

THE INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST SYSTEM BETWEEN 1965 AND 1989

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Abstract

During the Cold War, in the shadow of ideological confrontation, the attention of the academic literature on the small and medium countries within the confronted blocs was limited. This paper aims to redress, to a certain extent, the imbalance created by the significant amount of attention received by the great powers in the historiographical debate of the Cold War in comparison to other countries.

Given the significant role and importance secret services and their labour had in the development of the ideological war, countries with relevant endeavours in this matter are worth a more careful attention. The activities of the Romanian secret services were well connected to the aims established by the communist system while using interesting methods and techniques. Analysing some of these would enrich significantly the historiographical collection of the Cold War.

This paper is part of a study that aims to fill in a niche by trying to find out whether industrial espionage was a strategic aim for the second and last part of the Romanian communist system, namely between 1965 and 1989. This paper also highlights the contribution made by the Romanian secret services to the course and development of the Cold War and tries to give a specific and specialised context for the nowadays democratic Romania. The examination of the methods used by the Romanian secret services in connection to the established objectives gives a general perspective of the aims of the Romanian communist system during the Cold War and reveals the importance industrial espionage had on it.

The limited resources available might interfere in the quality of the analysed research. However, it leaves an open door for further investigation that might eventually answer some of the questions rose in this paper.

Keywords: industrial, espionage, Communism, Ceausescu, secret, Caraman.

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Introduction and brief literature review

This study is of particular relevance for this panel and provides an unusual perspective on what were the impacts of industrial espionage in a particular context. The industrial espionage that Romanians pursued so fervently in the second part of the communist era marked the country for future decades and its position within the international stage. The phenomenon seems to be a recurring pattern.

In the context of an aggressive capitalist system, paradoxically, industrial espionage has become again a topic of interest. Mainly conducted by major corporations, their link to their country of origin is important for the shaping of the international dynamics at economic and political level. The Romanian example, although in a different context, where the system was limited and shaped by the values of socialism and the example of the USSR, helps to create the framework of what industrial espionage means, brings and aims in different contexts.

The ideological clash represented by the Cold War was transformed into an authentic conflict that, as the Romanian historian Cristian Troncotă would say, although apparently cold, in fact as hot on the secret scene as to impact each of the historical events of the era (Troncota, 2006, p. 5).

With the study of secret intelligence of this period, historians understood, at least partially, what the Cold War was about. More importantly, they understood the relevance and the weight intelligence and secret actions gained meanwhile. Therefore, they described the Cold War as an intelligence conflict where the fastest and brightest in handling information while getting under the opponent's skin was the one to be victorious. Both sides tried to focus on this matter, creating complex structures of intelligence and adapting the old ones to the new international political and economic reality. They used espionage as main offensive weapon and counterintelligence as a defence tool.

Regardless the similar ideologies from within each bloc, among their members there were some countries that aspired to be more relevant and to have a different position in the international system, trying to break freer from under the socialism or liberalism umbrella. One of these countries was Romania who, even though rarely mentioned in the international historical analysis of the Second World War, played an important role in ending it sooner (Troncota, 2006, p. 6).

Through these ambitions, the Cold War, with its information and arms race, was seen by the Romanians as a good opportunity to weaken the strong link and control the Soviet Union had established on their country after the world war. To achieve this, Romania established specific objectives and

worked strategically and thoroughly towards this position, relying strongly on intelligence and espionage. They invested so much in their intelligence system that it affected the social one they were trying to defend and develop in appearance, leading to a Revolution in the winter of 1989 and eventually to its disappearance.

The historiography of the final decade of the twentieth century and furthermore, of the twenty first century, has not paid attention to the Romanian activities during this period or on its interesting political and economic dynamics. Even locally, few Romanian historians and political scientists have researched and analysed this period with the actions that entailed and the impact that these had on the Romanian society and its development during the Cold War and after it. Most of the Romanian historiography is dedicated to the study of the communist system installed after the Second World War, the dissidence it involved, its dictators and the development of the relations with the Soviet Union as an important pillar of the communist system.

Relying on the previous research of the communist system in Romania, of the functioning of its secret services, of the objectives developed by the communist leaders during the Cold War and of the development of the relations with the Soviet Union, this paper is trying to understand if the industrial espionage was a strategic objective of the Romanian communist system between 1965 and 1989.

The importance Romania had during the Cold War is becoming more interesting for the historiography nowadays and could turn out to be noteworthy in explaining and understanding missing perspectives of this period.

The historiography of Cold War Romania has not been able to develop fully the potential explanations and analysis regarding methods used by the Romanian secret services or their role during this time. The institution of *Securitate*, the main body of the Romanian security service during the communist era, was widely studied along with its relationship with the communist system. However, some of the deep analysis of its true importance is missing due to lack of access to relevant primary sources. Some historians focused their attention on the development of the Romanian communist system and of its activities in relation to its aims as a first step in introducing the role Romania played in the “behind the scenes” war between the two blocs.

Dennis Deletant, Cristian Troncota and Pierre Accoce (with Daniel Pouget) were among the most important historians to develop some insights related to the institution of *Securitate*. The three of them focused their studies on different aspects related to the Romanian secret services and their

development within the communist system. While Deletant and Troncota direct their attention on the historiography of the institution, Accoce and Pouget are more interested in some specific methods Romanians used to achieve their objectives.

The historian Cristian Troncota analysed in various detailed studies the relations between Romania and the Soviet Union and the role played by the Romanian secret services in the development of these relations. According to him, the development of the *Securitate* was strongly influenced by the actions the Soviet Union was taking towards Romania. The country was deeply penetrated by the Soviet secret services. It was considered by them one of the most problematic countries, able to disturb the Soviet influence over the Eastern bloc and already aiming at it. This comes strongly related to the political and economic aims of the Romanians, established by the communist leaders.

Dennis Deletant, also a reference in the study of the Eastern European bloc and the Romanian system particularly, focuses his research in how the security intelligence system had developed during the Cold War. Even if he explains the evolution of the Romanian security intelligence services, Deletant does not focus his area of expertise on the specific methods the *Securitate* used in order to achieve the aims established by the communist leaders. Deletant managed to study some of the files of the *Securitate* and explained along his studies the importance this institution had in the development and maintenance of the communist system. In order to detect and analyse its importance, he gives a thorough explanation of the structure of the institution and the changes within it as well as its actions and how they affected the society and the system. He talks about the 'legacy' the institution left on Romania and how this legacy affected the transition to democracy from 1989 to 1991 and its further evolution from 1991. According to Deletant, Romania "shared with all the communist regimes of Eastern Europe a total reliance upon terror as an instrument of political power" (Deletant, 2001, p. 159).

As Deletant's analysis concludes, following the aim of achieving a certain independence from the USSR was especially difficult during the leadership of Gheorghiu-Dej, whose institutions were deeply penetrated and controlled by the Soviets. However, this situation changed as 'Khrushchev's removal on the 14 October 1964 as Soviet leader [that] offered Gheorghiu-Dej a further chance to consolidate his break with Moscow'. The leader took the opportunity and the next Soviet ruler, Leonid Brezhnev finally acceded to retire the Soviet counsellors from Bucharest. Despite this, one of the starting points of this research is related to the fact that in spite of the retirement of the counsellors from Romania, the institutions remained deeply penetrated by Soviet spies. A thorough analysis of the context and actions taken by the Romanians indicates

that the strategic elements of the Romanian domestic and foreign policies were strongly influenced by this aspect. The continuous presence of Soviet officials within the Romanian apparatus was, probably, one of the aspects that pushed the communist leadership to establish the full independence of the Romanians from Soviet influence as main national objective, and the intelligence services as a main tool in achieving it. Industrialisation was going to be a key aspect in achieving this national objective.

Another author of relevance for this paper and the topic surrounding it, Pierre Accoce, focused his study of the Caraman network in explaining how the industrial espionage was developed, also by giving a brief perspective of the motivations. However, Accoce's story of the Caraman network does not provide an extensive explanation of the strategic nature of the actions of the network of Mihai Caraman or their level of contribution to the industrial conglomerate.

This study, relying particularly on the work of these historians, is aiming to provide a general understanding of the strategic nature of the industrial espionage practiced by the Romanians during the second period of the communist era and after the instalment of Nicolae Ceausescu at Cotroceni, the residence of the country's leader. As the topic studied is of recent interest amongst historians, the paper relies on the qualitative method of reviewing the existent literature and the study of primary sources related to the main topic of interest, available through the Romanian National Archives of the *Securitate*. It also includes a brief study case, relevant in answering the question raised by it.

The institution of Securitate in the Cold War Romania

According to several historians, the first period of the communist system was marked by repression and the elimination of the opposition. Defined by the Soviet model of dictatorship, the communist system was installed in Romania following closely the steps of the Soviet model of repression and terror. The main instrument used to achieve such measures was the *Securitate*. Mass arrests and a general sentiment of fear was what made Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's (the first long term communist leader after the Second World War) system comparable to George Orwell's dystopia of 1984. Of course, many questions regarding this system were left unanswered.

With the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, repression was no longer the main purpose of the communist system. With a much more developed communist rule, the new General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and leader of the country, Nicolae Ceausescu, started to focus more on the breakaway of

the Romanian nation from the Soviet overlord rather than continuing the terror system of his predecessor. Even so, the historiography of the Romanian communism refers to this period as the period marked by the ignominy of human dignity and human rights. Despite this description and according to conclusions drawn by Dennis Deletant, Ceausescu's system "never used the tactics of mass arrests and internal deportations that were a feature of most of the Dej era" (Deletant, 2001, p. 159).

Therefore, Nicolae Ceausescu focused the Romanian state policy much more on the aim of breaking-up with the Soviet Union than Gheorghiu-Dej had the chance to. With Ceausescu's coming into power, the *Securitate* had to be reformed completely once the Constitution was enhanced; Romania was transformed into a Socialist Republic from a People's Republic.

The External Intelligence Department

According to the Romanian historian Florian Banu, the creation of the External Information Direction was one of the most important moments of the history of the Romanian secret services during the communist era (Banu, p. 102).

From the beginning of the communist rule in Romania, espionage started to be an important element of the secret services, especially given the historical context of Cold War. Espionage activities were under the command of the *Special Intelligence Service*. After the replacement of the Special Intelligence Service by the *General Directory of the People's Security*, the external intelligence activities started to be undertaken by the *Direction A – External Intelligence of the General Directory of the People's Security*.

With the merger of the Ministry of State Security with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was created the Department of External Intelligence (*Departamentul I Informatii Externe – DIE*). The external intelligence ran under this name until 1963, when it was renamed the General Direction of Intelligence (*Directia Generala de Informatii – DGI*). Latter, in 1968, DGI became the General Direction of External Intelligence (*Directia Generala de Informatii Externe – DGIE*).

In spite of all the changes in the denomination of the institution, its structure remained more or less the same, including three more directions: the 5th Direction, in charge of the scientific and technical espionage, the 6th Direction, in charge of the *illegals* and the 7th Direction, in charge of the infiltrations in the foreign intelligence, counterintelligence services and the defence counterintelligence of the representatives of the state as well as the fight against the resistance movement and reactionary emigration. (Banu, p. 3)

With the passing of the Council of State Security under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were some changes in the structure of the *DIE*. Only after a year of this merger, the activity of the department was regulated.

The defection of general Ioan Mihai Pacepa¹ in July 1978, left an important mark on the Romanian communist system at the time, as well as some historiographical memoirs that contributed to the general analysis of the Romanian secret services during the communist era. Pacepa related in one of his publications how the *DIE* functioned after its merger with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to him, he and the general Nicolae Doicaru² pushed a proposal to Ceausescu to legalise the activity of the Department without publishing the regulation. This, according to Pacepa, was much needed as the Department was acting illegally in many aspects of its activity, as most of its activities were contradictory to the Constitution.

The decree was going to contradict the Constitution anyways but, to get it signed by the leader, Pacepa and Doicaru had to collaborate with Gheorghe Oprea, Ceausescu's vice-Prime-Minister and counsellor. To redact the decree in such fashion so the dictator would sign it, the generals mobilised the most important individuals within *DIE*, including General Mihai Caraman, an important and respected figure within the service, given his achievements (some outlined later in the paper). On 23 June 1973 the dictator signed the *Decretul Consiliului de Stat, nr. 363* (the Decree of the State Council number 363) regarding the organization and functioning of the Department of External Intelligence. The document was not published in the Romanian Official Gazette (*Buletinul Oficial*) and it was made available only to the specialised structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Banu, p. 6).

According to Pacepa, this decree created the mafia of espionage of Ceausescu, and as such, remained one of the most secret documents of the history of Communist Romania. It is worth having a critical perspective on Pacepa's view, as he had also mentioned that he had a great stake in the promotion and creation of the decree. Thus, his indignation and criticism when relating the masking of the activities of the department under cultural, diplomatic and religious activities should arouse a certain degree of reluctance. In the Department, the external espionage activities were under the diplomatic umbrella since 1941.

With this decree, the Romanian external intelligence started to have a specific and characteristic structure, until 1978, although it did not change significantly from the previous one. It also benefited of modernisation of some

¹ Former general of Communist Romania, who defected to the United States in July 1978.

² General within *Securitate* and chief of *DIE* from 1959 to 1978.

of the methods and means used by the Romanian espionage. All the informers were conspired officers that worked aiming to eliminate any Soviet (and probably Western) threat as well as to develop Romania's possibilities to become fully independent from the Soviets. Historian Florian Banu gives a detailed explanation of how the department worked including the financial retributions and other types of incentives the service used to maintain its informers loyal. Banu criticises Pacepa's perspective and explains that the acknowledgement of the system by the Western intelligence services discredited the professionalism and the correct functioning of such a complex structure put together and reformed in so many occasions. The fact that Western services were aware of the Romanian external intelligence organisation was discovered by Mihai Caraman through one of his agents in Austria that was able to obtain a document in which the organisation and functioning of *DIE* was described minutely. Regardless, the decree had lost any value after the defection of Pacepa, one of its promoters. The entire system had to be modified and the time lost by doing it had important consequences on the communist system.

After Pacepa's defection and Doicaru's replacement in 1978, as a result of Pacepa's defection, the department was renamed the Centre of Foreign Intelligence (*Centrul de Informatii Externe – CIE*), having slightly different of a structure and organisation. The institution was organised focusing its activities on regions and specific espionage objectives. However, Romanian espionage suffered irreparable damages under Nicolae Plesita, its new leader, and the external espionage stopped being a major matter of interest.

Numerous other defections were encouraged by Pacepa's. The communist system started being in crisis and the secret service had to focus on preventing further defections and trying to repair the damage made by the previous ones on the country's reputation. The service focused on unsuccessful counterintelligence activities and on restoring the reputation of the secret services and the Romanian communist system both domestically, among its citizens, and abroad. In consequence, the industrial espionage ceased from being among the strengths or main objectives of the Romanian external intelligence activities.

The industrial espionage from the perspective of the general Ion Mihai Pacepa

Nicolae Ceausescu might have seen a very good opportunity to be the beloved leader of the Romanians, by establishing Gheorghiu-Dej's policy of independence as the cornerstone of the communist system under his rule.

This policy and the personality cult have worked together for Ceausescu's regime, helping him, supposedly, to achieve the supreme leadership of the country. Regardless, during the era of his rule, the secret services were used as the most important tool to succeed in achieving the independence from Soviet umbrella. The most solicited department of *Securitate* on this matter was the Department of External Intelligence (*DIE*).

According to general Ioan Mihai Pacepa, Ceausescu based the entire economy of the country on the industrial espionage. The former *Securitate* general reveals in his memoirs important intelligence sources the Romanians had obtained from the West. Later declarations of Pacepa stated that according to Ceausescu, stealing from the West was moral, cheaper (than investing in research) but of great effort, and the information gathered with such efforts by *DIE* had to be used smartly in developing the country's industrial arm.

In 1967, the leader used some of the information already gathered from abroad to attract representatives of the Western countries to Romania. He transmitted them that Romania intended to import one of the most important chemical businesses from the West. Companies from England, West Germany and Italy came to Romania with large amounts of general documentation on the polystyrene industry. One French company though, came with an important concrete technical project, already put in practice in other Western countries. Even though the representatives of the company had their documentation well secured during the night, the Romanian espionage managed to obtain the documents that were photographed in detail. After obtaining the useful information, the Romanian government retracted its importation interests. Furthermore, Ceausescu ordered Mihai Florescu, the Minister of the Chemical Industry at the time, to put together a budget on the implementation of the project stolen from the French. The idea and plan of the project were attributed to Ceausescu's wife, Elena, who was known as being a chemist, praising 'her idea' that had brought the country a USD 15 million contribution to the economy. In eight years, the project was finalised, and the leader opened what he called 'the diamond of the petrochemical industry', a polystyrene fabric. The complex, constructed in Borzesti, became an important reference point of the Romanian industry. After such a success of the industrial espionage, Ceausescu gave more importance to this practice for the Romanians as a society and as country in the active process of industrialisation. However, according to Pacepa, Ceausescu used industrial espionage to fulfil his megalomania dreams only. These perspectives are always subject to questioning as they rely on subjective perspectives.

Furthermore, Ceausescu followed closely the actions of the Soviets in all the areas of the industrialisation. In 1970, Romania and the USSR signed a friendship treaty at Bucharest, on which occasion Ceausescu received important information related to the espionage activities conducted by the Soviets from the Soviet Prime Minister, Aleksei Kosighin. This concluded in the Decree 272 that raised the espionage activities to the rank of state policy.

In 1972, Ceausescu found out from the Bulgarian president, Todor Jikov, that all the large tonnage vehicles used to transport to the West fruits and vegetables were controlled by the state's secret services. Therefore, the dictator ordered all the Romanian International Transportation vehicles (TIR) to be passed under *DIE's* supervision. The chauffeurs of the vehicles were replaced by intelligence officers and the Romanian external intelligence managed to counterfeit all the Western custom seals. They were further used to reseal the vehicles, so they would not be controlled at the border and therefore be able to carry secret intelligence in all its forms. They managed to traffic high amounts of illegal drugs and arms. No records of the amounts trafficked through this method were found, including through research of the Romanian National Archives.

Most of the information provided by the Soviets was used in a clever manner by Ceausescu. He transformed the Romanian Civil Air Fleet, TAROM, in an undercover espionage organisation. It was used both for intelligence purposes, carrying diplomatic intelligence and human and equipment trafficking. The management as well as the cabin crews and the international representatives of the company were intelligence agents from *DIE*. The same happened with Navrom, the Romanian Agency of Naval Transport, that in 1975 was passed under the jurisdiction of *DIE* at the suggestion of Yuri Andropov, the chief of KGB. Shortly after, the external intelligence started to use the naval service to import illegally industrial and military equipment (tanks from Israel and radar installations from England and Italy etc.).

Ceausescu also found out about the intention of the Soviets to create 'mixed societies' with the Western companies. He stole this idea and, after signing a secret decree, 'so secret that it was handwritten', as Pacepa related, he put the latter in charge of them. The mixed societies had industrial and technological espionage purposes. The internal regulation of these societies specified that the employees in management positions had to collaborate with the secret service. Again, *DIE* oversaw them and their functioning. These societies had as sole contribution the intelligence gathered, as on economic level they failed massively. One of the examples cited by Pacepa was the automobile company, Olcit that collaborated with the French one, Citroen. The final purpose of this collaboration, from the Romanian perspective, was

the collection of a large amount of intelligence that would have allowed the Romanian production, based on French ideas, to export a significant number of automobiles to all the external markets, boosting the economy of the country. However, the focus of the employees was directed merely to the espionage activity. Twelve years after its creation, it went bankrupt, having produced by 1990 only 1.5% of the initial planned production (Pacepa, 2013, p. 213).

The conclusion that can be withdrawn by analysing this information, that Ceausescu was eager to transform every commercial service into a secret service supplier of large amounts of intelligence, supports the argument of this study. Spying and stealing information from any reachable party, including the Soviet overlord, without considering potential consequences of the undertaken actions, proves the strategic importance and the extent of the industrial espionage, despite the limited sources of intelligence to support it. It also gives a brief perspective of the levels on which the Romanian secret services collaborated with the Soviet ones.

As stated previously, it is important to analyse critically the information given by Pacepa as he criticised a system encouraged by him prior to his defection. Additionally, his insights are not backed by any public primary sources that can prove the objectiveness of his statements. A general line of judgement can be traced and even though the information might have suffered intended inaccuracies, the fact that Ceausescu put industrial espionage on a leading place is obvious. If it did it for personal or patriotic aims remains questionable as the answer can only be the result of a speculation. It gives space to further research, nonetheless.

The Caraman network – insights of the Romanian espionage methods

Nicolae Ceausescu inherited, as part of the development of the policy of independence, a very important and useful element of the secret services, the Caraman network, among the most important espionage weapons Romania had. The network was tediously-built by Mihai Caraman with the aim of providing a tool useful enough to distract the Soviets from the Romanian ambitions and from the gradual elimination of the Soviet agents from the Romanian institutions. The network aimed at providing important intelligence for achieving the ultimate objective of an independent country. Mihai Caraman was general of the *Securitate* with an extended experience in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Romanian Communist Party. He worked at the

External Intelligence Department (*DIE*) within the Service France-Benelux-Italy, under diplomatic cover.

The network divided its activity in two parts: from the fifties until 1964, when Ceausescu came to power, and after 1964 until 1989 when, allegedly, Ceausescu took more explicit actions in breaking up with the USSR. However, the network started its activity, fully subordinated to the party's desire of achieving independence, in 1960, when Gheorghiu-Dej began to instil the possibility of an independent country. From 1961 until 1969, Caraman managed one of the most powerful and efficient espionage networks among the communist countries that created significant damage to the Western defence and economic organisations. In this period, Caraman obtained a very large number of documents from his spies, who were working mainly at NATO.

With the creation of NATO, the Soviet espionage gave special attention to the organisation. Such was the case that NATO was the victim of Soviet related espionage every year, as the defence measures taken by the Member States did not seem to have a useful effect. However, given the strict supervision of the Soviets on their own territory, the Western espionage in the East had to rely on defections rather than infiltrations. This is also how the Caraman network was dismantled. Pierre Accoce described the Western measures of defence as inefficient, however, good enough to attract useful agents with a great amount of information from the East. This suggests that the Cold War might have been won by the Soviet bloc if the secret services had had a better acceptance within the populations of its countries.

Some months after the comeback to power of General Charles de Gaulle in France, Mihai Caraman was relocated to Paris at the Romanian commercial representation. The choice of this historical context (the Cold War) to create such a complex network of espionage, shows that the Romanians knew how to take advantage of the situation. The final half of the 50s and furthermore, the 60s, hosted a wide range of events that kept the main rivals of the Cold War, especially the Western countries, tense and vigilant. Caught in the middle of the Algerian war of independence, France could not react as fast and efficient to both internal and external threats. Also, the controversial Cuban Missile Crisis, the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the Prague Spring and its conclusion into the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, were distractions that gave Romania a good opportunity to react silently and efficiently within the secret war.

Caraman had under his command 12 handlers in charge of controlling the informers, some of whom were controlled directly by him. He appointed them among the Romanian diplomats, and thus none could have been arrested because of the immunity gave by their diplomatic status. According to the later

disclosures of the defector Ion Iacobescu, member of the network, the Caraman network was formed by: Mihail Simula and Ion Paduraru, working at UNESCO, Mihail Georgescu, Gheorghe Ionescu, Eugen Visan, Pavel Cismaru, Constantin Mirea, Marin Negrea and Mihai Ilie working at the Romanian Embassy in Paris (Accoce, 1999, p. 102).

Caraman analysed thoroughly every target and managed to lead the way of his handlers to the manipulation of these individuals and of many others. At first, he patiently observed them by creating their profile, studying their weaknesses and building up the strategy to manipulate them. He then attracted them, manipulated them and finally blackmailed them to achieve his goals.

The particularity of the Caraman network is marked by the fact that it managed to create a varied network of spies that were controlled through a variety of methods and that provided a great amount of different types of intelligence. Even though we are referring to the industrial espionage as a strategic objective of the communist system, it is worth mentioning that the damage that this network made was referred to important industrial, economic and scientific intelligence. This network was probably one of the most important tools of the communist system in obtaining industrial espionage with multiple purposes. To the extent that, according to Pierre Accoce, Romania managed to have a 13% rhythm of industrial development, the second one after Japan (Accoce, 1999, p.134). Given the context of the Cold War, the socialist system imposed and the Soviet pressure from above, Romania managed to walk as good as possible towards its aim of being a fully independent country. Through this network of spies and well-trained handlers, we have a fair image of the Romanian industrial espionage and its importance in achieving the often mentioned aims Romania focused on mostly during the second half of the Communist system.

Caraman network was fully dismantled in August 1969 after the defections of first, Evgheni Runge, a Soviet lieutenant-colonel that managed to pass to the West in October 1967, as his life was, allegedly, at threat, and furthermore of the general Ion Iacobescu, who was part of the network. Runge told the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) everything he knew about the network and the espionage activities of the East towards the West, generally. Nonetheless, the CIA just instructed the DST agents to keep a close eye on the Romanian Embassy in Paris. Without their defection, it is unlikely that the Caraman network would have been discovered in 1969. According to general Ion Iacobescu, Caraman received from Ceausescu the task of attracting and bringing back to the country all the scientists that left Romania. However, due to lack of information related to the outcome of this task it cannot be

confirmed if the network was successful in this matter. Such a task also proves the strategic importance of the industrial espionage in communist Romania.

Ultimately, Mihai Caraman returned to Romania and continued his service within the *Securitate* until 1979 when he was asked to retire. After the fall of the communist system in 1989, he was appointed adjunct to the Minister of National Defence and Commander in Chief of the Centre of External Intelligence (*Centrul de Informatii Externe – CIE*), nowadays known as the Foreign Intelligence Service (*Serviciul de Informatii Externe – SIE*). The actions of the Caraman network had longstanding consequences for the soon to be democratic country. In 1992, NATO warned Romania that having Mihai Caraman at the lead of the newly 'reformed' *CIE* was going to diminish the Romanian efforts in advancing towards its membership of the Alliance.

The limited space for the presentation of this study does not allow us to give a more insightful perspective of the actions of the Caraman network, through relevant examples. These would show the methods and techniques used by Caraman to obtain the needed intelligence.

Conclusion

Cristian Troncota appreciated that the history of the twentieth century proved, especially for the small and medium states with more limited interests, that the full commitment of the secret services in pursuing the aims established by the government brought the country to the fulfilment of its aim. Regardless, the Romanian Revolution of 1989 raises questions on the actual fulfilment of the Romanian aim of 'independence' of the Soviet Union. By the end of his dictatorship, Nicolae Ceausescu has reportedly managed to pay Romania's entire external debt, which might be an indicator of the status of 'full independence' from the Soviet Union and other Western actors. However, his removal from power and the allegations of external involvement in the Romanian Revolution, that later appeared, raise an important question mark on the actual autonomy of the Romanians.

Even though the industrial espionage was a strategic objective of the communist system, the limited information obtained on it and the short analysis of it, proves the deficits of the Romanian communist system. Its importance in Romania might be attributed to Romania's link to the USSR. For the latter, the industrialisation was an important objective to achieve, to ultimately win the Cold War. For the Romanians, the industrial espionage was a tool of the technical and scientific revolution they were aiming at, according to primary sources.

A major reference of the paper is the study case on the Caraman network as the most successful achievement for this matter. The limited resources explaining this objective gave a confined perspective of its real importance for the Romanian government at the time. Its results distracted the USSR from the actions taken by the Romanians to 'clean' the secret services of Soviet agents. Also, the industrial espionage, was used as a strategic weapon to develop the Romanian industries and scientific areas so the country could face easier the awaited rupture with the Soviets.

The thorough analysis of the research suggests that the communist system had the industrial espionage as a strategic objective between 1965 and 1989. The first objective of industrialisation established by the Romanians was fulfilled given the pace at which Romania had grown in this period, which in great part happened as a result of the intelligence gathered through industrial espionage. Many historians support the fact that providing the USSR with intelligence gathered from their espionage activities was part of the Romanians' strategy of distracting the Soviet overlord from their plan of independence. However, the historical findings suggest that the Romanians were conditioned by the Soviets to maintain their level of collaboration in the espionage activities in exchange of the withdrawal of the Soviet counsellors from their country. Such a mixture of hypothesis drives us towards the conclusion that the Romanians shrewdly managed to integrate their obligations towards the Soviet Union in their strategy. It has been mentioned previously that the importance of the industrial espionage was linked to the relation Romania had with the USSR. This was so for many reasons. First, would be the already explained strategy of distracting the Soviets from the internal restructuring. The industrialisation of the country, inspired by Soviet values in its initial stage, was also a tool of defence in order to be able to face the Soviets after the potential rupture. Also, the intelligence the Romanians obtained from their collaboration with the Soviets contributed significantly to the development of the industrialisation. So, in spite the often-mentioned desire to break free from Soviet influence, the Romanians used it as a weapon to achieve the eventual rupture.

As in the communist system the objectives were established during the process rather than before it, the industrial espionage became a strategic objective once the Romanians started to notice the facility they had in pursuing it.

The successful Romanian espionage activities between 1965 and 1989 were supported by some major happenings and circumstances. An example is the proposal of Yuri Andropov, in 1964, of a cooperation plan between the states of the Warsaw Pact. This plan suggested that the secret services of the

socialist countries would not focus on the total espionage but on limited issues and interest zones. In the meantime, the KGB would cover the general issues. This aspect is a potential explanation of the continuous restructuring of the *Securitate* and its focus on specific parts of the world rather than different issues, after 1965. Andropov's plan also mentioned the requirement of sending the full amount of intelligence gathered to Moscow rather than just synthesis of it. The denial of these proposals by the Romanian delegation after the retirement of the Soviet counsellors from Romania, increased the vigilance of the Soviets, but the Romanians expected it and were prepared to face it.

In the case of the Caraman network, as one of the most successful operations of industrial espionage from 1965-1989, there were several elements that facilitated espionage activities. First, the hate that General Charles de Gaulle nourished for the Americans helped the context in which a socialist country could have developed espionage activities. General de Gaulle was also looking for a hidden ally in the East.

Second, the fact that the intelligence gathered by the Caraman network and shared with the Soviets had a high quality facilitated an independent action with no involvement of the KGB. Therefore, the Romanians could manipulate easily the intelligence that reached Moscow as part of their obligation.

Third, the resources the Romanians, without Soviet contribution, invested in the operation were considerable and obvious, especially in the awards offered to their spies as well as in the facilities the diplomats had. Additionally, the fact that Romania had no reluctance in sharing the intelligence gathered by their own resources with the USSR, gives an interesting clue of the quality and importance of the intelligence shared with them in the first place. However, it is worth mentioning that the large investment in the actions of the secret services ended up affecting the population's wellbeing and furthermore it had a fatal effect on the system itself.

Fourth, the historical context of the Cold War and the fast-paced espionage activity that all the countries were engaged in, helped Romanian espionage activities to develop according to the country's needs. In this situation, is understandable why the Romanians had the industrial espionage as a strategic objective of the communist system. In their wish to outstand, to have a say, to be powerful when they had the resources, the means and the people to achieve that, it is not questionable why the Romanians pursued at such an intensity the espionage activities and particularly the industrial espionage between 1965 and 1989. Their potential to develop their industry was diminished by the Soviet interference and demands and that was only to be ended up with by growing stronger. The democratic countries had already

decades of development ahead. Thus, the Romanians had to focus their attention and skills towards them.

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