THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ACTIVE MEASURES PROGRAM WITHIN THE COLLABORATION AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING AMONG WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION MEMBER STATES' SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AGAINST THE WEST AND NATO ALLIES DURING THE COLD WAR

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Abstract

The article analyses the impact of the active measures program within the collaboration and information exchanges among Warsaw Treaty Organization member states' security and intelligence services against the West and NATO allies during the Cold War. The active measures conceived by the Soviets have been and still are truly sophisticated instruments that generate strategic events with the aim of creating advantages on short, mid and long term. The Soviet active measures program was an integrated part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization members' security and intelligence services collaboration against what was known as a common enemy, the West and NATO.

From the very eve of institutionalized intelligence/counter intelligence structures the cooperation and information sharing were a necessity for gathering information. The fall of the Iron Curtain over Europe was the start of a race between security and intelligence services from East and West. The successful operations of the Warsaw Treaty members against the West and NATO were partly due to the cooperation of their security and intelligence structures, and a very important role was played by the active measures program.

The working hypotheses are: the insufficient studies dedicated to the subject and the importance of the active measures for the past, present and future of the security and intelligence services; declassification and further possibility of studying documents relevant for the topic; the importance of bilateral and multilateral cooperation and information sharing during the Cold War inside the Warsaw Treaty Organization; the extent of the active measures program in the field of cooperation and information sharing.

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Soviet and American perspectives on the taxonomy of the active measures program in different historical contexts

Active measures (**activnyye meropriyatiya**) are a term used in the Soviet jargon specific for security and intelligence services. Its origins can be traced back before the USSR even existed and it has been used in promoting Russian/Soviet interests beyond its borders. The origin of the concept can be found in the Czarist period, being closely linked to two security institutions whose main objective was controlling the civil society: the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery and the Okhrana.

The failed revolution in 1825 determined Czar Nicholas I (1825-1855, crowned in 1826) to establish the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery (**Tret'ye otdeleniye Sobstvennoy Yego Imperatorskogo Velichestva kantselyarii**) (Monas, 1961, p. 63). The chief of this structure was Count Alexander Konstantinovici Benckendorff. A handkerchief given by the Czar and kept in a glass box was the symbol of the Third Section. According to tradition, Czar Nicholas I told Benckendorff: "Here are all the instructions. The more tears will be wiped out with this handkerchief, the better I will serve my purposes" (Andrew and Gordievski, 1994, p. 16). Therefore, at that time, the Third Section used to be the "moral doctor" of the Russian society. The main objective of this structure was to control the public opinion.

A relevant landmark in Nicholas I's reign is an act that „instituţionalizase crima politică". The 1845 "The Criminal Code" provided for tough sanctions on "the persons guilty of spreading handwritten or printed material or manifestations intended to induce a lack of respect for the sovereign authority or the sovereign qualities or its government" (Andrew and Gordievski, 1994, p. 17).

In August 1880, the Third Section was disbanded and replaced by the Department of the State Police whose name changed to Police Department in 1883. The "responsibility" of political crime was transferred to the Special Section (**Osobîi Otdel**) and a network of security sections called (**Ohrannoe otdelenie**) (Andrew and Gordievski, 1994, p. 17-18). The first such section was founded in 1880 under the name Okhranka – the Department for Defense of Public Security and Order (**Otdelenie po ohraneniiu obşcestvennoi bezopasnosti i poriadka**), also called the Defense Department (**Ohrannoe otdelenie**) (Encyclopaedia Britanica). The Okhranka had two defining aspects: a) back then it was a unique institutionalized structure in Europe due

to its form of organization, activities, duties and responsibility to protect tsarism; b) it contributed decisively to the implementation of state anti-Semitism. The Okhranka was abolished together with tsarism in February 1917, a first step towards the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917.

Both the Third Section and the Okhranka conducted their active measures programs in order to prevent the overthrow of monarchy. They had done so by controlling the population inside the state borders and penetrating dissident groups. A well-known case involved dissidents from France (Hingley, 1971, p. 80). So far, influence, subversion, manipulation (Shultz and Godson, 1984, p. 2) were the most common methods used to implement the active measures programs. The information is confirmed by a second source which adds three more elements: penetration, instigation and deception (Dziak, 1987, p. 39).

Thus far it can be argued that active measures programs used to have a more internal focus, therefore they belonged to what we may call in a more modern sense, counterintelligence[1] and they included six elements: influence, subversion, manipulation, penetration, provocation, deception. (Dziak, 1987, p. 39) After the Bolshevik Revolution and the establishment of Cheka (**Vserossiyskaya chrezvychaynaya komissiya** – the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage, 1917-1922), the new regime was faced with a severe lack of legitimacy. In order to fill this vacuum, a new bureau, meant to spread disinformation, was established within the GPU (**Gosudarstvennoye politicheskoye upravlenie** – the Soviet State Political Directorate from 1922 until 1923) "to stifle counter-revolutionary movements of enemies". This type of actions will be gradually amplified during the interwar period, with a special focus on chasing former dissidents, especially Leon Trotsky (Pringle, 2006, p. 3).

A constant aspect can be attributed to the program of active measures: its place in the field of Czarist/Russian/Soviet counterintelligence. Furthermore, we can add disinformation to the six elements specific to the active measures programs.

In the "KGB Lexicon", therefore after 1954, active measures were included in counterintelligence jargon, being defined as activities undertaken by counterintelligence services in order to prevent undesirable outcomes that could affect the internal order. The offensive potential of counterintelligence

[1] It must be mentioned that the active measures program initially played a defensive role (its activities were mostly limited within the borders of the Czarist empires) but it also included an offensive component meant to penetrate, intoxicate and influence the dissident groups active outside the Empire's borders.

was underlined, namely the prevention of (possible) hostile activities undertaken by (potential) opponents in the field of intelligence (Mitrokhin, 2004, p. 251).

After the Second World War, the active measures program became more significant for the Soviets as special emphasis was placed on disinformation. For this reason, in 1959, Department "D" (**Dezinformatsia)** was established within the PGU (**Pervoe Glavnoe Upravlenie** – the First Main/Central Directorate – Foreign Intelligence, soviet espionage, 1954-1991) and tasked with taking over and implementing all the active measures operations[2].

On a side note, secret/undercover operations were counterparts to the Soviet program of active measures, although it needs to be mentioned that the latter included a much wider range of secret/undercover activities, while also being known for "open and secret techniques applied to influence the events, strategies and actions of other countries" (Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, 1984, p. 193).

Cristopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin define active measures as a means of influencing world events according to KGB interests "(...) ranging from media manipulation to «special actions» involving various degrees of violence" (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 2001, p. 224).

During the hearings before the US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in July 1982, active measures were defined as follows: "The Soviet term active measures is used (primarily in an intelligence context) to distinguish influence operations from espionage and counterintelligence, but this term is not limited to intelligence alone . . . involve activities from virtually every element of the Soviet party and state structure and are regarded as a valuable, regular supplement to, and are closely coordinated with, traditional diplomacy. Soviet active measures include: Manipulation or control of the media; Written or oral disinformation; Use of foreign Communist parties and front organizations; Clandestine radio broadcasting; Economic activities; Military operations; Other political influence operations" (The Congress of the USA, July 13 and 14, 1982, p. 1).

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[2] There is conflicting data regarding the establishment of Department "D". Some sources support a version in which Service "A" (Slujba Aktivnik Meropriatil or the Service of Active Measures) became the successor of Department "D" (Dezinformatsia) in 1962. (See: Watts, 2011, p. 302) Other sources indicate that Service "A" became the successor of the Department "D" in 1971, at a time when the department included 700 officers and a KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti – USSR's Committee for State Security, 1954-1991) general was in charge of it. (See: Schoen and Lamb, June 2012, p. 19)

The same document mentions that "Soviet active measures constitute a policy instrument systematically employed to discredit, isolate, and weaken the United States. These ultimate objectives are a key factor in active measures, even in many instances when the active measures are immediately directed at other countries, organizations, or individuals". (The Congress of the USA, July 13 and 14, 1982, p. 1)

From another perspective, active measures can be described as "A Soviet term that came into use in the 1950s to describe certain overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behaviour in, and the actions of, foreign countries. Active measures may entail influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between other nations, and discrediting and weakening governmental and non-governmental opponents. This frequently involves attempts to deceive the target (foreign governmental and non-governmental elites or mass audiences), and to distort the target's perceptions of reality. Active measures may be conducted overtly through officially sponsored foreign propaganda channels, diplomatic relations, and cultural diplomacy. Covert political techniques include the use of covert propaganda, oral and written disinformation, agents of influence, clandestine radios, and international front organizations. Although active measures principally are political in nature, military manoeuvres and paramilitary assistance to insurgents and terrorists also may be involved". (Shultz and Godson, 1984, p. 193)

From the point of a view of a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Active Measures were clandestine actions designed on the one hand to affect foreign governments, groups and influential individuals in ways favouring the objectives of Soviet policy and, on the other hand, to weaken the opposition to it. Such actions might or might not involve misinforming an adversary by distortion, concealment or invention, but in practice we got better results by exposing truth – selectively. We usually made the distinction clear. When someone would propose a measure, for instance, we would frequently ask him, «How much deza [disinformation] is involved in it? »". (Clizbe, 1999, p. 99).

Oleg Danilovici Kalughin (former director of PGU's external counterintelligence directorate) described active measures as „inima și sufletul informațiilor sovietice": "Not intelligence collection, but subversion: active measures to weaken the West, to drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO, to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the eyes of the people of Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and thus to prepare ground in case the war really occurs" (Kalugin, January 1998).

By analyzing these sources, the active measures program during the Cold War can be defined as a range of sophisticated methods (disinformation, subversion, influence, propaganda, undercover operations, deception, rumours, manipulation, provocation, forgeries, diversion, **maskirovka**, reflexive control, sabotage, penetration, discreditation) which generate strategic events in order to gain short, medium and long-term advantages in social, political, military, economic and intelligence terms.

Mechanisms of implementing the program of active measures

Going back to the World War II security and intelligence services, the first chief of Department "D"/ Service "A" (starting in 1966) of the PGU was Ivan Ivanovich Agayants (code name "Avlov", he was MGB[3]/KI[4] resident in Paris between 1947-1949). He headed the structure between 1959 and 1967. The next chief was Alexandrovici Kondracev[5] (1967-1968), followed by Nikolai Antonovici Kosov (1968-1976), Vladimir Petrovici Ivanov (1976-1990), Leonid Alexeevici Makarov (1991-). Service "A" contained four directorates: political, economic, political-military and operational[6].

The mechanism of cooperation for implementing the program of active measures followed this path: Department "D"/Service "A" worked with the Foreign Affairs Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC of the CPSU)/Foreign Affairs Sections of the Central Committees of the other communist parties in socialist countries, the Propaganda Section of the CC of the CPSU/Propaganda Sections of the other communist parties in socialist countries, the Soviet Academy of Science/Science Academies of the other socialist countries, the PGU residences and the written and audiovisual press.

Within PGU residences, the mechanism of cooperation was provided by the "PR Line", which was in charge of economic and political information, military strategy and active measures (Mitrokihn and Andrew, 2003, pp. 454, 476, 570). According to a former officer of Service "A", who defected to the

[3] MGB – Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti – USSR's Ministry of State Security between 1946 and 1953 (Andrew and Gordievski, 2001, p. XVII; Mitrokihn and Andrew, 2003, p. 9 and 2006, p. 14).

[4] Komitet Informații – Soviet intelligence agency between 1947 and 1953. Initially, it integrated various foreign intelligence directorates from MGB and GRU (Glavnoe Razvedîvatelnoe Upravlenie – the Soviet military espionage service or the Main Intelligence Directorate), (Mitrokihn and Andrew, 2003, pp. 8 and 14 and 2006).

[5] Some authors argue that he became chief of Service "A" in 1970 (Volkoff, 2000, p. 14).

[6] Available at: http://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/1GU/A.htm, accessed on [19.07.2018].

USA in 1979, the active measures program was not implemented outside the Soviet borders by Service "A" officers. Instead, this mission was given to the "PR Line" staff along with precise instructions. Also, Service "A" used to draft a bulletin which contained secret information. The bulletin was given to the members of the CPSU Politburo. It included specific details of certain active measures programs or other operations that were already successfully implemented (Barron, 1983, p. 449).

Department "D" also used to cooperate with the residencies of security and intelligence services of other socialist countries, the Foreign Affairs Sections and the Academies of Science of those respective states. However, no actions were ever performed outside of KGB orders (Knight, 1990, p. 286).

Throughout the Cold War, the USSR had the advantage of receiving the support of powerful socialist parties in Western countries, especially France and Italy. The implementation of active measures was supported by Soviet advisers (Bittman, 1972, p. 45) placed in intelligence and military structures and the Cominform (1946-1956)[7]. After the dissolution of the latter, the same role was given to the Foreign Affairs Sections of communist and working-class parties in socialist countries.

Disinformation, **maskirovka**[8], provocation, penetration, forgery, diversion, influence agents, conspiracy, wet affairs and combination (Dziak, 1987, pp. 39-40) were the best-known elements of the active measures program from the establishment of Cheka until the seventies.

Between 1959 and 1965, the KGB "exported" its program of active measures to the other security and intelligence services of the Warsaw Pact (WP) member states (Bittman, 1985, pp. 142, 156-157) except Romania.

For example, the 1960 organization structure of the KDS (**Komitet za Dăržavna Sigurnost** – the Bulgarian State Security) mentions the Sixth

[7] It was founded on September 22th 1947. Its headquarters was in Belgrad. The Cominform had to ensure that links were created between European communist and working-class parties. It was designed like an "Information Office of Communist and Workers' Parties". The Cominform had lots of information on how the "popular democracies" were established. (Duroselle, 2006, p. 352)

[8] A traditional Soviet term used in military operations. Maskirovka is a term used to describe a "mix" of deception, hiding, simulation, disinformation, false demonstration, camouflage, all meant to hide the real position of the troops and mislead the enemy, leading to inaccurate plans, forecasts and conclusions. (Pirnie, 1985, pp. 1-22; Keating, 1981, pp. 1-20). In the KGB jargon, maskirovka describes a larger set of intelligence/counterintelligence actions such as: camouflage in surveillance (maskirovka v naruzhnom nablyudenii), camouflage of clandestine radio communication (maskirovka konspirativnoy radiosvyazi), and camouflage of microdot (maskirovka mikrotochki) – it refers to a small text or image printed on a disc to prevent its detection (Mitrokhin, 2003, pp. 64-68).

Department (within the Foreign Intelligence Directorate), a structure involved in disinformation operations (Persak and Kamiński, 2005 , p. 39). On November 17th 1967, by virtue of order I-3728, the Sixth Directorate for "«combating the ideological subversion of the enemy»"(implying "«ideological imperialist subversion and propaganda»") was established. The Sixth Directorate contained eight departments (Persak and Kamiński, 2005, p. 44).

We can observe that the Bulgarian active measures program was based on three components: disinformation, subversion and propaganda. Also, the KDS and the KGB worked together in a program of active measures that was focused on two major cases: "Bulagarian umbrella" in London, September 1978 and "Bulgarian connection", an attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II (Persak and Kamiński, 2005, p. 69).

Regarding Czechoslovakia, the Eighth or "D" Department was founded in February 1964. It was unofficially called the department for active measures or disinformation. According to Ladislav Bittman[9], the Eighth Department was involved in 115 active measures operations in 1965 and 300-400 of these were performed every year by all WP countries – except Romania (Bittman, 1972, p. 16 and 1985, p. 39). Bittman also argues that in the early stages of active measures departments three elements were very common: disinformation, propaganda and influence (Bittman, 1972, p. 20).

In Poland, the active measures program began with the establishment of the Independent Group "D" (disintegration and disinformation) on November 19th 1973, a direct order of Stanisław Kowalczyk (1973-1980), the MSW (**Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych** – the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Initially, Independent Group "D" functioned within the Fourth Department (its responsibilities were related to the Catholic Church and other religious organizations) but later it was reorganized into a separate department (the Sixth Department) inside MSW. The operations of the Independent Group "D" were kept secret even from the other SB officers who worked in other departments. The staff involved in the operations did not record any detailed documentation related to their activity. At the time, the activity of the Independent Group "D" was not compatible with the Polish legislation (Persak and Kamiński, 2005, pp. 221-283).

Colonel Konrad Straszewski and four other SB (**Służba Bezpieczeństwa** – the Polish State Security) officers played a major role in

[9] Defector from the StB (Státní Bezpečnost – the Czechoslovak State Security). Between 1954 and 1968 he worked in Czechoslovak espionage. Between 1964 and 1966 he headed the Eighth Department. See Ladislav Bittman, *op. cit.,* pp. IX-XXV. Bohumír Molnár was Ladislav Bittman's successor as chief of the Eighth Department. See: Persak and Kamiński, 2005 , p. 161.

founding the Independent Group "D". Disintegration and disinformation activities were based on strategic and tactical hypotheses that were previously elaborated. The chiefs of the Independent Group "D" were Zenon Płatek (1974-1976), Tadeusz Grunwald (1976-1982), Grzegorz Piotrowski (1982-1983), Wiesław Fenicki (1982-1983), Romuald Będziak (1983-1984) și Robert Szczepański (Pleskot, 2016, pp. 214-215).

Between November 18th and November 22nd, Konrad Straszewski led a group that travelled to Moscow to sign "Joint Operational Plan"of MSW's Fourth Department and the KGB. The aim of this agreement was to fight against the subversive activity of the Catholic Church and the Vatican (Lasota, 2003, p. 51). Cooperation between the KGB and the SB was very active. The KGB used the SB to implement its program of active measures. Many SB officers who worked in the Independent Group maintained unofficial ties to the KGB (Grajewski, 2008, pp. 177-198).

In terms of active measures, the USSR's partnership with Hungary produced the best results among Eastern Bloc states. After the 1956 Revolution, ÁVH (**Államvédelmi Hatóság** – The Hungarian State Security between 1948 and 1956) was disbanded. Hungarian security and intelligence services were reduced to a single directorate (the Third Directorate) within the Hungarian Ministry of Interior (Gábor, 2013, p. 36). Several independent departments worked within the Third Directorate. The first one used to deal with foreign intelligence. Available documents confirm the fact that a department of active measures had functioned within the Foreign Intelligence Department between 1964 and the end of the communist regime in Hungary: between May 1964 – August 1967, "Evaluation and Information Department" – active measures; August 1967 – July 1971, Department VII – active measures; July 1971 – 1980, Department VII – active measures. Active measures were performed by using disinformation, propaganda, psychological actions, subversion and they were used to destabilize emigrants' organizations as well as other international organizations such as NATO, CIA and BND (**Bundesnachrichtendienst** – Germany's Federal Intelligence Service) (Eszter, 2011, pp. 1-25).

Active measures received special attention in documents drafted by the Hungarian Ministry of Interior. At least around 1969, they mentioned people, bodies or subjects. The documents contained information concerning files that were related to active measures, where they were stored, and additional details about the implementation itself (Belügyminisztérium, 1969, pp. 3-51).

Regarding GDR (the German Democratic Republic), active measures were first implemented in 1956 by a small group of people. Department X of

the HV A. (**Hauptverwaltung A. – Aufklärung**, East German espionage headquarters A) was initially responsible. The purpose of GDR's active measures was to weaken the international position of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), established by the Hallestein Doctrine[10]. This meant influencing Western Europe and USA mass-media according to policies established at the level of the Socialist Bloc (Wolf and McElvoy, 1998, pp. 233-234; Münkel, 2015, pp. 143-144). HV A.'s Department for Mobilisation, "Domestic Security", Evaluation of Foreign Counter – Intelligence, "Active Measures" (Persak and Kamiński, 2005, p. 172; Olaru and Herbstritt, 2005, p. 434) appeared in the 1989 MfS (**Ministerium für Staatssicherheit** – the Ministry for State Security) organization structure. The department was headed by Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth and he was assisted by his two deputies: Colonel Wolgand Mutz (First Deputy) and Colonel Rolf Robe (Wiedmann, 1996, p. 356). In 1989, MfS' active measures program was based on disinformation and publishing material, financial support for influence agents and journalists focused primarily on the FRG (Wiedmann, 1996).

Romania was excluded from KGB's program of transformation at the level of security and intelligence services in the socialist sphere of influence, services which tended to collaborate well with the KGB. The decision to marginalize the Romanian intelligence and security services was applied as a countermeasure for the state's foreign policy. For the Securitate, this meant a greater amount of work to maintain its credibility internationally and to protect the trust between citizens and government, while preventing the Soviets from appointing their loyal people in key positions (Bittman, 1972, p. 130 and 1985, pp. 44-47).

The active measures program, an element which describes military and non-millitary irregular/unconventional methods of hybrid warfare

Wisdom begins with the definition of terms (Socrates). Considering the fact that the purpose of this article to highlight the importance of active measures in USSR's intelligence/counterintelligence activity, it is useful to present a Soviet/Russian perspective. Understanding an opponent is only possible if the analysis uses his concepts instead of our own.

Active measures were predominantly used by Soviet security and intelligence services and they also included the usage of military elements. I

[10] Named after West German politician Walter Hallstein, one of the founding father of the EU, former president of the European Commission between 1958 and 1967. The Hallstein Doctrine argued that the FRG was right in refusing to maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the GDR. The doctrine was abandoned after 1970.

can now affirm that nowadays active measures can be described as an element of hybrid warfare, "a military strategy that combines elements of conventional war, unconventional and cyber war"(Dungaciu, 2017, p. 190). To clear things up, irregular/unconventional warfare is a term used to describe what we nowadays call asymmetric warfare, with similar purposes or intentions, or, in American usage, fourth generation warfare (Robinson, 2010, p. 10 and pp. 166-167).

As a preliminary conclusion, corroborating the information found in footnote no. 3 and a personal definition that has been mentioned before, the Russian Federation only transferred the active measures from the intelligence/counterintelligence field to the military one, thus highlighting a paradox with a double significance which brings memories of the Cold War East/West rivalry: 1) while one side concentrated their efforts on innovation/development, proving its authentic intentions of progress (the Western side, the strong one), the other focused on "stealing" (the Eastern side, the weak one); 2) the Soviet Union and the "states in tight cooperation" from the WP (except Romania) implemented active measures against the West because they were the weaker international political actor in the East – West power equation. However, the second significance must be understood from the following perspective, as a lesson learned: the USSR was the first one to create structural "innovations" in the military and counterintelligence field, precisely as a response to the East-West development gap which increased USSR's/Russia's state of insecurity.

From our point of view, the program of active measures is a counterpart to the irregular or unconventional warfare. In order to bring the definition of the active measures program to the present, I argue that the program of active measures describes military and non-military irregular/unconventional methods of hybrid warfare. To better understand the current implications of the active measures program, it is necessary to present a retrospective of hybrid warfare.

Despite everything that has been said, both officially and unofficially, hybrid warfare is not new. Academic literature presents Evgheni Eduardovici Messner (1891-1976)[11] as probably one of the first authors to describe this

[11] Evgheni Eduardovici Messner (1891-1976). Had a rich experience in military theory and practice, he served as an officer in the Imperial Russian Army, fighting against the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War (1917-1923), After this episode, he sought refuge in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1943). He taught at the War School in Belgrad. During the Second World War he collaborated with the Wehrmacht and after the end of the war he moves to Argentina. See: Elżbieta Sawa – Czajka, „Rebel – war in Ukraine" in *The Journal of Kolegium Jagiellonskie Torunska Szkola Wyzsza*, vol. I: 25-31, 2014, p. 25.

practice. In the early 1950's, he theorized a type of warfare he called "insurrectional war" or "rebellious warfare." Messner said: "In such an armed conflict, combatants are not an army, but rather people's movements. In this case, the word "people" has no negative connotations, no one positive.

In the last decades classic warfare[12] was replaced with a rebellion type of armed conflicts with no well-defined battle fronts or opponents. Instead, psychology and propaganda are the most important elements in the preparation and evolution of these confrontations. Messner also proposed a hierarchy of objectives for this type of confrontations: a) at internal level, destroying the unity of the opposing nation, creating destabilizing situation in the army or in other institutions responsible for defending the territory and the population of the state, taking over or destroying some valuable psychological objectives; b) at external level, trying to gain new allies while weakening the support given by the enemy's allies (Sawa – Czajka, 2014, p. 26).

The concept of hybrid warfare became a topic of scientific debate after November 2005, when Frank G. Hoffman and James N. Mattis published their article "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid War" (U.S. GAO, September 10, 2010, p. 18). The study of these two military theoreticians highlights several aspects: 1) future means of conflict are unpredictable; 2) the conventional threat will never disappear, therefore the USA should never lose its superiority in this field; 3) hybrid wars are caused by hybrid threats.

Nowadays there are several definitions for what we call a hybrid threat: a) an opponent which is able to use and adapt a combination of means (political, military, economical and social) and methods (conventional, unconventional, disruptive, criminal, terrorism). This type of threat can include a combination of state and non-state actors; b) a threat that uses both regulated and unregulated forces simultaneously, including terrorism and criminal elements to reach its objectives, using a variety of conventional and unconventional tactics to create more dilemmas (U.S. GAO, September 10, 2010, p. 18).

According to Hoffman, hybrid threats incorporate a complete range of different means of warfare, including conventional capabilities, unconventional tactics, terrorist acts, generalized violence, constraint and chaos (Hoffman, 2009, p. 36).

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[12] According to experts, modern warfare has known three generations up until now. The first generation (1864-1860). The second generation is associated to the First World War, when the military thinking of the nations' armies was dominated by "massive fire power" as a key element for victory. The third generation warfare pays more attention to initiative rather than obedience (...). In the fourth generation, war "moved more to disorder and descentred power" (See: Paul Robinson, 2010, p. 166)

In the 2010 Russian Military Doctrine, modern warfare is described as the integrated use of military force and non-military resources, while the chapter "Characteristics of Contemporary Military Conflicts" highlights the high usage of military equipment systems based on psychological principles "Which are compared to nuclear weapons in terms of effectiveness"; increasing the role of the informational war and, most importantly, creating in the territory of the belligerent part of "a permanent area of military operations" (*The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, 2010, p. 28).

The strategic concept of hybrid warfare or non-linear war has reshaped the new doctrine of the Russian army, while the principles it is based on are still unclear. However, according to Gherasimov, hybrid warfare involves some principles that gain mutual strength.

First, it is the concept of "permanence of the conflict", which blurs the boundaries of space and time, of war and peace and of the actors involved. Essentially, it becomes more and more difficult to determine if there is a state of war or not, especially if you are being attacked.

Second, hybrid conflicts have an emergent and multidimensional side. Political and strategically objectives are not achieved through conventional military methods anymore. Hybrid warfare forces the army and the civil population of the opponent to support the attacker to the detriment of their own country.

Third, there is "the unitary effort". The implication is that mixed tactics are applied simultaneously on the enemy's territory and more importantly in his spheres of influence.

Collaboration and intelligence sharing among Warsaw Treaty Organization member states' security and intelligence services against the west and NATO allies during the cold war.

The confrontation between the great powers, the USA and USSR had created an opportunity for security and intelligence cooperation in those states that supported one of the two ideologies. Just as the CSUP was an ideological model for the communist parties in Central and South Eastern Europe, so was the KGB for the security and intelligence services in those countries. Before presenting the terms of cooperation and the information exchanges between the security and intelligence services of the WP state

members against NATO and the West, during the Cold War[13], it is necessary to define the concepts of cooperation and information exchange.

Cooperation in the field of security and intelligence is essentially an oxymoronic concept and it can only be achieved if two or more states share the same interests and cooperation does not affect them. These interests are basically related to national security and they are linked to the sovereignty, independence and unity of an international political actor. From this perspective, cooperation is difficult to be achieved in the field of security and intelligence either bilaterally or multilaterally. However, security and intelligence cooperation already has a tradition and it is continually developing.

Within the communist system, as the most important security and intelligence service of the Warsaw Pact, KGB has developed a specific lexicon. There is the term "**razvedyvatelnoye sotrudnichestvo**" which refers to secret cooperation in active intelligence activities (Mitrokhin, 2004, p. 114).

The analysis of available documents reveals the good collaboration between the intelligence and security services of the WP countries with a sole exception, the Securitate in Romania, which did not maintain a constant level of cooperation and information exchange. Overall, the inefficiency of the collaboration between the Securitate and the other similar structures in the WP countries can be attributed to political frictions. The cooperation and information exchange between the intelligence and security services of the WP countries during the Cold War can be summarized by underlining the following stages: 1) a phase in which intelligence/counterintelligence activities were led by Soviet advisers in each socialist country along with the establishment good relations with the KGB-GRU headquarters; 2) a détente phase associated with the Brezhnev Doctrine, meant to reform the system of inter-institutional collaboration while strengthening USSR's ties with partner countries in the field of intelligence and security, however this principle did not also apply to Romania; 3) a final phase associated with the last decade of communism, in which cooperation and information exchange were further reinforced in all partner countries except Romania.

The cooperation mechanisms implemented by the KGB and GRU were either bilateral or multilateral. In the field of security and intelligence services,

[13] The term "Cold War" gets its dual paternity from the critique of Walter Lippman, American journalist and publisher, which he addressed to George Kenan in regards to his attitude towards USSR politics. At the same time, Bernard Mannes Baruch, President Roosevelt's advisor, used the term "Cold War" to describe the state of international relations. (Lippman, 2009, p. 24)

the KGB preferred bilateral collaboration in order to obtain information from each partner country. This practice did not exclude multilateral meetings.

Another cooperation mechanism could be identified at the level of the Warsaw Pact. Following the structural reforms established at the meeting in Budapest, on March 17th 1969, several structures were subordinate to the Political Consultative Committee (PCC): a) the Committee of Ministers of Defence (of WP member countries); b) the Joint Armed Forces Command (JAFC) which was in charge of the Joint Armed Forces (JAF), the (JAF) General Staff, the Military Council[14] and the Technical Committee; c) the Joint Secretariat; d) the Permanent Commission (it must be mentioned that the members of the Joint Secretariat and the Permanent Commission did not hold a public office until the next reform of the WP). The establishment of two new structures subordinate to the JAFC (the Technical Committee and the Military Council) appears as the most significant change (Fodor, 1994, pp. 35-36). The next structural reform of the WP was approved in November 1976 during the meeting of the PCC in Bucharest. Within the new structure, the Permanent Commission was replaced by the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CMFA), while the Joint Secretariat retained the same role it had in 1956 (Fodor, 1994, p. 37). The exchange of military information was performed within these structures; since 1965, Romania was excluded from the strategy programs of the WP due to opposing views concerning foreign policy.

KGB-KDS (cooperation and information exchange in scientific and technical fields)

The KGB developed one of its most successful working relationships with the KDS. In order to highlight their partnership it could mentioned that "the basic issues of Soviet – Bulgarian post-war Security and Intelligence cooperation can be found in about 300 files from the first 22 Departmental Records at the Archive of the Ministry of the Interior in Sofia, which consist of about 27,000 pages in general. Approximately 16,000 pages of these files were Intelligence Information, Estimates, and Analyses, sent regularly by the KGB to Sofia in the period 1954–1989. Other more than 11,000 pages comprise Plans, Agreements, Protocols, Reports of meetings, and Correspondence between Soviet KGB and Bulgarian KDS services" (Baev, 2008, p. 25).

[14] The commander-in-chief, acting as president, its deputies (one from each member state) and the chief of the JAF General Staff were the members of the Military Council of the Joint Command. See ANIC, Collection *Tratatul de la Varşovia. Ministerul de Externe*, (1954-1991, and 1993), file no. 23/1966, f. 33.

The scientific and technical fields were among the most successful for the KGB-KDS partnership. An important aspect is easily noticeable: while the Western countries were separately developing their scientific research, thus creating rivalries between themselves, the Eastern Bloc countries were coordinating their activities by sharing duties. The PGU officers were leading the group, being in charge of the most important operations of scientific espionage in Eastern Europe. Declassified documents from the Bulgarian archives indicate that Bulgaria used to be one of the most advanced countries in high-tech technology, including electronics, chemistry, pharmaceutical products and the heavy machine-building industry (Baev, *Spying on the West*).

Jordan Baev described the mechanisms and the extent of Soviet espionage in the scientific field: "In the post-war years, the chief of Soviet scientific intelligence was Col. Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov (1947–64). He was succeeded by Col. Mikhail Ivanovich Lopatin (1964–74) and Gen. Leonid Sergeevich Zaytsev (1975–91). In the early 1960s, the 10th Department of the PGU had seven intelligence orientations: nuclear, aerospace, electronics, medicine, chemistry, new technologies, and information and analyses. The S&T Intelligence officers at KGB representations (*rezidentura*) abroad were codenamed «Line X». After the establishment of Directorate «T» in 1974, the Soviet leadership approved Andropov's proposal to double the staff abroad. Thus, in 1975, the Soviet S&T intelligence services activated 77 of its agents and 42 informers who focused their activity on the US alone, and specifically on 32 principal objects (General Electrics, Boeing, Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, Westinghouse, etc). According to a KGB report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), during the period 1972-7, S&T intelligence obtained about 120,000 pieces of new information with 20,000 schemes and diagrams, which were mainly delivered to the state Defence Industry Committee. In 1979 alone, the Soviet Scientific Intelligence Directorate realized 557 «measures involving operational agents» abroad. In 1980, the KGB delivered more than 14,000 pieces of information and 2,000 models of different technical equipment to various governmental departments and agencies, and to state firms and research institutes. In 1981, it provided 13,500 items and 3,000 models, and in 1982, 10,000 pieces of information and 4,000 models" (Baev, *Spying on the West*).

In his study, Baev highlights the following aspects: starting in 1966, 30 highly trained officers were enrolled in the Bulgarian espionage, some of them completed their PhD in exact sciences or humanities, 20 of them "were sent for one year to the KGB PGU Special School near Moscow (known as «School No. 101»)"; starting in 1971, the information exchange between the two services significantly increased, the KDS had sent KGB 161 reports and 5.6%

of them were deemed as valuable. "According to the next long-term agreement for the period 1975–80, collaboration between the two allied secret services in procuring military S&T intelligence included acquiring new information on US Trident nuclear submarines, Minuteman cruise missiles, the B-1 strategic bomber, and other items. As a result, in the period 1976–8, the PGU-KGB's Directorate «T» sent 643 S&T intelligence references to Sofia, 313 of which were military-related. In 1976 and 1977, the Bulgarian Scientific Intelligence Department sent 463 classified references to Moscow, eight of which were assessed as «extremely valuable», 82 as «valuable», and another 174 as «interesting information»" (Baev, *Spying on the West*).

KGB – STASI (collaborations and information exchange against NATO)

The cooperation between the KGB and the Ministry for State Security (**Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit**-STASI, 1950-1990) in the GDR was mostly concerned with NATO. The success of STASI in the HUMINT field, achieved thanks to the HV.A, was reached at the level of intelligence communities in the WP member states. For example, in the 1980s, HV.A "ranked the highest among the ten clusters of intelligence to be gathered «military policy, military planning and intentions, military potential of NATO, the USA, FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], other main imperialist powers, and the PRC [People's Republic of China]». The second rank included «armament research and production in the USA and other NATO countries, particularly the development and production of new strategic weapons and weapons systems»" (Schaefer, Bernd, "The Warsaw Pact's Intelligence on NATO").

Following the Soviet model, two espionage structures functioned in the GDR: HV A., within STASI, as a counterpart to the PGU, which operated within the KGB and "Aufklärung" (a department within HV A.), which served as a counterpart to GRU and specialized in gathering military intelligence. "Aufklärung" functioned as an independent structure until 1958, when it became subordinate to the HV A, after a series of high-level recruitments performed by the GDR's military espionage service. HV A can thus be synthesized: "HV A. as the civilian branch was commissioned by the Warsaw Pact to target West Berlin, the FRG, and United States and NATO. The intelligence it gathered was presented to the GDR's top political and military leadership. In 1988, for instance, Department IV of the HVA (Military Espionage) directed 74 FRG citizens as its agents, whereas Department XII, in charge of infiltrating NATO and the European Community, had 72 agents at its disposal to penetrate their institutions. Of the eighteen HV A. departments, four were primarily assigned to monitor and infiltrate specific countries and their

institutions: Department I (Federal Republic of Germany/FRG government), II (FRG parties and institutions), XI (USA) and XII (NATO and the European Community)" (Schaefer, Bernd, "The Warsaw Pact's Intelligence on NATO").

KGB – ÁVH (NATO, USA, Canada, the Scandinavian countries)

The working relationship between the KGB and the ÁVH can be described in very favourable terms, especially after the 1956 Revolution. It was mostly concerned with information exchange related to the following topics: NATO, USA, Canada, the Scandinavian countries. Regarding the issue of Transylvania, the two securities and intelligence services repeatedly used misinformation in order to deceive the Western intelligence community.

On a side note, as leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP), Janos Kádár continually encouraged the frictions between Hungarian and Romanian citizens in Transylvania in order to preserve a level of tension at bilateral level. More precisely, the Hungarian People's Republic was unjustly referring to a lack of support from the Romanian authorities regarding the Hungarian minority, thus expressing their concern for the Hungarians in Transylvania. These practices were forbidden inside the Soviet bloc but they went unnoticed due to well-organized disinformation campaigns. This type of operations became very successful. For example, a 1964 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) bulletin incorrectly mentioned growing tensions between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania (RSR) on the topic of ethnic Hungarians living in Romania (NIE, July 22nd 1964, no. 12-64, p. 9).

The reform of the Hungarian security and intelligence services under Kádár deserves special interest. Practically, there wasn't any particular structure, ÁVH, as experts call it. Instead, everything was organized under the supervision of the Hungarian Ministry of Interior. For this reason, many experts argue that Hungary was the only WP member state that lacked any security or intelligence services. There is no proof that would indicate instructions from the KGB but declassified reports from the headquarters in Lubyanka (TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 5, d. 3, II, 1-14) fail to mention the Hungarian secret services. This fact might be explained by an intention to prevent any kind of suspicion from Romania, thus turning into a *fait accompli*. Nowadays, these situations can be easily revealed but at that time very few people had access to this type of information, as censorship was part of the daily life.

Budapest's actions in diplomacy and foreign policy were justified by the freedom given under the protection of the USSR. Moscow successfully exploited Budapest under the program of active measures. Hungary became

an important source for disinformation and propaganda after many citizens fled to the Western countries in 1956. The ÁVH used the revolution as an opportunity to infiltrate agents among immigrants, especially in the USA and Canada. On the strength of disinformation and an influential Hungarian community, Hungary built itself a positive image during the Cold War and after 1990 as well, being admitted to NATO and the EU before Romania did. The KGB was also involved in the issue of Hungarian emigrants, having infiltrated 200 agents among them (Corson and Crowley, 1986, pp. 268-270).

The year 1968 offers us a less known detail. Throughout the year, Soviet-Hungarian disinformation created a "halo" for Kádár, painting him as an opponent to Moscow and the Warsaw Pact. CIA became the "victim" of this disinformation operation by believing that Hungary shared Romania's position on the issue of interference in Czechoslovakia's domestic affairs (CIA, *Intelligence Memorandum,* May 19th 1968, p. 2).

Kádár's image as a "dissident" and opponent of the Soviet Union lasted long after 1968. This was made possible with the support of the KGB and the Hungarian communities in the USA, Canada and Great Britain. In this regard, Kádár gained a moral advantage that allowed him to promote his agenda on the issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

In the early 1970s Kádár was a strong supporter of the so-called "New Economic Mechanism" (NEM), an initiative backed up by all the general secretaries of the CPUS up until Gorbachev (CIA – *Special Analysis,* May 22nd 1982, pp. 10-12). Hungary's intelligence activities benefitted from Soviet human and material support. If Budapest was facing any difficulties, Moscow was ready to act as a tutor by providing intelligence assistance. Kádár's credibility in the West was built upon the support given by the PGU, especially in Finland and France. Both countries made it possible for Hungary to build its positive image in liberal countries. At that time, Kekkonen, later identified as a KGB agent, was the leader of Finland, while left-wing political influences and a stronger support of Moscow became commonplace in France.

KGB – SB (Vatican, USA)

Polish historian Andrzej Paczkowski described the relations between the USSR and the Polish People's Republic (PRL) as follows: "For the purpose of this text I describe Poland's relations with the Soviet Union as that of a vassal. The sovereign power, the Soviet Union, deployed the services of the vassal, Poland, and was obligated to take care of the latter's security in return. Both sides benefited from the arrangement: the vassal enjoyed security and the sovereign thrived off its power. In the case of the vassal, the crux of the

matter concerned not only external security (international relations) but also internal threats (protection against a revolution or a coup), which the vassal could not overcome on its own (as in East Germany in 1953)" (Paczkowski, 2002, p. 4). Starting from this assumption and keeping in mind that the state plays some essential roles (self-preservation, innate sovereignty), we consider that military institutions tend to mimic the particularities of the societies and countries they serve (Toqueville, 2004, pp. 761-767), while the same principle also applies to intelligence/counterintelligence institutions.

The partnership between the KGB and the SB became more and more active in the beginning of the Cold War, "In 1956, during the thaw period, the relations became more – but not entirely – of a partnership. The team of advisers (operating within the Public Security Committee structures) was reorganized into a KGB mission in Warsaw. Still, the chief advisor, Colonel Georgiy Yevdokimenko remained the head of the mission. In January 1957, an official delegation of the Interior Ministry Security Service paid the first visit to Moscow. The agreement that was signed then opened a period of systematic and formalized cooperation of both services, which continued until 1990. The Polish side in the cooperation was mainly represented by the First (intelligence) and Second (counterintelligence) Departments. High level meetings (of the Polish deputy minister and the KGB deputy chairman) were held at least once a year. On 1-3 July 1963, a top level meeting took place in Warsaw with the Soviet delegation led by KGB Chairman Vladimir Y. Semichastny. From May 1961, an official post of the Polish Interior Ministry operated in Moscow" (the «Vistula» Operating Group of the Secret Service) (Bułhak and Paczkowski, 2008, p. 52). The cooperation between the KGB and the SB was mostly related to the religious activity of the Vatican and the USA which was home to an influential Polish community. Regarding the Vatican, the PRL developed an innovation at the level of the SB: "After 1956 operational intelligence gathering against the Vatican was a major task of the MSW. As early as in 1958, ministerial directives stressed the need to gather information on the Vatican's intentions, plans and tactics. A network of agents recruited also among the clergy was to be used to this effect. Passport procedures were used in recruitment. (…)From June 1962, all anti-Church activities were concentrated in Department IV of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, i.e. so-called 4th division of the Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa – SB). It was a specialised unit of the SB, tasked with surveillance, supervision and combating hostile – as they were referred to at that time – activities of the Roman Catholic Church, other religious organisations and associations of laic Catholics. The Department had its provincial branches, namely sections IV of the voivodship headquarters of the

Civic Militia (Milicja Obywatelska – MO). As in other countries in the Eastern Block, in all actions against the Vatican the units of Department IV co-operated closely with Department I of the MSW, i.e. foreign intelligence service of the PRL. This co-operation was regulated by detailed instructions of how to set tasks". (Grajewski, 2008, pp. 178-179)

KGB – StB (NATO, operation ALAN)

After 1948, the activity of CSR's security and intelligence services was hugely influenced by their Soviet counterparts. Following the same model applied in the other member states of the WP, Soviet advisers were appointed to the newly-founded security and intelligence services in the CSR and they imposed themselves due to their previous experience in intelligence/ counterintelligence.

The two security and intelligence services operated under the motto "Struggle for Peace and Socialism" and they used careful planning to synchronize their activities. This particular operation took place once every five years, although initially it was performed annually. "Using their own methods and experience the Soviet KGB advisors begun to define objectives and forms of co-operation to be conducted by Czechoslovak Intelligence, namely by the 1st Directorate (assumed name). Under the concept of the ´Struggle for Peace and Socialism´ the two intelligence services coordinated their activities first on a yearly basis, and later, on the basis of five-year operational plans. The plans referred to the activities conducted by the Centre and by the individual Residencies. The final forms of the operational plans were specified by Moscow after negotiations with the Chief of the Ist Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior (later, the Federal Ministry of Interior). Such a dependent subordinate position required that the activities of Czechoslovak Intelligence were, in practice, conducted against all former capitalist countries around the world. The focus of their activities was to obtain classified documents, resources and secret information of political, military, economic, scientific, technological and state-security-related contents. The operational activity of the intelligence was documented in the agency and operative files". (Bukovszky, 2008, pp. 25-26)

An interesting point in their cooperation, also known as "Operation ALAN", is related to the leaks of NATO classified information in 1982-1986. Otherwise said, "In the fall of the Cold War, at the end of the 1980´s, the American and West German intelligence services discovered and brought to the court a spy group composed of former officers of the US army operating in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Through their illegal

activities they managed to gravely threaten the security and stability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the United States of America. During its 17 years of operation the group now known as the Clyde Lee Conrad spy group would deliver to the member states of the Warsaw Pact copies of top secret documents of military and strategic contents related to the operational plans, regulations, procedures, tactics and strategy, nuclear armament, and scientific and technological knowledge of the NATO armed forces" (Rendek, 2008, p. 223).

In the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes of the Czech Republic, "Cooperation in the Eastern Bloc 1948-1989: documents on bilateral cooperation", are available on collaboration between socialist countries' intelligence services. Information exchanges and cooperation between CSR and SRR are reduced to only two documents, unlike the collaboration with GDR, where 102 documents are available. Within the same project in the section dedicated to "International Cooperation in 1989", CSR had collaboration protocols with all services in the Eastern Bloc, especially with KGB., except for the SRR Securitate.

Conclusions

Russia's assertive role in Central and Eastern Europe became very evident after the end of the World War II, when this area entered the hegemonic Soviet sphere. The expansionist tendencies of Medieval Russia/Imperial Russia/the Soviet Union/the Russian Federation can be explained by a strong sense of insecurity, still present nowadays. For Russia, territorial expansion was essential in building a solid state and ensuring its security, and this aspect was featured in the Russian interwar foreign policy. The logic of "conquering" Central and Eastern European states was part of creating the "glacis/security belt", therefore obtaining security through territorial conquests in two stages: 1) 1939-1940 by signing the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact; 2) 1944-1949 Red Army conquests and deliberate concessions from the Americans and the British.

The active measures, designed by Soviets, still are truly sophisticated instruments for creating strategic events in order to gain short, medium, and long-term advantages in socio-economic, political, military and intelligence terms. The intelligence war, in which the active measures program found plenty of use, was dominated by the Soviet Union and the allies from the Warsaw Pact against NATO and the West.

The hidden war fought by the Soviet Union, either through direct actions or middlemen, was part of a bigger strategy that repeatedly tried to use favoured international political actors (the other Warsaw Pact countries) to verify the power of a potentially hostile power inside the Socialist Bloc and Romania is a relevant example. Nowadays, from a realist perspective, this practice is called **offshore balancing**.

Active measures can be identified in what we call today irregular/ unconventional/asymmetrical/fourth generation warfare. Otherwise said, it is another tradition inherited by the Russian Federation.

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