

RISR No. 22/2019

# ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW





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The Romanian Intelligence Studies Review is an open access academic journal with scientific prestige, acknowledged by the National Council for the Validation of University Titles, Diplomas and Certificates (CNADTCU), indexed in the international databases CEEOL and EBSCO.

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Bucharest 2020

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
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### COGNITIVE BIAS, DIGITAL DISINFORMATION, AND STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES

#### Randolph H. PHERSON\* Penelope MORT RANTA\*

#### Abstract:

"In recent years, democracies have increasingly come under attack by perpetrators of Digital Disinformation"1, also commonly referred to as Fake News. Manifestations of Digital Disinformation can range from Russia attempting to influence election outcomes to young entrepreneurs in Macedonia posting false stories for profit. In the absence of laws or international standards to regulate these online activities, the perpetrators have honed techniques that, intentionally or not, effectively manipulate popular perceptions by exploiting the cognitive biases, misapplied heuristics, and intuitive traps shared by all people. This article explores which of these cognitive limitations have proven the most effective to exploit. Key biases and misapplied heuristics the Russians and others have used to promote their agendas include: Confirmation Bias, Vividness Bias, Groupthink, and the Anchoring Effect. Examples of intuitive traps that can easily be manipulated through postings on social media include Judging by Emotion, Confusing Causality with Correlation, and Ignoring Inconsistent Information. "The best antidote for such manipulation is to employ more deliberate and purposeful thought processes as described by Daniel Kahneman in his book, Thinking Fast and Slow. Structured Analytic Techniques are effective in helping people recognize when they are being influenced by Digital Disinformation and in countering its impact". (see more on Pherson, June 2019)

**Keywords:** Digital Disinformation, Fake News, Social Media, Cognitive Bias, Misapplied Heuristics, Intuitive Traps, System 2 Thinking, Structured Analytic Techniques

\* Expert Globalytica, LLC

<sup>\*</sup> CEO Globalytica, LLC

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A first form of this material was published in 2019 as Pherson, Randolph H., "Deep fakes and digital disinformation a looming threat", Globalytica Volume 6. Issue 2, June 2019, http://www.globalytica.com/deepfakesanddigitaldisinformation/.

#### Introduction

The growing power of social media has made democratic processes increasingly vulnerable to perpetrators of Digital Disinformation. The attacks on Western democratic systems have come from a multitude of sources, ranging from young entrepreneurs in Macedonia posting false stories for profit to Russian active measures campaigns to undermine democratic institutions and influence electoral outcomes.

Unencumbered by commercial or legal constraints, international standards, or morality, perpetrators of Digital Disinformation have learned how best to exploit common cognitive limitations such as Confirmation Bias, Groupthink, and Judging by Emotion in ways that easily manipulate popular perceptions. History may show that we have greatly underestimated the political and social impact of these techniques because we did not understand how easily popular opinion can be manipulated by leveraging cognitive biases, misapplied heuristics, and intuitive traps.

#### **Defining Digital Disinformation**

Digital Disinformation can take many forms and has many proponents. The phrase commonly used in the public domain is **Fake News but** use of this term by the current US President to describe any news reporting critical of his administration has undermined its usefulness. One way to distinguish between forms of Digital Disinformation is to focus on the motives of the perpetrators. (Pherson and Mort Ranta, 2018)

- "Entrepreneurial News" or "Fraud News" is usually generated by an individual to mislead a reader for personal or financial gain; the purpose is to attract the viewer to ads and thereby generate revenue.
- "Agenda-driven News" or "False News" is purposely intended to mislead the reader, most often for partisan political or social purposes. The objective is to provide incorrect information that affirms the reader's biases and further hardens mental mindsets.

Other types of Digital Disinformation can be distinguished based on the source of the misinformation:

- **Unintentional Misinformation:** Inaccurate information that is spread by people lacking malicious intent, who often do not know or care if the information is factually incorrect.
- Computer Propaganda: Best defined as the use of algorithms, automation, and human curation to purposefully distribute misleading information over social media networks. (Woolley and Howard)
- **Deception:** The intentional action by a known adversary or competitor to influence the decisions or actions of the recipient to the advantage of the deceiver.
- Active Measures: Deception operations by a nation state that are intended to manipulate the perceptions or actions of individual decision makers, the public, and governments to influence elections and the broader course of world events.

For purposes of this discussion, this paper will use the term **Digital Disinformation**, which encompasses all these forms. Digital Disinformation is the purposeful propagation of incorrect information over social media platforms to manipulate and manage popular perceptions in a way that advantages the political and social agendas of the perpetrator.<sup>2</sup>

#### **Explaining the Power of Digital Disinformation**

Propaganda, deception, and active measures have been used by nation states and politicians—as well as advertisers—to influence the public for decades, if not centuries. Such efforts at perception management appear to have had greater impact in recent years, however, because:

touches many aspects of our lives, including the politics of climate change, globalization, feminism, health, science and many other concerns. It posits that Digital Disinformation threatens the integrity of knowledge and scientific reasoning. See:

https://iamcr.org/clearinghouse/challenges\_of\_digital\_disinformation

 $<sup>^2</sup>$  This phrase has also been adopted by the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) as a preferred term for describing "Fake News". At its February 2018 Colloquium in Paris, IAMCR noted that Digital Disinformation

- The **breadth and volume** of misinformation has become staggering, owing to the power of social media platforms.
- The **speed** of the spread of disinformation is breathtaking as stories go "viral". An MIT study in *Science* documents that false rumors travel across the internet six times faster than factual stories. (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral, 2018, 1146-1151)
- People are increasingly seeking simple answers to complex problems. Social network platforms usually present information in simplified form which makes the message more digestible but far less nuanced—and often inaccurate. (Shearer and Gottfried, 2017)

Incentives to use social media to manipulate popular perceptions have also increased dramatically because:

- "It is an easy way for anyone with internet access to make money.
- Thousands, if not millions, of people can be reached almost instantaneously.
- Perpetrators are rarely held accountable for what they have posted.
- Perpetrators can micro-target their messages to those most easily swayed and open to persuasion". (see more on Pherson, June 2019)

#### **Increasing Susceptibility to Digital Disinformation**

Another potential driver that would help explains the growing impact of Digital Disinformation is the susceptibility of people to false messaging. If an individual's first instinct when receiving a story over the internet is to share it immediately with friends because it proves they are "right," the odds are that the person most likely has been victimized by Digital Disinformation.

Perpetrators of Digital Disinformation know what is most likely to "stick" in the minds of their audiences. This "stickiness" is usually attributable to the exploitation of human vulnerabilities that are manifestations of underlying, omnipresent, and well-engrained cognitive biases, misapplied heuristics, and intuitive traps.

Cognitive biases are mental errors caused by humans' simplified information processing strategies. The human brain is conditioned to process information quickly because of the "Fight or Flight" impulse. As a result, people have developed "rules of thumb" or heuristics that help them quickly arrive at a solution that is good enough to solve the problem at hand but can also produce a solution that is not optimal.

These cognitive limitations often prevent people from accurately understanding reality even when all the needed data and evidence that would form an accurate view is available. More importantly, people generally are quick to form opinions. Once their minds are made up, they are highly resistant to changing their judgment or conclusion. Usually they are blind to data that is inconsistent with their existing conceptual framework, often dismissing such data as noise or simply ignoring it. Such initial, incorrect perceptions are likely to persist even after better information is available.

Perpetrators of Digital Disinformation know how to take advantage of these cognitive pitfalls. They can anticipate when a person is likely to fall victim to a cognitive bias or to misapply a heuristic, and they leverage this knowledge to increase the impact of their messaging.

Experts in false messaging, for example, are aware that people's perceptions of data are strongly influenced by their occupation, education, cultural values, and past experiences. People with different backgrounds will perceive information differently. Moreover, knowledge of someone's social media profile greatly facilitates the process of identifying how best to package misinformation to sway that person's thinking.

**Exploiting Cognitive Biases:** Perpetrators of misinformation over social media outlets can easily manipulate popular expectations by capitalizing on cognitive biases. Three of the most powerful biases to exploit are Confirmation Bias, Evidence Acceptance Bias, and Vividness Bias.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This paper was inspired in large part by observations made during the US presidential election in 2016; most of the examples in this paper were drawn from that campaign. Similar dynamics, however, have been observed in recent elections in France, Germany, and several other European states as well as the Brexit campaign in the UK. All would merit careful study to assess whether similar dynamics were in play.

**Confirmation Bias:** "Social media is a Confirmation Bias machine" (see more on Pherson, June 2019) Advertisers and marketers use a form of Confirmation Bias all the time. They know that people are predisposed to seek information – and products – that are consistent with already formed judgments, conclusions, and preferences. They track activities and purchases on the web and tailor messages and product offerings to match each individual's personal preferences.

An interesting game to demonstrate this dynamic is to ask a group of friends or family members to search the web on their individual cell phones or laptops for information on a given topic such as "Brexit", "the Pope", or even "umbrellas". Participants will be surprised to discover that much of what is delivered to the searcher differs from one person to another, reflecting their personal preference profiles.

In an election campaign, astute political operatives now can tailor political advertisements to specific audiences – and even individuals – seeking to reinforce the concerns or fears of members of this target cohort or influence the final vote tally. They know that people gravitate toward information that confirms what they already believe. Echo chambers are formed by exposing individuals only to information that reaffirms their views without challenge, and unchallenged beliefs can lead to ill-informed judgments and decisions. Social media is an ideal platform for creating such echo chambers. (Karsten and West, 2016)

Algorithms are created by Facebook and similar platforms to display only content that is likely to appeal to – and therefore generate clicks from – each individual user. During the 2016 US presidential election campaign, for example, Brad Parscale, the architect behind the Trump campaign's online ad operation, took advantage of the personalizing capabilities of social media platforms to tailor ads to individual users. Pascale came under scrutiny for micro targeting individuals with dark ads, or ads targeting an individual that disappear unless they are shared with others. These ads were designed to tell people what they wanted to hear – confirming their biases – and to attract the most clicks, thereby generating the most interest and more campaign donations. (Stahl, 2017)

**Evidence Acceptance Bias:** Digital Disinformation is often easy to accept at first because it is designed to catch people's attention and

stick in their minds. It is difficult to erase the impressions Digital Disinformation leaves on the mind, even after a false claim has been disproven. This is especially true when the false messaging plays into a narrative that recipients are already inclined to believe. This trap is called Evidence Acceptance Bias and is defined as accepting data as true unless it is immediately rejected when first reviewed. It occurs when the recipient focuses more on the coherence of the story than on the reliability of the data.

For example, during the US presidential campaign in 2016, Donald Trump tweeted that his opponent, Hillary Clinton, said terrorism was "not a threat to the nation" in some of her campaign emails that had been released to WikiLeaks. (Carroll, 2016) Trump portrayed Clinton as aloof and disconnected with the security concerns of the nation. He repeatedly labeled the former Secretary of State as "Crooked Hillary" whenever he referenced her. Although the terrorism claim was debunked by PolitiFact, an independent political fact checking site, the impression of Clinton as distant, crooked, and unconcerned about the safety of the nation was slowly engrained into a significant segment of the popular consciousness of the nation.

If recipients of unproven messages are unwilling to consider competing views or unaware of their own propensity for misjudgment, they can become narrow-minded and will stubbornly continue to accept disproved data. This response is even more pronounced if the incorrect data supports a narrative they are already inclined to believe.

Much the same dynamic has been in play with the phrase "Fake News" itself. The constant repetition of this refrain by the US President serves to reinforce this mostly unsupported narrative that the mainline media is biased and cannot be trusted to report the news accurately. Polls show that individuals are increasingly beginning to believe that this false – and constantly repeated – narrative must be true.

**Vividness Bias:** "The objective of much Digital Disinformation is to generate clicks because clicks lead to increased site traffic which leads to increased income from ad revenue and donations. The more salacious and outrageous the story, the more clicks are generated. Perpetrators of Digital Disinformation employ the Vividness Bias to increase clicks by focusing attention on vivid scenarios while ignoring

other possibilities or alternative hypotheses". (See more on Pherson, June 2019)

For example, one teenager in Veles, Macedonia made USD 27,000 in ad revenue during the 2016 US election campaign by posting false stories with titles such as "Obama Illegally Transferred DOJ Money to Clinton Campaign". (Smith and Banic, 2016) Such vivid stories stick in the minds of readers, even if they learn later that the stories are total fabrications. Once recipients become preoccupied with the vivid – and false or misleading – story, they are disinclined to consider alternative possibilities. As a result, they end up basing their decisions on incorrect or misleading impressions.

#### **Leveraging Misapplied Heuristics**

Perpetrators of Digital Disinformation have become masters of exploiting misapplied heuristics such as the Anchoring Effect, Groupthink, and Mental Shotgun.

Anchoring Effect: One widely disseminated headline during the 2016 US presidential election was "Pope Francis Shocks the World, Endorses Donald Trump". (Ritchie, 2016) The headline portrayed Trump as honorable and worthy to be president of the United States. The intended impact of the headline was to elevate popular perceptions of him from a "slick businessman" and a TV star to a noble candidate endorsed by a saint. The headline, however, was completely false.

When someone in a position of authority and trust appears to pass a judgment, people anchor their expectations to the initial information they receive. They fall victim to the Anchoring Effect, or accepting a given value of something unknown as a proper starting point for generating an assessment. "Once anchored on an assessment, people usually will adjust their views as they learn more. But if the initial assessment is highly skewed, even people's adjusted views will be influenced by first impressions, leading them to make decisions grounded in incorrect or misleading information. People are particularly susceptible to this trap if they are already predisposed to believe a certain idea". (see more on Pherson, June 2019)

**Groupthink:** Social media creates echo chambers that enable Groupthink, which is defined as choosing the option that most of the

group agrees with or ignoring conflicts within the group due to a desire for consensus. Accepting a "certain view without challenging it through critical thinking is especially easy when one is surrounded by others holding the same opinion". (See more on Pherson, June 2019)

Social media sites are designed to create an echo chamber for each individual user to display only that content that is agreeable to the user. Echo chambers both enable – and are enabled by – Groupthink, because they present the impression that everyone shares a certain view. They encourage quick, non-thorough research of a given topic. For example, the widespread Digital Disinformation story that prominent Democrats, including Hillary Clinton, were running a child sex trafficking network in 2016 out of a pizza parlor in Washington, DC spurred a nonsensical shooting. A man was so convinced by the narrative he read online that he drove from his home in North Carolina to the pizza parlor in Washington, DC and opened gunfire on the restaurant. (Kang and Goldman, 2016)

By limiting the diversity of the arguments and views people are exposed to, the Groupthink dynamic limits people's perspectives and understanding. Not only does Groupthink spur under-informed decisions, it can lead to a misperception of public opinion and hostility toward those with dissenting or different voices.

**Mental Shotgun:** Social media is the perfect vehicle for exploiting the tendency of people to fall victim to the Mental Shotgun heuristic. Most people are busy and tend to read the headlines or the lead sentence of a story and then move on to other stories. Or people hear a sound bite on TV and never have time to consider or seek out the evidence that provides the foundation for that story. When this happens, people have fallen victim to Mental Shotgun which is "a lack of precision and control while making assessments continuously. It leads to providing quick and easy answers to difficult questions". (See more on Pherson, June 2019)

This cognitive failing is easily exploited when legitimate stories are pirated and given new, misleading, or false headlines that do not match the accompanying stories. For example, a story boasting "Pepsi Stock Tanks after CEO Attacks Trump Supporters" received 77,000 likes on Facebook. The associated story was only tenuously related to the

title. (Willingham, 2016) Reading the headlines without the accompanying story leaves the reader with lasting impressions of what the article is imagined having said, even if the article provides no evidence or is completely unrelated to its misleading headline.

Headlines can create lasting impressions that are never challenged because people simply do not have enough time or interest to explore every story in depth. Failing to be diligent, people make misinformed decisions based on incorrect or inadequate information.

#### **Capitalizing on Intuitive Traps**

Intuitive traps are a newly recognized category of cognitive limitations. Analysts and members of the public often fall victim to mental mistakes or intuitive traps that are manifestations of more commonly recognized cognitive biases. They belong in the realm of practitioners of analysis and were first identified by Katherine Hibbs Pherson and Randolph H. Pherson in *Critical Thinking for Strategic Intelligence*. (Pherson, Hibbs and Pherson, 2017) Three intuitive traps that perpetrators of Digital Disinformation frequently exploit are Judging by Emotion, Confusing Correlation with Causality, and Ignoring Inconsistent Evidence.

**Judging by Emotion:** In the two years prior to the 2016 presidential election potential voters often said they could not vote for Hillary Clinton because she was "evil," "corrupt," or "a horrible person." When asked which positions she held that they disagreed with, the response often was that it did not matter because she was just a bad person. These interviews probably were a manifestation of a classic trap, judging by Emotion, which is defined as accepting or rejecting everything another person says because the analyst, or reader, likes or dislikes the person.

"Much of the visceral hatred evidenced in political campaigns is likely to be a product of successful Digital Disinformation operations". (Anderson and Rainie, 2017) The 2016 US elections provided one of the most dramatic examples of the power of melding social media, individual targeting strategies, and Digital Disinformation dissemination techniques to influence election outcomes – but certainly not the first.

Confusing Correlation with Causality: "Many people will easily jump to a conclusion that one variable cause another because they want it to be true or think that by citing the "connection" they can prove their beliefs or justify their positions. This trap of inferring causality inappropriately by assuming that correlation implies causation is a favourite tool of manipulators of social media". (see more on Pherson, June 2019) For example, in summer the consumption of ice cream at a lakeside resort will increase as will the number of drownings. But this does not necessarily mean that the increased consumption of ice cream was the cause of more drownings. Another example: a 99.9 percent correlation exists between the divorce rate in the state of Maine in the United States and the per capita consumption of margarine – a form of butter – in that state. (Tyler Vige) While a graph of the two variables appears to show an unmistakable relationship, there is no logical link between consuming more margarine and obtaining divorces.

For perpetrators of Digital Disinformation, this mental pitfall is easy to exploit. Perpetrators merely need to associate one of their Digital Disinformation themes with a recent trend and then rely on Confirmation Bias to spur readers to assume a connection, thereby driving the perpetrator's message home. People will often infer that a correlation between two variables also denotes causation, especially when presented with an alluring graph that appears to scientifically prove the claim. People will be even more inclined to confuse causality with correlation when they already tend to believe, or hope, that a causal relationship exists between the two variables.

**Ignoring Inconsistent Evidence:** As the debate in the UK has intensified over the fate of Brexit – and in the United States over the fate of the Trump Administration – the tendency of many people is to say, "I don't listen to the news anymore because I don't know what or who to believe". This is "the true metric for success for the practitioners of Digital Disinformation, when people believe there is no truth or that the real truth is unknowable". "When confronted with data that is inconsistent with one's world view, politics, or deeply held beliefs, the response is not to argue the facts but to avoid the discussion altogether" (see more on Pherson, June 2019) Cognitive dissonance sets in, and *Flight* emerges as a more comfortable path to pursue than *Fight*,

especially if the person believes he or she is likely to lose the argument. The result is to fall into the trap of Ignoring Inconsistent Evidence which is defined as discarding or ignoring information that is inconsistent with what one expects to see.

People hear and see what they want to hear and see, often regardless of the evidence. For example, one example of this type of Digital Disinformation was a report that "Ireland is now officially accepting refugees from America" in response to Donald Trump's election as president. Although the headline accompanying the story only mentioned a small island off Ireland's coast that has no say on Irish immigration storv generated 810,000 policy. the engagements. (Ritchie, 2016) By ignoring data that is inconsistent with what one wants to believe, people simplify complex issues to justify their own positions. They maintain that their side is obviously correct, and the other side is simply irrational. People fail to consider that they may have overlooked information and therefore made judgments that are misinformed.

#### **Seeking Remedies**

Perpetrators of Digital Disinformation know that the best way to manipulate popular perceptions is to exploit well-engrained cognitive biases, misapplied heuristics, and intuitive traps. These inescapable cognitive limitations are powerful tools when used to reinforce Digital Disinformation stories. As Richards J. Heuer, Jr. argues, "Cognitive biases are similar to optical illusions in that the error remains compelling even when one is fully aware of its nature. Awareness of the bias, by itself, does not produce a more accurate perception". (Heuer, 2007, p. 112)

The best antidote to the scourge of Digital Disinformation is to employ Structured Analytic Techniques that help individuals recognize when they are being manipulated. Structured techniques provide people with methods they can use to avoid, overcome, or at least mitigate the impact of these cognitive pitfalls. Three Structured Analytic Techniques are particularly effective in helping to combat the scourge of Digital Disinformation (Pherson, 2019, pp. 5, 9, 19, 31, 43, and 53):

**"Key Assumptions Check:** Making explicit and questioning the assumptions that guide an analyst's interpretation of evidence and the reasoning underlying any particular judgment or conclusion.

**Analysis of Competing Hypotheses:** The evaluation of information that is consistent and inconsistent with a set of alternative hypotheses and the rejection of hypotheses with much inconsistent data.

**Premortem Analysis and the Structured Self-Critique:** A systematic process using brainstorming and checklist procedures to identify critical weaknesses in an argument and assess how a key analytic judgment could be spectacularly wrong".

Learning how to use these techniques and integrating them as habits of thinking into one's everyday life will help protect people from falling victim to Digital Disinformation. It is important, however, for people to recognize that they are not only naturally susceptible to Digital Disinformation postings on the internet but that they need to adopt new habits of thinking that prompt them to challenge their assumptions, consider alternative hypotheses, recognize inconsistent evidence, identify key drivers, and take time to reflect on the overarching context for what they read on the internet or hear in the news. (Pherson, 2013)

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#### A GÂNDI, A ROSTI, A SĂVÂRȘI URA (HATE THOUGHTS, HATE SPEECH, HATE ACTIONS)

#### Andrei VLĂDESCU\*

#### Abstract

Hate speech communications, whether expressed through text, image or sound, convey a two-way message: one to the target and the social group to which it belongs, as a factor of their minimization and dehumanization, and the second to other supporters of extremist-aggressive ideologies, to reinforce the sense of belonging to the group and to a common vision.

An aggressive discourse is all the more dangerous as it is stated by a charismatic speaker, who addresses a public marked by frustration, in a social or historical context favorable to violence and who benefits from an influential mean of dissemination which is unique or the main source of information for the target audience.

Aggressive online speech is an eloquent example of how advanced technologies bring both opportunities and challenges regarding the need for a balance between fundamental rights and principles, as is the case between freedom of expression and the defense of human dignity. The connection of aggressive online discourse with the real world is difficult to demonstrate through systematic empirical evidence, being less preferred the study of the dynamics underlying the transfer of energy from words to overt discrimination, hostile behavior and violent.

The purpose of this study is to identify the social groups most vulnerable to aggressive public discourse, as a primary stage in constructing an assessment tool which, based on the vocabulary or the symbolisms used, could determine the affinity of an individual or a group of persons for radical ideologies close to actionable hate.

**Keywords:** aggressive speech, discrimination, vulnerable social group, aggressive public discourse, intolerance.

<sup>\*</sup>Doctorand în Științele Comunicării al Școlii Naționale de Studii Politice și Administrative, andreivladescu@yahoo.com.

#### Introducere

Conceptul de *hate speech* este folosit de multe ori ca termen generic, în care se amestecă amenințări concrete la adresa unor persoane sau grupuri sociale cu situații în care oamenii pur și simplu se eliberează de frustrări acumulate ca urmare a unor neîmpliniri sau eșecuri individuale. Agresivitatea discursivă este element al unui sistem complex, din care mai fac parte libertatea de exprimare, drepturile individuale și de grup, dar și concepte precum demnitate, libertate și egalitate, motiv pentru care definirea sa este dificilă și deseori contestată.

O idee din categoria *hate speech*, indiferent dacă este exprimată prin text, imagine sau sunete, transmite mai multe mesaje: unul este direcționat către individul vizat (și, prin extrapolare, către grupul social în care avesta este inclus), ca parte a minimalizării și dezumanizării acestuia, iar al doilea către ceilalți promotori ai unor ideologii similare, pentru ca aceștia să nu se simtă izolați, să fie conștienți că nu sunt singuri și astfel să se consolideze sentimentul de apartenență la un grup (Waldron, 2012).

Altfel spus, pe lângă dezumanizarea victimelor, discursul agresiv are rolul de a augmenta identitatea de grup a surselor acestuia, prin crearea unei relații bazate pe antagonismul "noi" versus "ei" (Gelber 2011; Heinze 2017; Butler 1997). Waldron (2012) susține că unul dintre efectele *hate speech* este crearea unei amenințări față de pacea socială, "un fel de otravă cu acțiune lentă, care se acumulează ici și colo, cuvânt cu cuvânt, astfel încât, în cele din urmă, devine mai greu și mai puțin firesc chiar pentru membrii buni ai societății să își joace rolul în mentinerea acestui bun public".

Potrivit lui Susan Benesch, director executiv al proiectului Dangereous Speech (https://dangerousspeech.org), conceptul de *hate speech* este o categorie prea vastă ca să permită sesizarea acelor acte discursive care ar putea fi utilizate ca indicatori de avertizare timpurie pentru violență offline. Conform acesteia, "discursul agresiv este comun multor societăți, inclusiv celor unde genocidul are o probabilitate mică de a se întâmpla; pe de altă parte, deși discursul agresiv nu crește în mod considerabil riscul de violență în masă, poate provoca daune emoționale și psihice grave" (Benesch, 2012). Din această perspectivă,

autoarea a propus cinci criterii care ar trebui îndeplinite pentru evaluarea gradului de pericol al comunicărilor cu conținut agresiv (Benesch, 2012):

- un vorbitor charismatic, cu grad ridicat de influență asupra audienței;
- un public marcat de frustrări pe care vorbitorul le poate specula;
- un act discursiv perceput clar ca apel la violență;
- un context social sau istoric favorabil violenței, indiferent de motiv sau pretext, pe fondul unor competiții pentru resurse, a unei lipse a eforturilor de soluționare a nemulțumirilor sau a unor episoade violente anterioare;
- un mijloc de diseminare influent prin sine, prin simplul fapt că este unica sau principală sursă de informare pentru audiența relevantă.

Detectarea unei comunicări de tip *hate speech* este o sarcină dificilă, pentru că, în primul rând, există dezacorduri în ceea ce privește modul în care este definit conceptul, iar pe de alta pentru că un anumit conținut comunicațional poate fi considerat agresiv pentru unii și nonagresiv pentru alții. De exemplu, potrivit unor autori, *hate speech* reprezintă acea comunicare scrisă sau verbală care "discreditează în orice mod o persoană sau un grup bazat pe caracteristici precum rasă, culoare, etnie, sex, orientare sexuală, naționalitate sau religie" (Warner și Hirshberg, 2012) sau se poate considera că este *hate speech* dacă vizează "doar grupuri sociale defavorizate și le aduce prejudicii atât direct, cât și indirect" (Waldron, 2012).

Comparativ, Parekh (2012) este extrem de precis atunci când propune trei caracteristici definitorii ale discursului agresiv, o comunicare urmând a fi considerată *hate speech* dacă:

- "este îndreptată către o persoană specificată sau ușor de identificat sau către un grup de indivizi bazat pe o caracteristică arbitrară și irelevantă normativ";
- "stigmatizează grupul-țintă, atribuindu-i implicit sau explicit calități considerate pe larg ca extrem de nedorite";
- "grupul-ţintă este privit ca o prezenţă nedorită și ca obiect legitim de ostilitate".

Din perspectiva unor autori, conceptul de *hate speech* se referă de cele mai multe ori la expresii care susțin incitarea la daune, prejudicii sau vătămare bazată pe identificarea țintei agresivității cu un anume grup social, iar în unele situații, conceptul este extrapolat la expresii care facilitează apariția și întreținerea unui climat favorabil prejudecăților și intoleranței care conduc la discriminare, ostilitate și violență (Gagliardone et al., 2015).

Alte definiții interpretează discursul de tip *hate speech* ca "limbaj folosit pentru a exprima ura față de un grup sau este destinat să fie peiorativ, să umilească sau să insulte membrii grupului" (Davidson et al., 2017), "atac deliberat îndreptat către un anumit grup de oameni și motivat de aspecte ale identității grupului" (de Gilbert et al. 2018) sau "limbaj care atacă sau diminuează, care incită la violență sau ură împotriva grupurilor, bazată pe caracteristici specifice, cum ar fi aspectul fizic, religia, descendență, originea națională sau etnică, orientarea sexuală, identitate de gen sau altele, și poate aborda diferite stiluri lingvistice, chiar și în forme subtile sau când se folosește umorul". (Fortuna et al., 2018)

Din această ultimă perspectivă, ne punem o întrebare legitimă: oare putem considera că "Noaptea ca hoții" intră sau nu în categoria hate speech,? Altfel spus, prezența conținutului mundan în sine ar trebui sau nu să echivaleze cu hate speech? Sau putem considera că lumescul nu vizează neapărat stigmatizarea unui individ și poate fi utilizat în scopuri stilistice sau sublinierea unei idei, iar discursul agresiv poate denigra sau amenința o persoană sau un grup de oameni fără să recurgă la utilizarea vreunui termen sau sintagmă dificil de reprodus. (Malmasi și Zampieri, 2017)

#### Ce este atât de special la discursul agresiv online

Plasat în punctul de tangență al mai multor tipuri de tensiuni, discursul agresiv online constituie un exemplu grăitor al modului în care tehnologiile avansate aduc deopotrivă oportunități și provocări în ceea ce privește necesitatea unui echilibru între drepturile fundamentale și principii, cum este cazul celui între libertatea de exprimare și apărarea demnității umane.

Caracterul discursului agresiv online și conexiunea sa cu lumea reală sunt teme larg dezbătute și dificil de demonstrat prin dovezi empirice sistematice, fiind preferată varianta punerii accentului pe modul de soluționare, pe studierea efectului în detrimentul cauzei și mai puțin a dinamicii care stă la baza transferului energiei dinspre cuvinte spre discriminarea manifestă, comportamente ostile și chiar apariția unor acțiuni violente. Discursul agresiv poate rămâne în mediul virtual pe o perioadă nedeterminată, în diferite formate și pe mai multe platforme, putând fi astfel replicat într-o manieră repetată și care îi atribuie cun caracter practic itinerant.

Vom aminti aici un adevăr care are deja valențe de truism, anume că oamenii sunt mai agresivi și chiar brutal de sinceri, mergând pâna la impolitețe, atunci când comunică online, deoarece sunt perfect conștienți că sunt anonimi (cu un minim de efort intelectual și cu minime cunoștințe tehnologice) și deci pot acționa după bunul plac, fără consecințe imediate, fie acestea sancțiuni sociale, expunere la un atac fizic sau față de aplicarea legii. De altfel, în articolul "The Online Disinhibition Effect" (2004), psihologul John Suller a menționat un set de șase factori care ar putea explica modificarea semnificativă a comportamentului oamenilor atunci când se manifestă online:

- anonimatul disociativ ("acțiunile mele nu pot fi atribuite persoanei mele");
- invizibilitatea ("nimeni nu poate spune cum arăt și nici nu îmi poate judeca tonul");
- asincronia ("acțiunile mele nu se produc în timp real");
- introiecția ("nu îi văd pe acești oameni, trebuie să ghicesc cine sunt și care este intenția lor");
- imaginația disociativă ("aceasta nu este lumea reală, aceștia nu sunt oameni reali");
- minimizarea autorității ("nu există autoritate aici, deci pot acționa liber").

Potrivit HateBase, aplicație web care stochează cazuri de *hate speech* online la nivel internațional (http://www.hatebase.org), deși cele mai multe cazuri de agresivitate din mediul virtual au ca ținte persoane alese în funcție de etnie și naționalitate, incitarea la ură focalizată pe religie și categorii sociale este, de asemenea, în creștere.

În acest punct, se cuvine să arătăm că dificultatea identificării agresivității discursive este accentuată de faptul că cele mai importante platforme de socializare tratează ușor diferit ideea de *hate speech*:

- Facebook: "Definim hate speech un atac direct asupra oamenilor, pe baza a ceea ce noi numim caracteristici protejate rasă, etnie, origine naţională, apartenenţă religioasă, orientare sexuală, castă, sex, gen, identitatea de gen, boală sau dizabilitatea gravă. De asemenea, oferim unele protecţii pentru statutul de imigraţie. Definim atacul ca fiind acel discurs violent sau dezumanizant, declaraţiile vizând inferioritatea sau apelurile la excludere sau segregare"1;
- Twitter: "Comportamentul marcat de ură: Nu puteți promova violența împotriva sau atacul direct sau amenințările la adresa altor persoane pe motive de rasă, etnie, origine națională, orientare sexuală, gen, identitate de gen, apartenență religioasă, vârstă, dizabilitate sau boli grave".<sup>2</sup>

#### Prezenta hate speech în România

Pentru identificarea grupurilor sociale menţionate drept **cele mai vulnerabile** faţă de discriminare şi intoleranţă în România studiul de faţă a analizat comparativ un set de rapoarte referitoare la acest aspect, realizate în perioada 1999-2018: An Overview on Hate Crime ond Hate Speech (Centre for Legal Resources Romania şi Europe Monitoring and Reporting Hate Speech/EMORE - 2017), "Raportul anual cu privire la discursul intolerant şi instigator la ură din România" (ActiveWatch - 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018), "Raport asupra rasismului şi intoleranţei în România" (Comisia Europeană împotriva Rasismului şi Intoleranţei/ECRI - 1999, 2002, 2006, 2014, 2019), "Racism and Related Discriminatory Practices in Romania" (European Network Against Racism/ENAR - 2011, 2012) şi "No Into Hate" (Institutul Român pentru Evaluare si Strategie/IRES - 2018)

 $<sup>^1\,</sup>Sursa: https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/objectionable\_content.$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Sursa: https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conductpolicy.

În urma extragerii grupurilor sociale menționate în fiecare raport ca fiind vulnerabile față de discriminare/rasim și, pe cale de consecință, față de atitudini agresive, inclusiv de tip discursiv, au fost obținute următoarele rezultate:




Figura 1: Centralizarea grupurilor sociale vulnerabile față de discriminare și intoleranță

Motivul pentru care aceste categorii sociale figurează constant între "preferințele" autorilor de opinii agresive ar putea fi faptul că sunt "altfel", comparativ cu majoritatea, fie din perspectivă etnică/religioasă, fie din cea sexuală, fiind astfel dificil pentru un român "autentic" (creștin ortodox, heterosexual, naționalist) să se raporteze de o manieră tolerantă la acestea.

O altă posibilă explicație se bazează pe rezultatele sondajului *No Into Hate*, realizat în 2018 de Institutul pentru Politici Publice la solicitarea Consiliului Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării, care arată că în țara noastră există un "nivel ridicat de neîncredere în homosexuali (74%), romi (72%), imigranți (69%), musulmani (68%), persoane cu HIV/SIDA (58%), persoane de altă religie (58%), maghiari (53%) și evrei (46%)". (IRES – 2018) În același timp, studiul denotă existența în România a unei intoleranțe semnificative față de homosexuali (59% nu ar accepta să le fie rude, iar 52% nu i-ar accepta ca prieteni), imigranți (39%, respectiv 30%), musulmani (39%, respectiv 28%), romii (29%, respectiv 18%), maghiarii (24%, respectiv 15%) și evrei (21%, respectiv 14%).

De asemenea, peste 2 treimi dintre români (72%) nu agreează căsătoria între membri ai comunității LGBT, în timp ce 60% nu sunt de acord cu parteneriatul civil, peste "60% din români îi consideră pe musulmani ca fiind un pericol potențial, iar 52% cred că imigranții ar trebui opriți la granițele Europei" (IRES – 2018). Nu în ultimul rând, atrage atenția faptul că naționalismul este considerat de aproape jumătate dintre români drept o mișcare necesară pentru România, iar neîncrederea în străinii care critică România este afirmată de 50% dintre cei chestionați.

Încrederea în celălalt influențează determinant modul în care românii se raportează la alte etnii, semnificativ în acest sens fiind un sondaj realizat de Compania de Cercetare Sociologică și Branding pentru Asociația Pro Democrația în anul 2011 (Stereotipuri la adresa romilor. Perceptia privind etnia romilor. Rolul presei. Identificarea de alternative de îmbunătățire), potrivit căruia nivelul de încredere în romi (19%), evrei (30%) și maghiari (33%) era mult inferior celui cu care erau investiți români (65%) și germanii (52%).

Un alt aspect de interes a rezultat din Rapoartele anuale cu privire la discursul intolerant și instigator la ură identificat în spațiul public din România, realizate de organizația nonguvernamentală ActiveWatch în perioada 2014-2018, anume acela că cel mai frecvent discursul agresiv public a fost direcționat către **comunitatea LGBT**<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Acronim pentru Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transexual, recent devenit LGBTT - Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transexual, Transgender.

(32% din cazuri), urmată de **maghiari** (23%), **romi**, **evrei**, **musulmani și populația de culoare** (fiecare cu 8%), **refugiați** (7%), la distanță mare și practic marginale ca ținte ale discursurilor agresive fiind femeile și diaspora / cetățeni români relocați temporar în alte state membre UE în căutare de locuri de muncă (fiecare cu 3%).




Figura 2: Ținte ale discursului agresiv public (2015-2018)

Din Rapoartele ActiveWatch rezultă un detaliu semnificativ, referitor la autorii afirmațiilor agresive, care pot fi încadrați astfel:

- persoane implicate în viața politică (în special când participă la campania electorală);
- membrii unor organizații extremiste (chiar dacă în acest moment în România nu există un actor politic de extremă dreapta care să genereze un impact semnificativ în societate);
- unii reprezentanți ai mass media;
- o serie de persoane publice din diferite domenii ale vieții sociale din România;
- elemente "ultras" (persoane din componența galeriilor care sustin diferite echipe sportive);

- foști sau actuali reprezentanți ai autorităților / instituțiilor naționale (atrage atenția faptul că declarațiile formulate de oficialități au un potențial ridicat de legitimare a discriminării și, pe cale de consecință, de stimulare a agresivității, inclusiv în mediul virtual, aceasta apărând întrucâtva ca justificată oficial);
- autori necunoscuți (sau, mai degrabă, neidentificabili, aceștia fiind parte a unor grupuri informale care au exprimat colectiv diferite opinii agresive).




Figura 3: Surse ale agresivității discursive și țintele respective




Figura 4: Țintele agresivității discursive în raport cu sursele agresivității (2015-2018)

Corespondențele între sursele discursului sgresiv public și țintele vizate de acestea sunt reprezentate în graficul alăturat, din care rezultă, pe de o parte, că există surse preocupate de mai multe ținte, iar pe de alta, că unele ținte sunt în "atenția" mai multor surse.




Figura 5: Sursele discursului agresiv public din România si tintele vizate de acestea

#### Concluzii

Atrage atenția faptul că grupurile sociale ale comunităților evreiască, maghiară și LGBT nu sunt doar cele mai vizate ținte (sub aspect cantitativ), dar și țintele de care sunt interesate mai multe categorii de agresori, respectiv 5 surse. În plan secund se plasează grupurile sociale ale comunităților romă și musulmană, vizate de cîte 4 categorii de surse.

Din această perspectivă, o cercetare viitoare ar trebuie să se axeze pe studierea modului în care sunt referite fiecare dintre țintele principale, motivațiilor care sunt invocate de autorii agresiunilor discursive și a modului în care evoluția intensității *hate speech* este sau nu influențată de evoluțiile socio-economice din țara noastră.

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### TEHNICA ELICITĂRII - REEVALUAREA EXPLOATĂRII ÎN ORB

# Teodor Octavian TROPOTEI\* Ioan DEAC\*\*

#### **Abstract**

Academic studies in the sphere of intelligence have been fueled by the need to provide a scientific basis for the knowledge and foresight of the processes, activities and products pertaining to the field. Intelligence studies have traditionally been oriented towards the stages of the intelligence cycle, intelligence typology, doctrines, taxonomies, technological data collection, axiological and ethical aspects, and the feedback received from the recipients of the finished intelligence product. However, intentionally or not, the academic studies have, most of the times, left undocumented one of the fundamental activities of the field, i.e. the collection of information from human sources – HUMINT. Considered rather spycraft, or tradecraft at best, the lack of scientific research in this sub-field can be motivated, in the absence of a better argument, either by excessive and improper scientific restraint, or by invoking, as inappropriately as in the first case, the protection of professional secrecy.

This article aims to identify scientific foundations of information exploration/exploitation in the process of elicitation, which is a technique used to extract information from people without raising suspicion that specific facts are being sought.

**Keywords:** intelligence, humint, elicitation, exploration/exploitation in the process of elicitation.

#### Introducere

Ideea potrivit căreia obținerea informației și accesul la aceasta au avut un rol marcant în desfășurarea evenimentelor istorice condiționându-le este magistral ilustrată în lucrări de referință ale unor cercetători români precum Alexandru Popescu (Popescu, 2012, p. 11),

<sup>\*</sup>Doctorand în cadrul Academiei Naționale de Informații "Mihai Viteazul", tropotei.teodor@gmail.com.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Prof.univ.dr. în cadrul Academiei Naționale de Informații "Mihai Viteazul", ioan.deac@animv.ro.

Marian Ureche, Aurel Rogojan (Ureche & Rogojan, 2001, p. 21), sau ale unor cercetători americani precum Cristopher Andrew (Andrew, 2018) sau Michael Warner (Warner, 2009, p. 22), care arăta, de o manieră generală, că deja tratatele antice prezintă maniere de operaționalizare ale ciclului de intelligence în cadrul formelor de organizare economică, socială, politică.

Actualmente, deși domeniul *intelligence* a dezvoltat și aplică metode științifice dedicate, abordarea științifică a *HUMINT* se regăsește mai degrabă în perimetrul preocupărilor altor științe socio-umane: istoria, psihologia, sociologia, antropologia, științele comunicării (Dujmovic, 2005). Preocupările în acest sens sunt preponderent circumscrise psihologiei aplicate și practicilor agențiilor de *intelligence* americane ulterioare celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial și au fost făcute în încercarea de a veni în sprijinul activității de *intelligence* operațional prin identificarea unor seturi de tehnici care să se adreseze în mod explicit culegerii de informații din surse umane.

În acest context, deși studiile de *intelligence* sunt acceptate ca domeniu științific de sine stătător, domeniul *HUMINT* – definit în literatura de specialitate anglo-saxonă ca fiind culegere a informațiilor în domeniul securității: "human intelligence – intelligence militar obținut din surse umane ce dețin cunoaștere în aria de interes" (Collins, 2014), nu beneficiază de o teoretizare specifică, fiind privit de către teoreticieni și de către practicieni ca *tradeskill*, deși – în opinia noastră – există toate elementele ce permit diferențierea cunoașterii de la nivelul simțului comun la cel științific.

# Motivatia cercetării - teorie și rațiuni

Demitizarea subiectului adus în discuție aici, tratarea sa dintr-o perspectivă științifică, prin eforturi de abstractizare, analiză, sinteză, abordare științifică a domeniului, poate clarifica și investiga domeniul *HUMINT* și poate identifica soluții ce produc rezultate repetabile, ce pot fi standardizate și optimizate, adică teoretizate, depășindu-se astfel etichetările *spycraft* sau *tradecraft*.

Deși nu ne propunem să abordăm domeniul *HUMINT* dintr-o perspectivă holistică, considerăm că este imperios necesar să începem pornind de la clarificarea conceptelor și a modului în care acestea se

regăsesc atât în practica, cât și în teoriile pe care le intersectează. Instituirea unei maniere riguros argumentate din punct de vedere stiintific a fost initializată de către George Cristian Maior (Maior, 2009, p. 6), fost director al Serviciului Român de Informații, în contextul inaugurării Revistei Române de Studii de Intelligence, când preciza că abordarea studiilor de intelligence și a domeniilor sale trebuie realizate din perspectivă istorică - în vederea identificării apariției și evoluției fenomenului; teoretică - ca demers ce permite individualizarea domeniului studiat în raport cu alte stiințe apropiate; legalistă - ca abordare specifică statelor democrate ce pun preț pe drepturile și libertătile cetătenilor, respectiv pe aspectele etiologice, axiologice; acest tip de abordare este în măsură a trasa viziunea, misiunea, sarcinile și obiectivele organizațiilor de intelligence astfel încât acestea să nu genereze conflicte functionale între conceptele de libertate si securitate. În cazul de față vom utiliza în special primele două abordări mentionate.

Clarificarea conceptelor utilizate în cadrul acestui domeniu al studiilor de *intelligence* – va permite, ulterior, utilizarea lor într-o manieră clară, coerentă, corectă și va invalida utilizarea lor în contexte inadecvate, fie din ignorantă fie din malitiozitate.

În demararea studiului am utilizat modelul propus de către Eugen Glăvan (Glăvan, 2014), care o citează pe Kimberly A. Neuendorf (Neuendorf) și am inițiat acest demers prin explicitarea modului în care subiectul abordat este de interes.

# Decizii conceptuale

Studiul de față își propune să aducă în lumină și să identifice pattern-urile acționale utilizate în HUMINT prin metode non-intruzive de comunicare, în lipsa unei rețele informative, de la persoane care au acces la date de interes pe care le dezvăluie unui operator HUMINT, fără a sesiza scopul demersului inițiat de către acesta din urmă. Furnizarea de informații în afara contextului generat de rețeaua informativă este, credem noi, o precizare relevantă, întrucât literatura de specialitate face trimitere, de regulă, doar la contextul obținerii de

informații de către operatori/ofițeri specializați, handleri¹ (MI5, 2019) care gestionează agenții într-o formă de lucru organizată (rețea informativă), sistematizată; rețeaua gestionată astfel este formată din persoane care, în cunoștință de cauză, acceptă faptul că acționează în beneficiul unui serviciu sau unei agenții de informații și care oferă informațiile solicitate de către acei handleri.

În acest context este necesar să precizăm că o primă definire a tehnicii care reprezintă preocuparea demersului de față ("exploatarea în orb") a fost identificată în arhiva gestionată de către CNSAS și se regăsește în materialul "Index de termeni și abrevieri cu utilizare frecventă în documentele Securității" (C.N.S.A.S, n.d.). În materialul menționat, "exploatarea în orb" este explicată ca "metodă operativă constând în culegerea de informații sub acoperirea unei identități false. Obținerea unor informații prin metoda exploatării în orb era consemnată ca atare în documente". De asemenea, în "Ghid bibliografic privind problemele muncii de informații și contrainformații tratate în lucrările pe bază de traducere editate în Ministerul de Interne" (C.N.S.A.S., 1979), exploatarea în orb este menționată ca: "metodă folosită în munca de informații și contrainformații".

Florin Buştiuc (Buştiuc, 2015) face trimitere la această tehnică de exploatare informativă prezentând – o drept "culegerea informațiilor prin inițierea și manipularea unor conversații într-o direcție care să permită formularea rezonabilă/normală a unor întrebări despre aspecte de interes, ulterior fiind schimbat subiectul de discuție". Abordarea autorului este totuși una preventivă, el plasând explicarea tehnicii într-o perspectivă protectivă, contra-informativă și de înțelegere a modului în care poate fi dezvoltat nivelul de awareness al unei națiuni prin realizarea unei educații de securitate.

De asemenea, menționăm și o altă încercare de definire a modului în care tehnica este prezentată în viziunea unei organizații private de intelligence: "metoda de culegere a informațiilor prin purtarea unor discuții sau ascultarea unor persoane care dețin informații și nu au pregătirea necesară protejării lor" (Detectivi-Iași.ro, 2019), pentru a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Spre exemplu MI5 definește agenții – Covert Human Intelligence Sources – ca oameni care pot oferi intelligence ce susține investigațiile noastre și care sunt gestionați de către un officer (ofiter) sau handler.

ilustra conceptele utilizate în activitatea specifică desfășurată de către detectivii particulari.

Sintagma "exploatare în orb", prin care ofiterii Departamentului Secutității Statului (DSS) desemnau această tehnică informativă, face trimitere la sensul figurativ al termenului "exploatare": faptul de a profita, de a trage folos în mod abuziv; dar reprezintă și o contribuție a DSS la dezvoltarea expresivă a limbii române! Expresia "în orb" nu este inventariată în nici o ocurentă de către DEX, de unde se poate trage concluzia că "în orb" se poate referi fie la semnificația "lipsă de discernământ" ("orb") a celui care furnizează informatii fără să-si dea seama de asta, fie la sensul adverbial "pe dibuite, la întâmplare" ("orbește"), caracterizând modul de acțiune al ofițerilor DSS. În bună parte, sintagma "exploatare în orb" reunește și surprinde coincidenta dintre cele două condiții (lipsa de discernământ a sursei și întâmplarea profitabilă), care fac posibilă obținerea de informații prin această tehnică. Dacă e să acceptăm această explicatie semantică, constatăm că, se pot identifica câteva caracteristici specifice tehnicii *exploatării în orb*, obtinerea de informații prin purtarea conjuncturale, într-un proces de sondare a unei surse neatente, într-un moment de diminuare a discernământului informativ, de tatonare, fără a face trimitere directă la subiectul de interes și fără devoalarea scopurilor reale urmărite de către operatorul HUMINT, care are sansa ca din întâmplare, să identifice, să obțină și să valorifice date/informații detinute de către sursa informativă.

Așa cum vom arăta mai jos, în subcapitolul 3.4, vom aborda conținutul conceptual al sintagmei *exploatare în orb* într-o analiză comparativă, un *benchmarking*, cu conținutul conceptual al tehnicilor culegere a informațiilor dezvoltate și utilizate de către școala americană de *intelligence*, respectiv tehnicile de elicitare.

În mod dedicat subiectului *elicitation*, în cadrul articolului *Utilizarea tehnicilor de interrelaționare în vederea culegerii de informații* (Tropotei, 2016, pp. 1-2), arătam că tehnica este definită în Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Webster, 2019), *ca proces de a obține (un răspuns / informație etc.) de la cineva; înseamnă a smulge, a provoca, a scoate la iveală*, iar în definiția oferită de L. Michael Hall și Bob G. Bodenhamer

(Hall & Bodenhamer, 2012, p. 632) implică colectarea de "informații prin observarea directă a semnalelor nonverbale sau punând întrebări...".

Potrivit lui Nancy J. Cooke (Cooke, 1994, p. 3), tehnicile și metodele de *elicitation*, de extragere a datelor/informațiilor de interes, au fost obținute prin adaptarea și combinarea de tehnici conexe educației, consilierii, antropologiei, semanticii, managementului, filosofiei, psihologiei, lingvisticii și se referă la modalitatea de a extrage în mod direct informații de la oameni prin purtarea de discuții.

Wayne N. Taylor (Taylor, 2010, p. 6) definește tehnica elicitation ca "arta subtilă de a extrage informații de la un alt individ prin intermediul unor conversații normale și inocente. Definită în profunzime, elicitarea este modalitatea subtilă de a colecta informații de la un individ despre care crezi că probabil deține datele dorite, poate sau nu să admită că le cunoaște, este sau nu doritor să le împărtășească dar care nu trebuie să știe că elicitatorul este interesat de acestea".

În abordarea militară a SUA, potrivit Field Manual 2-22.3 (Army, 2006, pp. 1-24) *elicitarea* (combinată cu activitățile de interogare și de *debriefing*) are ca scop culegerea de informații din surse umane prin realizarea și menținerea unor contacte interpersonale cu persoane care dețin/pot deține, au/pot avea acces la date de interes și abordarea lor într-o manieră indirectă, non-invazivă. Aplicarea efectivă a acestei tehnici presupune realizarea și consolidarea unui sentiment de incluziune socială, de apartenență, bazat pe aderarea la seturi de valori comune ce vor determina apariția sentimentului de încredere între în relația elicitator – elicitat, stare de fapt ce poate facilita obținerea de informații.

În viziunea Federal Bureau of Investigations (F.B.I., 2019), tehnica elicitation constă în "colectarea de informații care nu sunt disponibile și realizarea acestui demers fără a atrage suspiciunea că sunt căutate anumite aspecte specifice", sau, într-o formulă succintă, "strategic conversațion targeting knowledge" (conversații strategice ce au ca scop obținerea unor informații de interes).

# Etapele studiului

Etapele parcurse în realizarea efectivă a analizei de conținut a documentelor din arhiva CNSAS aferente studiului au vizat, luând ca

model structura propusă de către echipa de cercetători condusă de către S. Titscher (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000, pp. 62-64): identificarea materialelor, analiza situației care a generat materialul (contextului), determinarea direcțiilor de analiză, formularea întrebărilor/obiectivelor de cercetare, stabilirea unităților de analiză, analiza materialului, formularea interpretărilor.

Identificarea materialului de analiză. Documentarea prealabilă a presupus studierea materialelor, studiilor, cercetărilor pe tema obținerii de informații din surse umane prin metode non-invazive, realizate în contextul evitării devoalării scopului vizat de către un operator HUMINT. Surprinzător sau nu, în literatura de specialitate românească astfel de preocupări lipsesc, ceea ce este poate de înțeles pentru un domeniu științific relativ recent introdus în preocupările teoreticienilor.

În acest context, pornind de la precizarea lui Charles Seignobos (Seignobos, 1901, p. 17) citat de către Septimiu Chelcea (Chelcea, 2007, p. 509; 511; 512) un document nu este decât "o urmă lăsată de un fapt", am pornit la un studiu al urmelor ("etude des traces") printr-o metodă non-reactivă ("unobtrusive research") comparativ istorică după cum o numea Earl R. Babbie (Babbie, 1975/1992, p. 311).

Metoda prezintă avantajul de a încadra abordări ce permit studierea documentelor publice și private și analiza secundară, potrivit lui Guy R. Sedlack și Jay Stanley (Sedlack & Stanley, 1999, p. 295), metodă de natură a ne facilita clarificarea subiectului adus în discuție și de a releva, după cum arăta M. Popa (Popa), "situații și evenimente așa cum au fost ele consemnate în limbajul personal al autorilor și fără a fi fost afectate de orientări induse de cercetător".

Întrucât taxonomiile documentelor diferă în funcție de autorul sau de școala sociologică de apartenență, pentru a păstra coerența studiului în ceea ce privește terminologia adecvată, am apelat la clasificarea realizată de către Septimiu Chelcea. Astfel, am utilizat documente scrise necifrice, publice, oficiale. Precizăm că acestea pot fi incluse, după clasificarea făcută de Kenneth D. Bailey (Bailey, 1978/1982, p. 301) și în categoria documentelor secundare – "realizate de persoane care nu au fost prezente la evenimentele descrise".

Am utilizat în acest sens (din perspectiva eșantionării) provenite din Arhiva CNSAS, respectiv în fondul documente documentar ce tratează Broșuri propagandistice și materiale pentru pregătirea aparatului de Securitate. În materialele studiate, trimiterile efective la tehnica exploatării în orb sunt formulate indirect și nestructurat, sub forma descrierii unor actiuni informative încununate de succes derulate de către fostele cadre ale Departamentului Securității Statului, sau de către ofițeri ai altor servicii de informații. Întrucât studierea întregului volum de date gestionate de către CNSAS ar fi constituit un demers cronofag, am considerat că este util să utilizăm chiar sugestiile adresate fostilor ofiteri ai Securitătii, sens în care am utilizat trimiterile indicate în "Ghid bibliografic privind problemele muncii de informații și contrainformații tratate în lucrările pe bază de traducere editate în Ministerul de Interne" (C.N.S.A.S., 1979, pg. 47-48), material care ne-a permis identificarea materialelor ce tratează subiectul adus în discutie de către noi, respectiv 22 de documente: Index de termeni și abrevieri cu utilizare frecventă în documentele Securitătii (n.d.), Hăituiala îndelungată (1977, p. 17; 38; 152), Arta Informațiilor (1967, p. 120), Fapte care nu se uită (1970, pp. 11-13), Oameni ai informațiilor (1972, p. 29), Dosarul 51 (1970, pp. 16-17), Sistemul informativ al S.U.A. (1971, p. 31; 40), Marile bătălii secrete ale celui de-al doilea Război Mondial, Între Washington și Tokio (1971, p. 13; 37), Război secret între Tel Aviv și Cairo (1972, p. 21), Agent secret la Damasc (1968, pp. 124-125;139-41;155-156;183-184;189), Ce stim si ce nu știm despre C.I.A. (1977, pp. 25;94; 96-97; 118-119;177-178; 197), În avanposturi informative (1969, p. 79), Retele informative (1969, p. 79), Rețeaua marelui șef (1970, pg. 97-98), Linia Viking (1969, p. 148), Operația "Long Saut" (1972, p. 75), Vulturul (1969, p. 46), Singur printre dușmani (1971, p. 43), Planul de măsuri al Consiliului Securității Statului în operatiunea "Ontario" (1968, p. 95), Ordine și instrucțiuni MAI originale (1954, pp. 296-297; 305-307).

Determinarea direcțiilor de analiză și formularea obiectivelor de cercetare. Considerăm oportun să plasăm acest studiu în paradigma școlii românești de *intelligence*, urmărind următoarele obiective:

- identificarea elementelor constituente ale tehnicii informative *exploatare în orb* în vederea clarificării conceptuale a sintagmei;
- relevarea contextelor și a modurilor în care tehnica era utilizată de către personalul DSS sau de către serviciile de informații adverse, în vederea creionării unui cadru care, deși empiric, poate fi modelat într-o metodă replicabilă ce poate fi determina obținerea unor rezultate previzibile, repetabile;
- individualizarea elementelor comune, respectiv distincte, față de practicile similare ale altor servicii de informații, ce i-ar conferi un caracter de unicitate;
- identificarea factorilor favorizanți, a mecanismelor motivaționale ce asigură succesul și eficacitatea aplicării tehnicii;
- reliefarea, pe principiul lecțiilor învățate, a avantajelor și dezavantajelor utilizării de către un operator HUMINT a acestei tehnici de obținere a informațiilor;

# Stabilirea unităților de analiză - stabilirea categoriilor și codurilor, respectiv definirea variabilelor

În vedere stabilirii unităților de analiză am selecționat ca fiind relevante elementele definitorii, așa cum se regăsesc ele în "Index de termeni și abrevieri cu utilizare frecventă în documentele Securității" (C.N.S.A.S, n.d.) sub forma definirii exploatării în orb, respectiv: "metodă operativă constând în culegerea de informații sub acoperirea unei identități false." Acestea au fost transformate în coduri, în unități de semnificație, care ulterior au fost supuse interpretării.

De asemenea, întrucât definiția citată este marcată de un caracter sporit de generalitate și ambiguitate, am apreciat ca oportun să trecem contextele operaționale citate printr-un dublu filtru: cel al tehnicii de exploatare în orb privit într-un benchmarking cu o tehnică similară, respectiv elicitation. Pentru aceasta, stabilirea unităților de analiză și definirea variabilelor am utilizat practicile inventariate de către FBI (F.B.I., 2019), respectiv: "transformarea întrebărilor în comentarii, întrucât sursa va fi mult mai dispusă să abordeze un subiect dacă nu este interogată, ci invitată să delibereze; complimentarea țintei (inflamarea ego-ului); afirmațiile provocatoare (menite a determina persoana elicitată să solicite lămuriri); referințele oblice (care

determină sursa să abordeze subiectul într-o proiectie de la general la particular prin abordarea unor aspecte care pot completa sau clarifica subjectul); **afirmatiile false** (elicitatorul sustine ceva gresit, iar tinta îl va corecta); quid pro quo (functionează pe principiul oferirii unor informații în schimbul unor confidențe similare); oferirea de informații "confidențiale" (off the record); simularea naivității; manifestarea simpatiei/dezacordului; utilizarea ascultării active; folosirea bracketing-ului (abordarea aceluiasi subiect din unghiuri diferite); abordarea din perspectiva argumentului autorității (proiecția/ afirmatia aparține unei terțe părți citate); abordarea "istoricului comun" (împărtăsirea unor experiente comune de viată, de exemplu, același cerc relațional, pasiuni comune etc.); solicitarea permisiunii (pentru a evita senzatia de invaziune/intruziune într-un demers ce din start supra-poziționează tinta și îi stimulează orgoliul); **utilizarea** umorului; repetarea cuvintelor (cu rol de întărire/încurajare); folosirea pauzelor de comunicare (tăcerea ca pressing); lansarea "loaded questions" (întrebărilor ce au inclusă o presupunere)" (Tropotei, 2016, pp. 5-6).

Pentru o imagine de ansamblu a modului în care tehnicile citate funcționează și a identificării factorilor favorizanți, am apreciat ca oportun să lărgim arealul variabilelor cu cel al pârghiilor motivaționale privite ca factori generatori, de augmentare și de consolidare a relației dintre un operator HUMINT și o potențială sursă umană.

Aceste pârghii motivaţionale sunt tratate în literatura de specialitate americană de autori precum M.D. Charney şi J.A. Irvin (Charney & Irvin) sub acronimul MICE: *money*/banii – informaţiile relevante/strategice pot fi valorizate (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000) pecuniar de către cei interesaţi; *ideology*/ideologia – aspecte identitare naţionale, sociale, culturale, politice, militare, economice, religioase etc.; *coercion*/coerciţia & *compromise*/compromisul – cu multiplele lor forme de manifestare sunt ancorate în sentimentul de culpă/frică al surselor umane; **ego**-ul – înglobează o categorie mai largă de emoţii din sfera compulsiunilor, de auto-afirmare sau de atragere a afectivităţii.

Sistemul motivațional MICE poate fi combinat cu sistemul motivațional RASCLS (bazat pe studiile efectuate de Robert Cialdini),

care poate să ofere instrumentele necesare înțelegerii și motivării comportamentului uman, respectiv: reciprocity/reciprocitatea – obligația resimțită de a răsplăti o persoană/entitate care a avut o atitudine pozitivă față cel în cauză; authority/autoritatea – brand-ul, renumele, recunoașterea socială sunt în măsură a atrage aderenți pe principiul conformismului social; scarcity/penuria – oamenii manifestă atracție față de persoanele/organizațiile în cadrul cărora competențele lor au căutare sau sunt dorite; commitment and consistency/asumarea și consistența acțională; liking/similitudinea –suntem atrași de oamenii în care ne oglindim, cu care suntem asemănători; social proof / acceptarea socială – implică un proces de observare a altor persoane, cu precădere în evenimente, medii, situații mai puțin familiare pentru stabilirea comportamentului corect sau acceptat social în aceste situații.

Procesul de definire a variabilelor a presupus clarificarea următoarelor criterii ce vor face obiectul produsului analitic:

- elemente constituente ale tehnicii informative (*exploatare în orb / elicitare*): toate acele modalități care ajută la obținerea de informații de la o potențială sursă umană;
- context și mod de aplicare a tehnicii: situații, evenimente, stări de fapt;
- elemente comune sau de autenticitate ale celor două tehnici: practici utilizate;
- pârghii motivaționale pentru o aplicare eficientă a tehnicilor: factori favorizanti/defavorizanti.

# Formularea interpretărilor

În vederea formulării interpretărilor, am pornit de la simple observații, conexând contexte și acțiuni ce pot reliefa pattern-uri, interferențe și corelații între variabile (Babbie, 1975/1992, p. 444).

Ca tipologie a analizei de conținut am optat pentru modelul propus de Titscher (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000, pp. 62-64) mergând, din punct de vedere al tipologiei procesuale pe nivelurile semiotic-semantic (care are ca obiect sensul cuvintelor și al propozițiilor, respectiv analiza de temă) și semantic-pragmatic (care are ca obiect înțelesul și efectul mesajului, respectiv analiză de atribuire).

În ceea ce privește procedurile analitice utilizate, am optat pentru varianta propusă de Titscher (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000), respectiv:

- 1. sumarizare încercarea de a decupa, sintetiza, simplifica și reduce materialul;
- 2. structurare relevarea pattern-urilor, tiparelor, modelelor și, construirea unui eșafodaj, a unei scheme silogistice pornind de la acestea;
- 3. explicare clarificarea materialului.

În interpretarea unităților de semnificație am conjugat elementele definitorii ale ambelor tehnici, *elicitation și exploatare în orb.* Întrucât prezentarea integrală a cazuisticii studiate și a interpretărilor aferente acesteia pot deveni, pentru un cititor, monotone și repetitive, am optat pentru prezentarea modului de operare în cazul unui exemplu preluat din cadrul celor 21 de materiale studiate, precizând că am recurs la același mod de lucru pentru toate segmentele de text analizate.




Figura 1: Model analitic - studiul documentelor CNSAS

Pornind de la definirile prezentate în secțiunea de conceptualizare și completând cu rezultatele obținute în urma procesului analitic au rezultat următoarele aspecte de interes:

# 1. Elemente constituente comune ale celor două tehnicii informative, respectiv *exploatare în orb* și *elicitare*:

- a. sunt utilizate în obținerea de informații de la surse umane;
- b. implică utilizarea unor contexte sociale ce permit sau facilitează inițierea unor discuții/interrelaționări aparent neintenționate cu persoane ce dețin date/informații de interes pentru operatorul HUMINT;

- c. presupun contextualizarea conținutului comunicării pentru a nu atrage atenția asupra subiectului/subiectelor de interes vizate de către operator;
- d. deși aparent dezinvolte, non-invazive, demersurile au un caracter orientat, concentrat pe obținerea unui anumit tip de informații ce prezintă interes pentru operator;
- e. aplicarea tehnicilor nu atrage atenția asupra interesului informațional;
  - f. pot fi lansate în manieră planificată sau inopinată;
  - g. pot fi utilizate atât în manieră ofensivă cât și defensivă;
- h. pot fi aplicate atât în activitatea de informații cât și de contra-informații;
- i. se regăsesc, potrivit materialelor studiate, în practica serviciilor de informații de pe tot globul, nefiind un atribut exclusiv al DSS sau al FBI;
- permit culegerea unor informații de primă mână percepții, opinii, judecăți proprii – de la o sursă umană, si verificarea, validarea, completarea unor date si informatii ce ar fi inaccesibile altor surse tipuri de surse, furnizând elemente în baza cărora, ulterior, în urma unui proces analitic, va fi produs livrabilul de intelligence (de exemplu: Hăituiala îndelungată (C.N.S.A.S., Hăituiala îndelungată, 1977, p. 17) "Iată-mă, așadar, conducând un local de noapte. Nimeni nu își închipuie ce mină de informații poate fi un cabaret de acest gen. Vedeam perindîndu-se toată lumea de vază din timpul ocupației, inclusiv colaboraționiști. [...] Știam ce regiment sosea sau părăsea Franța și cunosteam dinainte misiunile celebrei escadrile Richtoffen, deoarece echipajul făcea întotdeauna escală la "Monte-Cristo". Cea mai valoroasă informație a fost cea cu privire la atacarea Rusiei de către Germania. Am aflat-o cu opt zile înainte de declansarea ostilităților, din gura unui ofiter superior al statului-major. Era pe la ora 6 dimineata. Tipul avea în fața lui pe masă o sumedenie de sticle goale și pe genunchi o dansatoare. Mi-a spus: "Peste opt zile totul este gata, mergem la ruși".);
- k. pot fundamenta alte măsuri din domeniul activităților de intelligence: cunoașterea vulnerabilităților/pasiunilor unor persoane cu funcții de conducere din structuri/țări inamice care pot facilita recrutarea acestuia; cunoașterea stării de spirit a populației dintr-un

grup/categorie/clasă socială sau zonă geografică poate argumenta luarea unor măsuri ulterioare ofensive/defensive, etc.; ilustrativ pentru acest tip de abordare este citatul următor din Arta informatiilor (C.N.S.A.S., Arta Informatiilor – Allan Dulles, 1967, p. 120) "[...] dacă lucrătorii de informații sovietici din cadrul ambasadei, apartinînd rezidenturii "legale", cu ocazia activităților protocolar-diplomatice ca dineuri, cocteiluri, receptii întîlnesc diferite persoane interesante sau influente, vor trece la închegarea unor relații de "prietenie" cu acestea, vizînd eventual, mai tîrziu, chiar recrutarea lor"; de altfel, eficiența și utilitatea informatiilor obtinute prin aplicarea tehnicilor de colectare a informatiilor prin utilizarea tehnicilor de exploatare în orb/elicitare poate fi ilustrată printr-un exemplu oferit într-o manieră plastică de campaniile de awareness dezvoltate de către Guvernul SUA în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial ce aveau ca scop cresterea nivelului de constientizare – la nivelul publicului larg – a riscurilor pe care le pot crea tendințele de pălăvrăgeală, de diseminare fără discernământ a unor informatii ce pot fi (si erau la momentul respectiv) utilizate de către inamici. Astfel au apărut bannerele prezentate în locuri publice cu mesaje și sloganuri precum Loose lips sink ships (informații furnizate fără discernământ pot fi receptate de către un spion si utilizate de către un inamic pentru a ne scufunda vasele), Defense on the sea begins on the shore (protectia actiunilor de pe mare începe pe uscat) sau Defense in the field begins in the factory.

pot fragmentate. informatiile obtinute fi disparate. incomplete, subjective în comparație cu informații obținute tot prin surse umane dar ca urmare a angajării unui handler și a unei rețele informative; un exemplu elocvent în acest sens este furnizat în Hăituiala îndelungată (C.N.S.A.S, Hăituiala îndelungată, 1977, p. 38): "Rețeaua sa de informatii, Centurie, este un model al genului. Ea dispune de surse la un înalt nivel în toate serviciile publice aflate în contact cu ocupantul. Mii de ochi observă în permanență mișcările inamicului, examinează lucrările sale. Mii de urechi înregistrează frînturi de informații. Vîrsta comandantului, moralul soldatului sosit de pe Frontul de răsărit cu picioarele înghetate, opinia unui tanchist despre colonelul care-l Informații fără însemnătate la prima vedere care-l descurajează pe cel care le culege, simple pîraie în Franța, ele devin însă

fluviu la Londra și permit statelor-majore aliate să întocmească "harta vie" a armatei inamice".:

m. costurile (raportate la resursa financiară și la resursa timp) aplicării unor astfel de tehnici sunt reduse în comparație cu utilizarea altor surse de *intelligence* (de exemplu SIGINT);

### n. se pot realiza:

- i. punctual (de exemplu: Fapte care nu se uită (C.N.S.A.S., Fapte care nu se uită, 1970, pp. 11-13) "Într-o seară am primit la Tsubaki Club vizita unui comandant al unei nave-spital japoneze. Îmbătându-se, acesta îmi destăinui că sosea la Bougainville cu un important contingent de trupe. L-am întrebat dacă avea răniti la bord. El a rîs cu hohote și mi-a răspuns: "Avem câțiva răniți ușor. Toți ceilalti sunt soldați de elită Noi știm că acesti idioți de americani nu vor a încerca niciodată să atace un vas al Crucii Roșii". În aceeași seară am trimis un mesager care-i avertiza pe prietenii mei japonezii utilizau navele-spital că pentru transporturile de trupe.";
- ii. cu continuitate (de exemplu: *Oameni ai informațiilor* (C.N.S.A.S., Oameni ai informațiilor, 1972, p. 29) "Kuhn a deschis un salon de coafură. Soțiile ofițerilor americani, în timp ce se coafau, flecăreau despre plecările și sosirile navelor militare americane, despre schimbările care se făceau la bază, constituind astfel o importantă sursă de informații pentru serviciul secret japonez".
- o. riscurile rezultate ca urmare a aplicării tehnicilor studiate este limitat, cu condiția pretextării și contextualizării demersurilor colocviale inițiate de către operatorul HUMINT; (de exemplu: *Dosarul 51* (C.N.S.A.S., Dosarul 51, 1970, pp. 16-17): "Stenograma înregistrării unei conversații între Marguerite Maria și 8956 la data de 27.10.1967): 8956 Şi..., te ai bine cu stăpânii? M.M. Așa și așa. Nenorocirea este că ei îmi cunosc părinții, fiindcă conița este din satul meu. Cînd vreau să mă plimb prin oraș trebuie să mă întorc seara devreme. Altfel mă toarnă bătrânilor." "[...] 8956 Şi el te bate la cap? M.M. Aș, el este un fel de papa-lapte! Nici Liliane nu este grozav de fericită! 8956 Se consolează poate în altă parte...?! M.M. Treaba ei. [...] M.M. Îl vezi pe ăla cu părul creț din stînga? Vine des la bal în strada

Odessa. O dată m-a invitat la dans și se băga în mine de îmi crăpa obrazul de rușine. L-am lăsat în mijlocul dansului și am plecat. S-a luat după mine. I-am spus că dacă nu mă lasă în pace îi ard una peste bot de nu se vede. 8956 – Ce spui? Așa violentă ești? La stăpânii tăi ai dat de gustul palmelor? [...] Și mai slăbește-mă o dată cu stăpânii mei! Uite, s-a terminat tangoul ăsta și noi tot n-am dansat.";

- p. pot fi utilizate la nivelul simțului comun de către persoane fără o pregătire de specialitate având ca fundament doar calitățile native ale acestora însă rezultatele obținute și diminuarea riscurilor contra-informative sunt optimizate prin pregătire adecvată (de exemplu: *Sistemul informativ al S.U.A.*, (C.N.S.A.S., Sistemul informativ al S.U.A., 1971, p. 40): "Sursele de informații ale unui atașat militar sunt foarte variate. Buletinele și rapoartele tehnice, ziarele revistele, radioul, televiziunea și statisticile publicate în țara adversă prezintă interes pentru un atașat militar. De o deosebită valoare sînt contactele stabilite cu persoane ce dețin posturi de conducere în guvern, armată și organizații economice.");
- q. nu ridică riscuri aferente legalității: avem de-a face cu discuții amiabile, liber consimțite, responsabilitatea abordării unui subiect de discuție putând fi atribuită oricând partenerului de discuție (de exemplu: *Marile bătălii secrete ale celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial* (C.N.S.A.S., Marile bătălii secrete ale celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial, 1977, p. 38) "În baza semnalării unei informatoare care, simulînd că s-a îndrăgostit de un subofițer S.S. de origine din Peenemunde, aflase de la acesta că aici se lucrează la o uimitoare armă secretă";
- r. ambele utilizează mecanisme și strategii de comunicare și de interrelaționare operaționalizate prin intermediul celor 20 de subtehnici de elicitare, ce pot fi reduse la nivelul primelor două axiome a Școlii de la Palo Alto sintetizate de Alina Panait (Panait): "comunicarea este inevitabilă imposibilitatea de a nu comunica" și "orice comunicare se realizează simultan în două planuri: conținutul și relație" (de exemplu: *Între Washington și Tokio* (C.N.S.A.S, Între Washington și Tokio, 1971, p. 12) "Noi, japonezii suntem un popor curios. Manifestăm interes chiar față de detaliile cele mai puțin semnificative pe care le observăm în jurul nostru. Oare, în tren sau în restaurant, nimeni nu v-a pus întrebări care, în esență, ar putea fi calificate ca fiind un amestec în treburile dv. personale? Noi facem acest

lucru fără intenție; este metoda noastră de a ne împrieteni și a face cunoștințe. Ea constituie și explicația modului cum am aflat despre vizitatorul dv.: una dintre gazdele dv. I-a spus măcelarului despre vizita pe care v-a făcut-o Sato. El a comunicat noutatea aflată unuia dintre lucrătorii săi. Lucrătorul a transmis-o guvernantei Doamnei Fuzisava, iar aceasta stăpînei, care, la rîndul său, a retransmis-o soțului. Acesta, fiindu-mi coleg, mi-a relatat-o mie."

2. Context și mod de aplicare a tehnicii: în cazul aplicării tehnicilor exploatare în orb/elicitare înțelegem că de regulă acestea sunt lansate în cadrul unor situații, evenimente, momente sau în condițiile existenței unor stări de fapt care facilitează interrelaționarea între un operator HUMINT și sursa/potențiala sursă umană (de exemplu: evenimente mondene, conferințe, călătorii etc.). Operatorul utilizează cu aceste ocazii un pretext viabil, adecvat și adaptat contextului, care permite purtarea discuțiilor într-o manieră firească.

Materialele analizate evidentiază faptul că aplicarea tehnicilor exploatare în orb/elicitare se poate realiza si cu declinarea calitătii oficiale, dar cu voalarea scopurilor operatorului HUMINT (de exemplu: Război Secret între Tel Aviv și Cairo (C.N.S.A.S., Război secret între Tel Aviv și Cairo, 1972, p. 21) "După războiul de sase zile, Israelul a folosit aceleasi metode de stoarcere a informațiilor ca și în 1956, fără ca prizonierii egipteni, dintre care multi mai fuseseră în aceeasi situatie cu un deceniu în urmă, să își dea seama de cursa ce le era întinsă. Astfel, toți ofițerii superiori prizonieri au fost invitați să viziteze principalele orașe din Israel. Ei au părășit lagărul de la Atlit, de lîngă Haifa, în grupuri de cîte doi-trei, însotiți de un agent israelian și au mers să ia masa în restaurante luxoase sau la "gazde" israeliene, unde au avut loc schimburi de fotografii, discutii politice foarte largi pe marginea problemelor din Orientul Apropiat, mici confidențe. Încă o dată, oamenii Aman-ului nu scăpau nimic din ceea ce se vorbea. În acest fel, au început pregătirile viitorului conflict arabo-israelian."

3. Elemente comune sau de autenticitate ale celor două tehnici: în esență, deși sunt dezvoltate de către două structuri informative diferite și poartă titulaturi diferite, cele două tehnici studiate au același conținut, urmăresc același scop și se realizează în practică în mod identic. Totuși, o diferență notabilă a celor două tehnici se remarcă prin faptul că în abordarea autohtonă (DSS) este

nestructurată, bazată pe calitătile native ale operatorului si pe repere cadru (disimularea scopului discutiei, a identitătii sau calitătii reale a operatorului), în timp ce abordarea scolii americane de intelligence este structurată pe strategii de comunicare. Cu alte cuvinte: în timp ce DSS, referitor la exploatarea în orb, a răspuns doar la întrebările ce și de ce aplicăm această tehnică. FBI a dus acest continut un pas mai departe. explicitând si răspunsul la întrebarea cum anume aplicăm tehnica (eliciting). Esantionul selectionat de noi relevă faptul că nu toate strategiile de comunicare sunt însă utilizate cu aceeași frecvență, unele dintre aceste lipsind în totalitate. Materialele analizate relevă faptul că sunt favorizate abordările prin intermediul cărora operatorul HUMINT pune într-o lumină pozitivă sau care supra-pozitionează persoana care furnizează/poate furniza informații de interes; în acest sens sunt utilizate strategii de comunicare ce presupun existenta unor interese comune, a unui istoric comun, invocarea necunoasterii unui subiect adus în discuție sau flatarea țintei.




Figura 2: Frecvența strategiilor de elicitare utilizate:

O altă diferență, ce rezidă din modul în care sunt practicate cele două tehnici, poate fi sesizată în maniera în care DSS pune accent pe valențele protective ale aplicării *exploatării în orb*, accentuând pe necesitarea utilizării unei identități false (C.N.S.A.S, Index de termeni și abrevieri cu utilizare frecventă în documentele Securității, n.d.), a conspirării identității și scopurilor operatorului, în timp ce FBI face referire doar la necesitatea de "a nu ridica suspiciuni că sunt căutate anumite informații (în cadrul discuției)" (F.B.I., 2019). În mod practic însă, ambele servicii fac trimitere la caracteristicile ce presupun atât protecția operatorului HUMINT cât și a scopurilor vizate de către acesta, ilustrate grafic în figura de mai jos:




Figura 3: Caracteristicile tehnicii exploatare în orb:

**4.** pârghii motivaționale pentru o aplicare eficientă a tehnicilor: factori favorizanti/defavorizanti. În urma analizei materialelor ce au constituit esantionul studiului de fată, am constatat că au fost favorizate mecanisme non-intruzive ce facilitează si optimizează comunicarea interumană prin realizarea unei relatii bazate pe liking/similitudine, ideology/ideologie, reciprocity/reciprocitate, identity/identitate, commitment and consistency / asumare şi consistență acțională, social proof / acceptare socială, în detrimentul celor de factură coercitivă sau intruzivă cum ar fi scarcity/raritatea resursei, coercion/coerciția, authority/argumentul autorității materială. money/dependentă Frecventa utilizării motivaționale în aplicarea tehnicilor exploatare în orb și elicitare este prezentată în Figura 4:




Figura 4: Frecvența utilizării pârghiilor motivaționale în aplicarea tehnicilor exploatare în orb și elicitare este prezentată

Păstrând elementele definitorii prezentate în faza inițială a studiului nostru (în zona de conceptualizare) și completându-le cu rezultatele recente prezentate mai sus, considerăm că putem propune o nouă denumire a tehnicii exploatare în orb, respectiv tehnica elicitării și o nouă definire a acesteia: Metodă de lucru utilizată în activitatea de informații și contrainformații al cărei scop constă în a afla și a valorifica datele/informațiile deținute de către o sursă umană, fără a atrage atenția asupra demersului în sine sau asupra interesului informativ al operatorului. Tehnica presupune inițierea, purtarea de discuții între un operator HUMINT și o persoană ce deține informații de interes. Tehnica, regăsită în practica structurilor/agențiilor/serviciilor care desfășoară activități de intelligence, are un caracter non-invaziv și poate fi lansată în manieră planificată/inopinată, ofensivă/defensivă, punctual/cu continuitate și presupune implicarea unor resurse materiale și/sau financiare scăzute.

Riscurile rezultate ca urmare a aplicării tehnicii elicitării sunt limitate, cu condiția pretextării și contextualizării demersurilor colocviale.

Maniera de punere în practică a fost inventariată de către FBI (F.B.I., 2019), însă, din totalul strategiilor de elicitare sunt favorizate cele prin intermediul cărora operatorul HUMINT pune într-o lumină pozitivă sau supra-poziționează persoana care furnizează/poate furniza informații de interes. Cu titlu de exemplu, menționăm următoarele strategii de interrelaționare: utilizarea istoricului comun, a ascultării active, simularea naivității, complimentarea țintei, afirmațiile false (ce invită la furnizarea unor clarificări) etc.

Mecanismele psihologice, pârghiile motivaționale care facilitează aplicarea tehnicii, sunt plasate în zona reciprocității, similitudinii, acceptării sociale, asumării și consistenței acționale.

#### Concluzii

În studiul de față eforturile de cercetare au vizat modelarea unei metode de culegere a informațiilor prin identificarea caracteristicilor acesteia și a modurilor de acțiune care, în mod repetat, predictibil, empiric și s-au dovedit a fi de succes. Practic demersul în sine vizează, din perspectiva competitivității și securității, obținerea, utilizarea și păstrarea avantajului oferit de deținerea și utilizarea informației.

Mecanismul care facilitează întregul proces de tatonare, explorare și de devoalare a informațiilor și care exploatează nevoia umană compulsivă de apartenență, de acceptare, de feedback și apreciere, de înțelegere și relaționare bazată pe comunicare socială.

Relevanța și actualitatea studiilor de intelligence poate fi apreciată din mai multe perspective. Din perspectiva eficienței aplicării metodelor de culegere a informației, utilizarea cu succes a exploatării în orb / a elicitării a determinat acțiuni care au schimbat fie soarta unor conflicte, fie au inabilitat inițiativele unor inamici sau au facilitat obținerea avantajului economic.

Inițierea și aprofundarea cercetărilor aferente tehnicilor de elicitare utilizate în culegerea de informații din surse umane are valoare specifică, credem noi, și din perspectiva formării noilor generații de operatori HUMINT.

Intenția urmărită de către noi, circumscrisă clarificărilor conceptuale, a fost aceea de a conduce la înțelegerea și utilizarea tehnicilor analizate – exploatarea în orb și elicitarea – într-o manieră

unitară și coerentă. Clarificarea și integrarea conceptelor utilizate în cadrul studiilor de *intelligence* – vor permite utilizarea lor într-o manieră comună, coerentă, consistentă (inclusiv în practica istorică) și va invalida utilizarea lor în contexte inadecvate, fie din ignoranță fie din malițiozitate

Deși sintagma *exploatare în orb* are un caracter de autenticitate și face parte din practica și din taxonomia serviciilor de informații autohtone, în fond, tehnica se suprapune peste sintagma *elicitation techniques* statuate ca tehnici de culegere a informațiilor, tratate cu mijloace științifice și acceptate cu această denumire în cultura intelligence de pe filieră anglo-saxonă.

Prin urmare, considerăm că este necesară reevaluarea sintagmei *exploatare în orb* și, avînd în vedere caracteristicile acesteia, exprimarea ei într-o formulare lexicală profesionistă: *tehnica elicitării*. În această formulare, încadrarea semantică și cognitivă permite atribuirea unei noi denumiri și definiri, demers ce poate fi în măsură a alinia școala românească de intelligence cu practicile și conceptele acceptate și utilizate atât de către alte servicii de informații sau agenții de intelligence, inclusiv cu cele ale statelor membre NATO.

În acest context, precizăm că propunerea noastră are un rol constructiv, de clarificare și de adăugare la bagajul de cunoștințe aferente domeniului *intelligence* a unor noi elemente care, la rândul lor pot genera sau pot fundamenta inițierea unor noi cercetări circumscrise domeniului menționat. În acest sens, cel puțin în ceea ce ne privește, o viitoare direcție de cercetare este reprezentată de cartografierea cadrului de competențe aferente unei clase de profesii (HUMINT) cu intenția de a completa și clarifica aspecte care au fost atinse doar tangențial în cadrul cercetării de față. O altă direcție de cercetare poate viza practici validate științific care pot fi utilizate în obținerea informațiilor prin *tehnica* elicitării: maieutica socratică, influențarea interpersonală, negociere etc.

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#### THE FOURTH GENERATION OF INFORMATION WARFARE

#### **Iulian CHIFU**\*

#### Abstract

Information warfare has developed as a component of hybrid operations and as a type of aggression. The purpose is to project an alternative reality to a designated target population in order to create a perception which could enable it to put pressure on the decision makers and to alter the well assessed, evaluated and planned strategic decision on a very narrow and clear subject or theme. It is done by using a combination of sequences of truth, deprived of their context, lies, innuendo, sophism, and predetermined reflections, secret sources and some pieces of conspiracy theories.

So far, we have identified three generations of information warfare: the first one includes disinformation and propaganda operations, troll wars, lobbying, psychological operations, recruiting and conditioning; the second one uses the so-called sociological groups objectivized in the virtual space; the third generation is that of micro-targeting at the level of the entire groups of the population, Cambridge Analytica type of access. As a result of this, we have reached between 82-95% probability of impact using big data and high number of targets. The fourth generation makes the jump to targeting the differences, meaning personalities, highly educated targets, high value targets, targets which are protected due to their jobs and level of influence, who cannot be reached or influenced at a statistic level of impact.

For these complex components, news methods are involved in obtaining the same result. Offensive and defensive weapons are put in place, tailored attacks are planned, and individual instruments used for each of the high value difficult to reach target. Character assassination, labelling, change or doubling the identity, individual programs that exploit weaknesses and obtain a "genuine response" which meets the goal of projecting the alternative needed reality and "convincing" the unbeliever on a certain needed interpretation, idea or reality, are put in place. Our work presents some of those instruments that do not use criminal approaches like bribery, blackmail or forced decisions of any kind, and instead focus on informational instruments and "the genuine conviction of the subject".

**Keywords:** information warfare, fourth generation, hybrid, impact.

\* Associate professor at the National School for Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest and professor at the National Defence University.

# Three generations of information warfare. The public aspect of the field

The first generation: information warfare. What we know. A component of the hybrid war and a standalone instrument also is the information warfare. Information warfare is the creation of alternative realities by perverting the objective truth – using data, facts, and concrete arguments. At the same time it is about the misinterpretation by using a combination of elements, facts and fragments of the selected truth, interpreted, combined with reasoning altered by the use of syllogisms, sophisms, propaganda, forced interpretations, everything mixed with a multitude of lies (Chifu and Nantoi, 2016)

The battle of alternative narratives, of "alternative truths" has become the most insidious way of constructing beliefs. It is based on the groups and targeted audience for each operation, on a vast fabric of knowledge of the training, the inclinations and expectations of the target audience, its propensities, and frustrations. Obviously, the instruments do not only concern information as such but also refer to other more subtle components of fundamental emotions (Moisi, 2009), context and seizing opportunities offered by ongoing events and the mood created inside a particular target population in order to inoculate a certain type of opinion on the subject.

Alternative reality perverts the perception of a target population using a combination of psychological operations – *psyops* (Air Force Doctrine Document, 27 August 1999), along with misinformation and propaganda (Wierzbicki, 1996; Ficeac, 2014; Volkoff, 2009), using fundamental beliefs, sentiments and impact images, aiming to lead the audience towards a pre-defined perception. And finally, as the audience already has an opinion, its perception has replaced reality (Stern, 1999) and, no matter what argument or proof of truth they have been presented, it will clash with the perception.

In a world where information travels quickly and reaches many people in real time, through television, the Internet and the social media, the perception of a certain event is easy to form, derail, alter, and enforce. Subsequent presentation of the truth will lead to a minimal change of opinion on a large scale, due to the lack of critical thinking in most of the population. The conservative approach to assuming

recognition of one's own mistake in the large population, and the ease of use of the explanation already internalized by an ordinary person, especially in a community that has developed a conformism and has its own description, perception and its own "truth".

The general, main purpose of the information war is to determine, control or even alter the **strategic decisions** in foreign policy, security and defence, to corrupt or hinder the instruments destined for the military component of a state, and impede, if not block, the functioning of the elements of state security.

The instrument and mechanism to achieve this goal is to determine the audience, citizens, pressure groups prepared and organized, and guided, to pressure the authority to move it away from the objectively identified solution for the decision at a given moment on the basis of lack of support, or worse, the opposition of the population (Chifu and Nantoi, 2016).

The main features, principles and values of the open, democratic society are used against the states and its institutions. In other words, by building up groups of enemies inside the fortress, the society is undermined from within. Moreover, the approach is unitary, integrated, and often a fact or component of the information warfare. Taken separately, only appears as a strange, singularity, chance, not a planned aggressive act alongside a set of other elements. The insidious mode of action and this integrated approach create the advantageous elements of plausible deniability of such an act of informational aggression on a target population (Chifu, 2015).

The information warfare uses the three distinct levels of action, with different relevance and different degree of legal and moral significance. Together, the integrated and tacit approach to the target audience increases the effectiveness of information warfare (Simons and Chifu, 2017).

The first component is visible, evident, it involves altering the public space of an intended target through the Internet, media and social media but also at other subtle levels, an injection of ideas and information that uses the fundamental principles and values of democracy and human rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of speech, free movement of ideas, elements that are not only legal and

moral, but are also among the fundamental values that democratic societies defend. Underneath we are dealing with an open injection of propaganda, manipulation and misinformation that is hard to prove. Moreover, this type of action requires constant responses, investigations and public debunking of false voices and false interpretations of facts, alternative narratives behind these ideas, and using the way of interpreting facts to support the truth package alternatively proposed by the author.

Actions often exploit **vulnerabilities of the system** (Chifu, 2016), habits in breaching or circumventing penalties under the law or vulnerabilities of control institutions, legal limits or the absence of professional institutions able to sanction moral use of these excesses in promoting an approach or on a subject or proposed version of events, without proper context, lack of expertise to clarify the information released, the speed and poor training of employees in the field of media and broadcasting. False information, coming from obscure sources entering the mainstream, verified information and interpretation, to a predetermined conclusion (Chifu and Nantoi, 2016), the absence of alternative independent media, which strictly observes the rules of narrative events, of proper reporting to provide at the same time alternative approaches, polemic or the pros and cons; all these help to build this element of information warfare.

In developed, mature societies, with well-established rich media and with many alternatives, the component of **seizing**, **guiding**, **or controlling the public space** is significantly reduced. Education also matters and the democratic culture of the people, of course. But there are societies where public space is controlled by third-party actors, such as the case of the Republic of Moldova, where a news-impact report shows that 80% of the audience consumes news produced by Moscow (Chifu and Nantoi, 2016; CCA Report, 2016). And when they are packed up in highly productive and attractive entertainment programs, these genuine "injections" of news stories in the space of a preconceived narrative make the impact of the proposed alternative truths major.

Propaganda has its limits. It is therefore necessary to use an integrated set of tools developed and used together, to reach the target

audiences, and a distinct approach. Here we arrive at the second element, *the lobby, Public Relations* - if it is a company or a personality, or public diplomacy, when we talk about a state. It is a perfectly legal approach in states where there is a law of lobby or an equivalent.

The tool works like this: it must influence decision-makers using ideas spread within the public space by legitimate and credible message bearers with an impact on their own population and decision-makers who lead a state at a certain time. Money is paid to credible people, analysts, and experts, current and former politicians known by the target population, or foreigners, but then again credible and legitimate in the eyes of the target population, in exchange for their support of the thesis proposed by the payer.

The media institution, expert or analysts are paid to create a certain image, to defend a certain actor, to carry a message, a vision, a previously prepared narrative. So a credible, otherwise rational, impactful character suddenly presents itself in the public space, conveying ideas that are not the result of his analysis, of his thinking, but the result is delivered for the purpose of being disseminated, for some money, by a limited partner.

The public is not warned and does not know that the person in front of it does not speak in its own name, but that he expresses ideas coming from somebody else. Therefore, the assessment is made in the context of the credibility and legitimacy of the person in question (in fact, this is what the lobbyist sells). (Lobbying Reform, 2006-03-23; Simons and Chifu, 2017) Moreover, after completing the mission, the person returns to his legitimate, correct analysis, which is the result of his own thinking knowledge and ideas. The person re-establishes or preserves his credibility further and can later be used on another project of the information warfare, or on another subject.

While the US has a lobby law, requiring the public exposure of the paid positions, and a transparency formula for the amounts of money received to convey certain themes, this tool is missing in Europe. It is a legal instrument, somewhat immoral, but used in combination with propaganda and taking control or altering the media in the information warfare.

The third level is also the most insidious, profoundly illegal, targeting more subtle components of the information warfare. It is tied to psyops – elaborated psychological operations. The level of access to this component is much deeper, in the body of the society, in common beliefs, in the psychological state, and in deep fears. Here matters not only the widespread information, but above all, the effect created by information on the target audience, namely the birth or accentuation of fears, the creation of collective emotions (Moisi, 2009), preparing the public to react to future events in a previously guided, prepared, preformulated way.

The objectives are achieved by using fake news, personalities and experts with moral references known in society, directed to certain positions, but the target is not immediate information but the creation of the context for a certain emotional public reaction triggered by a subsequent event. Controlling the subsequent reaction is done by accessing subtle levels of the subconscious and creating patterns of thinking by repeating sequences of this type at predetermined intervals, teaching the brain and the consciousness to react in a certain way to predetermined informational and emotional stimuli (Chifu and Nantoi, 2016). And the purpose is to determine a certain public response, collectively, when it is needed to press and alter the action of a decision-maker in moments of crisis.

The tools used are a combination of narratives, alternative ideas, planting doubts, the promotion and the most credible validation of subconscious lies as perceptions of truth, exaggerated and guided interpretations, exaggerations, manipulation, misinformation, with all the components, trolls (paid commentators in the virtual space). It is here where the components of conditioning the target audience reside, actions at the subliminal level of the subconscious, the inoculation of the built perception, the access to the fundamental emotions and their orientation – fear, humility, hope (Moisi, 2009).

The functioning of the information warfare is integrated, in all three dimensions, with thought-based steps and vast instruments built over time. Major resources are used for such actions and the component is most often moved to the military space. It is a tool whose

relevance is barely discovered, and the impact can be extremely powerful.

The clearest examples in the case of Romania were two impactful pieces of fake news:

- i) Romanian traffickers of Ukrainian weapons sold to terrorists attacking the West on Skynews (Chifu, 14 August 2016). Here the reaction was immediate, DIICOT intervened, and the misinformation broadcast to 1.2 million viewers was stopped abruptly, proving the falsification of a news story through the usage of "actors" playing in the gun trafficking scenario through the mountains of Romania, with the author standing up in front of the alleged smugglers;
- ii) American Nuclear Weapons in Turkey moved to Romania on Euractiv (Andreescu, 18 August 2016), an absolutely false story that destroyed the credibility of the European Union website (*one time show*) but also demonstrated the vulnerability of the Romanian press that worked on the principle of "why ruin good news by telling the truth", instead go for the sensational and visibility. The best article published the next day, as the Romanian MFA vehemently denied the fact, was: "US nuclear weapons are moving to Romania. Romanian MFA denies". (Andreescu, 18 August 2016)

The second Generation: Objectification of the social construct in the virtual space. Good news and bad news. To address the second generation of information warfare, we need a warning first. It is not always that an instrument in the usable space (or used) by the information war is wrong, illegal or bad. But we must also note this evolution and an instrument that comes from the organic development of society, in the face of scientific evolution, and the result of which can be an instrument that can be used against a state.

Besides, the discussion is old, from the emergence of social networks, to the unlimited and free access to information, as well as to the emergence of social networks in which each person can be a journalist who has been widely quoted by mainstream media, and crisis management complicated for decision-makers, communication in crisis has acquired new valences (as I pointed out in the previous numbers

from Infosfera), but also the instrument of participation, persuasion and convocation in the protest actions has expanded.

From the Twitter Revolution in the Republic of Moldova (April 9, 2009) (Barry, 7 April 2009) which I have already encountered in the US during my visit to this country in 2010 in the IVLP Conflict Resolution program (someone taught us for two hours about these developments, and the impact of the Twitter revolution) followed the Arab Spring with the use of instruments mainly in Egypt, then on a large scale, and then encountered the perspective of "preparing colourful revolutions" including through this new technique provided by social media in strategies and doctrines Security and Defence of the Russian Federation (*The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, 25 December 2014 and the *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*) (Chifu and Ţuţuianu, 2016).

It is certain that the evolution of the domain went to "Leaderless Revolutions" where the *Occupy Wall Street* case was an example and a catalyst (Chifu and Ivan, 2013). Finally, the phenomenon has developed in Romania and I have theorized and analysed what we call the phenomenon of "objectivity of the social construct in the virtual space" (Chifu and Ivan, 2013). It is the phenomenon of coagulation of groups in the virtual space, from real people and unknown avatars, who beyond a certain point acquire self-consciousness independent of the members and the components of the group.

This composite collective consciousness begins to reject individual gestures or opinions, refuses to assume the responsibility or leadership of any member of the group, including the founders, and makes difficult to communicate with the group. There would be nothing out of the ordinary if such groups did not trigger actions in the real-world that fundamentally disturbed the decision-makers. It is the case in Romania of the phenomenon "Uniți Salvăm Roșia Montană" (www.youtube.com and www.totb.ro), and the failure of the Parliament/ Government negotiations with representatives of the group that did not want to speak in the name of the group, not even one. In addition, those who claimed to be representatives were rejected by the group or their agenda in bargaining was rejected by the collective

conscience. As a result, Gold Corporation's investment (about \$ 1 billion) has been halted with little regard to consequences.

It is also the case of Collective, the street demonstrations following the accident from a nightclub that killed more than 60 people, on the grounds that the authorities did not correctly manage the antifire clearance of the location through the city halls sector, which led to the fall of a government (under special conditions, it is true) (stirileproty.ro; Sandru, 4 November 2015). In the third case, the so-called "OUG 13", in January 2017, a newly-elected government, with an impressive majority, retracted its actions after less than a week of protests because it wanted, through a surprise emergency ordinance given at night, to absolve criminal charges brought against the leaders of the winning coalition (Digi24, #Ro-mânia, ziua a șasea; Zachmann, 5 February 2017; Diacu, February 2017).

The action generated massive protest movements which started in the virtual space, with 600,000 people in the street, which triggered the withdrawal of the emergency ordinance after four days, its final definitive cancellation in Parliament, a 10% drop in polls of the majority (although the opposition was not directly involved, licking its wounds after the elections) and the loss of moratorium and natural growth after a victory. And the government fell less than five months later, after a rather unique no-confidence vote where the majority voted against its own prime minister, after the withdrawal of political support, in special circumstances.

In all three examples, taking place in a context, participating in the public debate only when certain red lines were crossed has contributed to the development of a vibrant and solid civil society. Their coagulation in virtual space was achieved through social networks, and the movement quickly acquired a purpose and self-awareness (Hardt and Negri, 2005), becoming a revolution without leaders. We excluded the case of the second round of the 2014 presidential election, because here we were in an electoral process, there was a beneficiary, the future President of Romania, Klaus Johannis, and there was a party / electoral apparatus that managed the process, even though the essence the movement was similar.

The specificity of the aforementioned examples resides in the existence of an important part both within and outside society (diaspora) which does not usually participate in the component of the electoral debates because it is not interested – we are talking about young people, with high education and employability, with sufficient resources, not dependent on the Government, who have no one to choose from because of strict criteria and high aspiration (except Johannis's election which was more a vote against Victor Ponta). Such massive grouping is driven by the emergence of anti-moral illegality / access or massive anti-logical turnarounds that go beyond the red lines that lead to massive participation, the activation of groups and individuals, and the mobilization effect in the revolution without leaders (Hale and Slaughter, 2005).

Objection of the social construct in the abstract has, as a tool, negative effects because if it is general or directed from the origins on relevant topics of national interest, such a movement can cause major effects in reality without classical political approaches, dialogue, negotiation, used as tools to respond to or clarify the protesters' demands. The group objected to by collective consciousness in virtual space only stops when its claims are fully satisfied, and participation is no longer generated by expectations and excitement. But it can come back, even if it has quieted for a while, and it's going to reach the next phase. There are, of course, formulas to manage this case through the "isolation and forgetting" of the group, in a reactive form over time, and by inserting and controlling these types of groups with potential for objectivity over time in the preventive phase of their construction (Chifu and Ivan, 2013).

The third generation: Cambridge Analytica, like-ography and contemporary developments of individual targeting of electoral subjects. Brexit and President Donald Trump. The problem of the reaction to the information war is the fine line between legitimate, legal things and immoral, illegal ones and the related instruments. We have even seen it from the definition of the concept, where the first dimension, disinformation, propaganda and active measures has a legal, legitimate composition that most often employs

the freedom of speech or the right of association and the free circulation of ideas, principles and values which we fully defend (but which are speculated in this confrontation of societies precisely because some consider these principles and values to be the vulnerabilities of the democratic system that are worth speculating and used as opportunities to undermine this system).

Then the lobby is legal but immoral, because an opinion-maker is always supposed to be the bearer of his independent ideas and opinions, not of pre-paid messages for his audience and credibility. Finally, the third component, psychological operations, troll warfare, profound emotional approaches and catalysis of emotions – which are deeply illegal, and part of the arsenal directly related to active military and psychological operations (Chifu, 2016).

Another issue is that part of the information warfare instrumentation is used by parties in electoral campaigns. Moreover, this third generation of the information warfare, which initially uses a targeted and individually based marketing tool based on preferences, has been developed and used in campaigns for Brexit and the election of President Trump. An instrumentation owned by Cambridge Analytica, whose work, on this area, was banned in the UK.

The OCEAN psychometric model is the basis for the classification of personalities and behaviours and has been introduced to differentiate each individual. A model that seeks to evaluate people based on five personality traits, known as "Big Five". These are Openness (how open are you to new experiences?), Conscientiousness (how much of a perfectionist are you?), Extravert (how sociable are you?), Acceptability (how preventive and cooperative are you?) and Nevrotism (are you easily irritable?). Based on these five features – also known as OCEAN, after the initials of the term's openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeability, neuroticism – we can make a relatively accurate assessment of the person who is in front of us. This includes his needs and fears, and how he will likely react (The Guardian, 2015, Das Magazin, 2016 apud Pădure, EVZ.ro).

Cambridge University has developed the second part of the research project that underpins the identification of every person's tastes and options and how to get to it. From Michael Kosinski's

Psychometrics (Cambridge University, 2014) - with the relevance in individual and customized sales and marketing, led to like-orthography, identification of personality, personality and character – Big Five – OCEAN based on Facebook likes. Electronic preference information at this level has led to the identification of personality and, therefore, of the approach to selling something, depending on the appetite. It was a pure matter of approach, technique using psychology.

Kosinski and his team have continuously improved their model. In 2012, they showed that based on an average of 68 user-like styles, it was possible to guess their skin colour (95% accuracy), sexual orientation (88% accuracy), or sympathy for the Democratic or Republican Party (85%). They did not stop here. The coefficient of intelligence, religious beliefs, as well as the consumption of alcohol, tobacco or drugs etc. could also be determined. From the data it was possible to deduce even if someone's parents were divorced.

The effectiveness of their simulation was illustrated by how well they could predict the answers of a subject. Kosinski continued to work on perfecting simulations: in a short time, he was able to evaluate a person better than his colleagues, based on ten Facebook likes. Seventy likes were enough to go beyond what a friend know about him/her, 150 – what the parents know, and 300 – what his/her partner knows about a person. Several likes could surpass even what a person believed to know about herself (The Guardian, 2015, Das Magazin, 2016 apud Pădure, EVZ.ro).

Alexandr Kogan, from Cambridge, moved the whole business into the space of political communication. The level that was reached was to map all voting-age US citizens, establish the OCEAN, and create an application to address them based on voting options and influencing short-term behaviour. This is how it worked during Brexit. Methodology works on dichotomous choices, divides the spectrum of choices between determined, undecided but inclining towards the same decision and the other two opposite categories, with the aim of influencing the behaviour of those favourable to the desired option and the spreading doubt or keeping undecided ones from voting, but choosing instead the opposite option, avoiding wasting of resources for those already decided for the opposite option.

The result is a major influence formula, short and medium term, – 10 – 14 days – but with a very high impact and increased likelihood. It was used in two cases for the US campaign, the Cambridge Analytica director being Steve Bannon, until recently President Trump's strategy adviser. But the instrumental, with a major psychological effect, has other levels of alteration and alteration of will and options, being able to identify not only OCEAN and its psychological, character, but also behaviour at a given time. The likes have been abandoned since the invention of smart phones and the method identifies these features with a high probability (85-90-95%) only from having of the mobile phone and the actions performed on it.

In order to understand the sophistication level of this tool, if you go to a commercial negotiation, the user of such a tool determines how you will approach the negotiations based only on the actions taken on the phone from the morning until you have arrived at the business meeting. One can only guess what happens when we extend the use of such technology from business decisions and choices to electoral and much more. It is true that the instrument has its limitations and errors, but it has proven to be extremely effective as an element of influence in the short term.

This is where the Third Generation third-person information warfare toolkit has been developed, with a large adult population. These tools need to undergo an important study to block the harmful effects and unwanted influences, access to such subtle data and interpretations of this nature. Until the full disclosure of the effects of these instruments, the necessary regulations, the Information Warfare, without being a panacea, creates effects of the most important, major impact. The entry of these elements into the commercial, business space, where they can be virtually purchased by anyone, creates fear and negative reactions similar to any extremely powerful and major impact techniques that can be widely applied to the population, with easy-to-use distortive scenarios.

# **Character Assassination** – An offensive weapon of the information warfare

Information warfare comes with multiple instruments, tools and techniques complementary to the general attitudes and mechanisms specific to the field of alternative narratives, to take advantage of the perception of people, on one side, and to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of a targeted society, on the other (Chifu and Nantoi, 2016). And that comes from the fact that conflicts and wars moved from the situation of the confrontation of two armies, to the confrontation of two states/two actors and even to a confrontation of two whole societies (Simons and Chifu, 2017). Discussing about offensive and defensive weapons in information warfare, things evolved in the direction where the draft of plans for each operation begins with identifying the vulnerabilities of the society that represents the target in such an information warfare. In the democratic societies, the democratic principles and values, human rights and the rule of law, including **freedom of speech**, free flow of ideas, debates in the public space, mediating between opposite narratives and even free gathering for expressing protest, are instrumentalised as vulnerabilities of a society (Chifu and Tutuianu, 2016) and are subject to planning for using instruments and weapons in an informational operation, for some actors (Chifu and Nantoi, 2016).

One of the most important information warfare weapons is character assassination. It is the most effective because it targets the personality situated in the critical point of a network in the decision-making system of a country. Character assassination is both old and new, appeared together with the humanity and language, via gossips and the first lies, and has evolved until it was first theorised in 1950 (Davis, 1950), during the Cold War. It is used not only in information wars but also in political campaigns, the source of a multitude of such instruments. At the same time, social media has relaunched the impact and capacity of action of such a weapon that harms at a high rate than before, reaching a very well-chosen public.

So, character assassination is targeting the personality in a decision-making system. The attack using character assassination relates both to the individual at stake and to the public targeted by the

attack, and this duality makes the weapon difficult to build and calibrate, extremely nuanced and sophisticated and with high level of effectiveness when being used (Simons and Chifu, 2017). Moreover, prevention and defence against such a weapon are even more complicated to identify, build and deploy. The current analysis is aimed at identifying what is and what is not character assassination and to establish the characteristics and typologies of such a weapon used in information warfare.

The offensive weapons in information warfare depend equally on the target and audience. Information warfare is the creation of alternative realities by perverting the objective truth – made on the basis of facts, facts, and concrete arguments – its misinterpretation by using a combination of elements, facts and songs of truth selected, interpreted, combined with reasoning altered by the use of syllogisms, sophisms, propaganda, forced interpretations, all embedded with a multitude of lies.

The general, main purpose of the information war is to determine, to control or even to alter strategic decision, foreign policy, security and defence, perversion or hindrance to instruments destined to the military component of a state and to impede to the functioning, even blocking elements related to the security of a state. The instrument and mechanism to achieve this goal is used to determine the public, the citizens, the prepared and organized pressure groups, organized and guided pressure groups to pressure the authority to remove it from the objectively identified solution for the decision at a given moment, based on the lack of support, and even opposition of the population.

The battle of alternative narratives, of "alternative truths" has become the most insidious way of constructing beliefs. But it is based on the groups and publications targeted for each operation, on a vast fabric of knowledge of the training, the inclinations and expectations of the target audience, the propensities, the frustrations of the target audience. Obviously, the tools do not only concern information as such, but also refer to other more subtle components, which are related to fundamental emotions, context and the value of the opportunities

offered by ongoing events and the mood created at the level of a target population, inoculate a certain type of reporting on the subject.

Alternative reality perverts the perception of a target population in a combination of psychological operations – PSYOPS, along with misinformation and propaganda, using fundamental beliefs, feelings and impact images to bring the target audience into a pre-defined perception. And finally, as the audience already has an opinion, its perception has replaced reality (Stern, 1999) and, no matter what argument or proof of truth they have been presented, they would face this barrier of already formed perception.

One of the most important weapons in the early information war is character attack (the attack on character, reputation), respectively, character assassination (destruction of reputation). As we have seen above, the attack must not necessarily rely on real data (Samoilenko, 2016) and is dependent, at the same time, the target person (may be a group of people or an institution, even a country) (Icks and Shiraev, 2014) and also by an audience targeted to change their mind about the person. The goal is to remove the opponent from the public spectrum, eliminate it from the competition or at least make a fundamental mark with an engram, or with a psychological vulnerability to make him/her react to a particular topic in a way that will alter its decision-making capacity, its ability to compete or fight even if it resists an attack on its prestige and reputation.

What are character attack / character assassination? The character's characterization is based on the impact power of the perceptions created by words and images (Icks and Shiraev, 2014) in injuring, devastating, or even destroying status, character, reputation, prestige someone. In the first two levels with a different degree of impact, we are talking about the character attack, while complete destruction or elimination of someone from the competition space means character assassination. The non-elimination from combat of a combatant, for reasons of stubbornness or terribleness, does not mean that a character-type action has failed. As long as the target audience reacts and shapes its opinion, the opinion, based on the results of the attack, withdrawing its support for the target person, means that the

attack is successful, i.e. the competitive ability is completely ruined, even if the person remains in the competition of office. The only difference is the possibility of the victim to rehabilitate it.

There are cases (reduced in number and impact) of personalities who have survived a successful action of *character assassination* and who, while remaining in office in the context of a major impact that occurred when they came out of any competition, have managed to capitalize such an opportunity for visibility and to perform so much that the former action of *character assassination* no longer counts, the effects being wiped off with the sponge, and its individual qualities and opportunity exploited with force and common sense, without bragging or focusing solely on the image, but obviously appreciated professionally, to reverse the trend generated by the original attempt at *character assassination*.

The classical case is that of the former mayor of New York on 11 September 2001, Rudolph Giuliani, who was associated with the Mafia, involved in corruption cases investigated by the tax authorities, while going through a divorce on top of which managed to handle the tragic events of September 11 with great professional accuracy, to make the right decisions of the city's societal rebuilding in the face of the terrorist attack, through mass crowd gathering in Times Square to mourn the dead and rebuild hope - a political gesture with a massive risk if a new attack occurred - that this gesture turned him into the Mayor of America, gave him a solid political base, he ran for the US Presidency. and today he is in the Trump team. But the conditions for such a jump are exceptional, and even some would say that Giuliani was not the subject of an informational operation of character assassination, but only a subject of his own acts and deeds before September 11. For such a characteristic of characterization, the intention, the planning, the existence of the attacker (not only somebody who takes advantage of the operation) is necessary (Sigelman and Kugler, 2003).

We can, therefore, say what character assassination is NOT: the natural, mass media reaction, the media, the facts, the results of investigations, the actions of state institutions that prove actions and deeds in the courts of a public or political character. It is not *character assassination* or *character attack* the authentic action related to current

developments, real facts, even if these accounts are accompanied by subjective interpretations, forced, or political options and opinions are involved in the legitimate press reports.

Character assassination is about intention, planning, pursuit of this plan, and its application with various, not always real, elements of false and fake news, with insinuations, with rumours and anonymous artificial constructions, all meant to be in the conjunctive to target the ordered, from the spectrum of the above. And above all, it refers not to arguments, facts, and to the combating of the ideas displayed by the target person, but to the attack on the person who issues the ideas, to the elements that define it and validates its ideas, which are not even discussed in such a process.

A concept that unites multiple fields: The character, in the sense that it is used in character assassination, refers to the moral aspects of the experience and behaviour of an individual (Danzinger, 1997). If temperament has a psychological relevance and is rather native, it is biased, biology, personality is the sum of the stable characteristics, reactions and behaviour of an individual and the character has to do specifically in this definition and understanding of character assassination, ethical and moral aspects, those that give substance to the credibility and legitimacy of a personality.

As far as moral issues are concerned, their impact is obvious to the public and to the actual standards or the ability to absorb such news. For example, in France, the news about Francois Hollande's "parallel families" did not affect his election, while the same information in the US would have led him definitively to exclusion from the political life. It is here generally accepted appearances and rules, the expectations of the public, not even the habits of the community, its standards – with the hint of hypocrisy and snobbery that they can contain (we are told "to do what the pope says, not what the pop does"). It is about respecting appearances, doing "what is appropriate", avoiding gestures and actions that "shouldn't be done" because "it's shame", "your neighbours know you", "the good world knows us and we will be in an embarrassing situation". And for a leader, for an aspirant to public confidence, the standards required and society's exigencies are

higher than those of ordinary people who may be wrong, but they do not want to lead the people and have no claims to be loved, believed, and followed.

Public figures occupying important positions of authority, representation and visibility – emperors, kings, presidents, generals, bishops, opinion leaders, teachers, moralists themselves – must "adhere with utmost ostentatiousness and obstinacy to general morality and standard behavioural norms and to the expectations of the public" (Shiraev, 2010) about the personality of the person in a particular position. An actor or a creative person has greater freedoms than a metropolitan, a judge, or a member of a party ethics committee. They must maintain their good reputation for a long time, in any case as long as they are in office. That is the only way they maintain the support of the relevant public for the function and, especially, of relevance to themselves.

So, character assassination does not just refer to the target person, it does not just refer to a type of audience, but to more. First of all, those who ensure that the person in question, the public or the decision-makers depend on maintaining and effectively exercising the function, but perhaps more important here, on the offensive weapon in the information war represented by character assassination, the public who counts for the person concerned, the reference public, whose loss causes loss of self-esteem, support in the professional caste and the elite to which it belongs.

So, the concept itself is in many fields of study, from psychology, psycho-sociology, and political science, political and public communication. From each of these areas, relevant elements are detached to know the springs of offensive weapon construction in the information war called character assassination. In addition, from each one come elements of nuances, dosage, subtleties and sophistication needed to plan an attack to avoid victimization of the target or to avoid indolence or indulgence of the public, or even support for the target personality of the attack, once the attack is ostentatious and creates major side effects. Here are the sources of mistakes in the use of character assassination as a weapon in the information warfare, but

also the elements that give survival formulas to such an operation and the lessons learned to counteract such a destructive attack.

From our point of view, we can consider a successful operation of *character assassination* when the facts and the attack are not public, but the prospect of the attack is used to constrain the target to act in a certain manner. Conditioning or blackmail, or the exposure of important elements, may result in the folding of the targeted person into the expectations and directions suggested / imposed by the attacking group. In addition, the target's resignation achieves the same result, and has the same relevance, that is, the character assassination attack has reached its target even if it is not visible to public space. This perspective also requires careful research and evaluation of these events in a person's professional life in his or her past that creates vulnerabilities and makes it unacceptable later in another public function.

The concept of *character* assassination: Character assassination is the deliberate destruction of the reputation of an individual, institution, group or country (Samoilenko, 2016; Icks and Shiraev, 2014; Shiraev, 2010). Targets of actions that fit the typology of character assassinations are political leaders, officials, celebrities, scientists, public figures, athletes. In operations, they are targeted at actions that relate to individual elements such as personal life, behaviour, values, identity, self-confidence and others, close, their beliefs and aspirations are shaken by such attacks. The tools used are: bibliographic details are altered, interpreted or manufactured; intimate elements and personal moments are made public; their professional and personal achievements, family context, ethnicity, sexual behaviour; their good will is being questioned as well as their good faith and good intentions behind action, using exaggerations, gambling and irony, allegations, insinuations and lies. The purpose is to affect (in the case of attacks) and to destroy (in the character assassination) the moral position of the person (group, institution, state) in the eyes of the public and generate a negative emotional response of the public to the target of such an attack.

A nuance deserves to be highlighted here between the process of *character assassination* against a group, movements, ethnicities, institutions, countries and the process of creating the image of the enemy (Keen, 1988; Bruckner, 1996), element used in the conflict polarization phase. The instrument could be sensibly identical, but the intention, purpose and planning are different. In the first case we are in the classical case of destroying reputation, in the second we want to polarize society, coagulate public support for an emerging conflict, use the image of the existing enemy to blur the internal failures and divert attention from other subjects and stringent themes to target the attacker.

Defamation associated with the attack on the person aims at undermining the credibility of the opponent, based on a rhetorical strategy (Walton, *n.a;* Walton, 1985) and targets its own public and its mobilization for the coming conflict, as in the case of *character assassination*. On the contrary, in the second case, there may be an interest in maintaining the image of a fierce, fierce enemy that threatens me, in order to be able to mobilize, which is not in the category as destroying the reputation in the first case, when the objective is different, the complete deterioration of the target's image.

Character assassination, in terms of essence and content, was introduced into political communication in the United States in the mid-20s¹. The concept as such was introduced in the book with the same title by sociologist Jerome Davis (1950). Based on deconstructed fundamental emotions (Moisi, 2009) such as fear, ignorance, envy / jealousy used to propagate rumours and lies about a targeted person.

The major point of rupture and jump in the 1960s was the emergence of television, moreover, the use of television in political debates and electoral competitions, with all the helplessness of public communication tools, attacks and defence formulas in electoral strategies and the preparation of public debates of candidates which included negative propaganda and attack of the person, then even attacks on the character (morals) of the candidates. Sociology and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Although the notion of Character Assassination appeared in the US, there are equivalents on the European continent, Rufmord in Germany and Karaktermoord in the Netherlands. There are studies in Russia about attacks on the reputation of a person.

psychology have brought new elements about persuasion mechanisms in politics, using emotions and perceptions (Graber, 2009). Negative campaigns have prompted the creation of many instruments and tactics (Flower, 2007) used in *character assassination*.

**Character assassination** – a weapon of contemporary information warfare: As in the case of hybrid war or information warfare, a whole conceptual dispute between military and security theorists and strategic studies or international relations creates differences by looking at things using the new and old instruments. Some believe that all are old types of tools that have been encountered since antiquity, used in military action or have known military purposes. On the other hand, there are voices saying that that these are all conflicts, tools and methods of the 21st century (Simons and Chifu, 2017).

The mere fact that any potential attacker has access, as a result of the emergence of the Internet and social media, to anyone who is online or has a social media portal is a qualitative difference that exceeds the jump from the radio and cinema to television in the 1960s. Indeed, the jump to the Internet and massive connection has allowed social media to emerge, and with this tool, communication borders no longer exist, globalization is achieved, and anyone who intends to target the public space and connected citizens of a state or any other group aim. We have seen how sophisticated the information wars (Chifu and Nantoi, 2016) are and how fast the successive generations of informational warfare develop (Chifu, 2017).

And in the case of *character assassination* operations, this reality of the 21st century information warfare allows the use of social media tools with the measure. Thus, in closed societies, the rumour, insinuation, banquet and gossip played a major role in *character assassination* formulas (Wierzbicki, 1996; Volkov, 2009; Ficeac, 1996) (as well as a way to reduce tension within the society), in the contemporary era, the existence of social media gives major freedoms to anonymous sources to launch and multiply, through third parties, *character assassination* attacks. During the communist era, someone who was gossiping rarely knew or heard about gossip until it had not directly affected his family, reputation, position. Today, using

established social media formulas, closed groups, but also through anonymity formulas determined by avatars and false accounts, all categories of attacks in the *character assassination* sphere can be promoted and distributed without the knowledge of the target, but with greater impact, and especially from a distance.

Moreover, the psychological operations of the information warfare can determine the maximum effectiveness in character assassination attacks, once the aim is to destroy the target person by threatening the campaign or using similar tools. Removing the competitor without the attack being public is a successful assassination operation with impact, even if the general public only sees the result of this operation, not the content of the attack (credible threat of attack).

The International Society for the Study of character assassination (ISSCA – https://characterattack.wordpress.com): In July 2011, researchers and teachers from nine countries – a group of historians, social science specialists, and psychosocial and political psychology experts – gathered at the University of Heidelberg to discuss the art of defamation in the past and today. The result was the creation of the International Society for the Study of Character Assassination. The fundamental elements and lessons learned in this area are: the interdisciplinary character – the difficulty of detecting and counteracting character assassination operations; varied instruments and the ability to reach different audiences and audiences on the basis of their own aspirations, values, and options – freely disclosed by them on social networks.

Moreover, the third generation of information war (Chifu, 2017) allows for individual targeting on a large scale – all voters in Britain, Brexit, or all voters in the United States, for example – with messages of interest to them and which directly affects them, for which they have empathy, elements that allow the *character assassination* operation to exponentially multiply its target impact, after individual calibration on a targeted audience.

However, it should not be forgotten that public referencing for *character assassination* operations target the groups and decision makers who determine the perspective of choosing and maintaining the

target public person and especially the public that counts for the target person, his personal and individual, professional and emotional references. Targeting this component may have a greater impact than targeting the general public.

However, the degree of sophistication must be high and the attack must be properly calibrated, because we are talking about referential individuals for the target personality and a reference public who knows the person, has lasting emotional ties and has perceptions, beliefs and convictions regarding the person – well rooted and difficult to shake. Seeding some incipient doubts or mistrust is a sufficiently ambitious objective, because any exaggeration can have, in this type of attack, the disastrous side effects for the attacker, can create for the target personality a trampoline of visibility and a supportive emotion through victimization which can decide the fate of personality, of its reputation, in a direction completely opposite to that pursued by the attacker.

# How do we alter reality in information warfare: Post-truth, post-factual, post-humanity?

The fourth and fifth generations of information warfare are directly linked to the evolution of perception and a journey leading us from post-truth via post-factual approaches to post-humanity. If the post-truth<sup>2</sup> is about emotions that are influencing the perceptions and the attempt to alter perceptions at a large scale, especially due to interpretations of the reality, post-factual (Chifu, 25 September 2018) approach already deals with altering the facts and changing the past, so that the very reality is at stake. Moreover, if we move further, in the use of artificial intelligence<sup>3</sup>, we reach a moment where our mind is at stake

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Post truth – Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief. 'in this era of post-truth politics, it's easy to cherry-pick data and come to whatever conclusion you desire', 'some commentators have observed that we are living in a post-truth age' in Oxford Dictionaries, at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/post-truth.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Artificial intelligence (AI) is a term for simulated intelligence in machines. These machines are programmed to "think" like a human and mimic the way a person acts.

and the very processes of thinking, perceiving, understanding and knowing the reality are altered via the direct impact to our minds, when facing an intelligence that plays with enormous groups of big data<sup>4</sup>, that know each of us in detail and are playing with all of us, individually, in real time, with effective psychological tools, in order to twist everything that we know. It is no longer about perception or even facts, but about our own minds. And yes, we can protect us from the future, to protect our sanity of mind. We need to adapt, but costs are going to be heavy for a bigger share of our population. Sustainability (Jones, n.a.) and resilience (Chifu, 2018) of humankind, at the whole level, is going to be tested, as well as other characteristics of adaptation to the reality in a post-human challenge about the reality. And we need to adapt more and more to this life in between worlds, the real one, and the virtual one and even several alternative worlds that we are confronted with at the same time, in the very near future.

# Welcome to the post-human world!

Information warfare (Chifu and Nantoi, 2016): The fourth generation and the thesis of a fifth generation that is approaching fast. The theme of the information warfare shows us the developments that are taking place these days about the perspectives and pressures faced by the human mind, in our everyday internal world in the near and predictable future. The information war has already passed to the fourth generation and intensive technological studies are being conducted towards the fifth generation of the mind games, with what a person

The ideal characteristic of artificial intelligence is its ability to rationalize and take actions that have the best chance of achieving a specific goal, although the term can be applied to any machine that exhibits traits associated with a human mind, such as learning and solving problems. At https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/artificial-intelligence-ai.asp. A.I. research is defined as the study of "intelligent agents": any device that perceives its environment and takes actions that maximize its chance of successfully achieving its goals in Poole et.al., 1998.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Big data is a term used to refer to the study and applications of data sets that are so big and complex that traditional data processing application software are inadequate to deal with them. Big data challenges include capturing data, data storage, data analysis, search, sharing, transfer, visualization, querying, updating, information privacy and data source. (Laney, 2001; Reichman et.al. 2011)

perceives, with what he understands, with what he knows and how can be these stages be altered to impact his opinions, convictions and choices.

If the first generation explicitly refers to misinformation, propaganda, active measures and elements of psychological operations (Chifu, 2015; Chifu, 2016), the second one aims at objectification of the abstract construct in the virtual space (Chifu and Ivan, 2013) and the communication between the real space and the virtual space, the third refers to the individual access but based on models – social masses, based on big data, to target it to alter or direct options.

The fourth generation directly targets the unpredictable personalities of the third-generation Cambridge Analytica instrument, the 3-15% for which the likelihood of influencing is null, depending on the subject, through specific instrumentation tailored especially defined for the individual concerned after a thorough study of him/her, the clearest method being *character assassination* (Chifu, 2017).

Finally, the outlook of a fifth generation, which will occur in about two years, is already being drawn, when technology will allow "real images" to be assigned to every public figure that can transmit any pre-set audio or audio message. Imagine the confusion created when Donald Trump declares war in an alleged video, his image being manipulated instead of using an actor or a look-alike, or Emmanuel Macron resigns live (Green, 2018). Vision, our richest sense and 87% of the information that reaches the human brain, becomes relative and without the prospect of selection, to discern the fake from the real, the prefabricated from the reality. And when there is not only one such enormity present in the public space, but seven distinct and nuanced messages on a theme, confusion is perfect and playing with the human mind reaches the apogee.

In this manner we reached post-truth, post-factual, and, further down the road, post-humanity.

Post truth: its theorized origins and the tools that led to the validation of modern information wars. The *Post Truth* is a term used since 1992 by Steve Tesich in "A Government of Lies" appearing in The Nation. This is according to the Oxford Dictionaries, which also notes that it is the most sought-after word in 2016, when most of the

post-truth and information warfare appeared in various forms. Tesich (1992) then maintained that the history revealed by the opening of the archives related to Watergate, the Iran-Contras scandal and the first Gulf War demonstrates that "we, as free men, have accepted and voluntarily decided to live in a kind of post-truth" (Tesich, 1992). His references discuss how little ordinary people are familiar with the great dossiers and themes of contemporary operations – special, classified, military – and how great is the distance between what is publicly presented and what we absorb and understand from a more complexly sensitive reality which is denied in all its details.

The subsequent definition of the term / notion / concept of post-factual, post-factual, or post-reality policy refers rather to a political culture in which the debate calls for emotions rather (Oxford Dictionaries), unrelated to the details of concrete policies, in which the propaganda summed up in talking points (the general ideas established by the communication strategy, repeated unanimously by the group in question) that completely ignores the facts and the surrounding reality. Post-truth does not mean challenging or falsifying the facts and expert opinions but putting everything in full subordination to public emotions that ignore the truths and facts presented objectively, being blinded by emotions.

There is a whole debate about how old or new the information war is, as well as the populist policies that use emotions. Some say that elements of it date back to when there were debates in the Agora of Ancient Greece, but the explosion of post-truth is inseparably linked to the Internet and social media, to anyone's ability to convey, to a broad, uncontrollable but connected public network, ideas and deep emotions that affect his views. And it is deeply related to the social changes produced by technology, especially social media.

The origins of post-truth: classical philosophy, technology, populism. Bernard-Henri Lévy was the one who tried to explain the paradigm of post-truth, with all its components. The French philosopher speaks about the three components of this development of human reality that we will have to get used to it: there is "a

philosophical suspect, a technological culprit and a very responsible politician" (Levy, 2018) of today life and this hideous post-truth.

Therefore, everything started from modern philosophy. All those who question the Truth have their origins in Friedrich Nitzsche's philosophical thinking, which questions the Truth as an absolute, considers it relative, and furthermore, places it as an equal to the Lie. Nitzsche wondered why Truth had greater value than Lie. This is a great sign of a question that still exists today, and the effects of this philosophical syllogism exclude ethical, moral, or complex axiological reporting, and lead to the crazy world today.

But, in a way, there is a return to the cycle of a classical idea of Greek philosophy. It is the renaissance of the oldest idea of philosophy – the school of thinking of the sophists (Braunstein and Pepin, 1997) – and to perpetuate fights of ideas between the Philosophers and the Sophists. The Sophists questioned the owner, the absolute Truth holder. Their doctrine speaks of the fact that Socrates and Plato are not entitled, cannot claim to have the Truth. So, we are all, with social media, the reincarnation of the sophists in the modern world.

Technological interference, with the advent of the Internet and social networks, has led to absolute democratization in a virtual space but directly attacking the mind and perception of the real man connected to this space. Democratization has led to an explosion with enormous consequences by promoting a generous idea, every truth, and every idea to have equal value. And confront the competition of other ideas, to see what is most listened to, more prized.

It's not a question of verification of human nature, I say, an absolute check of the way in which man really looks on the average, and which is the nature of the human spirit, how individuality and the spirit of the flock matter. It has education, habits, traditions, characteristic features, but also society, relationship, community spirit and its natural hierarchy.

So, the Internet and the social media have made each sentence and every opinion equal. I have come to an absolute democratization of the Truth, which has pushed far beyond Nietzsche the relativization of the Truth. It is no longer about giving an ethical value superior to Truth in relation to the Lying, here is the equation of all nuances – which have

similar value in the competition of sentences on the Internet – between the extreme lie and the Absolute Truth. Moreover, it equalizes the source of these defended ideas, the idiot put together with the genius, the connoisseur, the expert, the professional. It is a disaster. Not necessarily a total one. Levy claims to be part of human nature and becoming, that man is forced, in his becoming, to confront and adapt to this stage of evolution in order to resist the future.

Finally, populist politicians are the third source of guilty for the problem being discussed. Here we are already entering approaches that remind Kafka or Eugen Ionescu, a theatre of the absurd. Populists resort to emotions, but their main idea is that "Truth is not the Reality, Truth is what I say." This is how Nazism, Modern Absolutism, Authoritarianism emerged. It is the new idea that pushes, through consequences, to the absurd and to the destruction of freedom, and to the absolute control of the centre, whatever it may be, on peoples, societies, nations, the world.

From post-truth to post-factual and post-humanity: While post-truth means relativizing the value of Truth, questioning the owner of the truth (sophists), equalizing as value of Lying with Truth (Nietzsche), democratizing Truth (social media, all sentences are equal, regardless of the issuer and the connection with Truth) about the connection of human perception, human understanding with the Truth. the reality. (Chifu, 2015; Chifu, 2016) We talk about interpretations, emotions that alter the understanding of truth, or obstruct and guide our individual Truth. But it does not affect the facts. The post-factual begins from where we speak of the paradigm. What you see is not True, what you perceive with the senses is, in fact, not True, namely, the alteration of the facts through the perception of altering perception. It is no longer about the interpretation, but about the fundamental alteration of the facts. The populist approach is *Truth is* what I say is the Truth (Giuliani, 23 August 2018; Koonz 2004, p. 13) which turns the fact into non-fact or it's opposite.

This type of approach, combined with media censorship, blocking press freedom, free circulation of ideas, freedom of expression, pushes the targeted society towards authoritarianism, dictatorship. If

we look today at the official presentation of the Kremlin, its spokespersons, Russia's aggression in Ukraine, the demolition of the MH17 flight over Donbas, poisoning with Novichiok by Sergei Skripal, interference in the US and other elections states, we see the meaning of the movement. Manipulating the Truth, with the construction of alternatives to reality, simply alters the simple facts for the Russian and captive audiences. Or, as Bernard Henry Levy said, "You cannot refrain from thinking that Putin is the commander of his country, he is historian chief, journalist chief, and wants to erase, rewrite, and reinvent the history of the past" (Levy, 2018).

Here the reference is transparent to Francoise Sagan, the one saying "No one ever knows what the past has in store for us" – with a direct reference to the alteration and re-writing of history in the future (Sagan, 1965). This is about populist and post-factual regimes. The facts are rewritten, not reinterpreted, but dramatically changed. We also know the history of Ceausescu's heroism, rewritten after his power in 1965. It is also rewriting history in present Poland, with the role of the opposition Solidarity. It destroys the image and role of Lech Valensa and puts Geremek in the foreground. That's what populist politicians are doing.

**Post-factual (Levy, 2018):** Post-humanity is even more tragic, and it links directly to another human creation, artificial intelligence – A.I. An automatic, independent machine learning mechanism capable of infinitely manipulating more data than the human being, with infinitely more efficient, safe fractions of a second, and capable of reproducing the reality of any human sense, how they can alter the human mind in a scheduled manner.

Everything started from the over-use of the A.I. in detecting *fake news*. I taught cars to corroborate language elements, taught them to translate, to read, to write lyrics (not poems!!!), to understand grammars and syntaxes, to create correct sentences in any language, more correct than real people's speech. Moreover, I taught them to recognize faces, to interpret gestures, to create grimaces, and today the program by which a text and an image of anyone, together with his voice, can create "authentic" factual statements that are transmitted on it will take up to two years for improvement (Buterin, 2018; David, n.a.). Then we should watch out for informational warfare!

As I was saying above, what will be like to wake up with an artificial intelligence engine that creates from algorithms and megadata, the life-like image of a leader who holds a speech, starting from only the text? With an image, voice and behaviour tics more authentic than the original. Well, from this point, forecasted over two years as a technological achievement, we have a clear case of a mechanism superior to humans in terms of memory, speed and access to information that affects the personal internal universe of each individual and psychologically alters us. This is post-humanity.

And this is not an isolated case, it is not about connoisseurs, but about a whole human population that will have to confront and adapt to the stress of this post-human reality, which affects us deeply on an individual level. Here important is human resilience and the possibility of existence and consolidation of adaptability to these developments of a near future matter. And it will also show the content and capacity of humanity in its entirety to adapt, we will know how the average man, humanity in its entirety, struggles with these real mental illnesses of the future of living in parallel virtual spaces, concurrently a schizophrenia caused by the constant shift between computer generated realities and everyday life, factuality, truth and humanity.

How do we adapt to post-truth, post-factual and especially post-humanity? Of course, there are forms of reacting to post-reality, now and in the future. Every human construct also has its antidote, even if it is already used as a weapon against humanity itself. We see today the reactions to generations of past information warfare, we see today the constant antidote accompanying the responsible construction of new technical discoveries, including artificial intelligence in action.

Niall Ferguson, the well-known historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, is the one who makes the most important pleading of Kondratiev's historical cycles and the repeating history of interpretation. It is the task of an applied historian, he argues, to choose from the multiple futures the relevant, condemning and stating that it is shocked how often politicians and journalists are going to wrong mistakes for the future. Ferguson argues that "Technology is important, but less important, in fact, in the future; it changes very

quickly and creates frequent ruptures, so the life of a technology is much smaller than it used to be. Computers and social media have a major impact, but they are eliminated more quickly than the 50's" (Ferguson, 2018).

What's new is the decentralization of communications. It happened with print media already and social media has brought about changes in impact, but fairly limited in time, that we learn. It is an analogy not sufficiently relevant today, even if it invites democracy and blocks the authoritarianism of that time. The difference is not only access to virtually infinite databases, at practically no cost to anyone in the world who is connected to the Internet, but also means anyone's access to large masses of people within any society, controllable, influential, known in their data personal and intimate experiences reflected by the social networks (Chifu, n.a).

Ferguson argues that the impact of decentralization of information and the strengthening of capacity and impact on people's opinion, however, leads to the recent upgrading of power. Even artificial intelligence can mean over time an instrument that leads to increased state control over the individual.

However, I do not believe in this hypothesis. Well, the difference is creativity, and the clearest model, the example and argument in this regard comes from China, where enormous data bases copied from all Internet traffic create knowledge that is offered on a silver platter to the Communist Party. Political control leads to fundamental consequences, I believe, and we find it in every centralized society and in politicized institutions that lose use of the capacity to act once the rule is the political truth, imposed top down, not the professionalism and knowledge that comes from the base of social organizations and professional institutions.

Likewise, in post-humanity, the fundamental consequence of control over Chinese society is repeated: Chinese control over networks leads to implosion by blocking freedom of thought and freedom of opinion, free experimentation and creativity. The technological difference, to paraphrase, again, applying to the reality of our analysis, Niall Ferguson, the fantastic ability of artificial intelligence, of post-humanity as a stage, **is that chess is best played by machines. But** 

can they interpret and create a better game than chess? More useful for applications in life of all kinds and all the circumstances? No! (Ferguson, 2018)

No matter how powerful the computers will be, the greatest determinist is the human mind and the human condition. This is decisive, regardless of technology. There are some human constants. And I still believe that the post-humanism era, as we have defined above, cannot destroy people, human society, human condition, and the human mind. Even if it creates a major impact, it fundamentally changes what we know today about our way of life, learning, knowledge and adaptation. And indeed, it is a major challenge for the future, which will make many collateral victims among contemporary people who will no longer understand anything and will isolate themselves in comfy bubbles, incapable of adapting to the shock of the future.

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# HISTORY AND MEMORY IN INTELLIGENCE

# ÎNTRE INTELLIGENCE ȘI RENSEIGNEMENT. EVOLUȚII CULTURALE ÎN SPAȚIUL FRANCEZ

# Răzvan VENTURA\* Florin BUŞTIUC\*

#### Abstract

In the field of security studies, the French culture has been particularly focused on the objective to remove any suspicion of civil society regarding the legal activities of gathering information. The term "intelligence" (borrowed from English) appeared in this context and its introduction has generated debates about the cases of synonymy, especially with renseignement. So, the numerous definitions was formulated in order to avoid the mistrust of the society. In addition, notional fluidity is the main reason for which the term intelligence seems not to have been imposed with authority in the specialized field of security in France.

**Keywords:** *intelligence, renseignement, secret, perception, sign.* 

# Introducere

Adaptarea unui termen la rigorile altei limbi constituie rodul unui proces deosebit de complicat, mai ales dacă acesta nu se înscrie într-un fenomen natural de aculturație. Am spune că în cazul unei limbi precum limba franceză acest lucru este cu atât mai vizibil, cu cât limba franceză stă de aproape 300 de ani sub semnul binecunoscutei afirmații a lui Rivarol, care o subsuma imperativului clarității: "Ceea ce nu este clar nu este franțuzesc". (Discours sur l'universalité de la langue française, 1784) Şi probabil puține voci s-au pronunțat mai limpede în această privință ca Emil Cioran, care a mărturisit în mai multe rânduri

<sup>\*</sup> Translator, razvanventura@gmail.com.

 $<sup>^* \</sup> Expert \ "Mihai \ Viteazul" \ National \ Intelligence \ Academy, florinnn 11@yahoo.com.$ 

că limba franceză a acționat asupra sa "ca o cămașă de forță", deoarece "are o rigoare care nu se potrivește unui balcanic". (Cioran, 1993, p. 97)

Cuvintele își au deci și ele istoria lor, unele aflate încă în căutarea logosului inițial care le-a dat naștere, altele tânjind după finalitatea care le-ar izbăvi de uitare. Formularea unei definiții nu este unul dintre cele mai ușoare demersuri, deoarece orice definiție se structurează pe măsura conturării unei arii cognitive; de aceea, și în cazul termenului *intelligence* "putem opta mai degrabă către o descriere a conceptului sau a activității de *intelligence*, decât pentru o definire a acestuia". (Niță, 2009, p. 60) Aceasta s-ar explica prin faptul că "termenul este definit, de fiecare dată, de fiecare autor ce se raportează la el, iar respectivele definiții fac rareori referire una la cealaltă, și, în foarte puține situații, sunt formulate pe baza celor scrise anterior". (Niță, 2009, p. 48)

Astfel, ne-am raporta de aceea la un paragraf platonician Parmenide (135d), în care Parmenide îi reprosează lui Socrate că se grăbeste "a defini lucrul frumos, cel drept și cel bun, și tot așa fiecare formă, una câte una, înainte de a te fi pregătit cum trebuie". (Platon, 1989, p. 96) Repros însusit de comentatorul Sorin Vieru, care observă că definiția ar trebui să vină, firesc, drept "încununare a efortului cognitiv" (Platon, 1989, p. 144) deci la final. Probabil că aceasta este situația care trebuie avută în vedere și în ceea ce privește termenul intelligence, împrumutat din limba engleză, care cunoaste deja o răspândire internațională în comunitatea serviciilor de informații. Abia după ce acesta și-a făcut intrarea în aria limbajului de specialitate suntem în măsură, poate, să ne întrebăm mai fundamentat asupra rostului său. Mai ales că, iată, si o cultură cunoscută pentru conservatorismul său lingvistic – în presa franceză au apărut în ultimii ani mai multe luări de poziție împotriva invaziei masive și necontrolate a anglicismelor, iar în mediul on-line o serie de bloguri și site-uri militează pentru apărarea limbii franceze - a preluat termenul de intelligence, însă "îmblânzindu-l" printr-o circumscriere mai precisă, fapt justificat și de concurența cu termenul consacrat în limba franceză pentru informațiile secrete, acela de renseignement. Termenul este utilizat în contexte specializate: renseignement humain - informații din surse umane; service de renseignement – serviciu de informații; fuite de renseignements – scurgere de informații etc.

## Explorarea definițiilor

Explorarea resurselor lexicologice în ceea ce privește termenii *intelligence* și *renseignement* ilustrează mai degrabă o preocupare pentru suprapunerea corectă a termenilor decât încercarea de a opera anumite distincții. Dicționarele engleze formulează definiții precise pentru *intelligence*, indicând genul proxim și diferența specifică:

- a. "information concerning an enemy or possible enemy or an area" (informații referitoare la un rival/inamic sau la un posibil rival/inamic dintr-o arie); also "an agency engaged in obtaining such information" (agenție angajață în obținerea unor astfel de informații) (Merriam-Webster);
- b. "secret information about the governments of other countries, especially enemy governments, or a group of people who collect and deal with this information" (informații secrete despre guverne ale altor state, în special guverne rivale/inamice sau despre un grup de oameni care colectează sau gestionează astfel de informații) (*Cambridge*).

În schimb, literatura lexicologică franceză încearcă să acrediteze termenul *renseignement*, echivalat chiar întrutotul cu *intelligence*. Singura ocurență în care dicționarul lui Jean-Paul Brunet acceptă termenul *intelligence* în franceză este cea referitoare la *intelligence économique* (Brunet, 2000, p. 128 și 514). Dicționarele nespecializate preferă termenul *renseignement*, cu conotații militare, "ensemble des connaissances de tous ordres sur un adversaire potentiel, utiles aux pouvoirs publics et au commandement militaire" (informații diverse despre un potențial adversar, care ar putea fi folosite de puterea politică și comandamentele militare) (*Le Petit Larousse en couleurs*) sau acoperind o arie mai largă "information concernant l'ennemi et tout ce qui met en danger l'ordre public, la sécurité" (informații referitoare la inamici și la tot ceea ce ar amenința ordinea publică și securitatea). (*Le Petit Robert*)

Atâta vreme cât literatura franceză de specialitate s-a mulţumit cu preluarea mimetică a termenului *intelligence,* acesta nu pare a fi depășit simplul sens de *proces de culegere de informații, de stocare, analiză și evaluare,* cu alte cuvinte – ceea ce este desemnat în franceză prin termenul *renseignement.* Cu toate acestea, observă unii cercetători

francezi, "trebuie luate anumite precauții înainte de a traduce termenul *intelligence* prin *renseignement* și de a importa pur și simplu definiția anglo-saxonă în studiile franceze". (Chopin, Irondelle și Malissard, 2011, p. 106) Ceea ce nu explică, totuși, bizara justificare a autorilor studiului, potrivit cărora specialiștii francezi au recurs "fără îndoială, inconștient" la strategii menite să evite dificultățile ridicate de suprapunerile de sens (Chopin, Irondelle și Malissard, 2011, p. 104).

Conceptul de intelligence și-a făcut apariția în aria culturală franceză, potrivit unei recunoașteri unanime, în urma apariției celebrului raport Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises, redactat în 1994 de un grup de specialisti sub conducerea lui Henri Martre. Documentul definea intelligence-ul economic drept "ansamblul de actiuni coordonate de culegere, gestionare si de distribuire, în vederea valorificării, a informației utile actorilor economici" (Martre, 1994), precizând că "aceste acțiuni sunt inițiate legal, cu toate garanțiile necesare protejării patrimoniului întreprinderii, în cele mai bune condiții de calitate, de termen și de cost". (Martre, 1994, p. 11) Astfel, esențială este specificarea faptului că acest proces de culegere de informații se desfășoară în limitele legale, vizând ca atare surse deschise. Conceptul este ulterior completat de Christian Harbulot, ce adaugă, în același raport, acțiunea de influență celor precizate de raportul Martre și indică necesitatea participării tuturor actorilor economici, esențială fiind "cultura colectivă a activității de informații".

Acest caracter colectiv este, la rândul lui, exploatat de Bernard Carayon, care se apleacă asupra "convergenței de interese între sfera publică și cea privată". (Beau, 2014) Probabil în același sens, al unei anumite puneri în corelație, este relevat acest caracter și în cultura americană. Potrivit *Joint Intelligence*, termenul *intelligence* ar reprezenta o informație pusă în relație cu alte informații deja cunoscute cu privire la mediul operațional și examinate în lumina experiențelor trecute cu privire la un adversar (Chopin, Irondelle și Malissard, 2011, p. 133).

Alte definiții sunt mai degrabă finaliste. Astfel, Jean-Louis Levet vede în *intelligence-ul economic* "capacitatea de a înțelege mediul nostru și de a anticipa schimbarea" (Bineau, 2016, p. 4), iar Alain Juillet, fost Înalt responsabil pe probleme de intelligence economic, pune accent pe

finalitatea economică (competitivitatea și securitatea economică a întreprinderilor) (Juillet, 2018). *Cartea verde despre inovație* (1995, p. 20) preia definiția consacrată de raportul Martre, dar are grijă să precizeze faptul că *intelligence-ul economic* include "protecția informației considerate sensibile pentru întreprindere".

Interesant este că singura definiție care distinge dimensiunea ofensivă de cea defensivă a *intelligence-ului* economic este formulată într-o circulară din 2002 a Ministerului Economiei din Franța: "Intelligence-ul economic este dispozitivul prin intermediul căruia orice actor economic asigură controlul și protejarea informației esențiale pentru activitățile sale. Pe de o parte, trebuie culeasă, gestionată și valorificată informația utilă. Pe de alta, trebuie protejată, într-un mediu caracterizat printr-o concurență serioasă". (Hardy, 2011, p. 20)

O altă distincție de interes este operată de Alain Juillet într-o prelegere susținută în februarie 2018 la Universitatea Corsicană. Expertul admite o definiție franceză, care respectă datele generale ale problemei, "controlul și protejarea informațiilor utile factorilor decizionali", dar și o așa-zisă definiție oficială, ce se întoarce din nou asupra finalității, însă, într-un mod mult mai elaborat "dezvoltarea unui mod de guvernare în măsură să culeagă, să controleze și să valorifice informațiile strategice utile", scopul său fiind "competitivitatea, securitatea și consolidarea economiei naționale și a întreprinderilor sensibile". (Juillet, 2018)

## Scurt parcurs etimologic. Evoluția conceptului

Se pare că termenul *renseignement* își face apariția în secolele XIV-XV, fiind derivat din infinitivul verbului *renseigner*, al cărui sens de atunci era "a instrui din nou", diferit de sensul contemporan – "a informa". Sensul specializat începe să se impună, bineînțeles, pe măsură ce se dezvoltă și structurile cu astfel de atribuții, pe la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea. În conotația sa specializată, cuvântul *intelligence*, provenind din *inter* (*între*) și *legere*, are semnificația de "a crea legături" între cunoștințe pentru a clarifica și presupune ca atare selectarea informațiilor avute la dispoziție, astfel încât culegerea de informații este completată firesc de analiza acestora. (Huyghe, 2012)

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Dată fiind dezvoltarea sa în context francez, putem spune că istoria conceptului *intelligence économique* face din el "o inovație à la française". (Hardy, 2011, p. 2) S-a remarcat deja faptul că în accepțiunea franceză termenul are o dublă conotație: de *intelligence économique* în sens larg, la nivelul întreprinderilor, și de *intelligence économique* la nivel național, de stat. Latura din urmă particularizează conceptul francez față de *competitive intelligence* din SUA, Marea Britanie și Germania, unde acesta este considerat ca ținând de domeniul sectorului privat și al asociațiilor profesionale.

Initial, limba franceză folosea termenul veille (veghe), dominant 1990-1994, renseignement fiind evitat din cauza conotațiilor polițienești și militare, iar intelligence fiind perceput doar "capacitatea de a înțelege" (Hardy, 2011, p. 22). Treptat, intelligence s-a impus, sugerând o atitudine mai activă; veille, în schimb, a fost considerat "prea pasiv" (Hardy, 2011, p. 11), părând a limita de la sine activitătile circumscrise. Astfel, "veghea (la veille) răspunde unei nevoi de informare, în timp ce intelligence-ul economic răspunde unei necesități legate de decizie". (Boizard, 8) Explicația oferită de raportul Martre în această privință este interesantă, conjugând psihologicul cu lingvisticul, întrucât folosirea termenului veille conditiona și o anumită atitudine: veille trimite la vigilență, deci la asteptare, însă progresul economic impune și activități mai ofensive. Acest considerent a justificat acreditarea unui nou termen începând din 1994, cel de intelligence économique, concept ce va conjuga acceptiunea ofensivă si cea defensivă, pe care le-am menționat deja. Conotația activă a noului termen a fost justificată de faptul că activitatea de intelligence *économique*, prin natura sa, presupune un contact nemijlocit cu publicul larg; reuniunile prin care specialiștii sunt conștientizați cu privire la amenintările reprezentate de spionajul industrial și tehnologic, organizate de zeci de ani de către serviciul francez intern și destinate specialistilor din ramurile "sensibile", constituie deja o tradiție.

Termenul de *intelligence* s-a dezvoltat, în paralel, și în alte țări, într-un context similar: în Japonia și în fosta URSS va desemna activitatea agresivă de contrainformații desfășurată de stat cu privire la industrie, la științe și la tehnologie; în SUA se va concentra în jurul unei practici focalizate pe concurență; în Marea Britanie va avea în vedere

lumea afacerilor (concurența și piețele de desfacere); țările scandinave vor integra în concept, asemenea Franței, aspectele social, cultural, tehnologic și al mediului înconjurător (Juillet, 2018).

## Probleme presupuse de sinonimie

Într-o anumită măsură, o motivație serioasă a folosirii termenului de *intelligence* ar fi tocmai eludarea posibilelor perceptii negative induse de termeni precum espionnage si renseignement. Grăitor în acest sens este probabil și amănuntul că renseignement a fost evitat timp de decenii în titulatura serviciilor de informații franceze: denumirea principalului serviciu de informatii intern nu a cuprins termenul renseignement decât în intervalul 2008-2014, iar cea a serviciului de informații externe nu a inclus niciodată acest cuvânt! De altfel, chiar si renseignement ar fi apărut spre a înlocui termenul espionnage; absent din Dictionarul Academiei din 1879, va apărea în editia din 1932 (Chopin, Irondelle si Malissard, 2011, p. 102). Acestor aspecte li s-ar adăuga faptul că, potrivit raportului Martre (1994), "noțiunea de intelligence economic implică depășirea noțiunilor parțializante desemnate prin termenii documentare, veghe (științifică și tehnologică, privind concurenta, financiară, juridică si privind regulamentele (...), protecție a patrimoniului, influență (...)". (Martre, 1994, p. 11-12) În acelasi timp, Hardy (Hardy, 2011, p. 17) vede în această viziune o tendință dialectică, a înaintării prin concilierea contrariilor, însă probabil ar trebui mai curând invocată tendinta firească de a simplifica limbajul conceptual prea stufos și insuficient fundamentat. Termenul intelligence este în măsură să satisfacă o anumită cultură a nuanței, scoțând în evidență "legăturile esențiale între indivizi, evenimente si tehnologii" (Martre, 1994, p. 15), spre a deduce intențiile concurenței.

Tinzând spre simplificare, pe de altă parte, unii specialiști nu ezită să arate că termenii de *intelligence* și *renseignement* sunt perfect sinonimi: "*intelligence* este echivalent cu *renseignement*". (Huyghe, 2012) În spațiul anglo-saxonă, *intelligence* desemnează mai curând "procesul de culegere de informații, de stocare, de analiză și de evaluare. El este sinonim cu activitatea de informații" (Mabrouki). Spre

exemplu, site-ul https://www.english-for-techies.net traduce constant termenul *intelligence* prin *renseignement*.

La cealaltă extremă, literatura de specialitate a încercat să fundamenteze o serie de distincții între conceptul de *intelligence* și alți termeni. Sunt puse în joc considerații naiv-morale precum "trebuie distinsă virtuoasa *intelligence* economică de abominabilul spionaj" (Huyghe, 2012), până la distincția fundamentală între *intelligence* și *spionaj*. Astfel, Francis Beau (2014) pleacă de la încercarea de a conferi o specificitate activității de *renseignement*, care reprezenta, în opinia sa, valorificarea informației utile procesului decizional într-o acțiune într-un mediu ostil sau pur și simplu nesigur. În schimb, *intelligence* ar reprezenta culegerea de informații cu mijloace legale sau aflate la limita legalității, incluzând culegerea de informații în orb sau activitatea de lobby, dar excluzând orice mijloc clandestin.

Dacă încercăm să fundamentăm conceptul de intelligence raportându-l la realitate, importanța sa pare a fi esențialmente de ordin strategic; în acestă privință, ar trebui luată în considerare distincția formulată de Jean-Marc Jaffré (2015, p. 3), care consideră *intelligence*-ul consolidează strategic informatia (le secretă renseignement) în faza de decizie operatională, în timp ce renseignement este rezervat acțiunilor concrete. O conotație a afirmației lui Jaffré, insuficient explicată, ar fi aceea că evoluția informației secrete (renseignement) spre intelligence ar fi condiționată de latura analitică, menită a facilita întelegerea fenomenelor: "Întelegerea se îmbogăteste cu informația secretă (renseignement), devine intelligence și duce la o decizie cu caracter operațional sau la capacități semnificative de a influența evenimentele" (Jaffré, 2015, p. 2). Mai ales că, reamintim, intelligence presupune crearea de legături, instituirea de relații.

Tot Francis Beau (2014) se află la originea altei disocieri, introducând și conceptul de *informație de întreprindere* (renseignement d'entreprise): culegere de informații masivă, din surse deschise, rezultatele fiind valorificate la toate structurile în măsură să contribuie la competitivitatea economică; agenții economici continuă astfel, activitatea de culegere de informații la nivel statal, adaptând-o, evident, la propriile obiective strategice. Beau insistă asupra faptului că acest

gen de activitate ar trebui să rămână în cadre strict private, spre a nu încălca regulile concurenței economice.

Spre deosebire de aceasta, conform lui Juillet, (2018) intelligenceul economic ar reprezenta o politică publică desfășurată în beneficiul agentului economic, al cărei obiectiv este obținerea de informații strategice utile, vizând în ultimă instanță să asigure competitivitatea și securitatea economiei și a întreprinderilor. Ansamblul de măsuri presupuse de aceasta este mai larg - valorificare, măsuri de protecție a securității bunurilor, lobby -, fără însă, a atinge amploarea celor pe care le pot lua autoritățile. Extinderea ariei gnoseologice presupuse de activitatea de culegere de informații, dar și, probabil, o anumită dezorientare generată de volumul imens de informații, care s-au dovedit necesare a fi gestionate a generat consacrarea, în anii 2000, a numeroase articole conceptului de cultural intelligence/renseignement culturel, definit de James P. Coles drept "ansamblul de informații sociale, politice, economice sau demografice, ce permit înțelegerea istoriei, a instituțiilor, a psihologiei și a comportamentelor unui popor". (Chopin, Irondelle și Malissard, 2011, p. 147).

## Conotații naționale, sensuri problematice

Reacțiile publice la noul concept de *intelligence* nu au fost din cele mai favorabile, o observație deosebit de fină a lui Mylène Hardy făcând lumină în această privință: faptul de a insista asupra diferenței dintre *intelligence economic* și spionaj, afirmând neîncetat caracterul legal al celei dintâi, poate stimula suspiciunea opiniei publice (Hardy, 2011, p. 22).

În plus, noțiunea în sine este greu de transpus în cultura și limbajul de specialitate ale altor spații, o serie de specialiști, inclusiv din Hexagon, recunoscând că, la urma urmei, conceptul de *intelligence economic* pare destinat să rămână "franco-francez" (Hardy, 2011, p. 18). Nu mai puțin, o anumită proliferare necontrolată și haotică a dus la apariția mai multor sensuri concurente, pe care înșiși experții nu au mai fost în măsură să le mai departajeze, astfel încât, orice încercare de a formula o definiție care să poată avea impact instituțional și oficial pare sortită eșecului. Într-o singură frază, trecând în revistă implicațiile conceptului de *intelligence*, Hardy (2011, p. 21) face referire la "metode

de *intelligence* concurențial, de *contra-intelligence*, de lobby", atât la nivelul întreprinderilor, cât și la cel al statului.

Impactul negativ în plan public în Franța a avut la origine cel mai probabil și accepțiile termenului în limba engleză. Nu numai autoritățile străine s-au văzut puse astfel în fața unor dificultăți, economic intelligence făcând trimitere la activitățile serviciilor de informații, în contrast evident cu conotația conferită de francezi înșiși, dar și agenții economici francezi care au ajuns să suspecteze implicarea serviciilor de informații în economia de piață. De altfel, atrage atenția faptul, că nenumăratele tentative de a clarifica diferențele între intelligence și renseignement, menite în special să înlăture orice suspiciune cu privire la primul, nu s-au soldat cu succes, din moment ce, la peste douăzeci de ani de la apariția raportului Martre în 1994, dezbaterile se bucură în continuare de atenție.

Inclusiv literatura de specialitate sau conexă din Franța privește cu circumspecție chiar și domeniul *intelligence* și posibilele sale implicații. Un raport al Centrului Francez de Cercetare în Domeniul Activității de Informații arată că, în cadrul comunicărilor prezentate la seminarul de la Paris, sesiunea 2010-2011, 39% s-au referit la activitatea de informații (*renseignement*), 42% s-au limitat la cea de spionaj, iar 19% au preferat să abordeze informațiile diplomatice (Arboit, 2013, p. 13).

Conceptul nu pare, deci, în măsură să se impună în lumea academică franceză: "Este suficient să intri într-o librărie britanică sau americană spre a constata neobișnuita rămânere în urmă a Franței. În timp ce apare o astfel de lucrare în Franța, cel puțin zece sunt publicate în țările anglo-saxone" (Arboit, 2013, p. 18). Astfel, conferințele și lucrările marilor strategi militari francezi, precum Ferdinand Foch, Raoul Castex, André Beaufre, Lucien Poirier nu fac nicio referire la activitatea de intelligence. Cauza ar fi, potrivit lui Arboit, faptul că "activitatea de informații are o conotație deosebit de negativă în conștiința colectivă franceză, fiind sinonimă cu spionajul și cu afacerile dubioase". (Arboit, 2013, p. 19) Fapt întărit de împrejurarea, că "întotdeauna cultura noastră a trasat o graniță clară între cunoaștere și activitatea de informații (renseignement – n.n.), prima fiind nobilă și

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legitimă, cealaltă demnă de dispreț și lipsită de legitimitate". (Denécé și Arboit, 2009, p. 8)

Anumite eșecuri și scandaluri generate de activitatea structurilor de *intelligence* ar fi generat o reținere a politicului în fața specialiștilor în domeniu, iar din acest punct de vedere invocarea activităților militare de către Alain Juillet (2018), care vede în *intelligence* "aplicarea civilă a tehnicilor muncii de informații puse în practică în plan militar", este firească.

#### Concluzii

Se pare că o variantă indirectă (temporară) a impunerii specificității termenului de *intelligence* a reprezentat-o inserția în zona economică: un raport privind *Studiile despre activitatea de informații în Franța* relevă faptul că, în planul cercetării academice oficiale, *intelligence*-ul economic a cunoscut cele mai semnificative inițiative, printre care se ilustrează crearea, în 2003, a unui Laborator de cercetare în domeniul războiului economic, în cadrul Școlii de război economic (Denécé și Arboit, 2009, p. 23).

Semnificativ este însă faptul că, deși admit că intervențiile specialiștilor francezi în *intelligence*-ul economic, foarte diferite în esență de *competitive intelligence*-ul anglo-saxon, se bucură de o reală audiență în afara Franței, autorii nu par a împărtăși adeziunea acestor experți, atitudine explicată pe de o parte prin faptul că acestea se referă mai curând la administrarea întreprinderilor și la politicile publice de dezvoltare decât la activitatea de *intelligence* propriu-zisă, pe de alta prin profilul autorilor, care sunt specialiști din structurile de intelligence și nu membri ai comunității universitare (Denécé și Arboit, 2009, pp. 30-31). Totuși, se recunoaște că *intelligence*-ul economic se află în ceasul unei crize conceptuale, iar evoluția sa ascendentă la data raportului este explicată prin moda științifică.

Desigur că această criză a termenului *intelligence* va mai dura încă. Însă, din concurența diferitelor sensuri și accepțiuni este posibil să se ivească, în opinia noastră, terenul fertil al unor delimitări conceptuale menite, în ultimă instanță, să reconfigureze un univers oricum nesigur și greu de (re)structurat.

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# SECURITY PARADIGMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

#### LONE ACTORS EXPERIENCING MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES

## Ioana MATEI (CHIȚĂ)\*

#### Abstract

Mental health is a concept that includes all the psycho-sociological aspects of an individual's life so that one manifests itself in a desirable way during its existence. It includes the ability to form and maintain healthy relationships, to study and make decisions about educational, professional, or personal issues. If an individual's mental health is impaired, the abilities above mentioned are severely diminished and have a negative impact at individual and societal level.

In the context of mental health problems of individuals displaying signs of radicalization or involved in violent extremism, the issue becomes of interest if we are to consider the emerging number of lone actors experiencing mental health issues across Europe and the significant number of youth and children returnees and refugees that due to the severe trauma exposure are more prone to develop cognitive impairment, post traumatic disorders and mental health issues. Therefore, this paper aims to map the existing knowledge in the literature regarding the link between mental health disorders and the involvement in lone actor terrorism.

**Keywords:** lone actor, mental health, mental disorder, terrorism, radicalization, lone actor terrorism.

#### **Definition**

There is a variety of definitions for lone actor terrorism. Most of them focus on the modus operandi of lone actors, and usually define lone actors as individuals that operate in isolation from organized networks (Spaaij, 2012; Crisismanagement, 2007). Other definitions emphasize that lone actors are individual terrorists executing attacks on their own, but maintaining contacts with organized extremists during the radicalization process. The analysis unit of the Danish Police

<sup>\*</sup> Phd Student at "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, e-mail: ioana.matei@animv.ro

Intelligence service, CTA, introduced a distinction between lone actors and solo terrorists, the former operating in isolation, without having any connection to a terrorist organization, and the latter having ties to violent extremist or terrorist networks (Spaaij, 2010), but acting individually under direct instructions (Graaf, 2011). As a consequence, a number of authors have distinguished between lone actors acting under no direction from a terrorist group, but this does not necessarily imply an absence of links, and individual actors acting under the instructions of a terrorist organization (Nesser, 2010; Pantucci, 2011; Spaaij, 2010).

Jessica Stern (2003) defines lone actor terrorists as: "small groups who commit terrorist crimes, inspired by a terrorist ideology, but do not belong to established groups". (Stern, 2003) Other authors prefer to pay attention to individuals and preclude those attacks committed by smaller cells that act isolated from a larger terrorist network (Borum, 2012; Gruenewald 2013; Spaaij, 2010). Pantucci (2011) even suggests that such groups design their own subset and named this kind of typology 'lone wolf packs' (Pantucci, 2011).

A more detailed definition for lone actor terrorism is offered by the CLAT Project: "the threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting out of purely personal material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without any direct support in the planning, preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any group or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others)". (Ellis, 2016)

For the intent of the present study we will retain that lone actors are individuals who "(a) act individually, (b) are not affiliated with an organized group/network; and (c) have a modus operandi designed and conducted by the individual excluding any immediate external direction or hierarchy". (Spaaij, 2010)

### The features of lone-actor terrorists

The general consensus in the specific literature is that it is not possible to profile terrorists. Accepting this limitation, we can still notice some patterns/characteristics of lone actor perpetrators. A literature analysis provided certain characteristics of lone actors as

respects gender, age, and ideological drivers of lone actor terrorism, education and relationship status. Another characteristic is the prevalence of mental health issues. However the results that indicate a mental health issue need comparison to samples of local, national or international health organizations. The results should be judged by mental health experts.

To begin with, most of the studies indicate that the lone actor "profile" is heavily male oriented (Gruenewald, 2013; Gill, 2014; Ellis, 2016). The percentage of male lone actors is over 85%. In a study by Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Baker, 96% of perpetrators are male (Baker, 2016).

According to Gill, Horgan and Deckert, the standard age of lone actor perpetrators is 33 years. The number exceeds the militants from Colombia commonly aged around 20 years old, the PIRA combatants that are usually aged 25 years old or Al-Qaida terrorists aged 26 years old (Gill, 2014). The lone actors found in Chermak, Gruenewald and Freilich's study are in their thirties (Gruenewald, 2013).

Nonetheless, it seems that the increased use of social media platforms determined a decrease in the regular age of the actors as a consequence of the users of social media. (Wolfowicz, 2017) More recent studies indicate that 20 year old men are most likely embrace radical action (Wolfowicz, 2017).

Regarding ideology, there are three dominant ideological drivers that can be identified: right-wing (RW), jihadist ideology and peculiar, self-grown ideologies. Daesh repeatedly promoted through its propaganda the use of lone-actor attacks. While it may seem paradoxical, most recently, the extreme far-right is taking insight from the Islamist extreme by moulding its ethno-nationalist ideology and by applying the reach of social media to advance it across borders in order spotting a younger, more tech keen admirers, who it cherishes to mobilize for what it perceives as a long-term attempt against the radical Islam.

However, these ideologies have very different age profiles. When correlating age with ideology, it seems that most of the older perpetrators are usually right extremists and some religiously-inspired.

The younger perpetrators are mostly religiously inspired (Baker 2016). In their dataset, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Baker, found that the youthful group, aged minor than 25 years, is in a high percentage religiously motivated (47%). (Bakker, 2016) On the opposite, out of the perpetrators beyond the age of 40, 47% were rightwing extremists and 21% religiously inspired (Bakker, 2016).

The spotlight of the media, and consequently the public eye, is mostly focused on Islamist extremists that are violent. Nonetheless, it seems that RW extremists are in charge for considerably more fatalities. The CLAT dataset, which includes Breivik's attack, RW attacks were responsible for 260 injuries and 94 fatalities. The same dataset highlights that religiously-motivated attacks killed 16 and injured 65 persons. The findings indicate clearly that RW extremists represent a substantial threat and must not be overlooked. (Ellis, 2016)

Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich's study indicate that half of the RW extremists examined had 'previous arrests' (Gruenewald, 2013). It seems there is a preponderance of preceding convictions by all of lone actors (Fredholm, 2011): 41.2% of the lone-actors had formal criminal sentences (Gill, 2014) - of this subgroup 63.3% were imprisoned and while being in prison 32.3% became radicalized that ultimately led to the final attack.

A misconception questioned by the research regards the general belief that lone actors are socially isolated persons. Studies indicate the opposite (Eby, 2012): they are rather well educated and somewhat socially privileged (Spaaij, 2012). Eby (2012) mentions that lone actors aren't indubitably lower-class citizens without any perspective of social flexibility ... [and are] as expected to be employed as unemployed (Eby, 2012). In the groups that are religiously inspired, the ratio of those socially isolated is very low (9%). (Baker, 2016)

In the CLAT dataset, the youngest cluster, which was aged below 25, exhibited the maximal proportion of social seclusion, which is 36%. The percentage of social isolation at those aged 25–39 years was of 25%, whilst the individuals aged over 40 reported the smallest amount of 11 percent. The youngest age group (lower than 25 years) manifested the topmost amount of mental-health disorder (40%). (Bakker, 2016)

Regarding the literacy of lone actors, the statistics are allotted relatively proportionately: Gill, Horgan and Deckert's research indicate a percentage of "24.7% of lone actor individuals that achieved the lowest level of education of secondary school or correspondent; 20.8% attained the highest level of graduate school and the remaining actors completed a level amid the two". (Gill and Deckert, 2014) Evidence regarding employment proves a bigger ratio of deprivation after graduating from school. Within the alike study cases of 112 persons, a percentage of 40 had no job. A 26% level of military background is meaningful within the authors' sample (Gill and Deckert, 2014) since the general population percentage is 13%.

Gill, Horgan and Deckert's sample also features the likely significance of the individual's relational context as 50% of the lone actors are sole and never married (Gill, 2014). From the above mentioned we can conclude that unlike we expected, lone actors are not socially isolated persons. Another important detail is that those aged fewer than 25 have the highest percentage (40%) of mental-health disorders (Bakker, 2016) and their attacks are mostly religiously inspired (45%). (Bakker, 2016) In the following we will highlight the link between violence and mental disorders, and between mental health disorders and lone actor terrorism, on the other.

## Lone actors, violence and mental health disorders

The research results obtained by (Schuurman, 2019) propose the reconsideration of the "lone wolf" or "lone actor" typology, in relation to the factors of radicalization. Their empirical efforts have proved that the motivation and behaviour susceptible to radicalization and criminal acts are correlated to radical milieus, both in online and offline environments. Attackers described as "lone wolves" result to have connections with certain groups, according to their interests – political, operational etc. Schuurman (2019) have studied lone actor extremism in Europe and United States, in case of 125 attackers who have been active between 1978 and 2015. The researchers consider that the term "lone wolf" implies a certain degree of cunning, which is not necessarily available, so they propose the use of the term of "lone actor". Factors like peer-pressure, polarization or leader-influence are

not available in the case of this type of attackers. The loneliness of the lone actors most often results after social changes – they cannot integrate, or just because of their lack of sociability or mental health disorders. Some lone actors experience the exit from certain terrorist groups, sometimes on a non-voluntary basis, therefore they act by themselves. The involvement of lone actors in radical networks offer them access to role models and also a frame for a justification of their terrorist acts; being exposed to extremist ideologies and authority figures contribute to the process of overcoming guilt. The results obtained by (Schuurman, 2019) indicate that 78% of the lone actors they have studied were influenced by external figures to use violence, and under a third of the sample has received assistance by external sources in preparing the attacks.

The lone actors have also been analysed in relation to possible returnees from Syria's civil war; the latest pose security risks in the context of their paramilitary training, war experience and previous interactions with terrorist networks. Schuurman (2019) suggest analysing this threatening possibility through a multi-disciplinary collaboration between academics, practitioners and policymakers.

Schuurman (2019) found that most often the lone actors connect to other groups or persons starting from the process of radicalization, to the planning of the terrorist act itself, fact which makes them detectable for the law enforcement agencies or intelligence services. Also, they seem to act by themselves after having attempted to recruit followers and have failed, because of their lack of social skills, or mental disorder. The analysis of lone actors' profiles indicate that they usually don't have operational skills, auto-evaluate themselves as very important and despise the potential partners. Also, they tend to give hints of their intentions long before starting the terrorist act. It is the case of 86% of the sample analysed by (Schuurman, 2019), who shared their convictions with others long before committing attacks, and 58% provided actual indications.

Studies on lone actors (Schuurman, 2019; Andres, 2016) have outlined a series of typical actions and behaviours that may indicate violent intentions:

• expressing the admiration for murderers;

- expressing support for the murders of people who facilitate abortion;
- expressing online a racial discourse;
- disseminating execution videos;
- critically addressing the Government's activities and decisions;
- expressing the desire to act radically, violently, or threatening persons or properties;
- ignoring operational security and not keeping the secret of their intentions or actions;
- being exposed to mental or physical abuse.

In the framework of mental health, violence can be sensationalized. What this only does is to deepen the stigmatization of the patients. (Welton, 2008) Mental illness may boost in the case of some individuals the possibility of performing violent acts, but a limited percentage of the violence from society could be attributed to individuals with mental health issues. (Welton, 2008)

Violence and mental illness share plenty biological and psychosocial features. "Individuals with mental illness, when appropriately treated, do not pose any increased risk of violence over the general population". (Welton, 2008) Violence could become a concern in the cases of patients diagnosticated with disorders of personality as well as with substance dependency. (Welton 2008)

Numerous distinct disorders have been associated to violence and illegality, such as psychotic disorders, substance abuse disorders, Cluster B personality disorders, delirium and dementia, dissociative, affective disorders and posttraumatic stress disorders. (Welton 2008) According to Steadman and colleagues "patients with mental illness and substance abuse were 73 percent more likely to be aggressive than were nonsubstance abusers, with or without mental illness". (Steadman, 1998; Rueve, 2008)

The percentage of violent individuals with a mental health issue is double the one of mentally healthy violent persoans. (Swanson, 1990)

Brugha et al. (2005) claim that weighted predominance of psychosis in penitentiaries was over ten times higher than the average population (52 per thousand as to 4.5 per thousand). (Brugha et. al.,

2005) Elbogen and Johnson demonstrated statistically that "bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and major depressive disorder were the only trustworthy predictors of violent assaults when there is substance addiction/dependence co-morbidity". Moreover Corner (2015) highlights in "an analysis of disorder predominance across nonviolent individuals, violent men, and members from gangs, the latter scored the highest percentage across six disorder groups (anxiety, depression, psychosis, drug dependence, anti-social personality disorder, alcohol dependence)". (Corner, 2015)

#### Lone actors and mental health disorders

Few lone-actor cases include reports on clinical diagnoses. Also, there is a difference between those where the diagnosis has been made and cases where there is an indication of a diagnosis (such as news referring to mental health problems). In many cases there might not be possible to find clear data on diagnoses (Bjornsgaard, 2015).

Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich determined that 40% of the actors in their sample had mental illness. The number is significantly higher than the percentage of 7.6 among the group actors (Gruenewald, 2013). The recent study by Emily Corner and Gill deduced that lone actors are 13.49 more probably to experience a mental illness than a terrorist from a group. (Corner, 2015) In a research project conducted by the Centre for Terrorism and Counter-terrorism at the Leiden University in the Netherlands focusing on the mental health aspect of lone actor terrorism, "32% of the cases had some indication reported of a mental health issue whereas this percentage decreased to 23% in terms of an actual clinical diagnosis of such a mental health disorder. However, for 62% of the cases a clinical diagnosis was unknown". (Network, 2017)

This means that either the direct environment of the lone actor – such as friends and family – declared that the individual received cure for a mental health problem, or they indicated that they knew he was suffering from a mental health issue.

The same research project found a significant difference in the score obtained by ideological groups with regard to mental health disorders. For the well-defined ideologies (extreme right, religiously-inspired), the figures were below average (24 and 28 percent).

The group "other" scored a percentage of 70%. This group is different from other ideologies: its ideology is the least well-defined; the perpetrators often combine different sources in order to design their own subset of ideological influences. (Baker, 2016)

Verwey Jonker Institute analysed 167 individuals that performed all together 351 threats in between 2008 – 2015. The main findings were that the threats or attacks are done by people with mental health issues (RAN, 2016).

A research study on the Islamic stated driven attack found that the attacks inspired – rather than directed – by the Islamic State had a higher preponderance of mental health disorders than the global average (Corner, 2016).

The scientific literature also examined personality issues. Thus, it seems that lone actors exhibit on a certain degree social problems. (Spaaij, 2010) ICCT concludes that lone actors don't "work and play well with others". (Graaf, 2010) This can lead to social alienation. This was found prevalent in Gill's samples of 119 offenders. (Gill, 2013) "It seems that social issues act as an impediment to joining wider terrorist groups". (Spaaij, 2010)

It was also revealed that grievances or significant personal events can play a central role in radicalization. In the study of Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, there were identified four characteristics that are common, which include sorrow and 'unfreezing', a personal crisis defined by maladjustment (Moskalenko, 2014). Nesser similarly concluded that 'a personal frustration appears as a substantial factor behind radicalisation' (Nesser, 2010).

Types of mental disorders prevalent in the lone-actor terrorism cases:

Early research studies point out that mental disorders such as psychopathy or personality disorders (Lasch, 1979). Later, the literature reviews questioned these assumptions, the methodology and claimed that there is no evidence to support the fact that some forms of mental disorders are caused by terrorism. (Horgan, 2005; Victoroff, 2005; Silke, 1999)

## Schizophrenia:

Schizophrenia is a mental health disorder characterized by delusions and hallucinations at visual, auditory, tactile or olfactory level. Because the hallucinations feel real, schizophrenic individuals cannot properly distinguish actual from altered reality. The treatment of schizophrenia involves antipsychotic medications and psychotherapy (Grohol 2019). Schizophrenic people suffer from stigma, prejudice and discrimination (National Institute of Mental Health, 2019).

The disorder was long accepted as being connected to violence and violent behaviour (Corner, 2016). Weenink's study on 140 extremist Islamists suspected for joining or planning to involve in the battle of Syria revealed a prevalence of schizophrenia of 2% – the double of the ordinary population (Weenink, 2015).

#### **Delusional disorder:**

Delusional disorder means that one experiences for at least a month "bizarre or non-bizarre delusions". Non-bizarre delusions refer to "beliefs of something possible in a person's life". The situations might be true, but the individual knows they are not, for instance through fact-checking, third-person confirmation, etc. Bizarre delusions are those implausible and they are not derived from the usual life experiences (i.eg. the loss of control over mind and body). The preponderance of delusional disorders is about 0.2%. (Bressert, 2018) These types of disorders are linked to violence because individuals have stringent beliefs, inconceivable in the eyes of others. At the same time, "loneactors have a high preponderance of single-issue ideologies; highly personal grievances linked to political aims". (Corner, 2016)

## Disorders from the autism spectrum (ASD):

"Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a human development disorder. It affects behaviour and communication" (National Institute of Mental Health, 2018).

The "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders" mentions that individuals with ASD display low communication and interaction with other skills, limited interests, behaviours that are

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repetitive, symptoms that limit their capacity to go to school/work or to get involved in other life areas. (ASP, 2013)

There are wide variations when it comes to the type and symptoms individuals' experience. "Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) occurs in all racial, ethnic and economic groups" (National Institute of Mental Health, 2018).

ASD registers a higher preponderance in lone actor cases. "Although ASD individuals don't necessarily display violent behaviours, the social interaction deficit impairs an individual's ability to maintain functional relationships. However, they often develop online relationships, a characteristic of lone-actors with ASD" (P. G. Emily Corner 2016).

#### **Conclusions**

Significant criticism has been brought to research studies that link mental health disorders to violent extremism. The most invoked reasons include the fact that these studies do not involve interviews with the perpetrators in order to assess the mental health status and it does not analyse the temporal order of the risk factors across the individuals engaged in violent extremism.

It is commonly argued that mental health disorders cannot predict terrorist involvement. Some authors argue that mental health disorders are a risk factor for terrorist engagement. At the same time, research studies clearly show a link between cases of lone actor perpetrators and some mental health disorders, such as schizophrenia, ASD and delusional disorders. It could be noticed from the above mentioned studies that these mental health issues are more prevalent to those individuals aged below 25 years and religiously inspired.

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# ANGER MANAGEMENT – CONSIDERATIONS AND REFLECTIONS USEFUL FOR FIRST LINE PRACTITIONERS WORKING WITH YOUTH VILLERABLE TO RADICALIZATION

### Cristina IVAN\*

**Motto:** "No one is born with a chronic anger problem. Rather, chronic anger and aggressive response styles are learned".

Harry Mills

#### Abstract

Anger is a fundamental emotion. It is also one of the basic human emotions, namely one that is experienced by all people. Fear, anger, sorrow, joy, disgust, acceptance, anticipation, and surprise are among the most cited to take part in the basic emotions range. (Picard, p. 6) Anger is considered a natural and mostly automatic response to adverse acts. The present article will, therefore, look into how to better understand anger, its origins as a basic human emotion, its biological and psychological characteristics, and its place in the life of the individual and of the community, as well as in a cultural system we may share and inherit. Last but not least, it is our intention to identify and describe various strategies and techniques used by educators, coaches and therapists in teaching and promoting anger management and to highlight those strategies and interventions that might also prove useful for the daily routine of different segments of first-liners working with children and youth vulnerable to radicalisation and violent extremism.

**Keywords:** management, anger, first line practitioners, radicalisation.

\* Senior Researcher PhD, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, Romania, ivan.cristina@animv.eu.

#### Introduction

This study is aimed to serve as a synthetic presentation of the main insights into anger as a basic, secondary emotion, and the various ways in which it can be first managed, then positively harnessed to detour the individual from radicalization and into more functional, constructive ways of asserting personal power and identity. It does not serve as an academic analysis of studies in the field, but rather as a summary of useful concepts, definitions and findings of researchers that have studied both the way anger works and its impact on the physical and psychological health of the individual, as well as his social wellbeing. As such, the study has served as documentary material in the preparation of the experimental lab dedicated to first liners working with vulnerable children and adolescents vulnerable to radicalisation in the framework of the "Armour project – A radical model of resilience for young minds".

Its main purpose is to serve (a) as baseline in building exercises and simulations and (2) as guideline for a better understanding of anger, its role in the radicalisation process and, last but not least, on how anger can be managed, reversed or harnessed and channelled toward positive forms self – affirmation and success.

#### **Definition**

Anger is a fundamental emotion. It is also one of the basic human emotions, namely one that is experienced by all people. Fear, anger, sorrow, joy, disgust, acceptance, anticipation, and surprise are among the most cited to take part in the basic emotions range. (Picard, p. 6). Anger is considered a natural and mostly automatic response to adverse acts. "Typically triggered by an emotional hurt, anger is usually experienced as an unpleasant feeling that occurs when we think we have been injured, mistreated, opposed in our long-held views, or when we are faced with obstacles that keep us from attaining personal goals". (Mills, s.a)




Figure 1 – Anger as second hand emotion (author idea)

This makes it a secondary emotion. The distinction between primary and secondary emotions has been defined as non-cognitively vs cognitively generated emotions. According to Damasio, "primary emotions are those emotions triggered by stimuli in the world that we respond to emotionally and which activate a corresponding set of feelings secondarily. Such emotions are primary and reside in the limbic system" (Damasio apud Picard, p. 1). Damasio defines secondary emotions as "those that arise later in an individual's development when systematic connections are identified between primary emotions and categories of objects and situations". (Damasio apud Picard, p. 1)

Anger triggers include feeling of inadequacy, rejection, threat, and loss. According to Williams, anger also has two distinct dynamic functions: "on the one hand it works as an inwardly directed signal urging the individual to overcome an adverse action, situation, obstacle; on the other hand, anger is also directed as an outward signal that shapes communication and distances the individual from a certain interlocutor, establishing differentiation and conflict with interpersonal relationships and affective bonds". (Williams, 2017, p. 1)

Researchers place the phylogenetic origins of anger in the basic reaction to a stressful situation, most likely "a response to a condition of physical constriction as an ultimate way for the individual to free itself from a predator or to an external condition causing pain or irritation".

(Williams, 2017, p. 5) This basic protective role of anger is then integrated in and supported by the fight-or-flight response.

The dynamics of anger remains difficult to establish and track, however. As part of the basic emotions set identified by the basic emotions' theory¹, it is said to represent a basic emotional signal with pivotal role in e.g. the survival mechanisms. Nevertheless, for anger to enter the area of *emotional experience*, it must be "secondarily represented by higher cognitive systems", that is embedded in and justified by rationally constructed and ethically loaded storylines. Subsequent theories placed basic emotions also at the core of motivated behaviour: "Modern ethology relied on cybernetics to reinterpret instincts in terms of goal corrected behavioural plans that flexibly (unlike the fixed behavioural sequence previously meant to characterize instincts) employ inborn or acquired motor patterns in order to achieve an expected outcome enhancing individual fitness". (Hinde apud Williams, 2017, p. 2)

To summarize, we can state that anger has been researched and explained as (1) a basic emotion driven by instinct, (2) a signal regulating goal corrected behaviours and later on as (3) an affective signal regulating a motivational system which orientates the individual towards a set goal (Lichtenberg apud Williams, 2017, p. 3).

The difficulties in spotting and handling anger come from two different directions: (1) anger can be generated by a negative stimulus (e.g. hurt, frustration) and directed towards solving tensions; (2) anger behaviours can result in behaviours that are similar with those sustained by positive emotions (personal empowerment, agency etc.). (Panksep apud Williams, 2017, p. 5)

## Anger in the life of the individual

Anger does not emerge until the end of the first year of life of the individual (Sroufe apud Williams, 2017, p. 5) and it is linked to the stage in which the subject begins to understand when his/her actions are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The basic emotions theory states the existence of basic schemes of automatic response named emotions, used to increase survival by facilitating the communication between co-specifics" (Eckman apud Williams, 2017, p. 2)

blocked and how it can overcome them (potentially fuelled by anger). Subsequently, *self-awareness and social awareness* are used to direct anger towards self or others. Nevertheless, "the degree to which rage becomes a part of the individual way to exert one's control upon the external world, conflict management and social assertiveness is much influenced by the actual social experience and interpretations that the caregivers offer to the child's behaviours as well as by the wider social context of social norms and established meaning". (Williams, 2017, p. 6)

It is also important to distinguish between anger and irritation, hostility, aggression, and violence. According to Thomas, anger is "a strong, uncomfortable emotional response to a provocation that is unwanted and incongruent with one's values, beliefs, or rights". (Thomas, 2001, p. 42) By contrast, Thomas describes hostility as "a chronic mistrustful negative attitude", while aggression moves forward to "actual or intended harming of another". (Thomas, 2001, p. 42)

Other authors, however, treat this range of feelings in a continuum. "Some researchers consider that hostility, anger and aggression can represent the cognitive, affective and behavioural components of the same multidimensional construct (Buss & Perry, 1992). Thus, the construct could consist of three basic dimensions: a) affective, made up of emotions such as anger or loathing; b) cognitive, consisting mainly of negative thoughts about human nature, resentment, and cynical distrust; and c) behavioural, defined by various forms of aggression, such as physical or verbal aggression. All these factors seem to be related to each other, varying in intensity, frequency, and duration". (Valizadeha et. al., 2010)

## Anger thresholds and ways of expression

The anger threshold may also differ significantly from one individual to another, but also from one community to another, depending on the social norms attached to its expression: "The experience of anger varies widely; how often anger occurs, how intensely it is felt, and how long it lasts are different for each person. People also vary in how easily they get angry (their anger threshold), as well as how comfortable they are with feeling angry. Some people are always getting angry while others seldom feel angry. Some people are

very aware of their anger, while others fail to recognize anger when it occurs. Some experts suggest that the average adult gets angry about once a day and annoyed or peeved about three times a day. Other anger management experts suggest that getting angry fifteen times a day is more likely a realistic average. Regardless of how often we actually experience anger, it is a common and unavoidable emotion". (Mills, s.a)

## Anger and culture

Research on emotions has taken many paths. Some studies have focused on positivist and biological interpretations, others, more recent, have also focused on understanding emotions as part of culturally specific models and theories of beliefs. Both highlight important aspects not only for the understanding of emotion expressions in context, but also for how they can be further positively handled.

Theories of emotion recognise that "people are generally more accurate at judging emotions when the emotions are expressed by members of their own cultural group, rather than by members of a different cultural group". (Elfenbein and Ambady, 2003) This is a strong hint towards the need for cultural competence in correctly assessing the nature of the emotion experienced by peers in interaction and calls for cultural awareness whenever one needs to reflect and correctly interpret expressions of emotions, including anger. Therefore, an important aspect to be taken into consideration when evaluating anger expressions is that individuals tend to more keenly understand expressions of emotions in their own community group and sometimes apply the same filter on regarding emotional expressions of individuals and communities that are different and rely on different valorisation. A certain cultural relativism in understanding must be inferred from here as a factor to be kept in balance. Fundamental evidence in this sense has been provided by studies on the perceived expressivity. Thus, researchers have demonstrated that people in different countries and most of all different races have difficulties in "reading" the expressivity of another group. (Matsumoto, 2001)

At the same time, it must be stated that cultural relativism has a limited degree of action in understanding and expressing emotions, and hence its importance should not be overstated. It is not a total obstacle

in assessment. An analysis performed on the judgement of facial expressions of emotions by individuals coming from ten different cultures has highlighted strong evidence of cross-cultural agreement in interpretation. "Agreement was very high across cultures about which emotion was the most intense. The 10 cultures also agreed about the second most intense emotion signalled by an expression and about the relative intensity among expressions of the same emotion. However, cultural differences were found in judgments of the absolute level of emotional intensity". (Ekman, et al.)

Hence, when dealing with expressions of anger from individuals of different ethnic origin and cultural backgrounds, one should be careful in assessing and look for further evidence and clarification before making a statement and/or assessment of intentions. Secondly, studies in cultural anthropology have shown that anger can be stimulated and harnessed in different social and cultural contexts including fighting a war, responding to social conflict and injustice etc. In different cultures and social contexts, anger expressions can be accepted, tolerated, or even fostered to induce change. According to Williams, "behaviours accompanied by anger and rage serve many different purposes and the nuances of aggressive behaviours are often defined by the symbolic and cultural framework and social contexts". (Williams, 2017, p. 1)

The implications put forth in the expression of anger by the symbolic and cultural frameworks are yet to be highlighted according to each distinct social, cultural and individual background. As observed, "interpersonal experiences, cognitive development and cultural meanings can intervene to modify the early interactive representations pertaining each motivational system, but their affective core remains unchanged". (Williams, 2017, p. 3) What can be stated however is that anger does get fuelled when dressed in and motivated by culturally, socially, and ethically loaded significance?

In Western culture however, raw expression of anger is oftentimes considered inappropriate and it is socially sanctioned. According to Mills, "many people are brought up to think that it is inappropriate to express anger directly; that it must not be tolerated; that it is always dangerous. Such people learn to distrust anger, to

bottle it up and ignore it, to express it only in indirect ways or to use it as a weapon". (Mills, s.a)

Studies of emotional experiences in various cultural contexts have also highlighted significant differences in terms of incidence between fear and anger rates of occurrence in Europeans, Japanese and Americans. According to the study, Europeans experience fear and anger more than Americans, who, in their turn, experience these feelings more often than Japanese. (Matsumoto and Juang, 2016, p. 10)

(means)	Europe	Japan	USA	mean	df	F	p	Newman-Keuls
Joy	3.83	3.26	3.48	3.52	2/502	13.38	.0000	JAP <usa<eur< td=""></usa<eur<>
Sadness	4.07	3.31	3.93	3.78	2/492	22.16	.0000	JAP < EUR = USA
Fear	4.03	3.30	3.85	3.73	2/487	18.56	.0000	JAP < EUR = USA
Anger	3.68	3.19	3.42	3.43	2/497	10.12	.0000	JAP <usa<eur< td=""></usa<eur<>
Average	3.80	3.16	3.61	3.44	2/507	31.55	.0000	JAP <usa<eur< td=""></usa<eur<>
Across em	otions:							
df	3/687	3/670	3/645	3/20	010			
F	3.61	n.s.	7.57	10.0	00			
р	.0131		.0001	.000	00			
Newman-k	Ceuls			Joy	= Anger <	:Fear = Sa	d	
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		2007		酒				
	Anger	<sad< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></sad<>						

Figure 2: Relative incidence of different emotions (Source: http://david matsumoto.com/content/1988\_Scherer\_Walbott\_Matsumoto\_Kudoh.pdf)

In conclusion, we can state that cultural differences in expressing emotions do appear, at least in the level of frequency they are experienced and the intensity with which they are expressed and perceived. These differences are due to differences in perceptions on events, frameworks of understanding, in culture-specific appraisal propensities, in behaviour repertoires, or in regulation processes. (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992)

### Some psychological and sociological aspects of anger

Emotions happen inside. They are part of the intra-psychic activity of the brain, involving perceptions, concerns etc. Nevertheless, they also have a very distinct social component, being expressed in and directly affecting social interactions. (Parrott, 2001, p. 6) As a highly negative emotion, anger is experienced by all individuals, yet the strategies used for its expression – action, venting, burial, denial etc. – are differently valorised and instrumentalised depending on social and cultural context.

Psychological containing and later on denying of anger, for instance, can be encouraged and enforced by social taboos, yet it can have very serious consequences in personality disorders as "(...) everyday life experiences as well as clinical insights into psychopathic, narcissistic and borderline personality pathology clearly illustrate the necessity to correctly interpret and give answers to the basic questions raised around the topic of anger as a basic emotion". (Williams, 2017, p. 1)

Among the effects highlighted by Williams, we state collateral expression of anger, destruction of relationships, impact on physical and emotional health and wellbeing. It is also associated with early mortality, alienation of family, friends, co-workers.

On the other hand, the experience of pain, once associated with an anger triggering thought leads to the experiencing of anger; anger triggering thoughts include, according to Mills, "personal assessments, assumptions, evaluations, or interpretations of situations that make people think that someone else is attempting (consciously or not) to hurt them".

However, since anger is a secondary emotion that can only be experienced once associated with a certain storyline, the good news is that once the individual becomes aware of his stereotypical thought pattern, or of his/her tendency to interpret reality in a certain threatening way, the story can be reversed and the energy unleashed by anger rechannelled for self-assertiveness, effective self-protection and positive social change.

Given the narrative necessary to embed anger and the need for various subjects to role-play in it, anger has also been characterised as a social emotion. "In this sense, anger is a social emotion; you always have a target that your anger is directed against (even if that target is yourself). Feelings of pain, combined with anger-triggering thoughts motivate you to take action, face threats and defend yourself by striking out against the target you think is causing you pain". (Mills, s.a.)

Anger can also be featured as a substitute emotion. People get angry so as not to feel pain, a change which can be done consciously or unconsciously. This way, one is distracted from feeling pain and channels thoughts toward harming those that have caused them pain (Mills, s.a.). Hence, we can better understand the link inherently created between anger and the process of radicalisation. Based on the existence of an individual or social trauma, collective empathy and feeling of loss, radicalisation implies stigmatisation of another that needs to be scapegoated so as to revenge a perceived injustice. Hence, anger affliction towards a designated collective or individual enemy. "Anger thus temporarily protects people from having to recognize and deal with their painful real feelings; you get to worry about getting back at the people you're angry with instead. Making yourself angry can help you to hide the reality that you find a situation frightening or that you feel vulnerable". (Mills, s.a.)

"In addition to providing a good smoke screen for feelings of vulnerability, becoming angry also creates a feeling of righteousness, power and moral superiority that is not present when someone is merely in pain. When you are angry, you are angry with cause. For radicalising individuals, anger offers the necessary psychological motivation to adhere to an extremist ideology and become its advocate. This transforms anger into bravery and violence into bravery displayed for a higher end. "The people who have hurt me are wrong – they should be punished" is the common refrain. It is very rare that someone will get angry with someone they do not think has harmed them in some significant fashion". (Mills, s.a.)

Thus, when discussing anger, we need to recognise it as THE ROOT CAUSE OF ANY RADICALISATION PROCESS. Fostering self-awareness, recognition of anger processes and recognition of baseline feelings of anger and hurt can therefore be instrumental in the reinstatement of positive self-perceptions and a meaningful life goal! Whether justified or unjustified, the seductive feeling of righteousness

associated with anger offers a powerful temporary boost to self-esteem. (Mills, s.a) "The adrenaline-caused arousal that occurs during anger lasts a very long time (many hours, sometimes days), and lowers our anger threshold, making it easier for us to get angry again later on. Though we do calm down, it takes a very long time for us to return to our resting state. During this slow cool-down period we are more likely to get very angry in response to minor irritations that normally would not bother us". (Mills, s.a.) During the radicalisation process, similar indicators can signal an embrace of violence.

Also, the memory related aspect is very similar "High levels of arousal (such as are present when we are angry) significantly decrease your ability to concentrate. This is why it is difficult to remember details of really explosive arguments". (Mills, s.a.)

### **Anger management**

At a biological level, when angered, an individual experience a raise in blood -pressure and stress hormones flows which may trigger extreme violence. Where is anger born? "Emotions more or less begin inside two almond-shaped structures in our brains which are called the amygdala. The amygdala is the part of the brain responsible for identifying threats to our well-being, and for sending out an alarm when threats are identified that result in us taking steps to protect ourselves. The amygdala is so efficient at warning us about threats, that it gets us reacting before the cortex (the part of the brain responsible for thought and judgment) is able to check on the reasonableness of our reaction. In other words, our brains are wired in such a way as to influence us to act before we can properly consider the consequences of our actions". (Mills, s.a.)

### Anger management - born or learnt?

Anger management does not come by instinct. Learning it properly is a skill that must be learned, instead of something we are born with. It is related to how we place threshold and to a complex interplay with other emotions. Anger can be either a constructive or a destructive emotion, depending on its goal setting system

manifestation. When well harnessed, anger can be an effective fuel of self-empowerment, "healthy narcissism" (Ronningstam apud Williams, 2017, 6), fostering autonomy and agency towards achievement of goals, managing conflicts, defending own boundaries and integrity etc.

Anger and rage have also been noted as "necessary instruments to re-establish a feeling of personal consistency and autonomy or to endure in a goal pursuit when a failure id experienced". (Williams, 2017, p. 6) "At its roots, anger is a signal to you that something in your environment isn't right. It captures your attention and motivates you to take action to correct that wrong thing". (Mills) When balanced by empathy, acknowledgment of the affective bonding with the opponent, respect, and regulation of behaviour according to ethical and social norms, anger remains in the sphere of benign expressions and interactions. Whether one ends up, harnessing anger signals or being harnessed by them becomes then of uttermost importance, with consequences in the success of social interactions, creating social bonds, professional accomplishment, health, and wellbeing. When asking what to do with our anger, researchers pinpoint to different mechanisms of coping which include: displacement, repression, suppression, ineffective expression, effective expression.

Anger	When placed on a different person/object than the
displacement	focus of anger itself – it happens when anger with
	the primary target is considered unsafe; it provides
	a release in tension on the short term; may have
	strong negative consequences in the long term -
	spoil relationships, hamper effective learning,
	damage self-esteem, produce depression etc.
Anger repression	In order to be controlled, anger is buried in the
	subconscious and unconscious levels of the psyche.
	Then, anger affects behaviour, although we are
	unaware of its influence and involvement in causing
	angry outbursts

Anger suppression	The subject is aware of his/her anger but consciously chooses not to express it, e.g. for fear not to hurt someone or when this would place us in danger. Then, most likely, a mismatch will be generated between verbal and non-verbal messages and the non-verbal will be perceived as more powerful. Alternatively, it may burst later on. Hence, the need to learn appropriate ways to express negative feelings altogether.
Ineffective expression of anger	Destructive and aggressive ways of expressing strong emotions. Escalates hostility and damages relationships. May result in danger to another person or to ourselves.
Effective expression of anger	Expression with respect to other people's feelings and perspectives. It involves communicating concerns while still respecting other people's right to alternative views

Table 1: Different mechanisms of coping anger (Source: Adapted from Faupel, Adrian; Herric, Elizabeth; Sharp, Peter M., Anger Management: A Practical guide for Teachers)

## How to express anger healthily

"Anger is also a critically important part of what might be called the self-preservation and self-defence instincts. People who are incapable of getting angry are also incapable of standing up for themselves. It is important then that people learn how to express anger appropriately. People need to learn healthy and socially respectful ways to express angry feelings, and to not to let anger get out of control to the point where it negatively affects relationships, employability and health". (Mills, s.a.)

"It is more satisfying to feel angry than to acknowledge the painful feelings associated with vulnerability. You can use anger to convert feelings of vulnerability and helplessness into feelings of control and power. Some people develop an unconscious habit of transforming almost all their vulnerable feelings into anger so they can avoid having to deal with them. The problem becomes that even when anger distracts you from the fact that you feel vulnerable, you still at some level feel vulnerable. Anger cannot make pain disappear – it only distracts you from it. Anger generally does not resolve or address the problems that made you feel fearful or vulnerable in the first place, and it can create new problems, including social and health issues". (Braaton, s.a)

### Interventions include:

**Relaxation-based interventions:** Relaxation interventions target emotional and physiological components of anger. Most of these interventions teach clients relaxation coping skills, provide training in applying these skills within sessions, and use homework to facilitate transfer. Theoretically, as clients learn to lower emotional and physiological arousal, they are in a calmer position from which to think clearly and access problem solving, conflict management, and other skills with which to address sources of anger and frustration.

Cognitive interventions: Cognitive interventions target angerengendering "cognitive processes such as hostile appraisals and attributions, irrational beliefs, aggression-supporting expectancies, ineffective problem solving, and inflammatory thinking". Alternative cognitions are developed and rehearsed within sessions, and homework transfers application to real-life events. Anger arousal is lowered as events are construed in less hostile ways and thinking is calmer and controlled. Cognitive interventions may take the form of themselves approaches - to guide self-instructional provocation, ways of challenging negative attributions, reappraisal and decatastrophization, coping self-statements, and selfreinforcement of coping. These new self-instructions are rehearsed within sessions to lower anger and then are transferred to external events via homework.

**Cognitive restructuring** – assisting clients in identifying biased information. The therapeutic styles may vary from the more rational, deductive approach of rational-emotive therapy to the more inductive, Socratic style of Beck's cognitive therapy; cognitive-restructuring approaches assist clients in identifying the biased information

processing and distorted beliefs that engender dysfunctional anger and forms of anger expression. Clients explore the errors in these cognitive processes and develop calmer, more logical, and reality-based cognitive responses. These are rehearsed within and between sessions for anger management.

**Problem solving**: Clients are, therefore, taught the general steps of problem solving (e.g., problem orientation, breaking problems down, resource review, generation of alternatives, implementation of a plan, etc.) and practice applying them to anger and conflict.

**Social skills interventions:** Individuals with anger problems often behave abrasively and react impulsively and antagonistically in the face of interpersonal provocation. They tend to engage others in verbal and physical aggression and to express themselves in less controlled and constructive ways in dealing with interpersonal approaches address Social skills difficulties. these dysfunctional means of dealing with anger and attempt to provide angry individuals with conflict management skills such as recognizing the impact of their behaviour on others, taking time out, and developing listening and feedback skills, assertion, and interpersonal negotiation. As these skills are deployed, anger is reduced as the person communicates more effectively and aborts or reduces cycles of escalating conflict and anger.

**Combined interventions:** Several interventions integrate two or more intervention components and target multiple elements of anger. For example, cognitive-relaxation interventions focus on cognitive, physiological, and emotional components of anger with both cognitive and relaxation approaches. Other interventions combine cognitive and behavioural interventions, and still others integrate all three. (Deffenbacher et. al., 2002)

#### **Conclusions**

This limited study looks into how to better understand anger, its origins as a basic human emotion, its biological and psychological characteristics, and its place in the life of the individual and of the community, as well as in a cultural system we may share and inherit. Last but not least, it was our intention to identify and describe various

strategies and techniques used by educators, coaches and therapists in teaching and promoting anger management and to highlight those strategies and interventions that might also prove useful for the daily routine of different segments of first-liners working with children and youth vulnerable to radicalisation and violent extremism. Further study is required to test and calibrate anger management strategies and interventions to the needs of youth vulnerable to radicalisation. The ARMOUR project will therefore investigate potentially useful strategies and calibrate them to the use of the practitioners by carrying out experimental laboratories in Romania, Italy, Spain, Germany, Greece, Malta and The Netherlands.

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# HATE SPEECH, DISCRIMINATION, POLARIZING EVENTS. MANAGING PUBLIC REPORTING AND RESPONSIBLE COMMUNICATION IN CASE OF SECURITY THREATS\*

#### Ileana-Cinziana SURDU\*

#### **Abstract**

The internet may be seen, through the social networks, as a "public sphere", which invites to a democratic discourse. On the other hand, the internet can also be seen as a support of the echo chambers, which create an environment for reinforcing certain beliefs and discrimination, and for creating hate speech, which can lead to polarization.

The culture of communication is highly influenced by the impact of the social networks, determining an increasing pluralism and a certain level of unethical dissemination of information, in the absence of critical analysis. Sensitive aspects, like security threats, impose a special approach, so they would not have a very negative impact over the public. The generalization of these type of topics may lead to panic, fear, polarization, discrimination, and even violent attitude and behavior.

The professionals who can prevent or soften the negative reactions of the public are the first liners in the field of communication and journalism, like institutional spokespersons and journalists in the field of security and law enforcement. Thus, these communicators bear the responsibility of delivering accurate data and information, in an ethical manner. These are only two of the requirements in relation to their audience. Other skills, competences and knowledge are also a must, such as the ability to think critically, develop responsible reactions, or the literacy in negative phenomena and actions that may lead to violent behavior.

<sup>\*</sup> Acknowledgement: This document was drafted with the financial support of the European Commission, as part of the CRESCEnt project ("Mind the gap in media CoveRagE and Strategic communication in CasE of security Threats – the development of critical thinking and responsible reaction" – CRESCEnt Project 2018-1-R001-KA202-049449). The content of the present document is the exclusive responsibility of the author, and the National Agency and the European Commission are not responsible for the way that the information will be used.

<sup>\*</sup>Researcher, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, Romania, email: ileana.surdu@animv.ro; surdu.ileana@animv.eu

The present study is a theoretical approach which aims at contributing to the understanding of the factors that may determine the elaboration of media messages and articles in an accountable manner, when reporting on security threats or sensitive issues for the public. The analysis represents a contribution to the first steps towards the literacy of both the communicators and the audience in the field of hate speech, polarization, discrimination and other related phenomena and actions. Each type of phenomenon is analyzed through comparative definitions and characteristics of manifestation, followed by the analysis of the human rights perspective in dealing with it, the analysis of the legal framework at European level, possible counteraction approaches, main challenges and lessons learnt when addressing discrimination, hate speech and polarization.

**Keywords:** hate speech, discrimination, polarization, and communication, public reporting.

### Arguments towards responsible public reporting

The power of the internet and the impact of social networks have a determinant influence over the culture of communication, thus, determining an increasing pluralism and the unethical dissemination of information, in the absence of the critical analysis of information. Actions like polarization or discrimination have led to the normalization of hate speech at European level in the recent years, fuelling radicalization, racism, xenophobia, toxic behaviours etc. Social networks can act as channels for communicating freely, within the public sphere, but also as echo chambers for reinforcing certain beliefs (Grömping, 2014).

Communicating news about security threats in a generalized manner may have a strong negative impact over the public and lead to different kinds of reactions, from panic and fear to polarization and violent behaviour. As such, institutional spokespersons and journalists in the field of security and law enforcement bear a high responsibility in relation to their audience, in order to deliver accurate information, in an accountable manner. As relevant communicators, the spokespersons and journalists are required to have crucial skills and competences, like critical thinking, responsible reaction, or the ability to identify fake news, polarizing discourses, or push and pull factors of radicalization that may lead to violent behaviour.

The present theoretical approach may contribute to the understanding of such factors and may determine an alignment of the social reality and the conveyed messages. Thus, the literacy of the communicators involved in such type of actions and elements represents the first step of the complex process of achieving instinctive responsible reactions in relation to the audience.

The analysis aims to provide a better understanding and use of communication techniques, dedicated to institutional spokespersons and journalists in the field of security and law enforcement and to relevant stakeholders, when dealing with hate speech, discrimination and polarizing events and reporting on security threats or sensitive topics.

The analysis of hate speech, discrimination and polarizing events contributes to the development of both individual and community capacities of spokespersons and journalists, in order to use media reporting conscientiously and ethically.

# What is hate speech and which are its specific characteristics of manifestation?

Negative opinions and views expressed with respect to certain individuals or groups, in the absence of counteracting actions, tend to be generally accepted and integrated as "normal" attitude. (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.)

The term "hate speech" refers to negative acts and perspectives towards society, minorities, democracy etc., which may lead to violent actions. The expression of hate speech in different ways of manifestation and through different types of channels, has contributed to phenomena such as radicalization, racism, discrimination, polarization and hate crime. This has led to the promotion of hate narratives towards women and minority populations like LGBTQI, Roma, migrants, refugees, minority religious communities, but also towards political movements, governmental decisions, policies, or associated key personalities. The resulted action of hate speech may contribute to the weakening of democracy, of the equity among populations, of social cohesion, but may also lead to distrust in the law and to concrete violent acts. (Erasmus+ Virtual Exchange, s.a.)

According to the Recommendation no. 97(20) of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, hate speech is to be seen as: "all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed through aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin". (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a., p. 7)

The *European Court of Human Rights* refers to hate speech as: "all forms of expression, verbal or written, which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance (also on grounds of religion)". (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a., p. 7)

ILGA Europe, an active organization in the field of equality and human rights, including countering hate speech, defines the term in relation to the concept of "hate crime":

"Hate speech is public expressions which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred, discrimination or hostility towards a specific group. They contribute to a general climate of intolerance which in turn makes attacks more probable against those given groups". (ILGA Europe)

Or: "Hate crime is any form of crime targeting people because of their actual or perceived belonging to a particular group. The crimes can manifest in a variety of forms: physical and psychological intimidation, blackmail, property damage, aggression and violence, rape, and murder". (ILGA Europe)

The above definitions underline the type of actions, which are grouped under the umbrella of hate speech: spreading, inciting, promoting, justifying. These actions have hatred, discrimination, hostility, and the characteristics of the targeted population as their triggers. They may result in the promotion of intolerance or in an attack by a third party. The targeted groups are usually the victims of hate crimes, which can manifest in the form of physical or psychological abuse, damage, aggression or even murder.

Hate speech cannot be identified only through the use of certain type of words, but also through the context in which it is used of using it, the expressed intention and the possibility to have negative outcomes (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.). Hate speech has as trigger

certain characteristics of the targeted communities, like ethnicity, religiosity, gender, sexual orientations, and its main purpose is the humiliation, the disrespect, or the legitimization of discrimination and attack on them (ILGA Europe).

Hate speech differs from hate propaganda, which is defined by its main characteristic of being systematic and consistent to specific ideologies. On the other hand, hate speech is not systematic, or the people who express such content do not necessarily share the same ideology (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

During the past years the internet has become an important channel of disseminating hateful content on the grounds of these terms/ideas are repeated over and over again. This channel and the rapid development of IT facilitated the work of extremist groups: if the first hate site was launched in 1995, by 2012 there were already 15,000 such web sites, mostly with racist or xenophobic content (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

#### What is discrimination and how does it manifest?

Instability, especially in the financial, economic and labor field may lead to the discrimination of certain groups, racism and xenophobia (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

The act of discrimination refers to "treating a person unfairly because of who they are or because they possess certain characteristics". (EOC, 2019) According to the UK Equality Act 2010¹, discrimination may occur and is protected according to nine characteristics: age, gender, race, disability, religion, pregnancy and maternity, sexual orientation, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership (EOC, 2019).

Research regarding discrimination has shown that most Member States (MS) are implementing the EU principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, but, at the same time, results have indicated that practitioners in the field, at the level of MS, don't know what procedure to apply if such a case occurs. The European Union has set as one of its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Equality Act 2010 provides the legal framework for protecting individuals in case of discrimination acts, comprising 116 pieces of legislation in the field (https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/equality-act-2010/what-equality-act).

objectives the safeguarding of non-discrimination and the implementation of the principle of equal treatments in relation to the victims' rights and on the grounds of "race, ethnicity, gender, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender, and religious orientation". (EPRS, 2017)

According to an evaluation of non-discrimination actions at the level of the EU's MS, the European Commission (EC, 2017) highlights the possible different types of discrimination:

- Assumed discrimination it occurs when assumptions are made about a certain individual or a group, even if the facts are not true.
- Associated discrimination it occurs when an individual associate with another person or group who present/s a certain characteristic.
- ➤ Multiple discrimination it occurs when an individual or a group of individuals are discriminated against on multiple grounds, e.g. for being a Roma elderly woman.
- ➤ Intersectional discrimination it occurs when an individual or a group of people are victims of discriminating acts on the grounds of several inseparable characteristics.
- ➤ Direct discrimination it occurs when people feel "the need to demonstrate less favourable treatment", when there is "a requirement for comparison with another person in a similar situation but with different characteristics (e.g. ethnic origin, religion, sexual orientation), when there is "the opportunity to use a comparator from the past" etc. (EC, 2017, pg. 43); direct discrimination can be stated when a person is "treated worse than another person or other people because: you have a protected characteristic, someone thinks you have that protected characteristic (known as discrimination by perception), you are connected to someone with that protected characteristic (known as discrimination by association)". (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2018)
- ➤ Indirect discrimination it occurs when "there is a policy that applies in the same way for everybody but disadvantages a group of people who share a protected characteristic". (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2018)
- ➤ Harassment defined as "unwanted conduct relating to racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual

orientation with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment". (Directive 2000/43/EC)

- ➤ Discrimination by perception it occurs when people are treated unfairly because they are thought to belong to a certain group or to have certain characteristics (EOC, 2019)
- ➤ Victimization it may happen when people who complain about being victims of discrimination, or who sustain victims of discrimination, are themselves treated badly because of this (EOC, 2019).

# What is polarization and which are its specific characteristics of propagation through events?

The elements that define polarization are mainly focused on attitudes, rather than behaviors. DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson (1996) consider that polarization can be related to either the process or the state by which attitudes are being diverted to ideological extremes. The EPRS study (2019) highlights the distinction between polarization of the elite public and that of the general public.

There is little evidence that factors like exposure to news or to opposing views may lead to the spread of polarization among the media's public. On the other hand, there are studies which prove that the two elements may contribute to the already strong attitudes and views of people, regarding a certain aspect. The selection of news sources across Europeans differs by the countries' current situations (political, economic, social etc.), while research on the topic at the level of the United States of America shows higher degrees of partisan media coverage, news consumption and polarization (EPRS, 2019).

In understanding the phenomenon of polarization, the EPRS report (2019) takes into consideration both levels of production and consumption of news, and analyses four topics when targeting news production:

- News content
- Current European issues, like immigration, corruption, refugees etc., are reflected in the news according to the political leaning of the source.

- O While in Europe researchers do not show a high interest regarding news polarization, researchers in the US indicate a high degree of polarization in news media content.
  - News media landscape
- $\,\circ\,$  News outlets tend to become commercialized, especially the online ones, but the degree of polarization has not been correlated to this aspect.
- o While national newspapers cover diverse topics, local newspapers tend to present more homogenous content.
  - Public news media
- Public news media is adapting to the audience's behavior of online consumption, in order to reach the public and to reduce the consumption of polarized news.
- o Because public news media relies on social media, it can itself be a factor of polarization.
  - Digital news media
- o Digital news media tend to present news so that it resonates with young people and the views of the targeted groups.

Polarization may also be the result of exposure to news, which can be "incidental" or "selective". While the incidental exposure happens as an incident, when trying to inform on other topics, the selective exposure implies the selection of topics, news, articles etc., in accordance with the people's previous interests. (EPRS, 2019) The media may increase the polarization level in case the audience manifests a dislike of the opposite views, and, at the same time, the media may contribute to the moderation of attitudes in the presence of convincing arguments. (EPRS, 2019)

With regard to the channels of propagation of polarization, studies have shown that social media platforms may facilitate the exposure to opposite views, especially concerning political topics, but with a lower impact on people who present a high degree of polarization (EPRS, 2019). Fletcher and Nielsen (2018) concluded as a result of their study on data from the 2017 Digital News Report that search engines used for news expose people to different type of views, but it didn't indicate a clear impact of polarization. Flaxman et al.

(2016), though, found that people who use search engines for news are more ideologically dispersed and polarized than the ones who use social platforms, or both social platforms and search engines.

# What is the human rights framework in dealing with hate speech, discrimination and polarizing events?

The main element of human rights is "equality for all persons" (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.). The act of hate speech has an important impact over the act of discrimination. It can lead to prejudice and social division. Mass media plays an important role in spreading and stopping the dissemination of hate speech among certain groups, through the messages they communicate. Nazi Germany and former Yugolsavia are two examples of the involvement of media in spreading hate speech, which has contributed to conflicts and mass murders against national minority groups (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights highlights the freedom of expression as a central value. The democratic character of the MS implies the availability of verified information, which citizens can use in understanding the political facts through their own critical lenses. Actions like disinformation<sup>2</sup>, hate speech, discrimination, polarizing events etc. interfere with the aimed desire for democratic processes of thought and analysis. (European Commission, December 2018)

The freedom of expression is protected through a series of international instruments (e.g. UDHR, ECHR), which permit the dissemination of any opinion in any type of environment without any restrictions. Apart from this right, there are others which are also being addressed, like debating, sharing information, or analysis of political facts (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

Studies have shown that hate speech and hate crime are often not reported by the victims, because of the discomfort they have to face, especially if they have been attacked on the grounds of their sexuality (FRA, 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Disinformation is here defined as "verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public harm" (European Commission, April 2018).

Hate speech is being addressed across European countries through restrictive measures regarding the type of messages legally allowed. How do these limits address the freedom of speech, though, in a time of free access to channels of both expression and information? The perspective of regulating hate speech is at the intersection of the freedom of speech and of authoritarianism (Erasmus+ Virtual Exchange, s.a.).

The requirement to respect human rights imposes the established standards, at an international level, of the quality of life, highlighting the necessity of equality and dignity. In this context, hate speech manifestation is considered in relation with the violation of human rights (Erasmus+ Virtual Exchange, s.a.).

"The Universal declaration of Human Rights" (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations after World War II with the aim of preventing the spread of intolerance and hatred, has contributed to the process of combating discrimination based on race, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance. The UDHR protects the people's freedom of opinion and expression. The CERD Committee has paid special attention to discrimination based on race, hate speech and derogatory speech, stipulating the right of the victims to be compensated (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

# What does the legal framework on hate speech, discrimination and polarization state?

In the context of the 2019 European, national and local elections, The European Union has developed an "Action Plan against Disinformation". The document establishes the allocation of the necessary resources in the field, the creation of a "Rapid Alert System" and the monitoring of the "Code of Practice" of online industry (EC, Press Release, 2018): "Healthy democracy relies on open, free and fair public debate. It's our duty to protect this space and not allow anybody to spread disinformation that fuels hatred, division, and mistrust in democracy". (HR Federica Mogherini, EC, Press Release, 2018)

"We need to be united and join our forces to protect our democracies against disinformation. (...). To address these threats, we propose to improve coordination with Member States through a Rapid Alert System, reinforce our teams exposing disinformation, increase support for media and researchers, and ask online platforms to deliver on their commitments. Fighting disinformation requires a collective effort". (Andrus Ansip, Vice-president responsible with Digital Single Market, EC, Press Release, 2018)

The Action Plan against Disinformation focuses on four aspects which may contribute to counter disinformation, by capacitating the MS and the inter-state cooperation (European Commission, December 2018):

- ➤ Improving detection capabilities this will be tackled by reinforcing the Strategic Communication Task Forces, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell in the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the MS with specialized human resources and tools; also, EEAS allocates a significant budget for raising awareness regarding disinformation (1,9 mil Euro in 2018 and an estimative budget of 5 mil Euro in 2019).
- ➤ Coordinating the response between EU institutions and MS the action includes the implementation of a Rapid Alert System, in order to better share the information between them in real time.
- ➤ Monitoring the implementation of the "Code of Practice by the online platforms" – the commitments made by the online industry include the insurance of the transparency of political advertising, closing fake accounts, working on identifying bots and disinformation content, or promoting fact-checked content.
- Empowering citizens through awareness and media literacy campaigns – these actions will include the empowering of local fact-checkers and researchers to identify disinformation content on social platforms.

The Rapid Alert System (RAS) represents one of the four pillars of the Action Plan against disinformation proposed in December 2018 by the European Council. This digital platform has as its main purpose the coordination of actions and responses regarding disinformation, at the level of EU institutions and the MS. The RAS has among its main sources of information open-sources, academia, fact-checkers, and

online platforms. It brings together 28 national contact points, which contribute with information, best practices, analyses, trends and insights to countering disinformation. The outcomes foreseen by the RAS include raising awareness on disinformation among the general public, identifying cases of disinformation in the online, empowering the civil society and the professionals involved, ensuring a coordinated response and responsibility. (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/59644/factsheet-rapid-alert-system\_en)

The Code of Practice against Disinformation has been signed in October 2018 by the online industry (platforms – Facebook, Google, Twitter, Mozilla and, from May 2019, Microsoft –, social networks, advertisers etc.), agreeing on counteracting disinformation and fake news in the online environment (EC, June 2019). The first monitoring report on implementing the code of practice has registered a significant progress in eliminating fake accounts and making less visible disinformation sites. The European Commission has stressed the necessity to ensure the transparency of ads, to allow access for documentation and research and to sustain the collaboration of MS and the Rapid Alert System. The implementation of the Code is to be monitored during the first year, followed by possible standardization actions proposed by the EC. (EC, January 2019)

In order to prevent and counter illegal hate speech in the online environment, in May 2016 the European Commission has signed with Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube the "Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online". In 2018, Instagram, Google+, Snapchat and Dailymotion, have joined in the agreement and in 2019 Jeuxvideo.com also became a member of the "Code of conduct". The actions developed by these IT companies in order to respect the "Code of conduct" are being monitored by established EU organizations in different MS, based on a standard procedure. The evaluation has shown that the companies have managed to act rapidly to eliminate racist and xenophobic hate speech and the last reports show that approximately 89% of the flagged content is being evaluated within 24 hours and approximately 72% of the illegal hate speech is being deleted (https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/countering-illegal-

hate-speech-online\_en). The IT companies that have signed the Code of conduct have taken on board different entities with the role of flaggers of (illegal) hate speech: within the first year of implementation 106 NGOs have joined the mission of Facebook and Twitter, at the level of 21 countries. Likewise, national contact points have been established, in order to facilitate the collaboration of the IT companies that signed the Code of conduct and the national competent authorities. The nine companies that signed the Code of conduct cover approximately 96% of the EU market share of online platforms susceptible to hate speech content. (EC, February 2019)

In 1965, the United Nations adopted the "UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination" (CERD) as a response to anti-Semitic attacks in Germany and colonialism. CERD promotes the eradication of incitement and discrimination on racial arguments and forces the parties of the convention to condemn hate speech, hate crimes and racial discrimination (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) also addresses the issue of non-discrimination of people (on grounds of sex, race, color, spoken language, religion, political orientation) in relation to the fundamental human rights and freedoms stated within the document. In 2000, Protocol no. 12 to the ECHR added the prohibition of discrimination for benefiting of any legal right within the national law.

The European Social Charter (1996) set the prohibition of discrimination in relation to employment and gender, aiming to install equal treatment of individuals. Other European conventions also address the issue of discrimination, such as: the CoE "Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities", the CoE "Convention against Trafficking" and the CoE "Convention on Access to Official Documents". Also, the CoE Convention on Cybercrime, through the Protocol on Xenophobia and Racism prohibits the dissemination of racist or xenophobic content in the online environment (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

All EU MS incriminate physical assault, and when it has a discriminative or hate-related reason, the crime may be considered even more dangerous. To this matter, the EU has adopted since

November 2008 a decision against inciting to hate crime on the basis of racism or xenophobia (JO L 328.20068). (FRA, 2009)

The Racial Equality Directive of the European Union prohibits discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and race in different fields, like education, employment, healthcare, supply, social protection. Moreover, the Employment Equality Directive prohibits the discrimination on the grounds of "religion, disability, age, and sexual orientation within the labor market". (EC, 2017)

# How to counter hate speech, discrimination and polarization?

A critical analysis of hate speech leads to the necessity of promoting alternative narratives. The Internet has proven to be an efficient channel of communication for hate speech discourse (Eadicicco, 2014; Kettrey and Laster, 2014), burdening the social media platforms with the task of detecting and erasing such content (Moulson, 2016), while respecting the freedom of speech (Waseem and Hovy,

2016). The disastrous outcomes of hate speech, like hate crime, highlights the importance of detecting and managing hate speech discourse, narratives and actions (Hate Speech Watch, 2014).

In order to identify hate speech, it is absolutely necessarv to critically analyze the messages, don't because they necessarily include preestablished hate speech terms (McIntosh, 2003: DeAngelis, 2009). Waseem and Hovy (2016) propose as efficient method an in

Feature (racism)
'sl'
's <b>la</b> '
's <b>lam'</b>
'isla'
'1'
'a'
'isl'
'lam'
'i'
'e'
'mu'
's'
'am'
'm'
'la'
'is'
'slim'
'musl'
'usli'
'lim'

Table 1. The most indicative character n-gram features for hate-speech detection Source: Waseem and Howy (2016, p. 92)

detecting hate speech *the n-gram model*. The model results with the probabilistic prediction of the items in a sequence of words (Jurafsky and Martin, 2018). Waseem and Hovy (2016) have considered more efficient for their analysis the use of character n-grams instead of word n-grams, in correlation to gender associated features and location.

Aiming to understand the role of social media in the polarization process, Beam, Hutchens and Hmielowski (2018) conducted a three-wave online survey during the US Presidential Elections of 2016. The results showed that news disseminated on Facebook have registered a decreasing polarization effect, especially as a result of posting cross-cutting news or pro-attitudinal information. The authors considered that Facebook might be used as an instrument of depolarization.

Results have shown that education is the main element in combating and preventing acts of discrimination, hate speech and social polarization. As a result, UNESCO (2019) proposes five ways to counter hate speech in the media, by imposing ethics and self-regulation:

- ➤ "Education on media ethics" during the last years, the emergence of social media has determined the creation of online platforms and has facilitated the dissemination of hate speech; UNESCO considers that education on media ethics and the important role of spokespersons and journalists in promoting peace is a first step in countering hate speech; the process has to start with the introduction into political, social and cultural rights of individuals, and has to continue with awareness in relation to the responsibilities that derive from the freedom of the press;
- ➤ "Encourage conflict sensitive reporting and multicultural awareness campaigns" the approach is destined to eliminate the fallacy of "us" versus "them"; in this respect, journalists are to develop skills for reporting on sensitive issues, and to learn about different cultures and traditions.
- ➤ "Regulate social media" media laws and ethics can contribute to the regulation of social media without trespassing the freedom of the press.

- ➤ "Encourage victims and witnesses to report hate speech related crimes" it is important that victims know where to report the experience, so it can be countered.
- ➤ "End impunity against hate crimes" UNESCO proposes to tackle the impunity against hate crimes by establishing units of monitoring and evaluation of hate speech; the units would have the responsibility of disseminating the evaluations to stakeholders and the civil society. (Jamekolok, P. A., 2019)

Media, especially the visual, is seen as an important instrument in shaping public opinion. As such, media can be a tool in promoting human rights, combating hate speech and violence, and creating group and social cohesion. At the same time, media can propagate intolerance and hatred. To have a positive contribution to the battle against hate speech, social polarization, and discrimination, media should report "factually and accurately", "draw upon professional codes of conduct within their different media sectors", "provide in-house training or opportunities for outside training for their media professionals at all levels, on professional standards on tolerance and intolerance as well as a multi-ethnic journalistic team". Media can also be used as a channel for public debate, facilitating the dialogue between communities. This is a must in a democratic society (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

The media literacy of individuals is also important in the fight against intolerance. The internet has become a more accessible channel of information, so individuals need to be taught about how the media works and how to critically analyze the information. "Media literacy is the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, and create media; from television, radio, Internet, newspapers, social media, and all other forms of media and to use them in a responsible and critical manner". (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a., p. 23)

Article 19 (2018) proposes the counteracting of hate speech by implementing a series of measures at legislative level, in relation to the human rights and the right to free expression, proposing, at the same time, a series of literacy actions:

Providing trainings on human rights applicable to hate speech, dedicated to law enforcement, judiciary and public

- entities; the main tool for training and further use should be a guideline based on the human rights regulations.
- ➤ Elaborating regulatory framework for the media, in order to ensure its diversity.
- ➤ Elaborating and implementing clear policy guidelines in relation to hate speech.
- ➤ Media outlets should guarantee the media reporters with resources for validation of information, in order to present accurate data; this process may include trainings for media in relation to hate speech and the provision of the proper technical equipment.
- ➤ Journalists' organizations should prepare proper responses for journalists to use in case of hate speech and freedom of expression; this may include a code of conduct or training on ethics and human rights.

# Main challenges when addressing hate speech, discrimination and polarization

When addressing hate speech, discrimination and polarizing events, the news consumption habits and attitudes of the public tend to become a challenge, especially regarding three aspects:

- ➤ the prevalence of online news media: Europeans have developed a behavior of consuming news online, because of the possibility to access various sources in a short time, based on their interests (EPRS, 2019);
- ➤ the use of social media platforms as news sources: the information on social media may lead to a higher degree of exposure to opposite political views, and few studies have indicated a higher degree of polarization in case of news consumption on social media, while others, conversely, showed de-polarization (EPRS, 2019);
- ➤ the consumption of populist news: the exposure to populist trusts has proven to have an impact only on people with populist views, without having a significant influence on those with no views to this regard (EPRS, 2019).

The EPRS study (2019) states that peoples' attitudes in the UK and Southern European countries have been more influenced by politics than in the Western and Northern Europe. The data doesn't show, though, that a selective exposure has a polarizing effect, but it can have a strengthening effect over the public with an already formed opinion.

A significant challenge in preventing and countering hate speech on the internet is the possibility of not being able to localize the source of the message/act. Also, the national legislations differ, so not all messengers of hate speech can be punished according to a standardized regulation, nor can the same ethical guidelines be implemented in all the countries. Thus, cooperation and coordination of responses and stakeholders, including private suppliers of internet services, are seen as main measures in preventing and combating hate speech and propaganda (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

#### Case studies and lessons learnt

European studies on polarization have connected the process elements to topic, source, frame and tone of the news, and, particularly, to the coverage of political issues. For example, in what concerns immigration, the UK newspapers have used as sources the Government or other official entities, and experts in the field (like research institutes and think tanks). Balch and Balabanova (2011) show that while the right-wing trusts used these types of sources to correlate immigration to a dangerous situation, the left-wing ones used it to denounce associated presuppositions.

Another topic of interest at European level, corruption, has led to the association of this issue with polarization. A comparative analysis regarding the level of press-freedom in UK, France and Italy, in relation to the commercialization character of the media, the target segmentation and the influence of politics, has indicated that the topic of corruption has been covered to a higher extent in Italy, than in the UK or France. It also covered, to a higher extent, topics regarding local politicians and used dramatic tones. Each newspaper that was analyzed targeted a specific market segment, by addressing corruption in such a

way so it would attract its own audience. (Mancini, Mazzoni, Cornia, and Marchetti, 2017)

The analysis of the two main Spanish newspapers (El País and El Mundo) showed that they both rely and promote official sources and dominant political parties, especially during economic crisis and elections. The two focused more on the opposition than on the allies, considering that this approach would make the news more appealing to the public. (Bonafont and Baumgartner, 2013)

The EPRS study (2019) emphasizes the fact that media platforms can influence each other's lines of topics, as an effect of the so called "intermedia agenda setting". The study conducted by Cushion, Kilby, Thomas, Morani and Sambrook (2018), during the 2015 UK election campaign, showed that, despite declaring that broadcast news haven't been influenced by right and left wing newspapers' coverage, the TV news reflected in the newspapers' agenda.

The 2017 Reuters Institute Digital News Report (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, and Nielsen, 2017 apud EPRS, 2019) highlighted an approach of measuring news audience polarization, based on the level of left – or right-wing beliefs of a news outlet's public. The study implied a quantitative measure on a seven-step scale from "very left wing" to "very right wing", which has been correlated to the type of news outlets read during the last week. The study has been implemented in 22 countries. The data resulted with "the average political leaning of the population" and "the average political leaning of the audience for each news outlet", which indicated the partisanship level of the audiences and the level of polarization of the online audiences per country (reported to the standard deviation of the resulted scores for each news outlet, at the level of each country) (see figure 1). According to the results presented in figure 1, news audience polarization is higher in the USA (5.93) than in any other country included in the sample, and it may have a smaller impact on the European audience.




Figure 1. Level of online news audience polarization (Source: Newman et al., 2017, apud EPRS, 2019, p. 29)

Trilling et al. (2017) have also studied the effect of news on polarization, using as topic the immigration situation in the Netherlands. The experiment conducted analyzed the impact of positive and negative news regarding immigration on the subjects' attitudes. The experiment included the measure of attitude before and after the exposure to the articles, and the assignation versus the free choice of articles. Those who could choose the articles selected the ones in line with their previous attitudes; those who were assigned articles with positive content towards immigration tended to express a more positive attitude, while those who were displayed negative articles did not register any change of attitude towards immigration.

Waseem and Hovy (2016) analyzed over a two months period of time, 16,914 tweets, out of which 3,383 contained sexist content, 1972 racist content, and 11,559 contained other different types of content. The process followed an initial manual analysis of terms associated with religious, gender, ethnic and sexual minorities, followed by an automatic process of collecting English tweets by using API<sup>3</sup>. The data

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> API is the acronym for "application programming interfaces". APIs allow users to post tweets, to search for certain content using keywords, or monitor certain Twitter accounts (Source: https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-api accessed on 18.07.2019).

set has been annotated manually and validated by a gender-studies expert, in order to eliminate any type of biases. The authors have proposed a model of identifying hate speech within tweets, considering that a message is offensive if it:

- "1. uses a sexist or racial slur.
- 2. attacks a minority.
- 3. seeks to silence a minority.
- 4. criticizes a minority (without a well-founded argument).
- 5. promotes, but does not directly use, hate speech or violent crime.
  - 6. criticizes a minority and uses a straw man argument.
- 7. blatantly misrepresents truth or seeks to distort views on a minority with unfounded claims.
- 8. shows support of problematic hash tags. E.g. #BanIslam, #whoriental, #whitegenocide.
  - 9. negatively stereotypes a minority.
  - 10. defends xenophobia or sexism.
- 11. contains a screen name that is offensive, as per the previous criteria, the tweet is ambiguous (at best), and the tweet is on a topic that satisfies any of the above criteria". (Waseem and Hovy, 2016, p. 89)

Aiming to study hate speech tweets in relation to demographic distribution, Waseem and Hovy (2016) have used proxy data (gender-associated names of profiles, or gender specific pronouns and nouns) in their analysis. The results have indicated a high prevalence of male users as being active in hate speech; the gender characteristic has resulted to be statistically significant only in relation to location.

The Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media organized on December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2014 in Vienna, Austria, a conference with the theme "Freedom of Expression for Tolerance and Non-Discrimination". The purpose of the event was to raise awareness regarding the relationship between freedom of expression, tolerance and non-discrimination, and it was addressed to international experts in the field, academia, and OSCE institutions. (https://www.osce.org/fom/127110)

The United Nations have acted against racism and discrimination over three decades between 1973 and 2003, which

resulted in three global conferences. The third one, held in Durban in 2001, focused on developing a monitoring system of the actions of the MS and has resulted in an "Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action" (DDPA). The DDPA contains measures for combating issues raised during the Durban conference, like racism, discrimination, xenophobia and intolerance (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

As a result of revising the DDPA and the organization of workshops with 45 experts from different areas in the field of incitement to hatred from a legislative, judicial and policies perspectives, the Rabat Plan of Action was elaborated in February 2013. The plan highlights the responsibility of communities and leaders, media actors and civilians to manifest and promote tolerance and communication, hence managing to determine the collaboration between different type of entities – academia, journalists, NGOs – for the purpose of ensuring the freedom of speech while removing hateful content (Pálmadóttir and Kalenikova, s.a.).

In August 2018, in Bucharest, and in January 2019, in Berlin, as part of the project "Like Share Diversity! Log Out Hate Speech!", a campaign dedicated to youngsters was implemented, aiming to promote diversity. The campaign included non-formal education activities which addressed the way the hate speech works as a social phenomenon. The youngsters had the possibility to learn about efficient ways of reacting to hate speech, especially in the online, and to accept diversity. The project was implemented by two partner NGOs, one from Romania and one from Germany, targeting to create an intercultural civic frame of education for the young generation. The project started as a response to the discrimination wave against vulnerable groups, through propaganda, hate speech and disinformation. (STIRI.ONG, 2019)

#### **Conclusions**

The present theoretical approach aimed at contributing to the understanding of the factors that may determine the alignment of the social reality to the message transmitted in case of security threats or of sensitive issues. Targeting to contribute to the development of individual and community capacities of institutional spokespersons and

journalists in the field of security and law enforcement, but also of other stakeholders, in order to use media reporting in an ethical and responsible manner, the analysis discussed the three phenomena addressed from the perspective of manifesting characteristics and definitions. Furthermore, the study discussed the human rights perspective, the legal framework, possible counteraction and preventive actions, main challenges and lessons learnt when addressing hate speech, discrimination and polarization.

Education resulted as the main element of prevention and counteraction of such negative phenomena, of both the communicator and the audience. A series of main challenges when addressing hate speech, discrimination, polarization and other similar actions, have also been highlighted, all in relation to the characteristics of the internet and online channels – the speed of circulating a message, the variety of sources of information, the creation of echo chambers, the anonymity of the source etc.

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
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# PROPUNERE DE EXERCITIU: ARBORELE PROBLEMELOR & ARBORELE SOLUTIILOR

### Valentin NICIII.A\*

#### **Preambul**

Victime ale abundenței informaționale, tindem să prioritizăm anumite explicații în detrimentul altora, ori să accesăm anumite surse și canale de informare datorită disponibilătii si nu al acuratetii, sub imperiul nevoii de rezolvare rapidă a sarcinilor primite, fără o evaluare sistematică.

Folosirea metodelor si tehnicilor de analiză permite extragerea de date relevante si obtinerea de produse analitice cu acuratete sporită, sub dezideratul mentinerii obiectivitătii. Astfel, se poate reduce distorsiunilor cognitive asupra procesului implementând una dintre recomandările fundamentale în materie de psihologie a analizei de intelligence: descompunerea si externalizarea<sup>1</sup>. În exercițiul de față, propunem spre testare de către studenți sau grupuri de experți reuniți în workshop-uri tematice metoda arborelui problemelor și a arborelui soluțiilor.

Desi la o privire superficială poate părea facilă, dacă este implementată sistematic, cu respectarea pașilor metodologici, această metodă poate oferi o serie de direcții strategice inovative pentru rezolvarea unor probleme complexe. Astfel, proiectarea si elaborarea unei strategii viabile prin care România să răspundă într-o manieră proactivă dezideratului privind coeziunea și consolidarea competitivității nationale trebuie să fie precedată de o diagnoză realistă, care să

<sup>\*</sup> Researcher "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, Romania.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Richards J. Heuer Jr., Psychology of intelligence analysis, Center for the study of intelligence, 1999, pp. 84-90.

evidențieze vulnerabilitățile și disfuncțiile cu potențial impact negativ. În urma acesteia, pot fi identificate și formulate răspunsuri pentru o serie de probleme, pentru a limita repercusiunile majore pe termen mediu și lung asupra cresterii competitivității și asigurării unei baze solide pentru dezvoltarea durabilă în context european.

În conformitate cu documentele programatice ale Uniunii Europene, statele membre au ca obiective strategice pentru următorii ani ocuparea forței de muncă, inovarea, educația, incluziunea socială, protecția mediului și asigurarea securității energetice. În acest sens, România trebuie să răspundă provocării reprezentate de consolidarea competitivitătii nationale într-un mediu al integrării si coeziunii europene. Atingerea dezideratului competitivității naționale este conditionată de dezvoltarea unei viziuni integrate dimensionale, care are la bază o arhitectură formată din 12 piloni: adoptarea institutiile. infrastructura, IT&C. stabilitatea economică, eficiența pieței de mărfuri, eficiența pieței forței de muncă, sistemul financiar, mărimea pietelor, sănătatea, abilitățile forței de muncă, dinamismul mediului de afaceri, capacitatea de inovare<sup>2</sup>.

# Precizări metodologice

Pentru rezolvarea cerintelor exercitiului, propunem utilizarea metodei arborelui problemelor, respectiv a arborelui soluțiilor, întrucât prezintă avantajul identificării soluțiilor unei probleme, prin cartarea cauzelor si efectelor generate de aceasta, similar unei hărti mentale.

## Arborele problemelor

Metodologia standard utilizată pentru dezvoltarea arborelui problemelor presupune aplicarea tehnicii în cadrul unui grup de experti, reuniți într-un format de tip work-shop. Primul pas al metodei presupune stabilirea problemei care urmează a fi analizată, în urma unei sesiuni de brainstorming. Principalul instrument folosit în

<sup>2</sup> Conform Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2019, World Economic

Forum, p. 2, disponibil la adresa http://www3.weforum.org/mwg-internal/ de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=V2c0jfFHQ8RH1klYM7Hyd5HGUtmsxRIU98cYR2dvR\_M, accesat la data de 21.10.2019.

construirea arborelui problemelor, aflat la îndemâna moderatorului, este utilizarea întrebării "de ce?" (de exemplu – "de ce a apărut această situație?"). Prin întrebări succesive, se stimulează creativitatea participanților și se adaugă noi niveluri de profunzime cauzelor identificate și factorilor care accentuează starea de fapt. Procesul continuă până în momentul în care soluțiile pentru rezolvarea problemei devin evidente sau până când se ajunge la trei niveluri de profunzime a cauzelor determinante (rădăcina arborelui). În aceeași manieră, se derulează procesul de identificare a impactului problemei asupra mediului analizat (reprezentând ramurile arborelui). În final, se revizuiesc elementele identificate, sub aspectul coerenței și logicii argumentative³.

## Arborele soluțiilor

După parcurgerea acestui pas, se dezvoltă arborele soluțiilor, care va avea aceeași structură cu a arborelui problemelor, cu deosebirea că propozițiile negative identificate drept probleme se vor pozitiva și se vor transforma în obiective de urmărit pentru rezolvarea problemei centrale. Se are în vedere acoperirea unei game extinse de soluții pentru cauzele identificate, ce vor fi trecute ulterior printr-un filtru de prioritizare.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Wendy Snowdon, Jimaima Schultz, Boyd Swinburn Problem and solution trees: a practical approach for identifying potential interventions to improve population nutrition în Health Promotion International, Vol. 23 No. 4 (2008), Oxford University Press, p. 346-347, disponibil la adresa http://heapro.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/4/345.full.pdf+html, ultima accesare 21.10.2019.




Figura 1: Arborele problemelor - schematizare




Figura 2: Arborele soluțiilor – schematizare

## Dintre beneficiile metodei pot fi enumerate următoarele:4

- problema poate fi descompusă în elemente mici, clar definite, cu care se poate opera mai ușor. Acest aspect ajută la prioritizarea exactă a factorilor și orientarea precisă a obiectivelor;
- se acumulează mai multă cunoaștere referitoare la problema analizată și la factorii cauzali, care sunt de cele mai multe ori interconectați și contradictorii;
- sunt identificate elementele constitutive, argumentele și actorii implicați în fiecare etapă;
- este utilă pentru stabilirea necesarului de informații, dovezi și resurse pentru identificarea unei soluții optime;
- prezintă avantajul de a constitui un prim pas în stabilirea unei strategii comune de acțiune, asupra căreia cad de acord toți actorii implicați.

#### **Tema**

Identificarea unor soluții viabile pentru **consolidarea competitivității României** prin definirea unui set de direcții strategice.

#### Mod de lucru

Grup de cursanți, reunit într-o arhitectură flexibilă de dezbatere și conlucrare (de exemplu: seminar sau workshop tematic) pentru identificarea de soluții individuale, pe echipe specializate sau la nivelul întregului grup subsumate temei privind consolidarea competitivității României – deziderat strategic al securității naționale.

# **Etape**

Moderatorul distribuie participanții în echipe de 5-8 membri

1. Echipele își desemnează un coordonator, care va prezenta sau va desemna persoane pentru prezentarea rezultatelor obținute în diferitele etape ale exercițiului.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> \*\*\* Problem Tree Analysis (Notes), Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center, disponibil la adresa http://peacebuilderscenter.jp/parts/20130124-0306/Marshall\_Conley/0205\_text05\_Marshall\_Conley\_Problem\_Tree\_Analysis.pdf, ultima accesare 28.03.2014.

- 2. Moderatorul realizează o prezentare a temei care trebuie rezolvată în cadrul exercițiului și pune la dispoziția membrilor echipei o serie de materiale documentare.
- 3. Echipele derulează o sesiune de brainstorming pentru identificarea problemelor care vor fi analizate în vederea consolidării competitivității României, ca deziderat strategic al securității naționale.
- 4. Echipele realizează un arbore al problemelor identificate aferente temei exercițiului, pe baza rezultatelor obținute în cadrul sesiunii de brainstorming.
- 5. Echipele realizează un arbore al soluțiilor, prin raport cu arborele problemelor.
- 6. Echipele analizează rezultatele și integrează soluțiile într-un set de direcții de acțiune strategică asociate tematicii privind consolidarea competitivității României deziderat strategic al securității naționale.
- 7. Echipele analizează soluțiile obținute, identifică și prioritizează alternativele de acțiune și optează pentru una dintre ele.
- 8. Rezultatele se susțin în plen în sistem dezbatere, pentru corelarea abordărilor identificate.

# Metode de lucru în echipă

- Sesiune de brainstorming;
- Realizarea arborelui problemelor;
- Realizarea arborelui soluțiilor;
- Dezbateri moderate.

# Direcțiile de acțiune strategică

Prin raport cu obiectivul exercițiului, direcțiile de acțiune strategică reprezintă un set concret de activități, rezultate în urma analizei problemelor și a soluțiilor identificate și prioritizate ca atare, pentru care se are în vedere un termen determinat de aplicare (de nivel scurt, mediu sau lung) și pentru care se evaluează beneficiile din perspectiva consolidării competitivității României ca deziderat strategic al securității naționale.

# Matricea de sistematizare a setului de direcții de acțiune strategică

Nr. crt.	Direcția de acțiune strategică	Termen de aplicare	Beneficii din perspectiva consolidării competitivității naționale a României ca deziderat strategic al securității naționale
#1			
#n			

# Resurse documentare utilizate pentru derularea exercițiului:

- 1. World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2019.
- 2. Strategia Europa 2020.
- 3. Strategia Națională pentru Dezvoltare Durabilă a României Orizonturi 2013-2020-2030.
- 4. Strategia națională de apărare a țării pentru perioada 2015 2019. O Românie puternică în Europa și în lume.
- 5. Anuarul Statistic al României, Institutul Național de Statistică
- 6. Analize demografice, diagnoze referitoare la învățământ, cercetare, sănătate, agricultură, infrastructură, mediul economic, dezvoltarea IT&C etc.
- 7. Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture European Union, Institute for Security Studies.
- 8. Politici sectoriale ale autorităților publice centrale.

# DE PE PRIMA PAGINĂ ÎN CARTEA DE ISTORIE: EXERCIȚIU DE ALFABETIZARE MEDIA

# Mihaela TEODOR, Bogdan-Alexandru TEODOR



#### **PREAMBUL**

În acest exercițiu de alfabetizare media și gândire critică, studenții analizează similitudini și diferențe între știrile de presă și informațiile din cărțile de istorie referitoare la patru momente importante din istoria românilor sau din istoria secolului XXI cu impact asupra evoluției evenimentelor și a istoriei naționale sau mondiale, precum:

- a. Atentatul de la Sarajevo (28 iunie 1914)
- b. Vizita oficială a președintelui american Richard Nixon în România (2-3 august 1969)
- c. Atacul de la World Trade Center (11 septembrie 2001)
- d. Semnarea Tratatului de aderare a României la Uniunea Europeană (25 aprilie 2005)

Scopul activității este cel de a înțelege importanța și rolul știrii de presă în scrierea istoriei și a modului în care evoluează informația din momentul producerii până la apariția în cărțile de istorie.

DOMENIU – analiză de conținut și alfabetizare media GRUP ȚINTĂ – studenți și masteranzi

FORMAT – la seminarii

DURATA – 30 de minute plus discuții (în funcție de implicarea studenților fără a depăși 20 de minute)

MATERIALE – copii ale unor pagini de ziar din epocă și ale paginilor din manualele de istorie prezentând aceleași patru momente importante din istoria românilor sau din istoria secolului XXI (sau link către ziare on-line, portaluri de știri sau web-site-uri cu manuale scolare digitale):

# REFERINȚE ORIENTATIVE: https://www.manuale.edu.ro/

http://www.newseum.org/todaysfrontpages/?tfp\_display=g allery&tfp\_region=E urope &tfp\_sort\_by=country https://www.iiccr.ro/2-august-1969-prima-vizita-oficiala-in-romania-a-unui- presedinte-al-statelor-unite-ale-americii/

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4480677.stm https://manuale.edu.ro/manuale/Clasa%20a%20XI-a/Istorie/Corint2/A365.pdf

https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/packages/html/nyregion/9-11imagemap.html

https://newseumed.org/artifact/terrorist-attacks-of-sept-11-2001-archived-papers/

5 minute de istorie: Vizita lui Richard Nixon în România, din august 1969, accesibil pe https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LqM-Za7Acg4

President Nixon Visits Rumania (1969), British Pathé, accesibil pe https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ge9L9i XIfx8

http://www.ceausescu.org/ceausescu\_media/nixon.html

#### **ACTIVITATE**

Pasul 1: spargeți gheața cu o discuție lejeră despre rolul presei. Cereți studenților să răspundă pe scurt la întrebări despre rolul presei ca sursă în scrierea istoriei precum:

> De unde credeţi că îşi procură informaţiile jurnaliştii atunci când fac ştirile?

- Dar istoricii, de unde credeți că își procură informațiile pentru cercetările lor?
- Credeți că știrea de presă este o sursă importantă pentru istorici?

Pasul 2: lucru individual sau în echipă. Împărțiți studenților documentele (copii ale ziarelor și ale paginilor de manual) și explicați-le că acestea sunt surse istorice și cereți să fie reevaluate răspunsurile la întrebările privind importanța presei ca sursă istorică. Apoi pregătiți activitatea propriu-zisă de analiză a documentelor, pasul 3.

### Documente

a. Atentatul de la Sarajevo (28 iunie 1914)





Sursa: https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-archduke-franz-ferdinand -1863-1914-and-duchess-sophie-chotek-1868-50029834.html şi https://manuale.edu.ro/manuale/Clasa%20a%20XII-a/Istorie/Corint2/A388.pdf

b. Vizita oficială a președintelui american Richard Nixon în România (2-3 august 1969)





Sursa: https://www.nytimes.com/1969/08/03/archives/text-of-statements-by-nixon-and-ceausescu-in-bucharest.html (http://larics.ro/category/analize/page/3/) și https://manuale.edu.ro/manuale/Clasa% 20a%20XI-a/Istorie/Niculescu/A146.pdf

c. Atacul de la World Trade Center (11 septembrie 2001)



Islamul Intre integrism si fundamentalism

Timed, can invalida serases un industria di oscinosio, resi dei si dissa men regio a hari funda di oscinosio, resi dei si dissa men regio a hari funda di oscinosio, presi dei si dissa men regio a hari funda di oscinosio, presi dei si dissa men regio a hari funda di oscinosio, presi dei si dissa di cancia di funda di conscioni presi haristi di conscioni presi harita di dissa di cancia di funda di conscioni presi harita di conscioni presi harita di conscioni presi di conscioni di

Sursa: https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/packages/html/nyregion/9-11imagemap.html şi https://manuale.edu.ro/manuale/Clasa%20a%20XI-a/Istorie/Corint2/A365.pdf

d. Semnarea Tratatului de aderare a României la Uniunea Europeană (25 aprilie 2005)



Sursa: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4480677.st şi https://manuale.edu.ro/manuale/Clasa%20a%20XI-a/Istorie/Corint2/A365.pdf

Pasul 3: analiza informațiilor din documente, lucru individual sau în echipă pe fișa de lucru pusă la dispoziție. Acordați studenților 10-15 de minute pentru a analiza documentele referitoare la un eveniment la alegere si pentru a completa fisa de lucru alăturată.

## FISA DE LUCRU

# Nume și prenume: Data:

Activitate: Completați în tabel răspunsurile la următoarele întrebări după analiza documentului sursă (pagina de ziar sau pagina de manual).

<b>Eveniment</b>	Întrebare	Jurnal	Manual
Informații cheie din document	<ol> <li>Ce s-a întâmplat?</li> <li>Unde s-a întâmplat?</li> <li>Când s-a întâmplat?</li> <li>Care au fost figurile cheie?</li> <li>De ce a fost important?</li> <li>Ce impact a avut în istoria națională/a lumii?</li> </ol>		
Întrebări suplimentare	<ol> <li>Ce informații credeți că lipsesc din cele două documente?</li> <li>Aveți întrebări legate de evenimentul ales și de importanța lui în istorie?</li> <li>Aveți întrebări legate de sursele folosită?</li> </ol>		

## Pasul 4: similitudini și diferențe.

Cereți studenților să analizeze și să încercuiască similitudinile și diferențele semnalate între cele două surse istorice, dar și întrebările la care nu au găsit răspuns în sursa folosită. Apoi cereți studenților să răspundă la întrebări legate de informațiile găsite precum: De ce credeți că unele informații apara în ambele surse și altele nu? Aveți toate informațiile necesare pentru a răspunde la toate întrebările? Credeți că pagina de ziar poate fi considerată o sursă istorică credibilă? Da că da, de ce da? Dacă nu, de ce nu? Argumentați!

## Pasul 5: completare informații din surse suplimentare.

Asigurând studenților acces la bibliotecă sau internet, acordați-le 10-15 minute pentru a căuta surse (enciclopedii, studii și articole, cărți) și a găsi informații suplimentare necesare completării fișei de lucru. Puteți pune la dispoziție referințele bibliografice incluse în preambul sau orice alte surse utile.

## Pasul 6: discuții și rezultate.

Păstrați maximum 20 de minute pentru o discuție colectivă pe marginea rezultatelor exercițiului, dar și a temei controversate *știre de presă versus istorie* punând întrebări precum:

Care informații sunt asemănătoare și care diferă?


Care dintre surse oferă mai multe informații?

De ce credeți că lipsesc informații în unul dintre documente?

Care este rolul unui reporter?

Care este rolul unui istoric?

Cât timp credeți că este necesar ca o știre să devină istorie?



Ioan Codruț Lucinescu, Mihaela Teodor, "Din patrimoniul istoric și cultural național: Grădiștenii și Conacul de la Grădiștea (Însemnări monografice)", Editura ANIMV, Bucuresti, 2019, 130p

## Review by Bogdan Alexandru TEODOR

As the preface highlights the *Historical and Cultural National Heritage: The Grădișteanu Family and Grădiștea Manor (Monograph Notes)*, signed by researchers Ioan Codruţ Lucinescu and Teodor Mihaela, is "both as a scientific effort to revive the memory of historical buildings in the patrimony of the Romanian Intelligence Service, and as an editorial endeavour, this being the first book of the series of "Culture and Civilization" published by "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy Publishing House".


The volume, an original initiative due to both the subject and the research, is dedicated to all those passionate on the national history through the subject addressed, the history of a building of public utility and a historical monument representative for the local cultural heritage. But the research isn't only about presenting the past and present of the building, but it also had – and met – the goal of bringing into light the destiny of the Grădiștea Manor, being the witness of the last outbursts of Grădișteanu men's nobility Grandomania.

The volume was structured in two chapters: the first one – dedicated to the family, *The national historical heritage: the Grădișteanu family*, and the second – dedicated to the estate and the manor, *The historical and cultural heritage: the estate and manor in Grădiștea*. The authors also added a special chapter of appendices, including

REVIEWS AND NOTES

illustrations, facsimiles and the complete family tree starting in the 16th century and until today; in this way managing to attractively recreate both the period and modernity.

Based on archival documents, some of them unique, but also on the existing literature, the volume presents a piece of history: "the evolution of those members who left the clearest footprint on the Middle Age and modern history of Romania, and, in particular, the evolution of the Grădiștea estate and manor in Vlașca – (now a village in the Giurgiu county), the place that gives the name of the family – from being a private property to a public utility building and a historical monument." It is what authors intended to be some monographic notes about the estate and the manor in Grădiștea, part of our national historical and cultural heritage.







Strategic partnership project within ERASMUS+ Program AGREEMENT No. – 2018-1-R001-KA202-049449\* MIND THE GAP IN MEDIA
COVERAGE AND STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATION IN CASE
OF SECURITY THREATS –
THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CRITICAL THINKING
AND RESPONSIBLE REACTION

(October 1st, 2018 – September 30th, 2020)

CRESCEnt project addresses the challenge of social polarization created by the propagation of disinformation and fake news. It is a proven fact that fake news have created in Europe, and in the three countries participating in the project, an acute miscommunication and lack of trust between the two targeted professional categories. As the media has been pressed into reaching large audiences, institutional spokespersons were forced into communicating what is necessary and not divulging aspects which could jeopardise security investigations and public safety. A gap of trust and efficient communication was, thus, created and later on widened by the phenomenon of fake news. While it is indeed the media professionals that shape the way information is delivered to the public, they themselves might get trapped in particular "narratives" and share common mental frames. Recognizing that the media professionals are themselves the locus of potential influence by external actors is crucial to developing strategies to combat misinformation and hostile influence. CRESCEnt aims to address this divide through innovative solutions and multiplication of best practices of both spokespersons and journalists.

<sup>\*</sup> Document drafted with the financial support of the European Commission. The content of the present document is the exclusive responsibility of the authors, and the National Agency and the European Commission are not responsible for the way that the information will be used.

ACADEMIC FOCUS

CRESCEnt project creates a training platform and a set of communication and cross-sectorial strategic communication instruments, which aim to capacitate institutional spokespersons and journalists from security and LEA fields, in order to use media reporting to the public in a conscious and ethical manner. CRESCEnt's main target group consists of spokespersons in the field of national security and LEAs. The secondary group is represented by (young) journalists who are active in the field of security.

Participating organizations are: "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA) – Romania; University "Rey Juan Carlos" (URJC) – Spain; Kentro Meleton Asfaleias (KEMEA), Centre for Security Studies – Greece; Ministry of Internal Affairs, Directorate for Information and Public Relations (MAI-DIRP) – Romania.

Objective of the project are:

- to develop a toolkit of techniques, methods and instruments for institutional spokespersons and journalists who communicate on issues related to security and law enforcement, as support in their professional activity;
- to enhance key-competences and skills of the spokespersons and journalists so that they become resilient to fake news, build an ethics of reporting, perform double fact checking, provide and obey ethical grounds in handling sources, report security threats and handle truth for the preservation of democracy and the rule of law.

The CRESCEnt project is part of the ERASMUS+ program and it is funded by the European Commission. See more about the project on the official website: https://crescentproject.eu.



# A RADICAL MODEL OF RESILIENCE FOR YOUNG MINDS – ARMOUR

Grant Agreement No. 823683 (January 1st, 2019 – December 31st, 2020)

The Euro-Arab Foundation leads ARMOUR (*A Radical Model of Resilience for Young Minds*) consortium and the project aiming to address the social polarization caused by the adoption and spread of extremists ideologies by creating an interdisciplinary learning model that helps individuals and communities develop resilience to the specific ideologies and behaviours of violent extremism. The ARMOUR's consortium, led by the Euro-Arab Foundation, is also made up of the Centre for Security Studies – KEMEA (Greece), the "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy (Romania), SYNYO GmbH (Austria), the Italian Ministry of Justice, Agenfor (Italy), LIBRe Foundation (Bulgaria), the University of Malta (Malta) and the University of Groningen (Netherlands).

ARMOUR Project aims to address societal polarization via strengthening resilience of individuals, communities and vulnerable groups (such as children, youth, etc.) to polarisation, and to promote interaction and cooperation between different local actors from public sectors, i.e. law enforcement, social services etc., that specialise in working with vulnerable groups in preventing extremism through development of cooperation models. The project will design and create a Toolkit for first-line practitioners to employ in reducing polarization among children and youth.

The Toolkit, capitalizing on previous work carried out by project partners, takes the form of experimental laboratories (experimental

labs) which together work towards: strengthening individual capacity to resist push and pull factors of radicalization; creating community empowerment and resilience to social polarization and violent extremism and assisting states deploy proportional responses against provocations and latent conflicts. The model will then be promoted through a social media campaign.

The expected impact of the project covers the following aspects:

- Increasing awareness and capacity of first-line practitioners: ARMOUR achieves this through the experimental labs and the related training programme. The first tool will help practitioners better understand and identify instances of radicalization and polarization among children and youth while the second one will help them improve their ability to use the project toolkit.
- Promoting interaction and cooperation among different stakeholders: ARMOUR achieves this by organizing the experimental labs in which practitioners and members of vulnerable communities have trusted interactions.
- Promoting the views of moderate voices by engaging with the silent majority and integrating them into the experimental lab.
- Developing and promoting concrete tools targeting vulnerable groups: the experimental lab combined with the best practices identified in the project and the online campaign are concrete tools which key actors can use when working with vulnerable youth.

The project is financed by the Internal Security Fund, a funding package of the Directorate-General for Home Affairs (European Commission) to promote the implementation of the Internal Security Strategy, law enforcement cooperation and the management of the Union's external borders. See more about the project on the official website: https://armourproject.eu/a/privacy-policy.



# Education, Scholarships, Apprenticeships and Youth Entrepreneurship Programme in Romania, funded by the EEA Grants – Financial Mechanism 2014-2021

*Grant agreement no.: 18-COP-0017* (October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2019 – September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2021)

THESEUS Project aims at Connecting the Disconnections between Disparate Data, in order to provide knowledge for building Insightful Analysis. The broad availability of data has led to increasing interest in methods for extracting useful information and knowledge from data, determining the emergence of new fields of science (e.g. data science). At the same time, big data algorithms have been signaled as a potential leverage that can lead to digital dictatorship if insufficiently understood, poorly handled and unethically regulated. Companies in every industry focused on ways to structure, process and analyze the growing volume and diversity of data so as to streamline decisions and gain a competitive edge. State institutions, regular citizens, social and political science practitioners on the other hand, are not yet properly equipped to properly mitigate the economic, social and political impact of the information technology revolution that awaits us in the decades to come. Therefore, in the process of understanding and mitigating risks and opportunities of Big Data, complex workloads, new skills and competences have to be acquired.

Following these emerging needs, the **objective of the project** is to enhance human capital and knowledge base by tackling directly skills and competences required and providing an understanding of the

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processes guiding big data analytics. This objective will be met by **building and delivering a course**, consisting of four modules, capitalizing on big data methodologies: introductory module, data collection module, data processing module and data analysis module.

The course will not be designed as a technologically focused course, but rather knowledge, awareness and understanding focused course. The course avoids an algorithm-centered approach. It focuses on how options are understood and choices and tradeoffs are designed. Thus, it enhances, through learning by doing, key-competences and skills required in collecting, understanding, correlating and processing big data, helping them streamline problem-solving processes in a data-driven ecosystem.

The project addresses **two professional categories**: *governance* and social scientists and national security practitioners, whose complementary work is of paramount importance in insuring the sustainable development of democracy. Both categories carry out great responsibility at social level. Ill-informed decisional processes in national security and policy-making, based on incomplete, inaccurate or incorrectly correlated data generate negative impact, affecting society at large. Although practitioners targeted by the project work with large amounts of data, their background is mostly in social science or security studies, lacking a very specific technical training. Such (future) professionals need to better understand what and how big data can be capitalized so as to ethically and lawfully improve the overall efficiency of their organization.

**Participating organisations** are: "Mihai Viteazul" National Information Academy (ANIMV) – Romania; University of Malta (UoM) – Malta; Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) – Norway; National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA) – Romania. THESEUS Project is part of the Education, Scholarships, Apprenticeships and Youth Entrepreneurship Programme in Romania, being funded by the EEA Grants – Financial Mechanism 2014-2021.



Empowering a Pan-European Network to Counter Hybrid Threats (EU-HYBNET) H2020 - Grant agreement no: 883054

EU-HYBNET is a 60 month project (2020-2025), financed through the Horizon 2020, which will start in May 2020. The project is being developed and implemented by a consortium of 25 partners, coordinated by LAUREA University of Applied Sciences from Finland. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and the Joint Research Centre are leading partners of the EU-HYBNET project.

EU-HYBNET will bring together practitioners and stakeholders to identify and define their most urgent requirements for countering hybrid threats, by undertaking an in-depth analysis of gaps and needs and prioritizing those that are crucial to address through effective research and innovation initiatives, including arranging training and exercise events to test the most promising innovations (technical and social) which will lead to the creation of a roadmap for success and solid recommendations for uptake, industrialization and standardization across the European Union.

The project aims to build an empowered, sustainable network, which will:

- define common requirements that can fill knowledge gaps, deal with performance needs, and enhance capabilities of innovation endeavors;
- monitor significant developments in research and innovation;

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- deliver recommendations for uptake and industrialization of the most promising innovations that address the needs of practitioners, and determine associated priorities for standardization;
- establish conditions for enhanced interaction among its members;
- persistently strive to increase its membership and continually build network capacity through knowledge exchange.

EU-HYBNET will address four core themes to ensure coherence in the project's results: 1) Future Trends of Hybrid Threats, 2) Cyber and Future Technologies, 3) Resilient Civilians, Local Level and National Administration, and 4) Information and Strategic Communication.

Romania represents the consortium through "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA). MVNIA will incorporate the project's research findings and information into its MA & PhD research programs. As students come from diverse areas (security practitioners, legal, media, private business), the impact of exploitation of the information will reach a wide audience, and the EU-HYBNET training documents will also be employed to enhance capabilities of experts and practitioners in the fight against hybrid threats.

EU-HYBNET is a Pan-European network of security practitioners, stakeholders, academia, industry players, and SME actors across EU, collaborating with each other to counter hybrid threats.

#### CALL FOR PAPER ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW

"Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, via its National Institute for Intelligence Studies, publishes the *Romanian Intelligence Studies Review* (RISR), a high quality peer reviewed and indexed research journal, edited in English and Romanian twice a year.

The aim of the journal is to create a framework for debate and to provide a platform accessible to researchers, academicians, professional, practitioners and PhD students to share knowledge in the form of high quality empirical and theoretical original research papers, case studies, conceptual framework, analytical and simulation models, literature reviews and book review within security and intelligence studies and convergent scientific areas.

Topics of interest include but are not limited to:

- Intelligence in the 21st century
- Intelligence Analysis
- Cyber Intelligence
- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
- History and memory in Intelligence
- Security paradigms in the 21st century
- International security environment
- Security strategies and policies
- Security Culture and public diplomacy

**Review Process:** RISR shall not accept or publish manuscripts without prior peer review. Material which has been previously copyrighted, published, or accepted for publication will not be considered for publication in the journal. There shall be a review process of manuscripts by one or more independent referees who are conversant in the pertinent subject area. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to the journal's theme, originality and scientific correctness, as well as observance of the publication's norms. The editor evaluates the recommendation and notifies the author of the manuscript status.

The review process takes maximum three weeks, the acceptance or rejects notification being transmitted via email within 5 weeks from the date of manuscript submission.

**Date of Publishing:** RISR is inviting papers for No. 25 and 26 and which is scheduled to be published on June and December, 2021.

Submission deadlines: February 1st and July 1st

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Contact: Authors interested in publishing their paper in RISR are kindly invited to submit their proposals electronically in .doc/.docx format at our e-mail address rrsi@sri.ro, with the subject title: RRSI article proposal.

ppearing twice a year, the review aims to place debates in intelligence in an institutional framework and thus facilitating a common understanding and approach of the intelligence field at national level. The target audience ranges from students to professionals, from the general public to those directly involved in intelligence research and practice. ISSN - 2393-1450 ISSN-L - 2393-1450 "MIHAI VITEAZUL" NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY National Institute for Intelligence Studies 20, Odăi Str. Bucharest 1 - ROMANIA Tel: 00 4037 7721 140 Fax: 00 4037 772 1125 e-mail: rrsi@sri.ro www.animv.ro www.rrsi.ro