

Intelligence for competitiveness and national security in the knowledge society (I)

A short benchmarking analysis on the creation of a Romanian national intelligence system

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Abstract

With the transition to the knowledge economy, the value of all social, organizational and individual entities is directly dependent on its intellectual and knowledge capital. Unfortunately, the majority of decision-makers focus too much on the tangible assets, almost to the point of ignoring the intangible ones. However, in order to successfully navigate this world, where the global is directly connected to the local it is essential, to first understand the interaction between certain key-concepts, such as politics, economy, knowledge, intelligence, strategy, competitiveness and security.

In the new evolution paradigm knowledge means value, while intelligence means power, that is why the paper analyzes the evolution of national intelligence systems in an attempt to shed some light on the interaction models employed at international level, which can then be adapted and re-configured to fit the necessities of developing countries, willing to engage in such a national endeavor.

To develop a national intelligence model applicable for Romania, the study employs benchmarking analysis to compare the structure and performance of various national intelligence systems and extract those structural elements that fit the overall approach to continuous improvement. To insure the efficiency of the results, we have selected for the comparison leading examples of national intelligence systems: the US, France, Great Britain, Canada and Germany.

The analysis resulted in a set of guidelines and best practices that, after integration can be used to elaborate a blueprint for the development of a Romanian national intelligence system by both decision-makers and representative of the academia and private sectors. This research product is by no means comprehensive, as there are many other case studies that could and should have been included in the benchmarking analysis, in order to create a full picture of the overall evolution undergone by states in the process of developing national intelligence systems.

Though the issue of national intelligence system has been debated before, both in the academia and at governmental level, as proven by the existence of the Carayon Report and the works of Robert Steele, this has always occurred in large states, with a strong tradition in the field. The originality of this paper is that it uses benchmarking to try to understand the processes taking place in all those places and then extract key elements and patterns that then can be re-adapted and replicated for a different type of state, such is the case of Romania.

Keywords: national intelligence model, competitiveness, national security, Knowledge Society, knowledge capital

Introduction

“We are a smart people, but a dumb Nation and this is something we must be aware of if we are to prosper and be secure in the 21 century”
(Steele, 2000:80)

National intelligence is produced to ensure national security, a concept defined at the political level, but having its foundations in knowledge intelligence. We can, therefore, conclude that the manner in which the concept of “national security” is defined plays an important part in the development of a national intelligence system/process.

In the last two decades the open systems and open sources field (OSINT) has known an unprecedented evolution. That is why it is important to address OSINT separately from the intelligence collected from covert sources. Such a model would support the theoretical and practical development for both areas of intelligence, enabling OSINT to integrate in the domestic informational cycle of the state. In the same time the covert intelligence becomes a client of OSINT, being unburdened by the efforts OSINT is currently making.

If we were to make an analogy between genetics and the intelligence cycle there are several interesting aspects, which draw our attention. In the case of living organisms, there are two information processing systems, one which works in the background, developing the characteristics of the specie and one which works in plain sight comprising those activities, which appear as a response to or anticipation of events taking place in the external environment¹.

¹A. Fedanzo (1993) A Genetic View of National Intelligence. *Second International Symposium: National Security & National Competitiveness: OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Proceedings*. volume I. p. 6-14. [Online]. Available from <http://www.phibetaiota.net/1993/12/1993-fedanzo-a-genetic-view-of-national-intelligence/>, p. 6-14.

Redefining national intelligence systems, in a context marked by the end of the Cold War, is characterized by processes, which take into account both the national and global features, processes that are controllable and often sequential. The concepts of reform, transformation and/or revolution in intelligence or revolution in intelligence affairs² are employed most often to depict the complexity of changes taking place at the human, institutional and conceptual levels. The objective of these changes consists in the formulation and acquisition of a new ability – the adaptability to an ever changing environment. This is the only way for any social entity to gain competitive advantage. This paper uses benchmarking analysis to study the transformation that has marked the evolution of national intelligence systems, in the last decades, focusing on several significant case-studies such as the US, Canada, France and the UK.

National intelligence units

To be able to conduct a comparative analysis of the national economic intelligence units this study employs a four-tier scale analysis entitled PEKS (P – Political, E – Economic, K – Knowledge and S – Security), layers that must be general and invariant (meaning, a supplementary analysis is needed to show that these tiers are encountered in each national system from the set under analysis). In this study, however, we will limit ourselves to a global analysis, though it is important to note the invariance (in terms of time, it lasted for tens of years) of the institutional structure, mixed with the flexibility necessary for the adaptation of the entire system.

Note that none of the descriptions of national intelligence units mention a platform for the management of human capital production albeit, if we were to study more carefully the cases under analysis, we would notice that each of these units made this their main strategic goal. The moral of this discovery is that, in terms of creating human capital no out-sourcing is employed and only the final institutional product is put forward to be debated upon.

Although, the phrase “economic intelligence” seems to be rooted in a national intelligence context, it is actually built in an interdisciplinary manner. The economic is a means to ensure security understood as sustainability, a necessary means for the value system through the capacity required to gain competitive advantage, a means and not an end in itself.

² D. Barger (2005) *Towards a Revolution in Intelligence Affaires*, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division. [Online]. Available from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf, p. 33-47.

It is vital to understand that through the very use of comparative analysis methods, a process of convergence takes place at the structural and functional level of various national intelligence systems, which the states that do not possess the wisdom to prepare in advance for this evolution will be unable to understand.

Besides, the reason behind the need to understand such national systems is that we must possess a good knowledge of the main trends first and then of the fluctuations (for the simple reasons that it is the trends which define the fluctuations in both statistical and cognitive terms). It would be an unforgivable error to accept that Romania is a small country and Romanians are not ready to face the future. Romania is not a small country inside the EU, and in order to have Romanians prepared tomorrow, people should have started yesterday to think about how to prepare them today.

The cases analyzed in this study are those of the US, France, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan. Mapping the level of knowledge in intelligence across the world is maybe one of the most important resources for any intelligence-related activity.

Case Study: the US

The beginning of the 90s in the US was the period of momentous transformations in the field of intelligence as a result of several facts: Robert Steele's redesign of the role of open sources and the creation of the "Smart Nation" concept – a movement that originated inside the Intelligence Community³ and was aimed at ensuring access to open information and later to education, the economic intelligence initiatives, all taking place in the context of the end of the Cold War.

Robert Steele's movement and the transformation it brought contributed to the process of redefining the Euro-Atlantic area in the new political context as the European states identified and implemented the imported conceptual mechanisms of the new paradigm

Even if it is not recognized today by the intelligence establishment the OSINT conferences taking place in both the US and then Europe provided the setting for disseminating to the American and European public information on the new field of intelligence, irrespective of the fact that the

³ An example is the creation in 1995 of COSPO (Community Open Source Program Office) inside the CIA.

audience belonged or not to the intelligence community. The first such conferences were organized by the OSS and Steele's website www.oss.net was for many of the first unrestricted contact with the intelligence field and the first step in the diffusion process of the intelligence culture.

In terms of institutional building the initiative of retired Marine Corps officer James P. Etter of creating in 1991 the American Military University, an establishment which has become a symbol of the intersection between the civil and military worlds, with the academia acting as the main catalyst, was one of the most important stages of the process.

In the new political context, intelligence-related initiatives have multiplied, ensuring a good representation of American strategic intent in non-military terms. What comes out of this is a network of interconnected institutions defending American interests in the economic and non-economic areas.

Therefore, an analysis of the transformations undergone by the American Military University between 1991 and 2004 reveals the sequencing and controllability of the entire process:

I. The research and preparation stage lasted for two years, starting with 1991.

II. The preliminary operations stage took place during a three year period, having national accreditation as the end-goal.

III. Maturation lasted for three years, 1996-1998; note that in 1996 Steele launched the "Smart Nation" concept.

IV. Growth lasted for three years, 1999-2001.

V. Expansion and Diversification lasted for three years, 2002-2004.

The American Military University is a solution fully able to solve the problem of integrating the civilian and military dimensions inside an intelligence/OSINT culture with the help of the academic intelligence concept⁴. The project is envisaged to continue until 2015 as the entire academic system is currently undergoing a transformation that would enable it to provide a nationwide integrated solution.

⁴ In U.S. political culture the civil-military relations were conceived in the democratic state framework, being a continuous research subject D. B. Bobrow (1996), *The Civic Role of the Military: Some Critical Hypotheses*, *The Western Political Quarterly*, 19(1), pp. 101-111 and O. R. Holsti (1998), *A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96*, *International Security*, 23(3), pp. 5-42. In the post-Cold War decades it became a central dimension for both NATO new membership and security affairs as seen in P. D. Feaver (2003), *Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press and H. Born, M. Caparini, K.W. Haltiner, J. Kuhlmann (2006), *Civil-Military Relations in Europe Learning from crisis and institutional change*, Routledge, New York: Taylor & Francis Group.

A current example is given by a report from the Defense Science Board (2014), which found there are “gaps” in the U.S. intelligence community’s “global nuclear monitoring” capabilities. It argued that closing these gaps “should be a national priority.” The report recommended adopting “new tools for monitoring,” including looking at “open and commercial sources” with “big data analysis”.

“In some cases, this problem is partly due to a lack of careful scholarship, which requires an awareness of the limitations of the available knowledge, an understanding of how far one can go in drawing conclusions from it, and a willingness to ask tough questions about those conclusions to see how well they hold up to scrutiny. But these gaps and failures are also the product of an institutionalized deficiency in the way the U.S. government recruits and trains intelligence analysts.”⁵

The network of public institutions supporting the national intelligence system has been expanded through partnerships with the public and private sector and a process of externalization aimed at increasing capacity in key areas is underway. An example of these evolutions is the relation established between the Central Intelligence Agency and In-Q-Tel, a non-governmental non-profit organization having the mission of investing in technologies that may prove useful for the technological needs of the US Intelligence Community.

The US structure is designed around what we may call “the Vannevar Bush paradigm” comprising:

- the micro-macro relations between the P component (the white colored area) and the rest of the system; in practical terms, the White House has a representation of the system (unchanged from 1947) and also a responsibility for the political power;
- the S component (the yellow colored area) is fully integrated in the other components through information fusion and decision configuration mechanisms; it acts in practice as an interface between the first component and all the rest, being endowed with the attribute of national security;
- the C component (the green colored area) is from the start designed to integrate the defense economy and civilian economy types of knowledge. One of the institutionalization elements resides right inside the NSF (National Science Foundation, which does not appear in the figure);

⁵ G. Kulacki (2014) Defense Science Board off point open source intelligence reform, Union of Concerned Scientists. [Online]. Available from <http://allthingsnuclear.org/defense-science-board-off-point-on-open-source-intelligence-reform/> [Accessed: 10th January 2014].

- the E component (the violet colored area) has an explicit hegemonic orientation in the framework of the democratic peace theory. It is orientated towards the outside, because domestic welfare is highly dependent on external performance - the welfare at home is achieved with the help of capital imported from outside (this meaning much more than just commerce and the tangible economy);
- the portals component (the blue colored area) is the correspondent of Vannevar Bush's MEMEX idea, represented through the concept of virtualization inside the national intelligence system.




FIGURE 1 – The US National Intelligence System
(Carayon, 2003, Annex 3)

All these elements show us that the system in question is highly flexible being designed for economic warfare conducted inside the paradigm “intelligence is knowledge and knowledge is power”. Moreover, following

a knowledge transfer, which has taken place in the last 50 years two phenomena occur: firstly, the philosophy behind this architecture provides the matrix for all other national intelligence systems and secondly, the system must be made more flexible so as to ensure competitive advantage.

The element left unexplained is the training platform, which has been reduced to universities and the “circulation of human resources”, while another key element is the positioning of the “influence” component inside the White House, influence being a fundamental factor in the functioning of the national intelligence system.

Currently, the process of making the system more flexible is undergoing a structural transformation in accordance with the “smart nation” paradigm through the:

- a. extension of virtualization – the AMU project has provided the first university that integrates the skills of military and civilian systems on a 100% online platform; this achievement is not prolonged with the “knowledge democratization” process – the creation of a meta-platform fed by the main universities

- b. extension of the OSINT paradigm inside the EU – the EUROSINT project for example is a replica of the AMU’s development project;

- c. preparations made to develop the theoretical framework necessary for the development of the intelligence field;

- d. measures aimed at setting the stage, with the help of the ideas related to the creation of national intelligence systems, for a new understanding of citizen roles – moving towards the vision of the citizen as intelligence consumer (eg. the “lifelong learning” concept fits this new type of paradigm).

Case Study: France

In the beginning of the 90s, as a domestic reaction to the global challenges and through the import in a more or less open manner of the conceptual models that have provided the theoretical basis for the transformation the American intelligence system, France started its own project of redefining its national intelligence system. The main fields of action for the French were the academic, economic and territorial levels. Consequently, a higher education institution was founded dedicated to the means and practice of “economic war”. Moreover, a national network of public and private institutions was created to manage the theoretical and

practical issues connected with the intelligence field. The French approach was openly oriented towards an intelligence culture and a realistic insight into the problems concerning the statecraft future sustainability⁶.

What distinguishes the French project is its centralized character, in agreement with the French political philosophy. Therefore, starting from this background and the existent institutional framework (developed throughout the entire country) the concept of territorial intelligence⁷ is defined as a supplement to that of economic intelligence.

Each of these three initiatives becomes a guiding axis for this study. Two additional clarifications come to strengthen the idea of a sequential and controllable process in what concerns the creation of the French national intelligence system.

Thus, an analysis of the stages undergone by the French intelligence system between 1989 and 2004 show us the sequential and controllable character of the process:

I. 1989-1991 – Identification of the problems through academic debates among experts (the studies of Bernard Naboulek, Christian Harbulot and Philippe Baumard);

II. 1992-1993 – Creation of an analysis group addressing the topic of “economic intelligence and enterprise strategy” within the General Planning Commissariat, under the presidency of Henry Martre;

⁶ e. g. “Even during the Cold War, getting intelligence in economic, technological, and industrial matters from a country with which you are allied is not incompatible with the fact of being allied. The competition in terms of technology and commerce and industry is stronger than it was during the Cold War. There should be more emphasis put on that, and on industrial espionage”, quoted in Schweizer, Peter. *Friendly Spies: How America's Allies Are Using Economic Espionage to Steal Our Secrets*, New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993.

⁷ The relationship between territory and political science was initiated as a landmark of the French political culture through the contributions of André Siegfried (1875-1959), the founding father of electoral geography and the corresponding analysis methods e.g. A. Siegfried, *Le Canada et l'impérialisme britannique*, p. 3-58 in A. Siegfried, P. de Rousiers, M. de Périgny, F. Roz, A. Tardieu (1911), *Les questions actuelles de politique étrangère dans l'Amerique du Nord*, Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan; A. Siegfried (1913), *Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisième République*, Paris: Armand Colin; A. Siegfried (1954), *Tableaux des États-Unis*, Paris: Armand Colin, etc. Some other two facts are relevant on this ground. First, it is noteworthy that this approach is highly different of geopolitics, classic or modern; this aspect was treated in a course of S.G. Sebe, *Analytical Spatial Theories in Political Science*, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, 1998-2000 (unpublished). Second these approaches are included in the class of research methods in political science; one example particularly relevant for Romania is Matei's PhD thesis, S. Matei, *Romania at voting age: 18 years of electoral change in post-communism*, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012.

III. 1994 – Publication of “Martre Report” comprising several proposals, such as:

- a. assessing the potential of existent skills and information networks at national and regional level;
- b. defining the necessary structures and means to create networks;
- c. introducing common procedures.

IV. 1995 – Creation of the “Competitiveness and Economy Security Committee”: seven key figures elected based on their experience, authority and competences in the field of economic intelligence for a period of 3 years with the clear objective of providing decision support to the Government in regard to competitiveness and economic security issues and of providing advice in the elaboration and implementation of policies in the field, thus ensuring continuous coherence and coordination of all actions taken.

V. 2003 – Publication of the “Carayon Report” on economic intelligence, competitiveness and social cohesion;

VI. 2004 – Creation of the General Delegation for Economic Intelligence inside the Ministry of Economy and Finances;

VII. 2008 – The White Book of Defense and National Security launched by the French Presidency of Sarkozy that tries to integrate all previous initiatives in a national intelligence system

VIII. 2009 – The official launching for the DCRI (Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence) and the creation of the DDRI (Departmental Directorates of Interior Intelligence).

IX. September 2009 – the adoption of a decree creating an inter-ministerial delegate for economic intelligence place under the coordination of the General Secretariat of the Economy Ministry. It has the mission of elaborating and promoting public policies in the field of economic intelligence and evaluating their efficacy⁸.

The national network of public institutions supporting the national intelligence system was expanded through partnerships with private and non-governmental organizations (from lobby groups to reputation management NGOs) that act inside the European Union, most often in Brussels, having as a main goal – the defense of French interests. Such an example is represented by the relation between Compagnie Européenne d'Intelligence Stratégique (CEIS) and EUROSINT Forum.

⁸ C. Countenceau, F. Barbara, W. Everett, A. Gilliéron, X. Jacquin, M. Poullain, C. Valle and E. De Vigouroux D'Arvieu, (2010), *Guide Pratique de l'Intelligence Économique*, Paris: Eyrolles, p. 4.

The main successive stages undergone by France in the process of defining a matrix for its national intelligence system, covering the period between 1994 and 2008 have already been mentioned in the beginning of the paper. There are, however, several important accomplishments of the Carayon Report, from which a lot can be learned when implementing a Romanian model. First, the design of the French system employs a state-centric approach, which brings it closer to Romanian traditions in the field. Second, the mentality of the French elite is of a Socialist orientation (following the European Socialist tradition and not the Russian one), which makes a radical transformation impossible. For the abovementioned reasons we will now proceed to show, which elements of the US design lack from the French model, thus indicating the distinct mark of Henri Martre.

The missing institutional components could not be included inside the already existent institutions due to the mentality problems already mentioned, therefore after being identified they were institutionalized separately (this was the case of the “École de guerre économique” and other similar institutions).




FIGURE 2 – French National Intelligence System
(Carayon, 2003, Annex 6)

The integrating link between the defense and civilian economies is preserved (the green colored area), acting as in the American case as the originating factor for the OSINT community. The orientation towards hegemony is preserved (the violet colored area). Furthermore, the decision support dimension was ensured through the creation of the French economic rating agency COFACE – Compagnie Française d'Assurance pour le Commerce Extérieur.

The traditional French approach on territoriality was re-conceptualized because of the fact that the nearest region is the European Union. Thus, the entire concept was extended through a system similar to territorial and informational early warning. Key positions to place the drivers of change were identified inside the newly created institutions (ADIT – Agence pour la Diffusion de l'Information Technologique, INIST – Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique and UbiFrance), designed to flexibilize the system without changing it radically structurally. For example, the great schools, which have provided France its elite for over 200 years (École de Mines, École Normale Supérieure, École Polytechnique și École des Affaires) have remained in place.

Case Study: Canada

The case of Canada is the most important for our analysis because the Canadian national intelligence system was not designed and implemented for hegemony, Canada not being in the position to claim such a status. Furthermore, Canada has a partnership with the US and the EU in the field of intelligence, being one of the most important contributors to the debates on how to make the system more flexible (through the development of intelligence education systems and building a theoretical framework for intelligence).

Canada's behavior is one of discreet intervention in all fields of activity, being oriented mainly towards the external environment and knowing not only how to strengthen its reputation, but also the best ways to capitalize on it.

The Canadian national intelligence system is an offensive one, designed not only for economic competition but also for "knowledge wars".

In what concerns the design of the Canadian intelligence system the following elements bear notice:

The component dedicated to traditional security (the yellow colored area) is part of the intelligence community and provides decision support solely to the federal government.

The research-development component is distributed between the conquest of markets module (the violet colored areas) for the Applied Research and Commercial Research tasks and the civil society organized as a forum of NGOs for the Fundamental Research and Applied Research tasks.

Although the figure does not include a knowledge production system, we must take into consideration that Canada has a certain particularity, which consists in the integration of think-tanks in the decision-making processes, be it governmental or private. The early warning component is explicitly connected to the concept of opportunity and integrated into the conquest of markets module (in violet).

Another particularity of the Canadian system is the fact that it reunites all professional organizations in a mixed module, which combines market conquering activities with intelligence-related ones (one of the first systems in the world in which the economic sector is conceived as the analogue of a unit engaged in war)

The Canadian intelligence system is practically designed for discretion and integrated action.




FIGURE 3 – Canadian National Intelligence System
(Carayon, 2003, Annex 7)

Case Study: Germany

The German case also provides a good study model. The intelligence and influence activities (the yellow colored modules) are conducted by a system explicitly designed for such a purpose as well as by labor syndicates (the OSINT analysis leads to such a conclusion) and through the German intelligence service – the BND. Moreover, these categories of activities are distributed in all the other societal components, from NGOs to the press, large private conglomerates, diplomats etc.

A distinct feature of the German system is its mixed character, which is much more striking than in the case of Canada. In addition to the abovementioned the first referral information are distributed both through the corporate component and through the professional organizations.

Germany's federal structure is transformed in this figure in a criterion for the segmentation of the other modules. For example, the support for research activities is given directly by the lands through universities that integrate fundamental, applied, practical and commercial research activities. Strategies have been initiated at national level to increase the integration of universities, research centers and corporations. For example, in Karlsruhe a technological institute was founded in 2009, which brings together the skills portfolio of the Universität Karlsruhe and the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe.

The orientation towards the conquest of markets is driven by the intelligence activity conducted by the banking system combined with the financial consulting and corporate sector.

The model does not include the analog of the French COFACE, namely HERMES, Germany's rating agency (a project conducted by the University of Ilmenau during 1993-2000 and then transferred to federal level).

The German intelligence community is one of the most advanced in Europe and one of the most relevant indicator of its success is the activity of the Springer Publishing House in Berlin, which in the last 10 years has coordinated several book collections dedicated to intelligence, the majority of which are not translations works written by foreign authors, but are books by German authors; therefore though the German intelligence community is not as vocal or as visible as other intelligence communities in Europe and in the world, the skills its possesses make it a very competitive European actor.

This characteristic is the result of two factors. The first is the PDCA cycle (Plan, Do, Check, Act), a cycle defined by Deming for industrial production processes from the 50s and the second is the management principles formulated by Drucker (in the same period, during their time in Japan). Their synthesis in terms of political marketing intelligence combined with the Japanese value system has led to this outcome. As the PDCA⁹ and OODA¹⁰ cycle are symbiotic, the conceptual structure of management places the architecture of such a system on a special position giving it a level of flexibility, which allows dynamic adaptation to take place.

Therefore, the Japanese designed extended the PDCA cycle from one of industrial production as component of the tangible economy to an organizational intelligence cycle¹¹. As we can notice the diagram includes all fundamental elements of the Japanese system. These elements are placed on an information platform (represented by the star-shaped pentagon in the center) which ensures the dynamic update of the information. The micro/macro characteristic confers informational cohesion and interoperability to the system. Furthermore, Japan has the only national intelligence system with a micro/macro accumulation, meaning that knowledge accumulation at the level of the company's functions by the same logic as knowledge accumulation at state level. The added value consists in the transformation of information in intelligence at the level of each organization.

Similarly to the British case, JETRO (Japan's External Trade Organization) integrates together with the professional federations the intelligence and conquest of markets functions, the two acting as the dynamic components which organically tie the two functions.

Another fundamental characteristic is the fact that the first referral information are often to be found in the scientific field, especially as a result

⁹ PDCA – Plan, Do, Check, Act – model elaborated by Dr. Edwards Deming, the father of modern quality check and Walter Andrew Shewhart.

¹⁰ OODA – Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action – the OODA cycle elaborated by John Boyd.

¹¹ In accordance with Wilensky's theory (1967), where the main feature is the integration of the governmental and corporate components to acquire competitive advantage for the nation-state.

of the fundamental and applied research processes in their early stages. This gives the system good prediction capabilities.

As mentioned before, the orientation toward hegemony manifests itself in the Japanese case not only in the economic field, but also in what concerns the universities and research institutes focused on the study of foreign markets (as each entity from the domestic markets has a clearly established position due to the dynamic accumulation mechanisms).

The syndicates are integrated into this cycle, being given decision-making powers. Through this the designer of the Japanese system wishes to acquire a certain dynamic social cohesion inside the system. The banks are conceived as integrating factors for the first referral information and conquest of new markets-related processes. The SMEs are in touch with the think-tanks through a separate regulatory channel, profiting with their help by the activities conducted by JETRO.

The state is, in reality, given a coordinator role for all scientific information, differentiating between the intelligence cycles of the corporations and the intelligence resources of the system. The analysis of this system is important not only because of its similarities with the OODA cycle¹², but also because of its dynamic nature.

Initially, the Japanese experts active in the field of marketing intelligence designed the intelligence capabilities of the large Japanese corporations and the solutions they provided led to the genesis of the Japanese national intelligence system.

¹² That in the meantime has become a research topic in the Euro-Atlantic area.




FIGURE 6 – Japanese National Intelligence System
(Carayon, 2003, Annex 7)

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