

THE REVIVAL OF THE INTERMARIUM GEOPOLITICAL PROJECT – THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE AND BUCHAREST 9 FORMAT –

Vasile CREȚU*
Dragoș ARDELEANU*

Motto: *The strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must.*
Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1966, V. 89, p. 512

Abstract

In the light of recent crises, EU and NATO seem to be in the middle of an internal struggle to maintain their unity and cohesion. In order to create a common and stronger voice within these two structures, the Central-Eastern European countries developed two cooperation frameworks: the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) and Bucharest 9 (B9). In our vision, both emerging formats contribute to the creation of a (new) strategic North-South Axis, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, with Poland and Romania as the pillars. This is not a new concern, having its roots in the Intermarium idea, coined by Jozef Pilsudski, Marshal and leader of interwar Poland. After the First World War, he envisioned the organization of the region as a federation of states, and then as an alliance, with the purpose of countering the then-German and Russian powers. Today, we assist at the revival of the project, especially politically in Poland, but also in academic circles. The fact that the U.S. supports both initiatives gives a new impetus to the security of the region. Therefore, the aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to present the Intermarium geopolitical project and its contemporary revival through TSI and B9; and (2) to analyze the revival from a Romanian perspective, as well as to assess the implications for our country.

Keywords: *Intermarium, geopolitics, security, NATO, EU.*

* MA student, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, v.vasilecretu@gmail.com.

* PhD, University Lecturer, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, dragosardel0@gmail.com.

Introduction

Ancient Greek historian Thucydides' words are not only the motto of this paper, but also, in our opinion, a leitmotif of international relations, because power, in its different forms, is the most important factor that determines the course of events. History is full of such examples. Due to the current issue, focused on the evolutions in Central-Eastern Europe, the first example is from the regions' own history. The majority of the states from this part of Europe gained their independence in the aftermath of the First World War, on the ashes of multinational empires. On the historical scale, the existence of these nation-states is relatively new, while their populations (nations) have a much longer history. But because they were 'weak', they were the subject of foreign rule, in accordance with Thucydides' dictum.

After the First World War, a geopolitical project meant to transform Poland into the leader of Central and Eastern Europe was developed. This is the case of *Miedzymorze*, more popular in its Latin version – *Intermarium*, which means, mot-a-mot, “*between the seas*” and which originally referred to a federation or an alliance of the states between the Baltic and Black Seas. It failed to be implemented in the interwar period, being forgotten during the Cold War. Nowadays we are witnessing a revival of the project, especially politically in Poland, but also in academic circles.

Geopolitics and geopolitical ideas

Since this paper is not about geopolitics, but one of geopolitics (more specifically about a geopolitical project), only a short definition is needed, in order to underlie the theoretical framework. Defining “geopolitics” is a daunting task, especially when we acknowledge the fact that it is an over-used term in discussions about the relations between states, or the evolution of certain events. (Sempa, 2002, p. 3) Concisely, geopolitics studies the impact of geographic factors upon political decisions (Serebrian, 2003, p. 25). The basis is the understanding of geography, as Nicholas Spykman observed: “*geography is the most important factor in interstate relations because it is the most permanent. Ministers come and go, even dictators die, but mountains ranges stand unperturbed.*”(Quoted in Kaplan, 2014, p. 68) Hence, the geography is the “*backdrop to human history itself*” (Kaplan, 2014, p. 66), the stage where state clashed (Sempa, 2002, p. 5), and the main motivation for it, as the territorial imperative influenced the behaviour of states over time. (Brzezinski, 2000, p. 49) Thus, geopolitics tries to explain, through its analytic methods and instruments, why an actor is interested in a region and why not in another. (Hlihor, 2005, p. 16)

Alike Robert Kaplan, who asks himself whether history is only the result of the vast impersonal forces – geographic, cultural, economic and technological – or it is influenced by extraordinary people who succeeded to overcome these forces (Kaplan, 2010, p. 204), we ask ourselves: is the impersonal force of geography the only element relevant to geopolitics? The answer tends to be negative as one looks at the global events. Through their actions, states try to turn geography into an advantage, because otherwise it remains only destiny. (Kaplan, August 14, 2014) In reality, this means following a certain path in foreign policy over the long term, on the background shaped by geography. From the theoretical point of view, the strategic thinking/culture of a nation gives birth to some conceptions – as geopolitical theories, doctrines or projects – which we will generically name ‘geopolitical ideas’. Thereby, a corollary to the classic definition of geopolitics is the following: geopolitics studies not only the impersonal forces of geography, but also the ideas, which are meant to determine one state’s vision about its place in the world or in one particular region.

The virtual space of these ideas covers every corner of the world. Some of them enjoy a large popularity among scholars; such is the case of Heartland and Rimland.¹ Or we could speak about pan-ideas, like Pan-Americanism, Pan-Slavism or the idea of Mitteleuropa, Eurasianism or even the subject of this paper, *Intermarium*.

Even though these ideas were developed in different eras, their applicability and relevance are still present in the 21st century, due to at least two characteristics: their connection with geopolitical reality and their flexibility. The first feature refers to the fact that every idea is well rooted in the geopolitics of that certain area (in its advantages and disadvantages). In terms of flexibility, the situation gets more complicated. This feature assumes that every idea has a margin of action, so that the adaptation is always possible, according to the geopolitical context. The basis for flexibility is the difference between the geographic and geopolitical position. While the former is unchanged as time goes by, the latter rests on global shifts or on global/regional balance of power.²

¹ A list of works dedicated to *Heartland* and *Rimland*: Keans, Gerry. *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder*, 2009: Oxford University Press, New York; Petersen, Alexandros. *The World Island. Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West*. Praeger Security International, 2011; Gerace, Michael P. (1991) ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, containment, and after’, *Comparative Strategy*, 10: 4, 347-364; Blouet, Brian W (ed.) *Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the defence of the West*, Frank Cass, 2005.

² For example, the geographical position of Romania is the same since WW2, in Central Eastern-Europe. In terms of geopolitics, we were in the “East” in the Cold War era, whilst now we are in the West, due to the NATO & EU membership.

Continual adaptation of geopolitical ideas implies assuming of the main driving principles that underlie that vision, and not every detail, which reduces from its relevance. In the case of the *Intermarium* geopolitical project, the discussion about its revival is only possible if we agree on the idea of flexibility.

The origins of the *Intermarium* geopolitical project

Every geopolitical idea is like a coin, with two sides: one theoretical, and one practical. *Intermarium* refers not only to a geopolitical project, but also to a geopolitical concept, used by analysts to describe “*the space between the Black and Baltic Seas, which circumscribe it in the north and south, respectively.*” (Chodakiewicz, 2012, p. 35) Also, we can observe the term being used as a synonym for the region in the geopolitical analyses of Stratfor and Geopolitical Futures.

The credit for the term goes to Jozef Pilsudski, Marshal and leader of the interwar Poland, who fought for an independent and powerful Poland since his early ages. After achieving this goal in the aftermath of WW1, Pilsudski tried to consolidate the position of the newly-established Polish country, through promoting the project of *Intermarium*, initially as a federation of states, and then as an alliance of states between the two seas. He understood the geopolitics of the region very well and he foresaw that Germany and Russia/Soviet Union would not be weak forever. Hence, the mission of the *Intermarium*, in Pilsudski's vision, was to counter the threats emanating from Berlin and Moscow.³ The *Intermarium* project, as envisioned by Pilsudski, embraced a pragmatic form, and not a theoretical one. He expressed publicly his vision, which was the product of two factors: his family history and his own bloody experience. (Kaplan, August 14, 2014) His family held lands in the times of the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Therefore, his vision would have been a “*spiritual and territorial descendent*” of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, considered to be a Medieval *Intermarium*. (Kaplan, August 14, 2014) He also led the Polish Legions in WW1 and the Polish army in the war against the Soviet Union (1919-1921). (Cambrea, 1939) The cult of Jozef Pilsudski is promoted abroad by Poland. For example, Polish Cultural Institute in Bucharest organized an exhibition for “*a statesman of Poland and of Europe*” (see Figure 1).

³ This mission was presented at the exhibition “Jozef Pilsudski – om de stat al Poloniei și al Europei” organized by the Polish Cultural Institute in Bucharest at the Bucharest Municipality Museum (17.04-20.05.2018);



Figure 1: One of the postings presented at the exhibition
 “Jozef Pilsudski – om de stat al Poloniei și al Europei”
 (Source: Personal Archive)

Both projects failed to be implemented in the inter-war period, due to at least two shortcomings: bad Polish relations with its neighbours (Lithuania and Czechoslovakia) and lack of support from a major power (except for France, who promoted to a lesser extent its *sanitary cordon*). Then Second World War started by splitting Poland between its two powerful neighbours, Nazi Germany and USSR.

Contemporary revival of the *Intermarium* project

With the end of the Cold War, the states from the *Intermarium* region went out of the Soviet sphere of influence, being free to follow an independent foreign and security policy. Most of the states followed the Euro-Atlantic path. The NATO & EU accession of former communist states from Central and Eastern Europe is what Robert Kaplan calls “*the partial institutionalization*” of Piłsudski’s idea (Kaplan, 2016, p. 194).

In the wake of Russian aggressions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014), the idea of *Intermarium* was being promoted again, as a way to solve

the security problems that arise from the East. We do not witness a unitary revival, as one can remark different circles discussing the idea, i.e. academic and political.

The academic revival refers to contributions added by different scholars in developing the theoretical side of the *Intermarium*. First of all, we notice the work of Jan Marek Chodakiewicz, American historian with Polish origins, that lectured on *Intermarium* in 2011 (*Intermarium Lecture Series*) and published the book "*Intermarium: the Land between the Black and Baltic Seas*" (Chodakiewicz, 2017) in 2012. He describes the region in a constructivist manner, defining it as "*an area of coexistence, convergence and clash of many cultures, [that] has historically been a staunch defender of Western Civilization despite long spells of alien domination.*" (Chodakiewicz, 2017, p. 16) Last year, Chodakiewicz reportedly wrote the speech Donald Trump held in Warsaw (July 2017). (Porter, 2017)

In a more pragmatic approach than Chodakiewicz's, George Friedman promoted the idea of *Intermarium* as a new containment line against Russia (Figure 2). One of his articles, published on the 25th of March, 2014 – *From Estonia to Azerbaijan: American Strategy after Ukraine* (Friedman, 2017) – became widely popular in the fever of Ukraine crisis. The author believes that while a direct U.S. engagement in Ukraine is not possible, a good strategy would consist in supporting the states that perceive Russia as an enormous threat to their existence. (Friedman, 2017)



Figure 2: *Intermarium* as a new containment line in George Friedman's vision. Source: Stratfor.

Andreas Umland, German researcher based in Kyiv, sees *Intermarium* as the only solution for embedding Ukraine and Georgia into a security structure, as the chances for NATO & EU integration are low (Umland, April 18, 2016).

On the other side, at the political level, we notice the revival of the *Intermarium* project in Poland. The main promoters of *Intermarium* are the current president, Andrzej Duda, and the Law and Justice Party (PiS), which controls both the executive and the legislative. The *Intermarium* idea is attractive to Poland because it implies achieving the status of regional power, which means political, military and economic influence in Central-Eastern Europe. (Hawk, April 26, 2016) In his first speech as president, Duda presented the creation of “*a community of friends*”, from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea, as his main foreign policy goal. (“Duda's inauguration speech”, August 5, 2015) In an interview for Polish Press Agency (PAP), the president included the Black Sea in his stated-community. (Smietana, August 23, 2015)

Promoting a foreign policy in line with Pilsudski's idea necessitate a coherent approach, not just political declarations (Szelachowska, January 14, 2016). As the *Intermarium* is a flexible geopolitical idea, today's revival does not imply the creation of a federation of states, but it generates the strategic framework for intensifying cooperation along the North-South axis. There are two emergent formats that contribute to this: the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) and Bucharest 9 (B9).

The Three Seas Initiative

The Three Seas Initiative is, according to the Dubrovnik Statement, “*an informal platform for securing political support and decisive action on specific cross-border and macro-regional projects of strategic importance to the States involved in energy, transportation, digital communication and economic sectors in Central and Eastern Europe.*” (“The Dubrovnik Statement”, September 2016, p. 7) TSI's goal is to function as an intra-EU lobby format reuniting 12 countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The first informal meeting was organized on the sidelines of the 79th session of UN General Assembly, in New York (29th of September 2015). (Bekic and Funduk, 2016, p. 1-2) As a Polish-Croatian initiative, the first two summits were organized in Dubrovnik (August 2016) and Warsaw (July 2017), where it received political support from the United States, through the participation of Donald Trump. Romania joined the nucleus of the initiative and organized the third summit (Bucharest: 17-18 September 2018). This event marked a few concrete steps towards

achieving TSI's goal: the selection of a list of priority interconnection projects, the organization of the first edition of the 3SI Business Forum, the creation of the 3SI Network of Chambers of Commerce and the signing of the Letter of Intent in relation to the establishment of the Three Seas Investment Fund. (*Joint Declaration of the Third Summit of the Three Seas Initiative*, September 18, 2018)

As stated above, a list of 48 new or existing priority projects was selected, at the countries' proposal. There are two types of projects: (1) multilateral and (2) bilateral and national projects with international potential. (*The Three Seas Initiative – Priority Interconnection Projects*)

Table 1 shows the number of projects proposed by every country, which can be interpreted as an expression of their interest for the initiative.⁴ Croatia, Poland and Romania have by far nominated the highest number of projects. While Warsaw and Bucharest are keen on multilateral projects, Zagreb has a greater interest in national ones.

Table 1 also shows that Austria, Czech Republic and Latvia do not see TSI as a way to promote certain projects. Almost every proposal involves the participation of other countries, as can be observed in

Table 2 due to geographical position in the middle of the Intermarium, Hungary and Slovakia share the second place, after Croatia and before Poland.

Country	Multilateral projects			Bilateral and national projects with international potential			Total
	Energy (8)	Digital (8)	Transport (11)	Energy (6)	Digital (2)	Transport (13)	48
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Croatia	2	1	1	1	1	6	12
Czech Republic	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Hungary	1	2	2	0	0	0	5

⁴ Only a few projects were proposed by 2 or more countries, while the vast majority has a single promoter.

Estonia	0	0	2	2	0	0	4
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	2	0	3	1	0	0	6
Poland	2	3	5	0	0	0	10
Romania	1	3	3	0	0	0	7
Slovakia	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
Slovenia	0	0	0	2	1	2	5

Table 1 The number of projects proposed by every country
(Data Source: The Three Seas Initiative – Priority Interconnection Projects)

Country	Multilateral projects			Bilateral and national projects with international potential			Total
	Energy	Digital	Transport	Energy	Digital	Transport	
Austria	2	7	2	0	0	0	11
Bulgaria	2	6	3	0	0	3	14
Croatia	2	6	3	2	1	6	20
Czech Republic	0	7	3	0	0	1	11
Hungary	4	7	5	1	1	1	19
Estonia	2	5	2	2	0	0	11
Latvia	2	5	2	0	0	0	9
Lithuania	2	5	4	1	0	0	12
Poland	3	7	8	0	0	0	18
Romania	3	7	4	0	0	1	15
Slovakia	4	7	7	0	0	2	19
Slovenia	0	7	2	2	1	2	14

Table 2 The number of participations
in selected projects by every country
(Source: The Three Seas Initiative – Priority Interconnection Projects)

As we can notice from Figure 3, the main energy and transport projects are on the Baltic-Adriatic line: Via Carpathia (Thessaloniki-Klapeida), Via Baltica (Berlin-Warsaw-Kaunas-Riga-Helsinki), Go Highway (Odessa-Gdansk), Rail Baltica, respectively North-South Gas Corridor, LNG terminal in Krk Island (Croatia), bilateral gas interconnectors etc. (Zurawski vel Grajewski, 2017) Although this map dates from 2017 and it does not include two Romanian proposals – BRUA and Rail-2-Sea (Constanta-Gdansk), our ‘peripheral’ geographic position limits the concrete results for our country.



Figure 3: The main projects to be promoted through TSI.
(Source: Zurawski vel Grajewski, 2017, p. 15)

We subscribe to Liviu Muresan and Alexandru Georgescu's opinion that the Black Sea is the main precondition for the success of TSI, both in

terms of opportunities and source of instability and threats, due to the complex security environment (Mureşan and Georgescu, September-December 2017). The presence of the Black Sea in the TSI's agenda would be in Romania's best interest. It would serve as a way to address the non-military issues from the economic or energetic field, for example.

Dariusz Gora-Szopinski, the chairman of the department of regional strategic studies at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University of Warsaw, believes that TSI has only economic purposes, and so it is a mistake to see it as the revival of the historical *Intermarium* (Gora-Szopinski, June 2017). Indeed, the mission of TSI is to cooperate in the energetic, transport and digital sector. But this may take place only on the background of a geopolitical shift, i.e. the consolidation of the North-South axis. Moreover, the intensification of cooperation in these areas has significant geopolitical implications, as it makes stronger the states united in their desire to avoid the position of buffer states. As presented above, the flexibility of the geopolitical ideas allow this revival, which is a matter of principles, and not details. Therefore, from a geopolitical point of view, we see TSI as an *extended Intermarium*, due to the inclusion of the Adriatic Sea in the classical form of *Intermarium*.

Bucharest 9 Format

Bucharest 9, the second emergent format that is meant to increase the cooperation in the region and contribute towards developing a North-South axis, from one sea to another, reunites all 9 NATO Eastern Flank countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). Being formed in November 2015 as a Romanian-Polish initiative before NATO Warsaw Summit (July 2016), B9's purpose is to function as a "*platform for consultation and dialogue*" within NATO. (*The declaration adopted at the final of the first B9 meeting*, November 2015)

Apart from many meetings organized at different levels (Presidents, Ministers of Defence, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, parliamentary summit) either in Bucharest or in Warsaw, concrete steps were also made in the region. First of all, the vast majority of NATO reassurance measures were implemented in the B9 countries: NATO forward presence (eFP – enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and Baltic states; and tFP – tailored Forward Presence in Romania and Bulgaria) (*Boosting NATO's presence in the east and southeast*); the formation of NATO Force Integration Units, which allows quick deployment of troops in case of crisis (Terlikowski et al, 2018). Secondly, 5 of the B9 countries (Romania, Poland and the Baltic states) have already met NATO's defence spending requirement (2% of their GDP on defence), while

the other 4 presented a road map for achieving this target until 2024 (25th of May, 2017) (Terlikowski et al, 2018). Finally, B9 countries launched the modernization of their armed forces, investing into new platforms and weapons, basically from the United States (Terlikowski et al, 2018).

As a consequence of the imbalance between the two forward presences (Socor, 2018), B9 Format may serve as a tool to promote a unitary approach in NATO's deterrence and defence posture.

Conclusions

Intermarium – a North-South axis in Central and Eastern Europe:

Intermarium is a geopolitical idea (i.e. geopolitical project) and, as every idea of this kind, it is flexible. Having its origins in the interwar period, it is adapted and promoted again at academic and political levels. Nowadays, a North-South axis is rising in the eastern part of Europe. There are two emergent cooperation initiatives that comply with this trend, the Three Seas Initiative and Bucharest 9. Both of them are within the most important pillars for European security and prosperity, the European Union, respectively the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The revival of the *Intermarium* is not only about creating a common and stronger voice within the EU and NATO, but also about a quest for regional (informal) leadership. Romania, as a core member of both formats, must be very active, through organizing events (meetings or summits) that increase our international visibility, respectively by implementing concrete projects. As it is revitalized today, *Intermarium* is a chance for Romania to be the southern pillar of the emerging North-South axis in Central-Eastern Europe.

References:

1. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, (2000), *Marea Tablă de Șah. Supremația americană și imperativele ei geostrategice*. București: Editura Univers Enciclopedic.
2. Cambrea, Nicolae, (1939), *Mareșalul Pilsudski: Omul de stat și comandantul supreme al forțelor poloneze în Războiul polono-rus din anul 1920*. Brașov: Institutul Cartografic Unirea.
3. Dobrescu, Paul, (2003), *Geopolitica*. București: Editura Comunicare.ro.
4. Friedman, George, (2009), *The next 100 years: A Forecast for the 21st Century*. New York: Doubleday.
5. Hlihor, Constantin, (2005), *Geopolitica și Geostrategia în analiza relațiilor internaționale contemporane*. București: Editura UNAp „Carol I”.

6. Kaplan, Robert, (2016), *In Europe's Shadow: Two Cold Wars and a Thirty-Year Journey through Romania and beyond*. Random House Publishing Group.
7. Kaplan, Robert, (2010), *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*, Random House Publishing Group.
8. Kaplan, Robert, (2014), *Răzbunarea Geografiei. Ce ne spune harta despre conflictele viitoare și lupta împotriva destinului*. București: Editura Litera.
9. Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, (2012), *Intermarium: The Land Between the Black and Baltic Seas*, Transaction Publishers.
10. Sempa, Francis P., (2002), *Geopolitics: from the Cold War to the 21st century*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
11. Serebrian, Oleg, (2006), *Dicționar de geopolitică*. Iași: Editura Polirom.
12. Thucydides, (1966) *Războiul Peloponesiac*, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, V. 89.
13. "The Drubovnik Statement" on the Three Seas Initiative, (September 2016) Newsletter of the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia, No. 6, p. 7. Available at http://predsjednica.hr/files/NEWSLETTER%20VIEWS%20and%20NEWS_no%206.pdf and accessed on 22.02.2018.
14. Bekic, Janko, and Marina Funduk, (2016), *The Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Initiative as the revival of "Intermarium"*. Brief, Zagreb: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO).
15. Friedman, George, (2017), *From Estonia to Azerbaijan: American Strategy after Ukraine*. Stratfor. Available at <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/estonia-azerbaijan-american-strategy-after-ukraine> and accessed on 14.01.2018.
16. Gora-Szopinski, Dariusz, (07.06.2017), *Trimarium is not Intermarium*. Available at <http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/07/06/trimarium-is-not-intermarium/> and accessed on 27.11.2017.
17. Hawk, J., (26.04.2016), "EU DEATH WATCH, PART 1: "INTERMARIUM". South Front. Available at <https://southfront.org/Intermarium-a-hare-brained-scheme-whose-time-has-come/> and accessed on 12.12.2017.
18. *Joint Declaration of the Third Summit of the Three Seas Initiative*, (18.09.2018). Available at <http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/comunicate-de-presa/joint-declaration-of-the-third-summit-of-the-three-seas-initiative> and accessed on 19.09.2018.
19. Kaplan, Robert, (14.08.2014), "Pilsudski's Europe." Stratfor. Available at <https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/pilsudskis-europe> and accessed on 12.01.2018.
20. Muresan, Liviu and Georgescu, Alexandru, (Sept-Dec. 2017), *A Romanian Perspective on the Three Seas Initiative*. The Market for Ideas. No. 7-8. Available at <http://www.themarketforideas.com/a-romanian-perspective-on-the-three-seas-initiative-a314/> and accessed on 20.08.2018.
21. NATO website. Boosting NATO's presence in the east and southeast. Available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm and accessed on 22.05.2018.
22. Poland's Presidency website, (05.08.2015), "Duda's inauguration speech". Available at <http://www.president.pl/en/news/art,7,address-by-the-president->

of-the-republic-of-poland-mr-andrzej-duda-before-the-national-assembly.html and accessed on 14.09.2017.

23. Porter, Tom, (06.07.2017), "Did a Polish Far Right Activist Help Donald Trump Write His Speech in Warsaw." Newsweek. Available at <http://www.newsweek.com/poland-trump-anti-semitism-632702> and accessed on 22.02.2018.

24. Smietana, Mariola, (23.08.2015), "The revival of Intermarium?" Visegrad Plus. Available at <http://visegradplus.org/opinion/the-revival-of-Intermarium/> and accessed on 10.10.2017.

25. Socor, Vladimir, (2018), *NATO's Summit Takes Half-Way Measures on the Black Sea Region (Part One)*. The Jamestown Foundation. Eurasia Daily Monitor. Volume: 13. Issue: 128. Available at <https://jamestown.org/program/natos-summit-takes-half-way-measures-on-the-black-sea-region-part-one/> and accessed on 14.02.2018.

26. Szelachowska, Ksenia, (14.01.2016), "The revival of Intermarium - Poland can talk the talk but can it walk the walk?" Stratfor. Available at <https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/revival-Intermarium-poland-can-talk-talk-can-it-walk-walk> and accessed on 12.12.2017.

27. Terlikowski et al., (08.06.2018), PISM Policy Paper no. 4 (164): The Bucharest 9: Delivering on the Promise to Become the Voice of the Eastern Flank. Available at http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=24501 and accessed on 09.06.2018.

28. *The declaration adopted at the final of the first B9 meeting*, November 2015 ("Declarația comună „Solidaritatea Aliată și Responsabilitatea Comună"). Available at <http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/comunicate-de-presa/declaratie-comuna-privind-solidaritatea-aliata-si-responsabilitatea-comuna> and accessed on 25.04.2018.

29. The Institute of World Politics, *Intermarium Lecture Series*. Available at <https://www.iwp.edu/events/page/Intermarium-lecture-series> and accessed on 22.03.2018.

30. *The Three Seas Initiative – Priority Interconnection Projects*. Available at <http://three-seas.eu/press-releases/#e52128e170> and accessed on 20.09.2018.

31. Umland, Andreas, (April, 2016), "Countering Russian Expansionism: Blueprints for a New Security Alliance." European Council for Foreign Relations. Available at http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_countering_russian_expansionism_blueprints_for_a_new_security_al and accessed on 10.10.2017.

32. Zurawski vel Grajewski, Przemyslaw, (2017), "Trimarium: A View from the North." Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea: Visions of Cooperation. Warsaw: Institute for Eastern Studies.