INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM: THE MEANING OF WORDS IS THE RIGHT TOOL TO MAKE AN EFFICIENT ANALYSIS WHEN THE THREAT IS HYBRID

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Abstract

Intelligence makes errors because it does not know their meaning of words (DB psyops). Using words and understanding their meaning allows seeing the reality and distinguishing it from what is not real. As the terrorists who have committed the last terrorist attacks in Europe that, nowadays, we all called "radicalised" (extremist) but that cannot be radicalised.

It is scientifically impossible to define as "radicalized" a subject that becomes interested and gets close to religion practices all dogmas in a couple of months. The cognitive process -that allows to encode the information- needs time in order to permit the writing of neural cells in the brain (for instance, choosing to start the elementary school at five/six years it is not a random choice as at this age the areas of the child's brain are formed and ready to learn).

Numerous studies have proven that for a radicalised individual to actually change his/her behaviour and mind-set requires no less than 7-8 years, so that s/he can interiorise content, ways of thinking and elaborations. These individuals can be defined as "infatuated" and have different characteristics from those that a real radicalised individual would have, therefore also the security algorithms used to identify these individuals need to be based on different criteria otherwise they won't be able to early detect and identify the threat.

Keywords: *bias, i-bias, gathering information, overcoming bias, terrorism infatuated*.

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Introduction

This paper investigates biases linked to the intelligence work, specifically those who have been defined as I-BIAS (Magris, Grassi, 2018). It will analyse not only the biases that impede the intelligence practitioners to work at the best of his/her capabilities but it will also address and refer to various ways to overcome such biases. Specifically, this paper will analyse, amongst the I-BIAS, those physiological biases that affect the work and daily life of any human being, intelligence practitioners and analysts included. It will underline the macro and micro systemic dimension of psycho-social biases and how, working on those, it becomes easier to eliminate individuals' psycho-social biases.

Moreover, this paper will stress how those biases have sometimes mislead the intelligence in identifying the terrorists that have committed the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, and how an analysis based on the correct meaning of words would have led the intelligence practitioners and analysts to more effectively predict the threat and find solutions to prevent it.

Taking into account the intelligence failures of the past years caused by biased analysis, this paper will explain the differences between a radicalised individual and an 'infatuated' one, allowing the establishment of new parameters and features with which update the security algorithms in order to early identify individuals like those who have committed the recent terrorist attacks in Europe and those who might attack in the future.

Given the hybrid threats that threaten our society, intelligence practitioners must be able to use every abilities and resources they might have in the fastest way possible.

Bridging the gap between academia and practice, this paper specifically addresses what it has been defined as I-Bias – Intelligence Bias – biases linked to intelligence and intelligence practitioners.

What is written in this paper is the result of the paper's authors' researches and elaborations and of the École Universitaire Internationale research centre. The term I-BIAS (Magris, Grassi, 2018) indicates all of those errors of perception, errors of vision and culture that impede correct analysis, that slow down analysis or induce the practitioner to make mistakes both in the analysis and in the field work, creating research models based on basic errors.

Correcting these basic errors since their beginning leads to committing fewer errors, to higher chances to accomplish an operation and to remarkably decreasing economic costs and resources.

Why terrorists can easily travel across Europe, being inspected without being recognised as terrorists? Why did our intelligence know the

terrorists but it was not able to stop them before the attacks committed in the last years?

This is because the intelligence activity was biased. For instance *Salah Abdeslam,* the terrorist that made the attack against the *Bataclan* theatre in Paris in the 2015 was stopped in Italy by the Italian police force when he was driving in the north of Italy but he was not considered as a possible terroristic threat. After his failure, he committed the attack a few months later.

He was stopped while he was coming back from Syria by car. The policemen that stopped him did not consider the possibility to easily go from Belgium to Syria by car, crossing several states. And so they did not make the connection.

A wrongful view of terrorists leads to committing analysis errors. In this case, the police officers that stopped *Salah Abdeslam* checked only his documents but did not cross over information that was out in the open, and that would have risen doubts. For instance he was travelling on rented car with a non-Italian car plate perfectly in order that had crossed various borders from Belgium to Turkey.

In order to cross over and drive by many borders, it is necessary to buy specific stickers to stick to the car window. Analysing this, it would have been easy to infer the journey the individual had made and ask for more information. However, the limits imposed to the officers by their assignment, traffic control, prevent them from making a broader analysis.

Their analysis was biased. A bias is an "inclination or prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way considered to be unfair" (Oxford University Press, 2018). Bias is "the action of supporting or opposing a particular person or thing in an unfair way, because of allowing personal opinions to influence your judgement" (Cambridge, 2018). Therefore, bias is a cognitive error, an error of perception. Those errors misguide perceptions and analysis of situations, events, people and facts. Biases refer to attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding of actions and decisions, attitudes and beliefs about a person or a group or facts.

Biases affect one's daily life and work, as they become an obstacle to perceive reality as it is rather than what the individual wants it or thinks it to be. Bias can be caused by physical trauma (i.e. dysfunction, pathology), by culture, education, social influences, experiences. It is a distortion of the evaluation process. The major part of biases derives from psycho-social influences, particularly from the environmental and social influences – macro system. However, the individual develops numerous biases based on his own experiences such as family, relationships, school and friends – microsystem. The biases developed ~~on~~ by personal experiences tend to have a stronger

influence on the individual respect those from the outside of society, strongly affecting his thoughts and behaviours.

Working on eliminating biases, it is important to bear in mind to work on the elimination of both macro systemic and micro systemic biases in order to effectively eliminate the individual's biases. Working at the same time on the double binary (macro and micro) it becomes easier to find solutions to overcome and eliminate also psycho-social biases.

Besides psycho-social biases recent researches by École Universitaire Internationale discovered that there is also another type of bias: a physiological bias. It is the elaboration of internal or external information aimed to cover up what is missed of the real information. The brain creates an ostensible version of what happens -based on the information it has already stored, without codifying new information- because it does not have the reality of what happens.

At the neural level it indicates the deficiency of substances that enable the connections between the parts of the brain involved causing the non-codification of the information received (Bellomo, 2017).

There is a particular bias called change blindness (ICD-10-CM, 2018) that can be categorised as physiological bias. It can be a consequence of a physical or psychological trauma. It is a perceptual phenomenon that occurs when someone fails to see a change in what he is looking at, someone that does not see that something has changed.

An experiment conducted by Simons and Levin (1998) in the 90s shows precisely change blindness. It shows a man talking to a guy explaining him direction when, at some point, a couple of men pass by with a big cardboard hiding a different man who replaces the guy asking for direction. After the cardboard has passed the man continues to give direction without realising that the guy he is talking to is a completely different guy, dressed in a completely different way.

Even though Change blindness has been discovered years ago it still affects the all population, even intelligence practitioners. That is because it has never been looked for the specific biases that affect the intelligence practitioner—using/through specific tests aimed to evaluate the real practitioner reliability, such as the test realised and applied in the I-Bias studies. These tests can be conducted since the selection process of practitioners and also during the ongoing evaluation of the practitioners already employed.

Bearing in mind the Simon and Levin experiment it becomes easier to highlight the discrepancy in the video of the Al-Baghdadi, ISIS leader, 2014 proclamation. In fact, even though the analyses seem to have missed this,

analysing the video it becomes clear that it is a collage of numerous frames. As Al-Baghdadi is climbing the stairs, everybody focuses on his facial expression while ignoring how the lights in the video are switched on and, a second after, are switched off. This discrepancy highlights that the video has been shot several times and only after, in the post-production, has been put together for the audience.

Watching the video now, aware of how change blindness affects everyone, it is easier to detect the discrepancy, however an intelligence practitioner or an analyst affected by change blindness could have missed those discrepancies making a wrongful analysis. The World Health Organization says that the 75 per cent of the population suffers from slight change blindness and that the other 25 per cent suffers from severe change blindness.

What is scientifically defined as Unilateral Spatial Neglect (ICD-10-CM 2018) can be categorised in this type of bias as well, physiological bias. Categorising the Unilateral Spatial Neglect as a physiological bias enables to start working and find solutions. The Unilateral Spatial Neglect is a spatial cognition disturbance that affects people that have suffered from cerebral traumas or incidents, individuals pathologically conditioned or sane people who are highly stressed and/or conditioned by external situations such as family, society etc.

To make it clearer, it is something that might happens to a policeman while driving his car during a chase. Due to the stressful situation, his sight will thin into a tunnel (allowing him to see only the car he is chasing excluding the rest).

The Unilateral Spatial Neglect modifies one's thinking, the stress makes the individual unable to have a correct and objective vision of what surrounds him. It is important to notice that the term 'correct' has been used on purpose instead of 'real' as reality could be different for every individual.

Thanks to numerous studies it has been highlighted that the Unilateral Spatial Neglect, which can be left or right sided, affects at least the 30 per cent of the population. In other words, eyes are slaves of the attentive system, therefore, one's elaboration process interferes in everything anyone reads or sees. Thus, the power of that elaboration process is the base of how individuals perceive anything they see. The more one sees the more one's brain creates his own elaboration of reality.

Cases have been studied in which individuals describe things that in reality were not there, or would report particulars incoherent with what they see, as it happens with individuals affected by Unilateral Spatial neglect syndrome. These subjects' brains perceive only a portion of the image they

have seen and then replicate, in an identical way, that portion to cover what is missing of the image. For instance, their brain would see only half of someone's face and would replicate that half twice in order for the individual to have the image of the entire face. Although, in doing so, they could miss the scar on one side of the face, for instance, or replace a missing eye.

For the intelligence practitioner and the analyst it means to collect and/or provide wrongful information, his biases, his perceptions, create a reality that is not the correct one. These concepts are very important also for the experts that create algorithms and technical instruments for the intelligence work, because if the machine is created and programmed by a human being with biases, the machine will have the same biases, the same failures.

Even in regard of Artificial Intelligence there would be artificial brains analysing with biases; this unveils a new study and evolutionary scenarios linked to cyber-sciences. At today, given what it is known, everything that has been created relating to Artificial Intelligence is flawed by the very fact that whomever has created the machine has unintentionally inserted his own parameters and biased perception/views.

Hence, using an Artificial Intelligence to perform intelligence analysis or any other task/operation is limited by the fact that the Artificial Intelligence does not have a correct initial building structure. If the human being has biases caused by the society, he would program a machine with his own limitations and biases.

Yet, even the analysis of an unbiased machine cannot be completed without the human intervention, because the human being is always able to update scenarios and strategies while the machine cannot, and to correlate the information the machine provides. The machine error is caused by the variables that the human being introduces, the more unbiased is the human being the better information the machine will provide.

As the programmers are technicians, they develop programs based on the information given by the intelligence, if the operator has a biased perception that does not see as dangerous a seventeen years old Turkish-German boy the machine won't signal the individual as dangerous because he does not fit the set parameters (as it happens in Monaco in 2015)

That is why is extremely important to eliminate the operator's biases. Eliminating the operator's limitations of thinking enlarges the range of connections the machine will be able to analyse and increases the possibilities to detect threats. It is possible to train an operator to be able to develop programs for a machine that can provide good results.

What seems to be scientifically so difficult is nothing more than a return to simplicity and humbleness, in order to understand the world for

what it really is and not for what individuals think it to be. For the intelligence to be effective and based on the real scenario, it is necessary to give to words and events their correct value, to return to the real meaning of words that are the instruments through which everyone communicates, expresses idea, gathers information, makes analysis.

Lately, the discourses regarding the Islamic religious terrorism that have attacked Europe in the recent years have been focused on the term radicalisation, committing a huge mistake.

What the word radicalisation really means?

If I talk with a theologist it means a process that takes up to eight years before its conclusion, in fact a boy that would want to become a priest would have to go through an eight years long path before becoming one; while if I talk with a psychiatrist – the word radicalisation – indicates a process that takes at least seven years, the time a psychiatrist would need in order to definitively reprogramming the brain of a worshipper of a cult.

Its scientifically impossible to define as "radicalised" a subject that becomes interested and get close to religion, practising all dogmas, in a couple of months. The cognitive process -that allows to encode the information- needs time in order to permit the writing of neural cells in the brain (for instance, choosing to start the elementary school at five/six years it is not a random choice as at this age the areas of the child's brain are formed and ready to learn).

Numerous studies have proven that for a radicalised individual to actually change his/her behaviour and mind-set requires not less than seven-eight years, so that s/he can interiorise contents, ways of thinking and elaborations. However, lately the word radicalisation has been used to indicate terrorists that, from the information gathered, got close to that pseudo-religion only few months before the attack.

It is easy to understand how one of the major mistakes of the intelligence analysis has been to define radicalised individuals that could not be radicalised, and in doing so, let those individuals that have committed the recent attacks in Europe pass unobserved to the analysis.

Simplifying, if the intelligence practitioner would ask a technician to develop a program aimed at looking for radicalised individuals, the latter would use the scientific radicalisation parameters. He would complete the task he has been given but developing a program with a high margin of error in searching for the today`s terrorists who, as it has been explained, cannot be

defined as radicalised. A communication error at the base leads to the creation of wrongful models.

Yet, it could have been possible to improve the algorithms and provide results if theological and psychiatric concepts, as the one of 'infatuated' (École Universitaire Internationale research centre, 2017), would have been taken into consideration, that would have allowed to specifically detect individuals as those who committed the attacks. The machine looks for what the human being programmed it for, if it has wrong parameters it will provide wrongful results. If the goal is to detect this type of terrorists, the analyst must look for infatuated individuals with all necessary medical, sociological, psychological parameters that characterised them. Yet, words must have a unique meaning (unless they are thought to be intentionally misleading like psychological-operations can do).

Moving back to the word radicalisation: If the analysis is made by someone that use theological or psychiatric concepts we will obtain a result; if the analysis is made by someone that use the common concept of radicalisation that everybody talk about we will have an opposite result. Taking this into account, it is easy to understand how this error at the foundation of the analysis causes repetitive errors that, like a waterfall, lead to a wrongful analysis and results.

Scientifically we cannot define radicalised any of the individuals that have committed the recent terrorists attacks in Europe in the last years. Nor we can use the word 'quick radicalisation'. Radicalisation, in its true meaning, cannot be a quick process.

These terms induce in error who makes the research and who makes the investigation in the field of the today Islamic terrorism. These individual can be defined as "infatuated" rather than radicalized. They have different characteristics from those that a real radicalised individual would have, therefore also the security algorithms used to identify these individuals need to be based on different criteria otherwise they won't be able to early detect and identify the threat.

Thinking of a radicalised individual, we would refer to a grown up man with a long beard that would never blend in the European culture. While if analysing the profile, the 'social profile' of those individuals that have committed the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, who have been defined as 'infatuated', arises characteristics completely different. A radicalised individual would never have a personal social profile, not to confuse with other possible social profiles created by terroristic groups for communication or to look for new worshippers. Social profiles, in fact, are an invention of the 'western Satan', and so they go against the Quran dictates. Yet, every

youth who has committed one of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe had a social profile.

These terrorists are individuals born and raised in Europe that identify themselves as Spanish, French, and German. This comes to light considering what the terrorist in Germany yelled during the attack in 2015 "I am German! I was born here!". This becomes evident looking at their social profiles pictures; they are dressed as any other western guy would, jeans, sneakers, hats and sunglasses (most of which with western recognisable brand).

They are not strong radicalised individuals that hate the western society but rather individuals wick, with a wick connection with both their origins (Arabic Countries) and the state they have been raised into (European Countries). There is also another particular element that comes to light analysing their social profiles' pictures: most of them wear tank tops (Magris, Fanti, 2017), tank tops that are usually worn by body-builders to show their muscles, as if they want to flaunt a masculinity they do not have. Analysing the social profile pictures the terrorists hedonism comes to light, the attack seems to be an attempt to reclaim themselves rather than an ideology.

The tank top is a symbol and appears dissonant with the bodies of these youth. Even their posture is dissonant; they appear to be flaccid, with rickety shoulder, far away from the image of the macho icon. Radicalised individuals wouldn't wear western clothes or western brands nor they would have a social profile. If the analysis would have looked for an infatuated individual it would have been easier to detect individuals like those who have committed the recent terrorist attacks in Europe.

Only reading the Quran would take several months while contemplating its meaning would take several years. Numerous verses have come to Mohammed to respond to specific problems such as in the occasion of battles to face alongside his faithful or to bring peace in community disputes, it is in light of these circumstances that these verses should be read. Uses and customs of those times should be known and taken into consideration in understanding the Quran. Yet, the Quran has many biblical references, therefore it is necessary to also read the entire Bible in order to truly comprehend the Quran. However, that won't be all, as to deeply comprehend it, it would be necessary to read also the Torah. Reading the Quran, the Torah, the Bible, studying Mohammed life and the broader Middle East story are just the first steps to beginning to grasp and understand the Islamic religion.

These youth show a mask they cannot wear linked to the self-external reflection and self-perception. This triggers a strong internal conflict on how the individual perceives himself that increases his frustration. We can see this

also in the way they are looking at the camera: their look is empty, passive, and apathetic and pride less.

Underlining the parameters and characteristics above mentioned it is easier to detect and notice them, however a practitioner with biases would hardly detect them and connect the dots. Yet, it is possible to train an operator to have as fewer biases as possible. First of all, to overcome these biases, the operator should know that biases exist and that they can mislead his/her perception.

S/He should be trained to have a scientific interdisciplinary background. This does not mean that the operator has to know everything about everything but S/He should be able to use different practical tools that derives from different disciplines such as psychology, sociology, neurobiology, neuropsychology, theology and others that are often not considered.

Here is where the evidence-based research filled the gap between academia and intelligence, enabling the operator to use tools that are based on scientific disciplines in the intelligence work.

Researchers by École Universitaire Internationale have proved that in order to reach a successful result, information must be easy to understand for the operator. The trainer must be able to explain those tools without necessarily explain all the science behind, because sometime there is not enough time to explain all concepts. For instance the operator does not need to know how the cortisol is produced within the body, but he or she needs to know that high level of cortisol affects the individual behaviour making him less focused and more irritable for more than 48 hours, and be able to use this to his/her advantage if necessary. The operator has to know the practical applications of information but S/He does not need to have the scientific preparations of all disciplines.

The '*Frullbrain*' method has been ideated and conceived to create education (for both the mass and the individual), it has been tested and applied in the past five years to a sample of about 2000 individuals reaching positive results in the 98 per cent of cases. École Universitaire Internationale researches have shown that training conducted with this method enable the practitioner and the analyst to have a remarkable bias reduction, a brain that permits to analyse the information in a flexible and correct way enabling him/her to detect the true information.

The first results, which consist in developing a different way of analysing the information surrounding the practitioner, are reached after eight hours of the '*Frullbrain*' method application. Again, the method enables who works in the field to be able to understand the scenario in which S/He is involved and to put in practice the best strategies to perform the task. The

training conducted this way, using of neuro-psycho-pedagogical method as the one developed by École Universitaire Internationale, allows any practitioner to perform the job at the best level increasing his/her cerebral and cognitive capabilities of the 35-37 per cent. Techniques tested on aware and unaware individuals (to guarantee the results) based on written protocols, enable to obtain the desired chemical reactions in order to obtain the desired reactions from the operator. For instance, increasing of cortisol, decreasing of adrenaline, managing of i-mao enabling to remotely trigger reactions in an individual or to train the operator to obtain the right reactions based on situational needs.

Conclusion

The narrative of the recent terroristic attacks is a spot narrative. The terrorist grabs the first tool he founds (i.e. a knife) and performs the act yelling *Allah Akbar.* The narrative is short, very short, making really difficult to detect the early initiation signals.

Carrying out an accurate research/identification of individuals using specific parameters is extremely important, as performing a spot act, the only rule they follow is self-advertising, personally posting selfies and videos that serve the goal to self-feeding their ego without even realising they do not have an audience to applaud their deeds.

The narrative can be defined as spot narrative because it is a short story of the event. They did not plan the attack based on alleged Quran indications or dates, they do not know the Quran. These individuals did not read more than five pages of Quran, their acts are merely an emulative attempt in order to feel important based on common stereotypes. Even the pictures in which they held firearms, as guns or *Kalashnikov*, reveals their inability in using firearms, holding them is simply aimed to the self-production of photographic and visual materials.

If this individuals would have had the physical characteristics and the chance, they would want to work for an American movie major, or play football for an important club – they only want to find a place in which express their ego -, showing the complete absence of any real repulsion to the 'western Satan' whatsoever.

They are individuals with no identity, this is why it could be helpful to complement fake news with web sites and structures that offer alternative identification for the mass of youth. This could represent a quick and cheap solution to apply in this kind of activities.

The majority of the terrorists had planned normal social activities for the evening or the day after their spot, showing no understanding of the harmful/negative consequences it would have had for them. They show an acute cognitive bias affecting their perception of the consequences of the act they committed, as if their act was less valuable than a simple video-game match. This said, this does not in any way gives them neither any attenuating circumstances nor any possibility to appeal to any mental disease to reduce their responsibility for the actions they committed.

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