# TERRORISM IN THE FUTURE: STRATEGIES AND METHODS TO ELIMINATE, PREVENT AND MANAGE ATTACKS OF THE NEW TERRORISM

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#### **Abstract**

The phenomenon of internal nationalisms with international infiltrations, which is rising again, is a global one – experienced from Europe to America – not to be overlooked. It is a phenomenon that leads to domestic terrorist attacks and its characteristics distinguished it from other types of terroristic attacks that are of a non-Islamic matrix, thus adducing to a higher risk to take place than during the past.

This is the motive that drives young people that – as already reported by some Intelligence agencies – even if they don't have a concrete knowledge of the historical events that have occurred in the past or about the various ideologies developed over time, to follow the ideologies of these individuals. –Some of the analysed solutions concern obtaining consent through the mass management and handling techniques used in Psyops Operations for the construction of consent to leaders. In the training of leaders, when communicating to the mass, it must be kept in mind that one cannot simply refuse requests without giving justifications, the reasons why decisions are made must be explained to the population so they can be well understood so as to limit or to eliminate the dissent. The senseless denial must never be used, and the masses consent and consent to leaders must be built by using more groups of people, included those who dissent, so to convey dissent. Therefore there must be created dissenting groups to the leaders that are credible and vehicular to all those who have opposite opinions than the leader, so that to be able to convey and to manage potential opponents in the best way.

**Keywords:** terrorism, domestic attack, intelligence, aggregator, strategic communication.

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## Introduction

This paper addressed the rise of the evolution of Internal Political Terrorism, a phenomenon that is spreading all over Europe and that had already caused several terrorist attacks. This study will present specific counteractions tailored for this type of internal terrorism with immediate, mid and long-term actions. It will present directives designed specifically for the education and training methods for intelligence practitioners. It will clarify the process by which this type of terrorism started to take hold by exploiting the growing disappointment of the population towards politics and also by using the perpetual search of the youth for an identity. The study will analyse the different figures and contexts in which this internal terrorism has set upon and the characteristics of the people involved, through the analysis of different attacks. It will specifically address how the attacks have been conducted with the use of old terrorist group techniques updated to the modern context and how Intelligence counteraction can be used by basing its strategy on old techniques and new neurostructured approaches.

Ultimately, this paper offers a structured analysis of this new phenomenon, regarding the territories involved and explaining the methods used by the terrorists to attract as many subjects as possible. Every terrorist action, weather it originates from issues concerning Islam, or draft of eco-terrorism, domestic terrorism, or politically oriented one, it causes damage to the State where it occurs, even if it does not have the effect foreseen by the terrorists. The effects can thus have various forms: they can range from image detriment to political damage, from creating terror among the mass, to implementing the annoyance of fanatics and individuals who have no belief system but whose sole purpose is to unleash their aggression by emulating each other. A clear example could be those individuals who started throwing stones to vehicles from overpasses, simply because they saw someone else doing it but without a real motivation.

### Terrorism is communication: avalanche effect

The preferred means by terrorists to send their messages to an audience is communication, as the only one capable of guaranteeing results on a large scale. A terroristic action, if not highlighted by the media, does not have the desired impact so it can be considerate inexistent. The only way population can get to know about terroristic attacks is through the information spread by the press and television. Every day around the world terroristic attacks happen although populations belonging to States and continents different than the ones where those acts occur rarely get to know about those news. The more the media emphasizes a terrorist attack, the more likely it is that the news of the event reach a large number of people, so the populations becomes aware of it. Great media attention for terrorists attacks means that the terrorists in question are being placed in a position of relevance at the time when the attacks occur, and they and their cause become like a light for their supporters, without taking into consideration the real victims and damages of attacks.

As stated before, it is to affirm that there is a great difference in media emphasis between the terrorist attacks that had a limited number of victims and damages and those where, instead, the numbers are much more substantial, so to underline the importance that newspapers and TV give to one attack rather than to another one. Information management can create panic and anxiety among the people who get to know about terrorist acts, so it is fair to say that if a terrorist attack is not planned into an area covered by important television and newspapers, it does not exist. Statistically, average Europeans do not remember a news learned more than three days before; they do not read or listen news coming from an information source different than the ones from their own State and into their native language. This fact allows us to be able to identify possible terrorist groups structured for individual attacks precisely by virtue of the choice of the place where the objective is located and to whom the objective is: this is possible because the final purpose of the structure will be the one to have a media prominence rather than creating significant damage to people and things. A clear example of this

avalanche effect is the *Bataclan* attack happened in November 2015 in Paris, France.

After the *Bataclan* attack, France had to face the various effects of the attack. There have been numerous deaths, major economic losses and very high expenses to repair both direct and indirect damages caused by the attack, as well as to improve safety. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2015) the terrorists' budget available for committing the attack was around 18.000 Euros. The economic consequences for the entire community have been much higher. But the internal effects are not the only ones caused right after the attack: the attack had also important consequences abroad, economically speaking, that affected other states, including Italy. The terrorists who committed the attack, then stated that they had not foreseen such an avalanche effect abroad. (Proceedings of the trial of Salah Abdeslam, defendant of the terrorist acts in Paris, November 13th, 2015)

As anticipated, as a consequence of the *Bataclan* attack in Paris, Italy suffered significant economic losses. Shortly after this terrorist attack occurred, in Italy, precisely in Rome, there was the Catholic Jubilee of Mercy (from December 8th 2015 to November 20th 2016), a very important event for the Catholic Church, and therefore for the whole Catholic world: it is a year during which every religious has the opportunity to receive the total cancellation of the penalties provided for their sins, which necessarily involves crossing the threshold of at least one Holy Door. It is an event normally held every 25 years, although the Pope may decide to hold an extraordinary Jubilee - as done by Pope Francis in 2015. For the Jubilee, the City of Rome, and all Italy, were waiting for a very high number of pilgrims and tourists, people who had booked hotel rooms, vacation houses transportation. As a result of the attack, most people cancelled their reservations and plans because they were terrorized by the possible advent of a new terrorist attack. This caused tremendous economic loss for the entire State and for the City of Rome, since restaurants, transportation, hotels and all kinds of productive activities suffered great loss both due to the fact that the reservations were cancelled and both for the large investments that many had made in order to better

accommodate pilgrims and tourists that, in the end, no longer arrived. This impact was publicly reported by the Rome Chamber of Commerce underlining the fact that no terroristic attack took place in Italy. (Rome Chamber of Commerce, 2016).

## **Internal Political Terrorism and transversal actors**

In the past years the discourse has been focused on Islamic terrorism. Today Internal Political Terrorism (IPT) is on the rise. This fact is caused by the current distrust of the population towards the political class and decision makers, and this is an occurrence that happens in several European States. This is a current threat, as considering the fact that various internal terrorism attacks have already taken place in several States, forcing intelligence to consider and to counteract this type of terrorism that works with transversal actors.

For example, a specific terrorist attack took place in Italy in August 2018, in the city of Treviso. It was a bomb attack deposited and detonated at the headquarters of the Political Party "Lega". In this case, with the incrimination for terrorism, a Spanish anarchist and an Italian were arrested a year later. Thus, in this and others attacks, emerges that there is a transversal line of collaboration in internal terrorism that links the various European terrorist groups to each other in order to carry out attacks, which was typical of the 70s and the 80s as simply demonstrated in the various Court processes and investigations. From these arrests it emerges the age difference between the terrorist subjects, their different nationalities and, contextually the different political opinions which converge, in spite of it, in carrying out the specific terrorist act. (Il Fatto Quotidiano, May 2019/ ANSA, August 2019, Attack on the headquarters of Lega of Treviso)

The transversal aspect refers to the fact that the Internal Political Terrorism involves and lures individuals who are very diverse from one another. It is transversal with regard to their age, social class and ideology. It becomes extremely easy to external sources to offer to youth many identity hints regarding the construction of an identity, considering the problems that young people have in building one that can be able to support their behaviour and their life choices in a balanced way. Today these youth rarely have an ideology.

As World Health Organization (WHO) data state, in the last twenty years young people have undergone changes: these are not only psychological changes but also physiological changes. Physiological changes have occurred in their brains, in fact it has been proven that the white matter in their brains is less than twenty percent thicker than the one of young people of the same age ten years ago. This is the cause of the decrease in the number of neurons and of neuronal connections present in their brains.

It is important to emphasize the way in which the physiological, psychological and social changes that have taken place outside and inside young people today have led to the increase of micro pathologies caused by excessive use of mobile phones, tablets and technological devices. Among the micro pathologies of this kind that have been observed among young people, there are FOMO, Sensorial Distortion, False Perception and others, all pathologies that render youth easier to manipulate. (JWT-J, 2012; RSPH, 2017; Loppi, 2018)

The diminished neuronal connections mean that the construction of thought, one's own identity, as well as the perception of the self are discordant from the real self and that there is a simple, less elaborate and less nuanced possibility of thinking.

As pointed out above, these social, physiological and psychological changes in young people have influenced their way of acting and making decisions and have rendered youth more easily attracted by this internal terrorism that offer them the possibility to quickly have an identity, that identity they seem not able to create on their own.

Although they are, therefore, in search of an identity and of an ideology, they aim to acquire them by putting as little effort as possible. It is easier to follow an ideology and to be part of a group placed in their own territory and to follow who make use of their native language, without the need to move abroad or to learn a new language or new religion in order to be able to follow the ideology.

Youth are seeking for an identity but they do not want to work for it, to put themselves on the line. It is in this type of internal terrorism that youth find their certainties, security and the ordinary things to which they are used to, as their lack of identity and its research leads them into a circle of "indifferent" social polarization. This type of terrorism thus becomes alluring not only because it gives to youth the opportunity to have an identity, but also because, at the same time, it allows them to unleash the repressed aggression that has formed within them with no apparent reason, their Apathetic Aggressiveness. The term Apathetic Aggressiveness refers to all those extremely aggressive behaviours that have no motivation, such as those youth who kill and torture a peer and when asked the reason s/he did it, s/he answers *I don't know, I wanted to see how someone dies* (École Universitaire Internationale, 2016).

In the search for their identity, young people are attracted by ideologies that very often they do not deeply understand and that thus exchange for their own identity. In order to reach with certainty the conclusion that a certain ideology is one's ideology, the process contemplates knowledge of the historical facts occurred over time, as well as of the different existing ideologies. Young people are often unaware of it and are not even interested in getting to know them. It is in this confusion that they grab themselves to false tailored ideologies, trying to base their identity on them, and it is still because of this confusion that they are easily attracted to terrorist groups that claim to be able to offer them the desired identity and ideology they were looking for, although it is a false identity and just a way to unleash their suppressed aggression. They roam as wounded animal with no identity and full of resentment.

If in the past years the Islamic State (ISIS) attracted many youth thanks to this series of characteristics (due to its massive use of propaganda), this current internal terrorism has the capability to attract not only youth, but also adults. They can be a source of hope for those adults who have been disappointed by political parties and by politics at large. They had and they still have an ideology that has been betrayed by the same people, by those politicians and political parties that should have protected them and supported their ideologies. Thanks to its transversal characteristics, the Internal Political Terrorism is able to attract completely different individuals from one another.

It has been proved how ISIS made specific videos in order to attract young people of various nationalities, by editing them with television commercials and videogames modes. The music, the colours and the image sequences were always made by copying the Hollywood style and characterizing them with stories in the languages in which the movie would have been widespread. BBC has made a specific search for a documentary aired in 2016. Islamic terrorism has a broad culture, something that has not been seen in terrorists of the last decade. The broad culture and the knowledge in various themes make the figures of these subjects fascinating, they are seen as anti-state figure, and contextually in the imaginary seen as liberators, as some Robin Hoods who struggles to subvert a totalitarian power. With this reading it is easy to ensnare young people, like those highlighted above, by a subject who has carried out terrorist acts (2015, BBC).

Speaking about the adults, in the climate of political disbelieve – which is affecting various States – the mentioned adults are easily attracted by these Internal Political terroristic groups that provide them a way to avenge their betrayed ideology and to fight for them by any necessary means. These adults, who find no alternative among the political arena, can be lured by internal terroristic groups.

An important fact that should also be highlighted is the different methodology used by the two types of terrorists that does not only depend on social and psychological aspects. The two methodologies are different not only because of the kind of preparation and methods of performance, approach to planning and to carrying out the attack, but there are also many differences in the aspect that should be emphasized most of all: the modification of the diminished neuronal connections among subjects aged less than 45 years old, as already proven by science in different occasions (WHO).

## Terroristic groups with old schemes in today's context

These new internal terroristic groups act following old schemes and military tactics already used by the terroristic groups that had acted in Europe in the 70s and 80s updated to the today's context. These are terroristic groups such as BR Red Brigades, ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – Basque Homeland and Liberty, IRA Irish Republican

Army, NAR Armed Revolutionary Nuclei. The union between updated old military tactics and the current social context describes the characteristics of this current internal political terrorism. This union is particularly evident in the mentioned recent attack committed in Treviso, the north of Italy (2018) and in the recent New Zealand attack. On March 15<sup>th</sup> 2019 at Christchurch in New Zealand a 28-year-old man attacked two mosques with rifles and guns killing 50 people (The Guardian, 2019).

Both the way the attacker carried out the attack and the way he trained for the attack resemble old techniques that belong to specific geographical territories. As the attacker stated, he has been trained in ex-Yugoslavia territories by people familiar with guerrilla techniques used in those territories at the time of the war of Former Yugoslavia.

The attacker, equipped with rifles, guns and explosive tanks ready to use (typical modality of Sarajevo attacks) entered the mosque using military tactics and started shooting at the people present. On the rifles and gun there were written on names of people he considered as model to follow as they committed terrorist attacks with similar motives. From the video he posted on-line, it is visible that in the trunk of his car there were other rifles, guns and explosive tanks ready to be used. The explosive tank is an important detail since using explosive tanks in order to turn cars into bombs is an old technique developed in the Balkan area during the Balkan conflict, as well as using another explosion after the attack, when the first responders arrive on the site, in order to create more victims and damages. Many have overlooked this detail, even in the analysis of the video and of the images of the car trunk the attention has been drawn on the dark rifles with white writing on, without taking into consideration the tanks right next to them. This is an important detail in order to start the investigation on every individuals involved. In fact, the attacker had previously travelled across several countries including Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Pakistan and others. However, when taking into account the subject that committed the attack, there are many incongruities that come to light.

The attacker is an Australian man who stated he wanted to liberate his state from 'those who went there stealing jobs from the

*native* population', but he committed the attack in New Zealand and not in his own country. The writing on his rifles refers to individuals he thinks to be model who share his same beliefs; on a rifle there is written the name of Traini Luca - an Italian man who shoot against black people in the streets in Italy without deaths in February 2018. However, Traini, after his arrest, rejected his racial motive saying that he committed a mistake and was glad nobody died. This shows the little knowledge the New Zealand attacker had of facts, and consequently shows a weak ideology based on false beliefs rather than real motives. The above demonstrates the statements made so far applied to a real case. The terrorist was born in Australia, he lived in Australia and carried out the attack in New Zealand declaring that he wanted to free his State from the invaders. This definitely shows a confused situation in the terrorist's mind. The New Zealand is not his state, he is a foreign subject in New Zealand, and he himself would be one who steals the job of the New Zealanders. It takes its cue from past and recent historical situations that have nothing specific related to terrorist acts aimed at driving out invaders. The most striking case is to cite the Italian Luca Traini who declared himself, to the Italian judges of not being a terrorist, of having nothing against black people and non-Italians, that he made the gesture in a particular psychological moment of his life apologizing to have injured people and making himself available to pay damages. We therefore have a clear picture of a terrorist, the Australian, who reflects the characteristics highlighted by the studies we carried out (École Universitaire Internationale, 2015, 2016, 2018).

As already mentioned before, on August 15<sup>th</sup> 2018 Italy has suffered an internal political terrorist attack that took place in the city of Treviso. Two explosive devices, one of which exploded: one was placed up on the stairs located inside the building, and the second one in front of the external door of the local head quarter of a right-wing political party, Lega. This modality indicates that the person who positioned the explosive devices knew what he was doing and how to place the devices in order to cause more victims and damages as possible. The explosive device placed in front of the external door was aimed to attract the attention while the second one up on the stair was aimed to cause the massacre.

On October 13<sup>th</sup> 2018 Italy suffered another terrorist attack that took place in a north region of the State, in Trento. The attack was accomplished by placing explosives. The attack resembled the same old tactics and schemes used by 70s and 80s terrorist groups, and that has been committed in the same places. The terroristic group placed two explosive devices in front of the local head quarter of the same political party, one of which exploded without causing victims; they damaged radio-transmitting trellis blocking radio communication and they also damaged university laboratories.

Another thing similar to old terrorist groups is the fact that the attackers lived together in a house. On February 18, 2018, Italian Police and Italian Counter-terrorism arrested seven anarcho-insurrectionists, responsible for the attacks in northern Italy. Also in this case we are talking about Italian subjects, including several young people and two men of about 50 years old. The group is accused of at least three attacks plus others being investigated, which have always been carried out with bombs in recent years. (AGI, February 2019, Terrorism: anarchicinsurrectionist cell in Trento, 7 arrests)

As anticipated above, the way these two attacks were conducted resembles techniques and tactics used in the Former Yugoslavia territories during the conflict. In both cases there have been used a technique that took hold in Sarajevo during the conflict, and then used in different places in the world. A first explosive device exploded in order to create injuries and damage and rush rescuers and onlookers, to then explode manually, by pressure, or with a remote control a second explosive charge much more powerful, in order to make a massacre.

In an objective Intelligence analysis individuals that have been deployed in these territories should be monitored as they are looking for a positioning. Since they had lived a past that saw them as protagonists in these war situations, and having them seen particularly heavy situations for the human psyche, once they returned to their own countries they found themselves no longer having the importance they had during the conflict. However, since they have learned the only profession of combat, they look forward to re-establish their knowledge and at the same time are seeing a social position re-allocated. Studies

on aggression and on the psychic state of veterans have been carried out by the US government and repeatedly cited by various studies and sources, so much so that since the 2000s the US State Department had issued specific indications that veterans who commit criminal offenses against things and people should not be put in jail with common subjects. This because of their specific knowledge in the use of combat weapons and fight methods (US Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015).

From an investigative point of view, Intelligence professionals trained in putting together information into should be interdisciplinary way. It must be taken into consideration that this type of attacks are committed by groups of individuals - rather than a random single individual such as attacks committed by infatuated -(École Universitaire Internationale, 2018) so detecting them it's easier because of the greater exchange of information between the group members, which means higher possibility of committing error and leaking information. In addition, a high number of people means a greater probability to identify the weakest link. As this type of terrorism is an internal terrorism, the group members will talk the same language (most probably the one of the State they live in) and it will be necessary for the practitioner being able to understand not only the language spoke into that territory, but also its dialects and its idioms. Compared to the old internal terrorism groups, it is easier and common nowadays having members of the group that speak new languages. For instance, non-native members that speak other languages, and that mix their own language with the State language: a mix of terms of the different languages that leads to the formation of new mixed languages or new idioms that are hard to understand to those who are not part of the group (i.e. a person originally from Ukraine that lives in Italy and speaks both Italian and Ukrainian, mixing the two and creating mixed terms and way of saying).

For the purpose of monitoring these groups and gathering information is necessary the use of old techniques applied to the new modern context. Although using wiretap and transmitters with a lone wolf or an infatuated was harder (because of the little or no exchange of information), they become useful with these groups, "chiacchiericcio" technique becomes helpful again. The "chiacchiericcio"

technique, in fact, monitors the intensity of information. For instance if in the group there is an exchange of information between the members which then suddenly ends, to then resume again among all the members or even among only some of them, there is a high probability that an event is about to happen. In addition, when having a group, Humint operations become useful. Although having more individuals to monitor has a higher cost, the quality of the information gathered is more valuable and accurate.

Although these techniques are dated, their use updated to the current context become invaluable. To achieve this, senior professionals need to teach young professionals the old techniques and tactics so that young professionals are able to implement them in the current context by updating them. This exchange will ensure that intelligence can upgrade its *modus operandi* and therefore its results, avoiding the gap that it has experienced in the last decade where there was not kind of exchange of information between senior professional and the young ones, with the result of obtaining unprepared young practitioners replacing *tout court* old professionals and so losing their experience.

This exchange of information is able to make intelligence analysis more efficient and precise: it will ensure that professionals are able to correlate information regarding how the attack was committed to the ones about who committed it. Recognizing a certain type of modus operandi of the attackers, therefore understanding where they have been trained and, therefore, being able to correlate it to a specific geographical area of belonging, allows to delimit the area of investigation and to earlier identify the individual. Therefore, the ability of recognizing this type of detail is essential for conducting the investigation in an appropriate manner. For instance, a person trained in the UK, or someone deployed, acts differently from a person trained in Russia; at the same time the way a person from the Balkans slits throat is different from the way someone from Latin America would do it, so a person from Egypt tortures differently than someone from Venezuela. Knowing these aspects and being able to recognize them, will enable to forecast the type of the next attack, where it will take place and to whom it will be directed, and to know the wav the attackers have been trained.

Though all this becomes possible only if senior practitioners will share their information with young practitioners: only those who have worked in certain scenarios and during a certain time possess this type of information and detail.

This is all possible because the human brain works by creating repetitive models, and it survives using the same repetitive models and making the individual repeating the same schemes. This is the reason why practitioners must have a flexible and non-repetitive brain: it would be able to get out the repetitive schemes and then successfully detect threats and early counter act them. In order to be able to render it this way, the practitioners' brain could be trained with the *Double Imprinting* technique, for the purpose of having a better performance of the brain in analysis, speed and resolution of the problems. (École Universitaire Internationale, 2016)

During the intelligence training, including subjects that address the way thought is formed is also important, not only from a strategic and political point of view, but also from a neuropsychological one, addressing how brain works and how neurons can affect decisions and the creating of thoughts.

When analysing this type of current internal terrorist attacks, different peculiar characteristics came to light. The group members greatly differ in age, geographical origin and cultural level and this highlights the role of a figure that is crucial for these attacks: the Aggregator.

## The role of the Aggregator

The aggregator is an individual that attract members and aggregate them into the group. S/he is not a member of the group. S/he provides both the tailored ideology for the youth seeking an identity and the chance to avenge the betrayed ideology of those disappointed adults. S/he has likely being involved in subversive actions or has been a supporter, s/he might have a military training, s/he might have been in prison and s/he can be that model, that beacon that attracts others. s/he has experience, knowledge, connections and appeal. The aggregator is empathic; s/he has a halo of credibility and s/he is able to communicate it.

This type of figure was not common in the Islamic terrorism that committed the terroristic attacks in Europe in the past years. The only case in which the aggregator was presented is related to the terrorist attack of August 17th 2017 in Barcelona, Spain. In this case the aggregator was a men around forty years old, he was the football coach of the youth that committed the attacks on *La rambla* (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, 2018). He persuaded those youth into committing the attack. In this case the aggregator was the real motive behind the attack. The bombers were all young soccer players of the team coached by the man, the aggregator indeed. The aggregator gave his own motivations to the young people who, in order to avoid the exclusion from the team, carried out together this terrorist attack. The young people did not have a marked religious identity and they were substantially different subjects from one another. The only magnet was precisely the aggregator who was also the one who studied and prepared the attack. However, he did not take part to it, letting the young soccer players carrying out the attack. The aggregator, in this case an adult man, felt psychologically important since he was the head of a team of young terrorists that put into place what he thought and named.

The aggregator does not take part in the terroristic attacks. Considering the scenario that has arisen, intelligence should use different and new techniques when dealing with this phenomenon. This new internal political terrorism raised because of people's disappointment towards the political class and the actions of the decision makers.

The first action to implement is speaking to the population. It consists in explaining to the population why the decision makers decide for an action, by using simple terms that are effective and able to include the whole population. In order to ensure the security and the stability of the State, the Intelligence should indicate to the decision makers which are the most effective solutions to be taken. Economic Intelligence, Operational Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence must therefore work in order to ensure that politician's communications become more widely disclosed and that are simple and clear, so to have the support of the population and to obtain the result that population

itself communicates anomalies or facts to the police and Intelligence, thus building a social information fabric: so to make territory, companies and the State itself safer, and it happens not by the creation of a state of deletion, but through a state of collaboration between free citizens that are made aware of the fact that reporting things to the police is not bad and that it can serve to avoid attacks and facts in general that could create problems for the state. So the bottom line is explaining that the whole is, and must be created for the progress and the good of the state. This is a method of communication that is strategic and effective (Bellomo, 2015).

For instance, explaining the reasons why there is an increase in alcohol taxes. The decision maker should explain to the population that the rising of price has the purpose of determining a decrease in the numbers of the buyers, it will so head the rise of competitors that will determine a higher quality of products and also the fact that the money gathered will be used to improve the cure of diseases linked to alcohol. The decision maker should established a period of time, i.e. six months, in within which to publish the collected data so to create within the population, in a period of time of 24 months, credibility of his decisions showing he does what he promised. If the tax increase should not have the expected result, the decision maker should stop the project without trying to justify himself or his decisions. The first phase is creating a true credibility of the decision makers.

In order to do so the decision maker's education should be oriented towards national security. They should be educated and trained in leader communication and strategic communication, while intelligence practitioners should be also trained in neuro-structured approach techniques. Speaking in a strategic manner to the population will also lead to the result that even those who initially had doubts will flow into the majority group, thus homologating the group in favour of the decision makers. It is known that the population does not question a high salary if it witness positive results. The questioning is the result of the population disappointment towards the institutions and decision makers.

The second action is the approaching phase in counter terrorism activities. It must be activated among the youth from 14 years old. It must provide those different hints and more options in order to let the youth free to find the option that best suits them.

Youth need to be stimulated, they can be approached by using their own language. It is important for young people to find a way to unload their energy and to express themselves and having more ways and hints among which they can choose, will lead to higher probably that they will choose one of the ways offered by the community instead of being attracted by the terrorist world, giving them the opportunity not to be attracted by wrong models and by the aggregator.

Young people are not looking for a friend but rather for someone that can indicate them a path, someone to trust. These actions are based on the behaviour of the mass and of the single individual who works simultaneously on both of them.

There are three different strategies that can be implemented in order to decrease the aggregator's appeal. One of them consists of a tailored action aimed at managing the acute intervention through a neural inhibition of the individual. For instance, recent studies have discovered a new inhibitor neuron located in an external part of cerebral cortex, called Rosehip (Eszter et al, 2018). With the use of the inhibitory action of the neuron it is possible to block the individual from continuing the action s/he is committing, thus stopping him during the action or interacting to him so that action will be totally inhibited. The second strategy consists in using the normal methodologies of communication that can be used to move away the individual from the aggregator. The first strategy is intended to be used during the action (immediate strategy), while the second strategy is intended to be used outside the action (mid-term and long-term strategy). The third strategy consists in using a fake aggregator (cover action) that works to separate the group rather than aggregate them.

## **Conclusions**

Concluding, the current internal political terrorism is on the rise. The individuals that have committed attacks differ greatly for age, social class, geographical origin and cultural level. They usually act

within a group: the individual is attracted by the aggregator who is not a part of the group but is the one who aggregates it. The groups use techniques and schemes used by past terrorist groups updating them to the new context of action.

As in the past, also the current internal terrorism has international ties. For instance, ISIS terrorists are likely to flow into this type of terrorism: since ISIS has been defeated, they have no longer a place in it. Indeed, it is unlikely for them to try to merge in Al Oaeda. Al Qaeda is a structured terroristic group that respect the Quran, contrary to ISIS that does not respect the Quran as its terrorists do not know the Quran. ISIS terrorists cite a modified Quran, in fact the same Quran that is distributed by ISIS is not recognized by Islamic communities as it is modified in several parts and does not respect the sacred scripture. In actual fact they committed terrorist attacks also in the sacred months, the ones during which Prophet Mohammed stated that no kind of violence is allowed, and whomever disobey this precept will be automatically condemned. ISIS terrorists are more likely to try to recycle themselves by becoming the soldiers of those who pay them or to flow into this internal terrorism where they could have a higher consideration and a role as having them already fought. As mentioned, young or adults that have not a clear creeds, beliefs or identity can became part of a group (terrorist group) not following an ideology but just to be part of "something".

Furthermore, the future internal terroristic attacks will have a military oriented structure along with an excessive cruelty. The future attacks will be more precise, more structured, more violent and committed with greater cruelty. It goes without saying that intelligence should be trained with the new and advanced techniques in order to be ready to effectively counteract this phenomenon.

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