

Doctrine and Intelligence

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Abstract

Development, implementation and compliance with a clear and concise intelligence and national security doctrine are a sine qua non requirement of existence, functioning and achievement of strategic and tactical objectives in any organization or nation state.

Power and performance can be achieved by public and private institutions, at both organization and state level, through strategic and doctrinal linking. Specialized intelligence and security management can operate effectively only through flexible and coherent doctrinal foundation, providing decision makers with a real advantage, based on which national security geopolitical strategies are built.

International doctrinal schools, such as those in Canada, United States of America, United Kingdom or Australia as well as NATO's, have included a series of fundamental elements in building an intelligence doctrine, which is necessary to each state that wants to embrace these principles, including at organization level.

Keywords: doctrine, intelligence, organization, strategy, transformation.

Introduction

To compare argument, and make it with the quiet tone of mutual good faith is the core of any serious discussion¹.

(Mihai Eminescu)

Accelerated development of our society is based on the rapid flow of information, which has become a powerful resource in the age of speed. Moreover, by shifting from the information age to the knowledge age, the ratio between tangible and intangible assets has changed dramatically in favor of the intangible, reaching a score of 10 to 90. Intangible assets are

¹ Mihai Eminescu, Works, vol. XII, PUBLICISTICĂ, January 1, 1881 – December 31, 1881, in Timpu, VI, no. 20 of January 27, 1881, including 28 reproductions of manuscripts and publications, Critical edition coordinated by Perpessicius Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 1985, p. 46.

built through the most important resource of the moment, knowledge, which is always based on concepts.

Within any organization operating in the knowledge era and society, everything starts from and is based on concepts. Organizations cannot progress without a clear and well-defined conceptual basis that is anchored in the conditions specific to each field and, in the case of intelligence and security organizations, in national, regional and global security framework. Today's knowledge competition is gained by those who hold supremacy in conceptual design and development of organizations. Those who design and develop new viable concepts shape the future. In this context, doctrinal construction is fundamental to any social entity's existence, survival and gaining of competitive advantage.

The intelligence doctrine is also related to the conceptual framework developed to understand and efficiently implement activities in that area (before, during and after carrying out an action) to provide military with common conduct and ideas². They must represent the arsenal of knowledge enhancing joint actions, from individual to team, that are facilitated by a common language among parties, which is understood and treated in the same manner by them.

The purpose of this approach is not to launch such an initiative, but only to highlight the importance of doctrine to an organization, state some elements of interest in developing a national and organizational intelligence doctrine, and highlight issues specific to the national framework and environment.

What The Doctrine Is?

DOCTRINE, *doctrines*, s. f. All the principles of a political, scientific, religious, etc. system – From French. **doctrine**, Latin **doctrina**.
(Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language³)

Any doctrine implies connecting the fundamental elements of theory, history, and practical experience in the field. In this respect, several organizations and publications have proposed definitions of the intelligence doctrine, referring to the fact that it is designed to provide broad guidance on the use of judgment in the activities performed and to establish a common language of people working in the field.

² Coast Guard Publication 2-0, *Intelligence*, Washington, D.C. 20593-0001, May 2010 and Till, Geoffrey, "The Evolution of Strategy and the New World Order" in Craig Snyder (ed), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York (2008), p. 97.

³ 2nd Edition, Author: Romanian Academy Iorgu Jordan Institute of Linguistics, Univers Enciclopedic Printing House, 1998, Type: Official, DEX '98.

Thus, according to the Canadian Army, doctrine is “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives”. Moreover, it states that intelligence is the product of a process that involves an analysis of information to be included in the decision-making process. It is authoritative and requires judgment in application. It embraces established knowledge in the areas of planning, decision making and problem solving, sometimes being simply defined as “what is taught”⁴.

Also, the Doctrine Centre of the *Australian Defense Force Warfare Centre* defines doctrine as “a description of the application of force to achieve national interests, domestically and internationally”. According to the Center, the doctrine implies a philosophical military approach to the operational environment and provides a mechanism for the analysis of key operational challenges, assisting in the delivery of professional military education and training⁵. Its elaboration is part of a dynamic process based on judgment and professional experience, and its application must be tailored to a given situation, according to specific characteristics.

On the other hand, according to Geoffrey Till, the doctrine is nothing but applying strategy in a space and time context. To highlight the relationship between strategy and doctrine – considered essential to security – he makes a culinary analogy, saying that strategy is the culinary arts and doctrine the menu⁶.

Last but not least, military theorists warn against turning doctrine into a dogma. For example, Sir Julian Corbett says that “nothing is more dangerous in the study of war than to allow sayings to substitute judgment”. Thus, the principles of the doctrine must be always questioned, and procedures tailored to circumstances⁷.

Why Do We Need A Doctrine?

“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose and a unity of effort.”

General George H. Decker, US Army Chief of Staff (1960-1962)

The need to elaborate a national security and intelligence doctrine is obvious, given the fact that in order to be complete, an intelligence

⁴ Canadian Military Doctrine CFJP 01, 2009.

⁵ Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – D (ADDP–D), 3rd edition, Defence Publishing Service, 2012.

⁶ Till, Geoffrey, “The Evolution of Strategy and the New World Order” in Craig Snyder (ed), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York (2008), p. 97.

⁷ Till, Geoffrey, “The Evolution of Strategy and the New World Order” in Craig Snyder (ed), *Contemporary Security Strategy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York (2008), p. 97.

organization must have a solid theoretical and technical support, a strong strategy and, last but not least, a clear and concise doctrine⁸. All these elements are essential for a proper conduct of activity and achieving performance by an organization.

Several arguments can be raised to explain the need for a Romanian intelligence doctrine, as follows:

- First because there is none, and without strategy, doctrine, and relevant technology, an intelligence organization is not complete and therefore it does not operate effectively and does not achieve performance;
- Also, a common language that facilitates both intra-institutional and inter-institutional communication and cooperation is established through a doctrine;
- At the same time, based on a intelligence doctrine, one can efficiently and effectively fulfill the objectives and tasks;
- Last but not least, it is necessary to apply the principles of change management within the organization for them to maintain competitiveness in a knowledge society which is permanently evolving in the century of speed.

Even since the Cold War, the concept of doctrine has been used predominantly in the military, but the intelligence activity, especially that at the national level, did not have a specific doctrine for all actors operating in the field. The military doctrine can be defined as the set of prescriptive principles guiding the use of armed forces of a state in pursuing its interests in times of peace and war⁹.

Military organizations have traditionally provided information to their forces in three ways: orders, intelligence, and doctrine. Orders are used to define a specific task. Intelligence provides information about the environment in which the task will be accomplished. Doctrine establishes the “rules of the game” or standard operating procedures. Unlike orders and intelligence, doctrine is not provided in real time, but it serves to establishing the culture and mentality of the individuals involved. The information was, until recently, inseparable from commanders, command structures, and command systems¹⁰.

As for Romania, in 2004, the Romanian Intelligence Service had the initiative to develop such a document, which was approved by the Supreme Council of National Defense as “The National Security Information Doctrine”. Experts in the field mention the following about the respective document:

⁸ Barger, D. G., *Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs*, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2005.

⁹ Russel, F. Wiegly, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, New York, Macmillan, 1973, p. 512.

¹⁰ Alberts, D. S. *The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies*. NDU Press Book, 1996.

“If an academic approach to the problem of the intelligence community is wanted, then, all the same people have to accept that its necessity results from the Intelligence Doctrine. This doctrine exists and perhaps the above-mentioned people have coordinated and participated in drafting and endorsing it in the Supreme Council of National Defense, during 2001-2004. It can be accessed on the Presidency website, its full name being the National Doctrine of Security Intelligence.

Indeed, the doctrine seeks an academic approach, except for the fact that, as it is conceived, it has no power and clarity to generate the concrete framework to organize and develop a new intelligence activity needed by our country in the process of training and consolidating the democracy and the rule of law”.

“The intelligence doctrine and the intelligence community remain simple academic digressions, excuses for Bucharest-style political tensions or they are claimed as a need for reform towards democracy?”

Mihaiu Margarit, Brigadier General (r), former Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Project manager at EURISC Foundation - European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication.

The above-quoted military intelligence specialist indicates that the move is unsubstantiated, being historically inadequate to the current conditions and needs of Romania and its intelligence services. With a view to arguing this idea, he mentions the need to change the doctrine, regarded as the only way to develop the organizational culture, particularly at the level of the organizational management. The organizational culture can be changed by replacing it with another form of behavior, while in order to implement the formulated strategy, each member of an intelligence organization must know how to change the manner of performing tasks.

Alberts Davis considers that the process of drafting the doctrine tends to be slow and difficult due to the large number of people and organizations involved. Even so, it is further necessary to ensure consistency of appropriate behavior throughout the organization¹¹. Besides that, there is also the reluctance of members to changes in the organization, once a new doctrine and measures that precede it are implemented.

For an intelligence organization to maintain its flexible and adaptive nature – fundamental attributes of any social group or form of organization in the contemporary era – it needs a doctrinal construction. Once it is formulated, implemented and assumed by all group members, individuals on lower levels gain flexibility in creation and adaptation, as long as their actions are subsumed to the general framework formulated by the management, which allows them to operate more quickly and more efficient.

¹¹ Alberts, David S. *The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies*, NDU Press Book, 1996.

In this context, the interdependent relationship among *strategy*, *doctrine* and *intelligence* emerges, the reference of American strategist John Boyd's vision on the adaptability and responsiveness of individuals within the organization – "*He who best manages changes, survives*" – to the scale of dynamic capabilities enounced by Sun Tzu – known as "*the speed beats strength, speed beats surprise, surprise beats strategy*", being worth mentioning¹².

The absence of a doctrine in the intelligence field or the existence of an unclear doctrine, with poorly defined terms and concepts, without logical and conceptual construction, hinders the development of reforms and transformations in relevant organizations. Here it is worth noting two important elements: on the one hand, the difference between reform and transformation, often misunderstood either by politicians or by some intelligence leaders of the last quarter century, and, on the other hand, the way of elaborating the legislation, regulations and instructions in the intelligence field. This is a step of the trinomial which links theory, education and practice. Therefore, the elaboration of laws, rules and instructions requires first the clear establishment of theory, strategy and doctrine of the respective field. This explains why the amendments to the legal framework or changes in the management of intelligence services have not always had the desired effect, namely that in the absence of a doctrine, each intelligence structure provided its own interpretation, as an integrated vision lacked.

In this regard, experts point out that, in a chaotic world, leaders need to rethink the organizations they lead through underlying concepts, principles and values, not by developing rules¹³. And this is possible in Romania. Let's go through them one by one.

According to Webster's dictionary, to reform means "to return to a good state". The majority of individuals perceive the reform as an effort to improve or eliminate shortcomings of a situation, process, product, etc. A second definition attributed to reform is "the action to improve social or economic conditions without a radical or revolutionary change". Based on this definition, we can conclude that the implementation of a reform requires the maintenance of the existing form, aiming just to rearrange components in order to eliminate the deficiencies.

¹² Osinga, Frans P. B. *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*. London: Routledge, 2007.

¹³ Pinchot, G. and E. Pinchot. *The End of Bureaucracy & the Rise of the Intelligent Organization*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1993.

However, on the other hand, to transform means to change the form, not just to rearrange it. In nature, transformation involves not only a change in appearance, but also in the character and life of an organism (for example, the transformation of a caterpillar to a butterfly). Unlike reforms, transformations can involve changes with negative impact: at the individual level, we can notice changes in the way of thinking that, once produced, completely change the configuration mode of the cognitive process, eliminating thus any way back.

Also, when we talk about transformation, we must realize its meaning. Thus, according to Ackoff (2004), reforms and transformations are not the same. Reforms aim at changing the means by which goals are achieved, and transformations involve changes in pre-established objectives. These changes occur in relation to the evolution of intelligence: activities of services/ intelligence communities' members come in response to internal and external factors, by replacing the objectives, and to changes that occur outside the intelligence field. Sometimes the respective changes and trends are not addressed in a timely manner by practitioners and academics, or they are addressed only partially. The major difference between reform and transformation is similar to investment in tangible versus intangible assets.

Organizations that manage to make especially long-term investments in intangible assets will be able to get a competitive advantage in the field/market/sector where it acts. To that end, the intelligence field and discipline have come of age in the last two decades, and a market of economic, competitive, technological, business, academic, etc. intelligence begins to take shape within it requiring a clear-cut and dynamic strategy, where only those organizational, state or private entities that design and implement concepts and models of action with which they can outperform competitors achieve great results.

In this context, an organization or a state without doctrinal construction or with a poor intelligence doctrine cannot operate and effectively operate, so therefore we cannot speak of a viable transformation.

What Should an Intelligence Doctrine Contain?

A first step in detecting the elements underlying the building of an intelligence doctrine is a benchmarking analysis on profile documents in various countries of the world. To this end, we can examine the constituent elements of doctrine in the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia and the United States of America.

In any activity, achieving performance and obtaining success consist primarily in the correct understanding of the nature of that activity and its

principles. The same reasoning applies to the intelligence field, as well. Experts stress the importance of the aims pursued, and clarify the relationships established with the decision-making factor and the operational area¹⁴. Considering our situation, the first step would be to take into account Romania's NATO membership acquired in 2004. To that end, the challenge of our mission should be diminished since we already have a fundamental North-Atlantic doctrine. Unfortunately, however, the real situation differs from reality, the topic on which we will resume later.

By analogy, the Canadian intelligence doctrine – Joint Intelligence Doctrine – represents "a guide for all those involved in the intelligence process". This material addresses topics such as: the nature of intelligence, the process of intelligence, intelligence practice, and intelligence support for planning, the operational intelligence and guidelines for joint intelligence¹⁵. To be useful and efficient, the doctrine should specify the authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders can use, provide guidance for the exercise of that military authority, provide fundamental principles and guidance for command and control, prescribe guidance for organizing and developing joint forces, and describe policy for selected joint activities¹⁶.

The US Army document – "Intelligence Field Manual No. 2-0" – represents the fundamental material for the military intelligence doctrine. It describes the bases of intelligence operations, intelligence warfighting function, the intelligence process, the roles and functions of military intelligence in the context of military operations, the intelligence in unitary action, intelligence concepts in preparing strategic and intelligence-related disciplines.

According to Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies/BCIIS, a doctrine should also provide servicemen the following elements meant to guide them and help them in their work: a guide to best practice in the field, a learning platform, a document that sets out the responsibilities in carrying out their duties, a database that can be extracted from the rules and regulations and an "aide-mémoire" for officers during operations¹⁷.

Another document on intelligence doctrine of national importance is Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00 from Great Britain. It comprises the intelligence theory, practice and procedures, described in six major themes: understanding and influence centrality, the importance of intelligence exploitation, inter-institutional cooperation and joint cooperation

¹⁴ Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2, 1997.

¹⁵ Joint Intelligence Doctrine, Canadian Forces, Publication B-GJ-005-200FP-000, 2 October 2002.

¹⁶ Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, 2013.

¹⁷ BCISS, 'BCISS Comments on JWP 2-00 Re-Write Arising from DCDC Intelligence Seminar', December 3, 2009.

procedures, command – staff relationship, intelligence in the contemporary cooperation environment.

In the French version¹⁸, an intelligence doctrine must approach the following areas: the type of intelligence and its customers (including the subject and the definition of intelligence, decision-making levels, the types of intelligence used by decision-makers), intelligence origins with "information bank" from which intelligence is extracted and intelligence production (including the fundamental principles of intelligence and intelligence cycle).

If we try to summarize the contents of the American, British, French and Canadian doctrinal schools' documents, we could highlight a few fundamental doctrinal benchmarks needed in the construction of an intelligence doctrine. They consist in understanding environmental intelligence, the nature of intelligence, bases/theory of intelligence, which includes the creation and development of an effective intelligence, an intelligence cycle, and the role and functions of intelligence.

In the case of drafting a Romanian conceptual doctrinal base, a first step could also be the observance of the above-mentioned algorithm. It is not necessary to develop it now, but some clarifications are important at this stage.

A first indication refers to the pattern we approach when conceiving and drafting an intelligence doctrine. In this case, the pattern is adjusted to architecture of the team conceiving and drafting the doctrine. This architecture must respect logical chaining of the research-education-occupation trinomial (or learning-theory-practice), so that the team conceiving and drafting the doctrine is heterogeneous, including also experts of the three elements of the trinomial and the conceiving/drafting stages are formalized in an information flow on the departments related to this formula. Therefore, the academics and research experts have to support a first draft doctrine, for a previous configuration of its content with the help of operational experts. We do not intend to elaborate now on the cooperation way and the instruments used in the actual activity.

A second indication is related to identifying and understanding the intelligence environment. Within this context, before conceiving and drafting the doctrine, it is necessary to analyze the intelligence environment, an environment included in a certain context having several components. An intelligence environment could consist of: strategic context – made up of international security environment and the national intelligence environment and the specific context – represented by the intelligence environment

¹⁸ La stratégie mondiale en matière d'information et de renseignement, 2005.

specific to the organizational entity. The projection of the elements is necessary for each of the two components.

Things seem to be very clear in the case of our country as far as the intelligence framework is concerned: there is no intelligence community in Romania. An explanation to that end is the understanding of the phase we have reached in training intelligence officers. Human capital development has not been considered important in Romania, a proof to that end being the education system. Intelligence services and community have to reconsider their position towards scientific national security-related research by projecting and setting up a national systemic intelligence. Why do we say that? Because from many reasons our efforts to build an intelligence community in Romania have failed. One of them is that the policy makers have not understood the role of intelligence in the knowledge society, and by that we mean the two executive branches – the Government and the Presidency – which both wanted to control the community or to keep it as far as possible out of the political reach. However, that's not why we have failed. The main reason of our failure is that we did not understand the processes behind creating such an organizational entity: national intelligence community. In order to succeed in setting up the community, we have to start not with legislation, legal framework and rules but with the concepts projection, definition, and elaboration, starting with intelligence in case we decide to maintain this word into Romanian language. Another reason of our failure is that we have to understand the tangible and intangible assets because we do not clearly comprehend the importance of intangible assets within an organization in Romania.

And a third reason is related to the nature of intelligence and intelligence discipline theory. Thus, intelligence represents the activity of intelligence and security services and agencies. From theoretical point of view, we talk about intelligence as a social sciences domain or what we can consider to be *academic intelligence*. It includes academics, experts in the field who became trainers and professionals who subsequently achieved academic status by developing their competencies in research or education.

Amid this context, one has to have in mind the nature of current intelligence field and discipline which is quite different of one century or ten years ago. Human society rapid development and the transformation of information era into knowledge society with steps towards intelligence era (as Dedijer and other specialists have anticipated even from 2002) produce significant changes in intelligence activity.

This leads to reconsider the specific taxonomy of the discipline by projecting new concepts related to current reconfiguration of the social organizational models. One example to that end would be the creation of academic intelligence, a concept initiated by us few years ago to connect the

academic, educational, and operational “tribes” and to fuel the development of intelligence knowledge

If we were to follow the evolution of the intelligence concept, which started with the actions and operations developed under the shadow of secrecy and undercover actions, but also to analyze its biological (Fedanzo, 1993), organizational (Lippmann, 1922, Wilensky 1967), and business side specific to the last decades, we would notice its extended translation to all people in the society and its transformation into a systemic entity that produce knowledge through models of learning and continuous adaptation to dynamic market demands, this time under the rule of “openness”.

Intelligence is a knowledge process. If initially intelligence developed as an essential part of military capabilities, nowadays it became an important part of every organizational capability, taking into account all its components from political, to social and economic ones.

While the elaboration of an organizational doctrine might be considered a simple process if we understand the nature of intelligence, but this is not the case, the extension of the doctrine to state institutions, by taking into account the two private and public elements, transcend the knowledge operational limits.

After clarifying the nature of intelligence we can strengthen the theory of this discipline. But we will discuss this complex topic later.

Conclusions

We cannot talk about a scientific paper on information on Romanian historical and ideological space due to the fact that the last century topics in the Romanian specialty literature are only information history-related and case studies. The absence of a specific Romanian intelligence theory and doctrine led to the development of contemporary intelligence systems that triggered obvious and significant differences. To conclude, this state of mind can triggered the emergence of an *agnostologic intelligence*¹⁹ rather than an *epistemological intelligence* that is useful to most of the people. The main effects are to be felt at the level of operational experts who could pay attention to research and education only from operational perspective. To that regard, a potential development of a Romanian intelligence doctrine could be done by using the collaborative principles and methods for joint teams of experts from both operational and academic spectrum.

¹⁹ Agnotology describes and studies culturally induced ignorance or doubt, particularly the publication of inaccurate or misleading scientific data. The term was introduced in „*Agnotology: The making and unmaking of ignorance*” (2008) by professor specializing in the history of science Robert N. Proctor.

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