intended to be the first in a series of scientific activities dedicated to the history of intelligence: "Identity highlights of Romanian identity. From memory to the current state of affairs". The meeting was a good opportunity for dialogue and dissemination of national scholars' expertise and interests. The free and pragmatic debate focused on crucial moments that had defined both the development of national intelligence structures and the Romanian state during the tumultuous 20th century.

The guest participants to the event were:

- Prof. Dragoș Petrescu, Chairman of the National Council for Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS);
- Prof. Cristian Troncotă (Faculty of Social Sciences, "Lucian Blaga" University, Sibiu);
- Dr. Constantin Corneanu, "Gh. I. Brătianu" European Association of Geopolitical and Strategic Studies
- Assistant professor Alin Spânu, Department of History, University of Bucharest;
- Senior adviser dr. Florian Banu, CNSAS;
- Senior adviser dr. Liviu Țăranu, CNSAS;
- Representatives of divisions within the Romanian Intelligence Service and students from MVNIA.

The National Institute for Intelligence Studies was represented by Lecturer Gabriel Sebe, vice-rector for research at the MVNIA and associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, who gave the opening speech:

This event is a first step in the attempt to build an identity of Romanian intelligence, conceived as an interoperable interaction between the academic perspectives and the professional vision, inherently assumed by the „Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy. The history field has a special interaction with any other knowledge domain, nevetheles, when talking about the security culture, this one becomes a symbiosis. In particular, when approached from a historical perspective, the success-failure theme has a potential for future capitalization, adopting thinking patterns specific to the discipline of intelligence. Moreover, the security studies become the implicit beneficiary of such an initiative that we look for after today's event that should turn into a perennial research programme, assumed by academic and military institutions.

Moderators: Dr. Codruț Lucinescu and Dr. Sorin Aparaschivei, senior researcher at NISI.

The speakers' presentations included a wide range of themes of scientific interest, such as:

- "The spies who defended us. (Fictional) successes of the Securitate and Ceausescu's regime" by Dragoș Petrescu;
- "Successes and failures in the activity of the secret service in the Soviet space during the interwar period", by Cristian Troncotă;
- "A historical perspective on the success and failure as image elements of the Romanian intelligence community" by Florian Banu;
- "Counterintelligence in Romania, 1914-1916" by Alin Spânu;
- "Romanian espionage after General Ion Mihai Pacepa's defection (1978)" by Liviu Țăranu;
- "International relations, spheres of influence and the Romanian intelligence. Case study: 23 August 1944 vs 22 December 1989" by Constantin Corneanu;
- "Motivations of betrayal. Historical cases from the perspective of contemporary analysis models" by Valentin Stoian and Ioan Codruț Lucinescu;
- "Soviet Russia - a major concern of the Romanian intelligence services in the early years of the interwar period (1918 - 1924)" by Ioan Codruț Lucinescu;
- "Afanasie Moruzov, the great forgotten spy" by Sorin Aparaschivei.

At the end of the debate, participants and organizers decided to start a joint program for strengthening certain directions of scientific research of the history, tradition and values of the national security intelligence activity whose details would be established later.

EUROSFAT

Eurosfat is an annual forum of European debates that takes place in Romania since 2013. The purpose of the event is to bring together politicians, representatives of civil society and business environment, experts and citizens to debate on the most important topics on the European agenda, in this way facilitating the positioning of Romanian actors within EU. This international forum of debate is organized by Europuls, under the patronage of the European Parliament, the European Commission and supported, this year, by the Dutch Presidency of the European Union.

The edition from this year, held at JW Marriott Hotel in Bucharest on May 6, brought together over 700 participants. The main topic this year focused on the upcoming 2019 EU Presidency that will be held by Romania and the event will try to find an answer to the question: Is Romania ready for the exam of maturity in the EU? Key speakers have included: Dacian Cioloș, *the Romanian Prime Minister*, Angela Filote, *Director of the European Commission Representative in Romania*, Stella Roner-Grubanciuc, *Ambassador of the Netherlands in Romania,* Raluca Prună, *Minister of Justice* Willeke Slingerland – *researcher, Saxion University of Applied Sciences, the Netherlands,* Laura Ștefan – *anticorruption expert, Expert Forum,* Mircea Geoană – *President, Aspen Institute in România*, Dean Thompson – *Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy in Bucharest.*

During this edition, Europuls has launched a new project entitled ”RO2019 Support Platform”, which will provide a structure consisting of representatives of the civil society and of institutions involved in preparing the Romanian Presidency of the Council in 2019. The purpose of this platform will be to support Romania’s efforts in preparing the Presidency, providing a framework of debate, analysis and exchange of best practices.

For the first time since joining the EU, Romania will ensure the rotating presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2019. In addition to the responsibilities assigned to this role, the presidency will coincide with both national and European several major events: elections for the European Parliament, renewal of the European Commission, presidential elections in Romania, the negotiation of the multiannual financial framework and of the EU budget for 2020.

At the 4th edition organized this year participants could participate in debates on topics such as Energy Union and the future energy strategy of Romania, justice, migration and refugees, as well as to a documentary regarding a topic of European interest and to a play/workshop entitled "In search of Europe", hosted by Eurosfat.

The debate about refugees was organized due to the fact that the European Union faces a major challenge because of the large number of refugees arriving in Europe every day. Exposure to the influx of refugees varies from one country to another, and the load is distributed unevenly. Some states, like Germany, faces an unprecedented high number, while others, such as Romania, does not feel the same level of pressure yet. Germany has had to adapt to the current situation, thus has rapidly implemented various integration strategies. On the other hand, as a country that has not experienced the refugee crisis, Romania has to make an assessment regarding how it should position itself.

A very controversial topic was the one concerning the "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership" (TTIP). The workshop dedicated to this debate addressed the main provisions covered by TTIP and the current status of the negotiations. The discussions focused on a detailed analysis not only of the benefits deriving from the Treaty, particularly on trade and investment, but also of the potential costs for European citizens. This debate was necessary for a better understanding of the priorities regarding the commercial policy of the major economic players from Romania and the region, as well as of the benefits arising from international trade. The discussions aimed to assess the role of TTIP in promoting a type 4.0 economic model in EU-USA relationships, model that brings changes for all modules within the value chain and requires a new set of skills on labor markets from EU and USA.

This year's edition of the international forum Eurosfat enjoyed a wide range of partners, being organized under the patronage of the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Dutch Presidency of the European Council. It also benefited from the support and cooperation of several embassies in Romania, civil society organizations, foundations and European think-tanks and private partners.

Alexandra POPESCU

„SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION. SHARED CHALLENGES, SUSTAINABLE FUTURE" (SBSR) THIRD EDITION

The Romanian Intelligence Service, organized, during May 30-June 4, 2016, via its National Intelligence Academy, the third edition of the international program "Security in the Black Sea Region. Shared challenges, sustainable future" (SBSR), which has been developed in partnership with Harvard University and with the participation of National Intelligence University (US).

Carried out under the auspices of the Romanian Presidential Administration, SBSR takes on the philosophy, mission and goals of the Regional Black Sea Security Program, which was initiated by Harvard University in 1997. The current program also embraced the mission to promote and enhance regional actors' responsibility and initiative in approaching security challenges in the Black Sea Region. This year's edition shall focus on "***Convergent forms of power in the Black Sea Region. Think hard, act smart".***

The 2016 edition of the SBSR program has reunited well known personalities in the international academic and diplomatic environment. Debates focused on identifying mechanisms of hard, soft and smart power as well as force projection patterns in the extended Black Sea Region. Participants, in a record breaking number, have advanced a variety of political, academic and diplomatic perspectives on the most relevant aspects of regional security.

The program included a strategic gaming scenario in which the participants were encouraged to identify major elements influencing the power structure in the region as well as those elements that can determine profound changes in the years to come. Finally, all participants contributed to building a regional strategic vision.

This year's edition was attended by approximately 90 people, keynote speakers and participants from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, France, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Russian Federation, Moldova, Serbia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine, as well as high ranking officials and experts from the European Union and NATO. For details please visit http://www.sbsr.ro

INTELLIGENCE IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
XXII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
Bucharest, October 13–14



The first decade and a half of our century has made the world of security and intelligence confront provocative game-changers. New levels of social unrest, aggressions impossible to attribute, (apparently) unpredictable migration flows, semi-state terrorist organizations like DAESH or cybercrime add to the anxieties law-enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, but also communities of citizens must face. If we add to this landscape the global economic downturn, the scarcity of resources and the increasing income disparity across the world, we come to understand that providing security to future world(s) is not an easy task, but rather a dilemma made up of complex, interdependent and interconnected variables.

Furthermore, we see how subtle repressive mechanisms of propaganda and manipulation are also increased by the advent of information, communication and surveillance technology. And, in order to address these issues efficiently, they all need to be considered from a political, an ethical and a security standpoint.

This is the reason why the 22nd edition of The Intelligence in the Knowledge Society International Conference (IKS) aims to explore multi and inter-disciplinary perspectives on the interaction, intersection and interdependence between the exponentially growing new technologies, security and intelligence. Last but not least, the conference will explore ways in which intelligence and security methods and practices need to be reshaped to address the challenges of asymmetric, smarter, better and faster aggressors.

For details please visit the site http://www.intelligencestudies.ro

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

"Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, via its National Institute for Intelligence Studies, publishes the Romanian Intelligence Studies Review (RISR), a high quality peer reviewed and indexed research journal, edited in Romanian and English twice a year. Submission deadlines are February 1st and July 1st. Authors interested in publishing their paper in RISR are kindly invited to submit their proposals electronically in .doc/.docx format at our e-mail address rrsi@sri.ro, with the subject title: RRSI article proposal.

The aim of the journal is to create a framework for debate and to provide a platform accessible to researchers, academicians, professional, practitioners and PhD students to share knowledge in the form of high quality empirical and theoretical original research papers, case studies, conceptual framework, analytical and simulation models, literature reviews and book review within security and intelligence studies and convergent scientific areas.

Topics of interest include but are not limited to:

- Security paradigms in the 21st century
- International security environment
- Security strategies and policies
- Security Culture and public diplomacy
- Intelligence in the 21st century
- Intelligence Analysis
- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
- History and memory in Intelligence

RISR shall not accept or publish manuscripts without prior peer review. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to the journal's theme, originality and scientific correctness, as well as observance of the publication's norms. Material which has been previously copyrighted, published, or accepted for publication will not be considered for publication in the journal. There shall be a review process of manuscripts by one or more independent referees who are conversant in the pertinent subject area.

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