

SECURITY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AS KEYS TO REGIONAL STABILITY: ROMANIAN LESSONS

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Abstract

The paper aims at analyzing, from a practitioner's perspective, security problems and patterns for South Eastern Europe, ranging from terrorism to Russian influences, as well as potential common solutions for them. It will review the variety of reasons for which this particular region is considered of great importance and interest from a strategic point of view, such as being an "unquiet frontier", a weak zone or "soft spot", and why the subject should be very high on the agenda of policy-makers, security analysts and practitioners alike, academics and various other institutions.

I intent to case-study Romania's manner of dealing with security risks, which I consider significantly superior to those of some of its neighbours', the success of its historical and current security strategies, and the lessons which our country can provide for the region. In my opinion, the key for all SEE member states to achieve a safer status is capacity building. And capacity building cannot be obtained by individual efforts of the Eastern European countries alone, but rather through a solid system of support, encouragement, and help from regional and Western partners and allies. Current cooperation formats as well as potential ones, including NATO and EU enlargements, will also be reviewed, since they constitute the main security solutions for unstable and insecure countries in the region.

Keywords: #unquiet frontier, #terrorism, #Russian influence, #cooperation, #capacity building.

Overview of the Region

Due to a variety of reasons, South Eastern Europe is considered an area of great importance and worthy of significant interest from the strategic point of view: it has a particular geography and unique history, radically different from that of Western European states, constituting both a physical

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extremity for the European continent and a fringe for traditional alliances such as NATO and EU. With all advantages stemming from its geographic location, it is also what Wess Mitchell and Jakub Grygiel have called an *unquiet frontier* (Grygiel and Mitchell, 2018), a weak zone or soft spot, prone to intrusions of various natures, which need to be addressed as such, advantages and disadvantages included.

Part of the interest for this region stems from its status as contact point for Western values and alliances with one of the foremost challengers to the status of global power¹ of our time, the Russian Federation. This border status makes the region particularly vulnerable, even more so since its strong, prominent allies are at the weakest at the margins of their influence; this makes regional actors more prone to shifting sides when pressed, if not enough support comes from traditional allies. The potential for regional conflict is still high in an area which has sparked both World Wars, and the Cold War.

Concerning common historical traits, during the Cold War, most countries in the region were part of the Warsaw Treaty, had communist regimes, therefore had little or no contact with democratic values, no freedom of speech, and the concept of free media was unknown to them². Economy in former USSR satellites was centralized, obviously dysfunctional, most times corruption-generating, as well as lacking notions such as private property. Those characteristics are also reflected, in different degrees, in today's economical underdevelopment of the region, and in the pervasive corruption, and both factors are only aggravating for most security threats.

During the Cold War, countries in the region used to have extensive military capabilities and large armies, but not professional ones, while intelligence services were strong and effective with regards to countering terrorism, but also reputable weapons in maintaining the political *status quo*. From the security point of view, basically, during the Cold War and

¹ Wess Mitchell and Jakub Grygiel actually call Russia a revisionist power, aiming at becoming as influential as it was at the apex of its power. According to the same authors, revisionist states try to challenge not necessarily the global order, but rather the regional one, by trying to reap benefits – including annexation of territories they had previously controlled – from political control over neighboring states; although their ambitions are regional, their effects have the potential of creating worldwide instability. See Grygiel and Mitchell, p. XXV.

² Surprisingly, from the national security standpoint, controlled media turned out to be somewhat an advantage, because state-controlled press made no references to terrorist attempts or attacks, therefore the propaganda purposes of terrorist organizations could not be fulfilled.

afterwards, the SEE countries had a low terrorist threat, and relatively few terrorist incidents.

It is important to mention that most of the former Soviet satellite-states had no problem with religious minorities (except for the former Yugoslavia), and, as to religiously-motivated terrorism, they only had small and old domestic Muslim communities, well integrated and moderate. Most countries in the region – Romania among the most prominent – also had good diplomatic, cultural, and economic relations with Muslim states, while communist leaders had close personal ties with Arab and Muslim ones, which helped them and their countries stay safe. A notable exception from this general trend is, of course, Turkey, which has a generally moderate Muslim population, but is known for being “a top notch area where (terrorist) operations targeting the European continent are organized, and where they (terrorists) withdraw” (Migaux, 2018).

The Autumn of Nations and the subsequent second wave of revolutions at the beginning of the '90s brought about political and economical instability, and power vacuum; the fall of the USSR and dismemberment of the Warsaw Treaty left former satellite states leaderless, disoriented, and in a difficult and prolonged transition. Economically, their situation was difficult, while from the point of view of security, it was a *grey area*, with several actors struggling to gain influence: Russia, the US, and the EU. Democratic values were inexistent or at a minimum, and acquiring such values was a long, painstaking process, in some instances still ongoing as we speak.

While the period before 2001 was marked by global stability – let's not forget about Fukuyama's proclaimed *end of history* –, for SEE, it was marred by regional instability. Frontiers were reorganized, and serious military conflicts took place. However, with regard to the terrorist threat, extremist nationalist attacks tended to be less frequent, while religious minority problems increased only slightly, overall. There was only a slow growth of the Muslim community, which was, however, still well integrated and with a low level of radicalization. Countries in the region still enjoyed overall good relations with Muslim countries, mainly by virtue of their former ties. Low levels of the terrorist threat and relatively few terrorist incidents were still a major advantage of the region. Security and stability were achieved to a higher degree by most states only once they became NATO members.

SEE states' accession to NATO had the major advantage of mitigating potential sources of conflict in the region, dissuading Russian military interventions, and suppressing regional territorial disputes. It is relevant for countries in the former Soviet sphere of influence that they sought security first and foremost. Political and economic alliances came second to the

necessity of NATO integration. Accession was, in some cases, a three step process, consisting of Partnership for Peace Membership, Membership Action Plans, and, eventually, full integration.

NATO accession meant operating difficult but effective reforms of the security sector: national armies were professionalized; defence infrastructure was modernized, while intelligence services were reformed in order to overcome political police suspicions. The intelligence organizations from the communist period were dissolved, and they handed over their archives, most of which were made accessible to the general public. New intelligence agencies took over, with some of the old inheritance, but making radical changes in personnel, regulations and preoccupations, while also being held to new democratic and professional standards, which were further validated by Euro-Atlantic allies and partners.

For Romania, making the shift from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, passing through a long and painstaking transition, was anything but simple, but it was mandatory. Based on Romania's experience, as well as those of other countries in the region, sooner rather than later, people do support this difficult process towards democracy, choosing to be part of the solution, and not the problem, even if they are under different pressures, like hybrid war, assertiveness of revisionist powers, radical Islamic influence, terrorism, migration, separatism, Chinese persuasions etc.

Despite all progress and despite its relative safety from the terrorist threat, currently, SEE is still a weak point for the European continent: it exports instability, due to its ethnic conflicts and territorial rivalries, as well as organized crime, connected to trafficking human beings, weapons or drugs, or even cybercrime, which has found a safe haven in some countries. Those complex vulnerabilities need to be tackled and solved as soon as possible, since they are exploited by all kinds of interested parties, from Russia, which uses and deepens them in order to gain influence and economic advantages, to China, which invests heavily in the region and tends to spy as heavily, or to some Muslim countries which try to fund and support radical Islamic communities in the area.

As for the current regional status, at least two particular events can significantly alter the status of the region; first of all, the negotiations for swapping territory among Kosovo and Serbia, aiming at making them both more ethnically homogenous. Various factors, like Serbia's tight relations to Russia, or the EU's divided attitude towards such arrangement, already rejected by chancellor Angela Merkel, make it a questionable deal. The second essential event for the region's stability is the referendum in Macedonia over the name dispute (*Why Efforts to Build Bridges Could Threaten Peace in the*

Western Balkans, 2018), which could effectively end a serious source of tensions with Greece, but is rather shaky since nationalist have already caused violent protests against the deal, the Macedonian president himself is boycotting the deals, and the two parties in the ruling coalition have opposite views on the Macedonian affair. Good results in these matters would lead to a betterment of the regional stability, better relations between neighbouring countries, and EU accession for some of the involved parties, with all economic and political consequences.

Terrorism in South-Eastern Europe

With regard to terrorism, particularly the religiously motivated one, countries with old, moderate Muslim communities have a competitive edge, since they are prone to support the integration of potential newcomers. This is highly relevant in the context of the immigration waves that hit Europe in the past years.

Nonetheless, currently, extremist groups are an increasingly worrisome phenomenon in the region; foreign ultra-conservatives, prone to radicalization and generating tensions in the receiving societies, managed to cause some religious communities to reject local religious authorities, and even state authorities. Social values widely accepted in SEE societies tend to be contested by radical Islamist newcomers, which provokes a further widening of the gap between European societies.

The region has built the necessary counter-terrorist capabilities, which are in place at levels similar to those of our Western partners and allies, but – fortunately – were never fully tested. And although the threat level is considered low in the area, states such as Romania and Bulgaria are entry points for terrorist militants targeting the West. The countries' involvement in peace-keeping missions in the Middle East also led to an increase of terrorist risks. There were also allegations regarding readily accessible nuclear material in former communist countries, which could easily have become ammunition for terrorist operations.

The most relevant and worrisome facet of the terrorist phenomenon in SEE is that of foreign fighters and returnees. Several Eastern European countries are placed on the main routes used by European foreign fighters in order to travel to areas of conflict (mainly to Syria and Iraq). Moreover, there are states in the Western Balkans with a sizable Muslim population out of which more than 1,000 people have travelled to conflict areas (Petrovic, 2019), the most prominent being Kosovo, and Bosnia Herzegovina. Worth noticing the fact that these jihadists are mostly young males (between 20 and

35 years of age), coming from remote rural areas, usually poor, unemployed and lacking work experience or skills (Beslin and Ignjatijevic, June 2017). This brings up the important questions of how much of this process is generated by ideology, and how much is financial gain involved in motivating those youngsters to join violent fights. Gl. Kircio Kirov, former chief of Bulgarian NRS, publicly stated, in 2017, that there are premises for activation of sleeping terrorist cells, with the return of DAESH foreign fighters in Albania, Kosovo, FYROM, Montenegro, and Bulgaria.

Radicalization and home-grown terrorism are also becoming increasingly relevant for the region's security environment. Romania, for example, does not have an extensive radicalization issue as yet, nor home-grown terrorism to such an extent as to be called a phenomenon, but there have been isolated cases in which young people engaged or planned to engage themselves in radical activities. There is a growing need to pay attention to the isolated cases of Romanian converts, who are more prone to adhere to the extremist interpretations of the Islam.

Other states in the area were, nonetheless, more affected by the radicalization and recruitment process. The local, moderate Muslim community, also secularized by prolonged communism, was infused with radical Muslims in the 1990s, when an estimate of 2000 Arab Mujahedeen fighters came to the aid of Bosnian Muslims, in the Yugoslavian wars. Some of them settled in the region, and contributed to the radicalization process, particularly in rural, poor areas, with high unemployment and a precarious economical state. Funds from the Middle East supported mosques, radical Islamist canters offering what seemed like social services to communities, and NGOs, which degraded the regional security environment.

Later on, particularly in the Balkan-Slavic regions, Al-Qaeda was thought to have developed extensive recruitment campaigns in 2003-2004, aiming at Slavic Muslim from Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo. For a period after the 9/11 shock, the Balkans were thought to be a new general headquarter for Islamic terrorism operations targeted at Western Europe. Strong Al Qaeda cells were established in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia in the first five years after 9/11. Porous borders and endemic corruption were considered the main reasons allowing for those negative developments.

A special note is to be made on the extent and the very significant role of the current online activities in radicalization, indoctrination and communications among people interested in the Jihadist ideology. In an era marked by limitless communication, the shadow of anonymity offered by chat-rooms and forums or by the Dark Web enables jihadist to indoctrinate and recruit vulnerable youngsters, to support and fight for terrorist organizations.

Most countries in the region managed to update their legislation, in order to prevent and punish terrorist funding, as well as recruitment (on-line included) and fighting abroad. A Pew Research Centre study as of 2017 showed that most Muslim communities in the Balkan countries have an overall reduced support for conservative Islam. The Sharia Law had percentages of support among the Muslim population of maximum 20% in Kosovo – which is actually something to worry about, in my opinion, and 12% in Albania (Lipka, 2017).

As expected, migration also has a direct impact in increasing terrorist risks and is currently difficult to assess. Migrants can be terrorists and terrorists can be migrants. Balkan states are not as affected by the phenomenon as other Southern European countries, but it is important to note that rising anti-immigrant sentiments, even in countries which are not destination, nor transit countries, is distancing SE European partners from their Western counterparts.

Romania is a positive example in countering terrorism. Romanian intelligence services entered the “first league” of counter-terrorist fighters in 1995, when they caught an important Japanese Army member, responsible for several bombings on public Japanese targets. We managed to avoid any attack on our national territory, although, as I described it above, the regional context wasn't entirely peaceful, nor was it really secure. Romania understood, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, that it needed a prompt reaction in order to prevent such events and this understanding generated first of all legal and administrative reforms which would allow, for a while, for proper counter-terrorist prevention. Authorities acted concerted and proactively, passing relevant legislation regarding terrorist financing, but also supporting intelligence gathering and close cooperation among many state institutions and authorities with relevant roles in the matter. The Romanian National System for Preventing and Countering Terrorism (SNPCT) was the first structure of its kind in Eastern Europe, and it instituted a flexible cooperation mechanism, as well as capabilities for swift crisis reaction. It succeeded in cutting funds for some terrorist cells (Coldea, 2017, pp. 111-116) and became a role-model for other states in the region.

Prevention became the main preoccupation for Romanian intelligence with respect to terrorism, which actually helps project security in neighbouring countries, as well.

Russian influence

Different, but just as significant factors in regional stability are outside influences, some helping the security climate, others undermining it. As mentioned in the introduction, there is a tendency of some revisionist states – among which Russia, China, and Iran – to try and change the global balance of power, and to challenge the hegemony of the United States. And what better way to do this if not by trying to attract the allegiance of border states – such as those in SEE, trying to include them in a new sphere of influence, in order to achieve various domestic goals?

Russian lack of access and influence in the region means it is deprived of instruments for making a clear statement in the European balance of powers. It has no gateway to central Europe, due to Poland's resistance, not enough control over energy routes, no access to the Mediterranean Sea, due to Romanian and Bulgarian opposition. Deprived of influence, Russia is, thus, only another Eurasian powerful state.

Regional attitudes towards Russia vary between two poles: the "balancers", such as the Baltic States and Romania, keep a consistent resistance strategy, while some of the region tends to maintain closer ties with the Eastern neighbour, placing economic interests above political objectives. Bulgaria, for example, although a NATO and EU member, kept a particularly tight relation to Russia, choosing, among others, to enter the South Stream project, and ignoring EU anti-trust regulations.

Russia is also ubiquitous in Serbia. This is not entirely surprising, since Serbia is enjoying a status of military neutrality and is currently remaining out of the EU, although a candidate for membership. When Russia continues to provide support for a strategically ambiguous Serbia, it also suggests that Serbia's full membership of the EU may not be compatible with the principles of the Free Trade Agreement that Serbia has signed with the Eurasian Economic Union.

That said, a geopolitical convergence reinforced by the links of the Orthodox religion, which are still central to Russian foreign policy, appears to reach its limits, as we can currently observe in the Balkan region.

As for the EU, there are six states included in the EU's Eastern Partnership: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, all with different national specificities, democratic tradition (or lack of), and long-term interests. Russia takes advantage of the EU's indecision to fully politically support the Eastern Partnership countries, and employs a wide – and mostly already known – array of tactics to keep these states under its sphere of influence and control.

A secondary reaction to the resurgence of Russian interest in generating a new sphere of influence, difficult to anticipate in the '90s, was a tendency of the neighbouring countries to make new provisions for self-defence. After having considered NATO as a security warranty for some time, states in the region started to increase defence spending and enhance their defensive capabilities. In this regard, Latvia, a country prone to invasions similar to the Ukraine one, due to its large Russian community, increased defence spending by 12%. Lithuania increased spending by 40% in 2014, anticipating further increases.

Romania also increased defence spending by 15% in 2014, due to the Ukrainian crisis, and to potential Russian threats to neighbouring Moldova, and, by 2017, it even fulfilled the NATO target of allocating 2% of GDP for defence, alongside Estonia, and just under Greece spending. Bulgaria has also constantly increased budgetary allocations for defence.

Military analysts also noticed a tendency of SEE states to return to traditional means of defence, renouncing pretensions of interoperability with the US, or forces necessary for joint interventions. The Estonian concept of security, for example, was focused on international peacekeeping missions at the beginning of the Millennium, while in 2011; it rather reverted to conventional threats, considering the possibility that small states could, at a difficult crossroad, lack necessary support from the international community.

Russian influences are, however, difficult to counter in the region; we were, obviously, not ready for this type of hybrid war, which includes fake news, manipulation and propaganda, able to easily persuade a rather poor, uneducated population, as it is the case in South Eastern Europe. A European Political Strategy Centre analysis as of May 17th 2018 (*Engaging with the Western Balkans*, 2018) reveals that lack of criticism towards fake narratives is much higher in the Balkans than in EU-member states, quoting resilience to harmful narratives to an index of 56 in the EU, 31 in Serbia, and a minimum of 10 in FYROM.

Cooperation is the Key

We are only as strong as our weakest link; therefore, as neighbours and allies in the region, we need to help each other in order to make this area a more secure one. Aggregating capabilities and resources makes for a more effective security strategy, consequently cooperation is tantamount to security. Cooperation is already well established on two levels: strategic orientation, stemming from alliances and partnerships such as EU and NATO,

as well as operational orientation, dedicated to intelligence, military, and security policies.

The EU has multiple initiatives dedicated to the issues at stake as the Eastern neighbourhood represents a strategic position with important connections to Central Asia, the Middle East, but also to the Western Balkans, with a great potential to develop energy, transport and commercial routes, and a high relevance of issues like environment or democracy.

The EU approach towards the countries that form its Eastern frontier is to support their stability, predictability and European path – based on instruments related to the *European Neighbourhood Policy* and, implicitly, the *Eastern Partnership*. The main priorities of the ENP (as of November 2015) concern: building resilience to the new threats, reforming the security sector, border protection, judicial cooperation and combating terrorism and radicalization, corruption and organized crime. But, by virtue of the new “differentiation principle”, each partner state can decide on the speed and depth of the partnership and the domains it covers.

With regards to law enforcement cooperation on pertinent matters for regional security, the EU’s EUROPOL dedicates resources to countering international terrorism, as well as organized crime, supporting law enforcement in all member states. Intelligence cooperation is, nonetheless, not in the EU’s purview, since national security is, according to the EU Treaty, a matter of exclusive domestic concern.

The EU is also, by far, the largest investor in the SEE, accounting for over 75% of all direct foreign investments in the region in the 2007-2016 timeframe (*Engaging with the Western Balkans, 2018*).

Table 1: The EU remains by far the largest investor in the Western Balkans
Foreign Direct Investment inflows, in million euros, 2007-2016
(Source: Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, FDI)

EU28	China	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Turkey
21,031	2,727	1,126	233.2	110.6

Nevertheless, this hasn’t necessarily increased the EU’s popularity in the region, with population and leaders caught between Russia’s struggle for influence, and temporary personal and political interests. A Balkan Barometer by the same Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (*Engaging with the Western Balkans, 2018*) shows that, since political elites in some of the SEE countries have frequently sought to use all advantages the EU had to

offer to their own interests, people saw little or no real progress, and they were disappointed with the European solution. While EU favourability was rather high in the 2007-2016 timeframe in Kosovo, exceeding 90%, it reached a minimum in Serbia, of just under 30%, with averages of around 50% in Macedonia and Montenegro, and lower support in Bosnia Herzegovina, of only 32%.

As for cooperation within NATO, the Alliance proved to be aware of all regional security dangers and took some steps to respond accordingly. Especially after the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia and in the context of Russian aggressive actions in Eastern Ukraine, we – as allies – definitely needed to establish a new approach of our relation with Moscow, and new measures to adapt and strengthen our collective defence capabilities. NATO also needs an enhanced forward presence in the East (as defence ministers already agreed in February of this year): a multinational and rotational presence that sends a clear message that crossing NATO's borders is not an option, whether it's with tanks or with 'Little Green Men', and that such action can and will be countered. The VJTF-*Very High Readiness Joint Task Force* and 6 NFIUs-*NATO Force Integration Units* (in Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) will be the main instruments of that reassuring allied presence. The basing of the AEGIS Ashore missile defense system in Romania also contributes to overall regional security and stability. Targeting the stringent matters of terrorism and espionage, NATO has a *Civilian Intelligence Committee* (CIC), in which all member states are represented.

A significant regional defence initiative is the Northern Baltic Eight informal military alliance, which includes Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, alongside Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland, and engages in periodical consultations, military interchange, and common exercises, while also repositioning air defence equipment, accelerating common military purchases, and increasing military spending.

Regarding intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, there are several cooperation formats that tackle directly the threats at European and regional level:

MEC – the Central European Conference includes 31 foreign and domestic intelligence services, including the ones in Balkan countries. Its objectives are to support mutual trust, reforms, and the sharing of best practices.

SEEIC – South Eastern Europe Intelligence Conference, established in 2002, for which Romanian intelligence services are among the founding members.

CTG – the Counter Terrorism Group, formed in 2004 at the EU's request, after the New York and Madrid terrorist attacks; all member states plus Norway and Switzerland are in CTG, and it acts as an interface between the EU and member states' intelligence community.

Romania also had a particularly relevant security initiative at regional level, establishing the Bucharest-located Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), with 13 member states among which Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey and Hungary. The organization started working in 2000 and has eight different working groups, among which a counter terrorist one.

Conclusions

Capacity building is the key for a sustainable security environment. This cannot be obtained just by the efforts of the Eastern Europe countries, but they have to be supported, encouraged and helped by Western partners, through a continuous process of "mentoring" and sharing expertise and best practices. We also need a comprehensive, coherent, and consistent legal framework which will allow all authorities to act in a swift, concerted, and timely manner in order to prevent and counter the terrorist threats.

In my opinion, durable stability in the region can be achieved by taking into account some basic principles, followed by adequate measures. First of all, policy-makers need to use the best of their possibilities at the bilateral and multilateral fora, mainly EU and NATO, in a coherent manner, to support the countries of the regions with reforms (in depth) in the fields of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement and security, education. In fact, policy-makers have to manage not only to create relevant programs (some, already in place), but to follow their actual implementation and necessary adjustments, and eventually to correctly assess the results, the impact of those programs.

Cooperation for security purposes is already well established on two levels: strategic orientation, stemming from alliances and partnerships such as EU and NATO, as well as operational orientation, dedicated also to intelligence, military, and security policies.

Further measures have to be taken by the Euro-Atlantic intelligence and law enforcement communities, to support and encourage a real reform of their counterparts in the region, and to engage them in different cooperation formats (and I am able to confirm relevant steps were made in this direction).

NATO and EU accession are viable solutions to regional peace and stability. I have personally witnessed the progresses Romania has made since its accession to NATO and the EU, as well as the difficulties and uncertainties that some of our neighbours have faced outside those alliances. Being connected to the West has always represented, sometimes in a more subtle way, an incentive and a hope for Romania. It allowed us to be proactive, to take on thorny issues, to commit ourselves to protecting national security and promoting Romania's interests. In this line of thought, even if there will never be an EU with over thirty members, I strongly believe it is of paramount importance that the Western countries continue to support the Eastern European countries, as a reassurance, even if, at times, back-steps are inevitable from both parts.

The European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization have done a lot for the regional security and stability, and they have created a framework towards a better context in the area: NATO gives member states the necessary impulse to consolidate their defence, security, and law enforcement, while the EU brings economic prosperity, together with rule of law, human rights, and democracy. Accession to those two organizations was a good solution for Romania, and is a good solution for the region in its entirety, the only solution which can keep it from exporting instability, organized crime, and even radical extremism. But nonetheless, much more is needed than formal adherence to those organizations: they come with adequate rules and regulations, which must be implemented, and their actual implementation must be monitored in the field. Much more needs to be done in consolidating the rule of law, as well as local law enforcement and intelligence, and NATO and EU involvement are tantamount in order to stabilize and secure SEE.

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