

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

SEVEN ANALYTICAL COMMANDMENTS (I)

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Abstract¹:

Intelligence organisations focus on methodology and methodology-related issues. However, there is one more important thing that should also be discussed and this is ethics. Both elements are inextricably linked, and they should be presented and described together. Only with both can we identify bits and attributes that make a good analyst and allow him to grow and mature into an artist. There are so many dangers and things analysts have to pay attention to so as to survive workwise. They have to save the mental and physical forces that would allow them to have a long and distinguished career. Analysts are a special kind of humans, who continuously improve at their job, fine-tune methods and techniques, and discover new tools and technologies every day. This should be complemented by a dynamic exchange of ideas with fellow analysts. Those are things this paper is all about.

Keywords: *Intelligence analysis, methodology, ethics, analytical processes, analytical principles.*

Review of the subject literature

Strategic intelligence as a research area is quite new in Poland. This is also the case for exploration and efforts to build new theories in

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this domain. The number of publications is still modest, so to speak, and topics cover mainly basic theoretical issues, with no new initiatives to develop a conceptual basis.

At the beginning of the 21st Century, Polish subject literature included mainly translations from foreign languages, such as books by Micheal Herman (i.e. *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, translated to Polish in 2002). Some efforts have been made by the Collegium Civitas in Warsaw and Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities. It was not until 2014, when the book of Professor Mirosław Minkina was published in Poland, *Gry wywiadów. Sztuka wywiadu w państwie współczesnym* [*Art of Intelligence and the Modern State*] that we could start talking about serious Polish efforts to approach problems of intelligence holistically. The year 2016 was a caesura for Polish Intelligence Analysis with J. Kozłowski's monograph, *Teoria i praktyka działań analityczno-informacyjnych* [*Theory and Practice of Intelligence Analysis*], and for Big Data analysis the 2020 publication *Historia i perspektywy analizy dużych wolumenów i strumieni danych* [*History and Perspectives for Big Data Analysis*]. Limited national resources have resulted in researchers still relying on publications by Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, Mark Phythian, James J. Wirtz and Alan Breakspear.

Other sources had been thematic journals such as *Intelligence and National Security*, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* and *Studies in Intelligence*. In these periodicals, the views and opinions of many other distinguished authors were presented, including Charles Cogan, Michael Warner, Donald Cameron Watt and researchers from Germany and Spain.

However, such pieces were not sufficient to respond to the demand at the national level. Therefore, the next efforts have been made to take a new, more energetic, and sustainable approach to continue research in the area of Intelligence Studies.

Framework and methodology

To meet the requirements of the Intelligence Community, an essay-like form of an article has been used to present, from a personal point of view, several topics that should be examined and evaluated

methodically. Hopefully, this will encourage readers to take sides and accept the presented arguments.

In this work, many sources were analysed in detail, especially those referring to systems, processes and problems in military reconnaissance and intelligence organizations. Such work was conducted in different dimensions, including organizational and functional areas. Descriptive and analytical approaches to sources, as well as a functional and logical synthesis of the most important elements, were used. They were complemented by comparisons and analogies as well as by abstractive and generalizing methods, mainly to strip away unnecessary details. All these efforts have been made to allow for the finding of the most important issues that would be required to build a theoretical framework for intelligence studies in the area of strategic analysis and propose feasible solutions.

ICD 203

The most recognizable element and exemplification of the standardization approach is the document that regulates the work of the US National Intelligence Community – the US Intelligence Community Directive 203 (ICD 203). This directive was signed on 12 June 2023 by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and it:

- establishes the American Intelligence Community (IC) Analytic Standards that govern the production and evaluation of analytic products.
- articulates the responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigour in their analytic thinking and work practices; and
- delineates the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Analytic Ombudsman (Intelligence Community Directive 203, “Analytic Standards”, June 12, 2023a).

All analytic products shall be consistent, according to the above-mentioned ICD 203, with the following five Analytic Standards: objectivity, independence of political consideration, timeliness, exploitation of all available sources of intelligence information, and implementing and exhibiting analytic tradecraft standards. Moreover, analytic tradecraft standards include:

- (1) Proper description of quality and credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies;
- (2) Proper expression and explanation of uncertainties associated with major analytic results;
- (3) Proper distinction between intelligence information, assumptions, and judgments;
- (4) Incorporating analysis of alternatives;
- (5) Demonstrating customer relevance and addressing implications;
- (6) Using clear and logical argumentation;
- (7) Explaining change to or consistency of analytic judgments;
- (8) Making accurate judgments and assessments;
- (9) Incorporating effective visual information where appropriate.

The ICD 203 Standards are US core principles of intelligence analysis and were introduced across the American IC. They are applied in each analytic product in a manner appropriate to its purpose, the type and scope of its underlying source information, its production timeline, and its customers. They are also the foundational assessment criteria for a review of analytic products. Standards also serve as a common foundation for developing education and training in analytic skills as well as for the promotion of a common ethic for achieving analytic rigour and excellence and for personal integrity in Intelligence Analysis.

Approach to the problem

Before we start to sail through the set of Intelligence Analysis dimensions, it would be instrumental to draw up several things to define some of its important terms such as methodology, methods, techniques, and tools. The essay form should help present issues from a personal point of view and methodically examine and evaluate topics of rationality, morality, and ethics in Intelligence Analysis, all within the academic agenda. The work stated from papers such as: P. Gill and M. Phythian. (2018). "Developing Intelligence Theory," *Intelligence and National Security*. 33(4); Mark Phythian, Peter Gill, and Stephen Marrin. (2009). *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates*. Abingdon: Routledge; and Andrew Rathmell. (2002). "Towards Postmodern Intelligence." *Intelligence and National Security*. 17 (3): 87–104. More

specifically, some personal points of view were presented in the paper to support the offered views. Hopefully, this will encourage readers to take a side and accept submitted arguments.

Methods in this specific world should be considered as procedures, structures, and algorithms used in analytical processes to find a solution to analytical problems, all planned and value-neutral. They can include examinations, theoretical and logical procedures, experimental evaluations, numerical schemes, statistics, etc. Methodology should then be considered as a systematic way to solve a problem and should include procedures of describing, explaining, and anticipating different analytical elements.

How knowledge is generated by Intelligence is both an art and a science. Both should generate ways an analytical project should be carried out and find appropriate methods. The notion of Intelligence and related methodologies include the why, where and who as well as all the opposites – when not to, who not to, what not to, etc. With the proper application of methodology, analysts can follow the tracks of analytical rigour and achieve elevated levels of adequateness and accuracy. As for techniques, they should be perceived as practical elements, regulated by precise, diligent, and proven instructions that allow for generating necessary data, information, opinions, and facts.

Analytical tools are components used to collect necessary data and information. All the above-mentioned elements do not exist in nature. They are purely notional and represent, for better or worse, intended or otherwise, contributions from both the analyst's mind and spirit – intellect and character. They are just figments of the human mind and the spirit, designed to link the thought and the real-life world. Such a construct allows us to obtain and build up knowledge as well as to identify laws and rules necessary to make analytical progress. The analytical product should then not be an outcome of just conventional procedures but should always create added value. It is always outputs versus outcomes. If we are doing forecasting instead of foresight, then we are not learning – we are not improving the decision-making of our intelligence customers.

Forecasting is looking at a future scenario, in which we simply do a linear extrapolation of current trends. Foresight is looking at scenarios

that are possible or probable. Foresight provides plausible, sometimes unexpected, insights, which are often provocative, and which adversaries may hope we experience. We do not offer value to our customers if we are only providing a forecast of trajectories with flashpoints of concern. Many times, they can already see much of this coming as it is the trajectory they are already on. Intelligence Analysis needs then to map out possible and do a gap analysis – options and implications or consequences of taking or not taking actions. With this ethos in mind, analysts both add value and provide a commitment to their calling, improving the value of outputs and outcomes. This leads us to the conclusion that the **Intelligence Analysis methodology should also be Intelligence Analysis ethics as it always generates new important, sometimes critical elements.**

Main findings

The work of an Intelligence analyst is a kind of scientific work and as such is subject to two main threats:

- a. the first is when analysts take a deep dive into their subject and are not able to fight effectively with the current. It results in a fast exhaustion of their vital and mental forces if they forget that the analytical work is more like a marathon rather than a sprint.
- b. the second item is equally dangerous, although it might not surface for quite a long time. If an analyst's creativity and capability are harnessed and drowned in everyday procedures, important elements may remain undiscovered and unexploited.

To avoid this, Intelligence Analysis ethics should find an ally in methods and techniques. Ethics without such software will get burned; methods and techniques without ethics would remain sterile and pointless. Therefore, we have to find the proper way to marry these two dimensions. Firstly, and foremost, most of the things in Intelligence Analysis are linked with the problem of personal ambitions. An analyst should answer the question of what is more important – to prove something to myself or others. For me, it is quite clear that those others are an important element in the day-to-day work of an analyst.

Most of them don't know, and they cannot even know, how much effort it is necessary to expend to complete a task, how many tears and

how much sweat it costs an analyst. That is why appreciation is so important, just to keep the analytical process going. If it is followed by an official recognition – the more, the better. It is like the case of a Nobel Prize. It is often appreciated not because of a big dollar cheque but because of the nameless crowd, which will never get close to it.

Ambitions are similar to two sides of the same coin. They can be good as they provide strong motivation to continue analytical efforts. They can also be a destructive element and become a destructive force. They may cloud judgments and distort the creative abilities of an analyst, especially one who does not have enough strength to be impartial and objective. Objectivity is expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations. In short, everything comes down to self-assessment, with cold blood and fairness, also with courage to recognize our shortcomings, and with modesty and humility to see abilities and talents.

Only in this situation, when our weaknesses are attributed to our evaluation sheet, we, as analysts, can think about improving performance and even punch well above our weight. Such elements might contribute to analytical successes and lead to recognition within the analytical world.

Objectivity is a difficult art and only a few can practice it. There are always analysts stuck in their self-righteousness, who can get widespread recognition and outstanding results. However, their results are tainted with a lack of impartiality from the very start of their analytical project. Therefore, with the next projects, generating true and credible results, analysts should always look at things and themselves from a distance, identifying and recognizing their cognitive, educational, and professional limitations.

To sum up, objectivity is a difficult art. Therefore, the analyst should place himself in two reference systems. He should be well aware of the inner self but also be able to reach beyond himself, to stand aside for a few moments and generate an appropriate assessment. An analyst should partially be an Einstein, who can associate observations made in different reference systems to a great analytical conclusion. Being a very smart person or even a genius is not a sufficient condition to become a good analyst. Several such people are walking the Earth but most of the

successes in Intelligence were achieved by average yet dependable analysts. Average abilities will then do, but this is not enough – it is necessary to develop them systematically and without a break. Simple and regular painstaking work, aimed at just earning money, is not sufficient to be successful in an Intelligence enterprise.

Analysts always need a few seeds of passion for Intelligence Analysis. How to define such an element? As for every psychological element – it is quite difficult to describe it. However, we can present at least two of the most important issues. The first one is the personal character of interest in the analytical problem. This should be not only regular, professional engagement but also a deep dive into a subject, engaging most of the analyst psyche. We should even identify ourselves with the analytical topic. The second element is to find a psychological pleasure in examining an analytical question. We have to look for a particular kind of satisfaction generated by an outcome of professional curiosity and even by the analytical process as such. However, it is not possible to achieve this level and maintain it for long.

Those few moments, from time to time, will do. They provide an analyst with the energy to survive long hours dedicated to a study of a subject and overcome fatigue. This special kind of psychological pleasure is normally not a result of an intensive experience events, emotions, and results of our mental work. Generally, it is more than enough if it is somewhere in our subconsciousness, which focuses on solving an analytical problem.

An analyst should not be afraid of being different from the rest of the people in the Intelligence establishment. This is mainly due to the situation of dedicating most of their time to systematic, painstaking, and long-lasting projects. Partially, it is because of a certain mental distinctiveness generated by interest in specific, difficult, sometimes critically important topics. The courage to be different in many cases results in the necessity to resign from many everyday joys and being Mr. Social, elements that are often appreciated and valued in organizations. Such a position should not however lead to victimization or showing being different and/or superior to other people in the organization.

Analysts lose nothing if we compare them with other members of Intelligence teams as the former can open for themselves new mental

perspectives. Such elements produce a kind of satisfaction, which is quite incomparable to other jobs and generates the effect of fulfilment. With time it changes to savouring this specific, analytical atmosphere and each moment dedicated to analytical work. However, as always, there is a catch – some analysts move to analytical blind alleys, where moments dedicated to regular life and normal, everyday pleasures are considered a waste of time and effort. This is not healthy and eventually creates a mental problem instead of increasing productivity.

It is also necessary to emphasize that there is no real passion for work without proper motivation. However, enthusiasm will ultimately burn out if it is not deep-rooted in the remotest layers of the analyst's personality. Rush for a professional carrier will not suffice. Even more, focusing on the carrier as the most important objective is at odds with the analyst-type calling. Any candidate for an analyst's post must be aware that this kind of job requires long working hours at the office desk. He should also know that this is often accompanied by a lack of professional recognition by colleagues and superiors, and many administration-type duties necessary to climb the career path. Therefore, strong motivation is necessary if one wants to become successful and have a satisfying career.

Motivations might have different dimensions. Firstly, the analyst wants simply "to have fun" and experience an intellectual adventure. Secondly, the analyst wants to be of use to the intelligence organization and the nation. Thirdly, many analysts are driven by striving for the truth and finally – motivated by ideology and/or religion. In most of the cases, all elements co-exist and are difficult to separate.

Naturally, aiming for knowledge and truth is deeply seated somewhere inside the mind, even against our spoken declarations, declared intentions, and things an analyst is not aware of. Ideological and religious motivations surface quite often, especially when analysts use Intelligence Analysis to support their beliefs and philosophies. We also have to mention the necessity factor to be a constructive and active part of an organization. Intelligence work, and Intelligence Analysis, in particular, does not only reside in the desk, folders, databases, and computers. It is also an institution, its components, processes, and procedures.

Besides, it is possible to exercise Intelligence work only within an Intelligence organization. In this case, there is no freedom for manoeuvre. Only within this specific framework it is possible to acquire and develop specific skills as well as to build up personal and institutional knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to not only be an active member of the project team, department, Intelligence organization and national Intelligence Community but also be a part of international programmes and joint Intelligence efforts.

As always, there is a catch. Analysts should focus on their projects, tasks, and teamwork. However, it is quite easy for an analyst to become a person who only celebrates successes and presents past achievements, instead of focusing on the future. The higher the position of an analyst, the bigger the danger of celebrating Intelligence Analysis instead of exercising it. Instead of long hours dedicated to analytical work, the member of a national Intelligence enterprise flies from one partner location or allied service to another, presenting and discussing the same issues repeatedly. This is a straight path to discuss the past and avoid presenting estimates and develop foresight.

An analyst should always be a friend of books, journals, and databases. Permanent contact with professional literature, new data and information should be a part of their strategies. But Intelligence Analysis is a game with a big stake. Analysts who know publications, data and information only from their areas of interest can become just good craftsmen. Therefore, each analyst should actively seek new information, and new publications from different areas, domains, and disciplines. This should be complemented by continuously discovering novelties of science, culture, and art, reading not only volumes and articles on topics of interest but also construing popular science books and journals going well beyond the analyst's regular work area. This could not be achieved without good feelings for reading. There is of course a danger of analysts becoming lonely in the analytical crowd and they should be able to find ways and tools to fill such a gap if they want to be successful.

The next element could additionally become a kind of summary for all the above-mentioned fundamentals. Perusing accessible analytical resources, continuously keeping the shoulder to the analytical wheel and poring over available solutions are sets of actions that should be a

mantra for every analyst in each Intelligence enterprise. Long hours at the desk, days spent reading, and months dedicated to Intelligence studies, are things that characterize good analysts. If a person is not able to do all this, it can only be an impostor, not a real analyst.

An analyst's desk is an important thing, but we have also to present a few things that should characterize such an approach. *The first one is the system.* There are people with different approaches and characters. Some work according to a meticulously prepared plan, with specific hours dedicated to analytical work; others prefer "long jumps" with long hours and days of intensive effort, followed by slowing the pace down and taking the rest necessary to regenerate forces. Independently of the approach, *the system* should become an important part of each analytical strategy as chaos is the biggest enemy of an analyst.

If one presents to their superior a paper with many corrections, arrows, and deletions, and this overcomes the regular text, it is a clear sign that they are not a suitable candidate for an analytical job. One of the best approaches for the analyst is to dedicate a specific period of the day, be it half an hour, one hour, or any other time, just for one purpose. It is possible to count how many hours of true work it generates during the month, quarter, or year. This is a significant amount of time, in reality, plenty of time! Working a specific amount of time per day does not ensure immediate progress. This may have a destructive effect but results always continue to accumulate. One can especially see the value of such an approach when learning a foreign language. Another part of the analytical strategy is to remain consistently on the topic of a launched project. The selection of the topic should be carried out putting one foot in front of the other pensively. However, if the choice is made, it should be flown either to the good or bitter end, to find a solution or prove that it is not possible or that tasking is out of an analyst's reach.

The second one is curiosity. They are also people and analysts with an insatiable curiosity, for whom each new message, new book, new article, and lecture are irresistible attractions and elements more interesting than the current project and subject of current analytical work. This constitutes a dangerous situation. If somebody succumbs once to such a temptation, they are finished as valuable and productive analysts.

The capability to work is an important element in Intelligence Analysis, if it is necessary or if there is no other choice, occasionally in short, intense intervals. This ability should also be developed and continuously mastered by analysts, just to use every moment for the task. Any other approach should be considered as an excuse and try to put the blame for the volume and quality of an analytical product delivered on the so-called objective difficulties. Most of them are real and all of them consume time and effort. They are being used as an excuse in the analytical world but, excluding exceptional circumstances, this should not be the case.

The world is full of everyday problems, unsolved difficulties, and inevitable situations. If an analyst is not able to find a slot between those elements and exploit already existing conditions to carry on with their work, they will never reach the level that would allow them to become good experts. Excuses are often accompanied by feelings of bitterness and a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude. This shows that such a person is not the one Intelligence should invest in. A good solution for the on-again and off-again types of jobs is creating slots for the analytical work and filling them in with a well-prepared plan.

Some people need quite a long run-up time, i.e. a long preparation time, the phase preceding the proper work, examination of the data, information and literature on the subject, efforts to establish where the previous work had stopped etc. For this kind of people, an on-again and off-again type of job is especially difficult, but everyday practice and gathered experience shows that even in such a case regular practising and endurance can lead to mind-boggling results.

The more an analyst makes his/ her way up the ladder in the organization, he spends time preparing, signing different documents, and filling out numerous forms. Therefore, the best solution for solving the problem of an excess of administration work is the "two-desk" method. The first desk should be used for standard administration work for ongoing communications with collaborators and partners, documents awaiting approval and signature and finally – any other documents awaiting their turn. The second table should be placed somewhere in the room's corner and dedicated only to the analytical work with documents opened on the last read page, with half-written

sheets of paper and a ball pen ready to finish the already started sentence. If an analyst can adhere to the above-mentioned strategy, the rule of systematic build-up of efforts will do its job.

There is no creative job without permanent and continuous learning. Therefore, an analyst should be motivated by two main objectives: the necessity to constantly train his/her mind and the requirement to discover new knowledge areas needed for analytical problem-solving. The human brain is an astonishing tool, however with many imperfections, just to mention fatigue and a necessity to regenerate after the job. We should also mention brain plasticity, which allows this part of the human body to accommodate quite easily to repeated mental processes and situations. If we repeat mental operations with a comparable structure, the brain builds for itself a mental route, in which each next reasoning easily falls in. For new elements falling into the mind, it is extremely difficult to find new answers. In such a situation work often leads to old, already tested conclusions, rationalized rather by a psychological structure of an analyst's brain than proved objective reasons. Most of the people are not able to get free from such mental mechanisms. Therefore, they want to construct their personalities and build unique styles of work, independence, and originality of thinking. On the other side – such an undertaking could lead to personal quirks, mannerisms, and even analytical fixations. Almost nobody can get rid of established mental habits, but in the case of analytical work, analysts should do everything possible to minimise their effects on his/her actions.

The ability to exercise self-criticism is quite a rare thing and an extremely valuable capacity. Criticism creates a question situation, and self-criticism does not allow for the acceptance of shoddy answers. There are several elements of self-criticism: a balanced attitude towards an analytical product, examining analytical elements without being either tardy or jumping the gun and making statements that in the foreseeable future may not stand a test, accepting critical remarks and constructive suggestions of other analysts, learning from own mistakes, good recognition and identification of own mental abilities. Nurturing such talents should become an objective for each person involved in the Intelligence Analysis.

One of the most important elements that allows to keep the proper and strong analytic shape is the permanent training of the brain, mental gymnastics. This should not be limited just to the current analytical project but also include learning new things from others, gradually and steadily building up a personal analytical toolkit, improving the art of understanding, continuously developing, practising, and testing logical skills and training the memory.

This will be, of course, most of the time, linked with current projects, but it is also necessary to look for and find things that are not necessarily immediately applicable to analytical tasks and are not of direct benefit to the analyst. The good thing is using morning hours, if a busy schedule allows, to wrestle with the most difficult logic and analytical problems. It is to be noted that at present there is not too much time for systematic and pre-planned studies on specific topics and analytical elements. This has been mostly replaced by studies of elements needed to finish current projects. Such a concession is necessary due to an overwhelming wave of tasks, emerging problems, and additional duties. However, as long as it is possible, it is necessary to cling to the old ways of doing analytical business and try to dedicate time to learning new things and improving new capabilities.

The other way of doing everyday mental gymnastics, complementing the one mentioned above, is to not part with books, journals and documents and dedicate each available moment for reading. This should not be a minute just “for reading” but rather taking time “for learning”. New topics should be studied wherever and whenever possible. It is just necessary to sit and go through it considering difficulties with concentration of attention at different times and various places. In such situations, we should not demand too much from our mental powers, but we should keep going and try to accumulate new knowledge and new skills.

Identifying talents and personal limitations. On the one hand, having at least some skills is a precondition to undertake challenges as big and complicated as analytical projects. On the other, both personal abilities and limitations can only manifest and be proven in action, during the real analytical process. Preliminary inquiries are just the beginning. In addition, it is also necessary to control Intelligence

Analysis-related processes and procedures permanently, as they fly. The main objective of such actions is to identify what could be done, what else I can do and what is absolutely out of reach. Therefore, a great amount of objectivism is required and having much humility about himself/ herself. It is necessary to admit here that these are rare characteristics within analytical teams as it is difficult for many people to admit – “I am not able to do this!”

Such a situation immediately generates the question situation and a typically human impulse – “Why is that?”, “Should I surrender? Now! Others gave up but they hadn’t noticed a simple way around for emerging difficulties. I am to win this time!” There is a piece of conceit in such an approach, but just a small one – “I am not as good as people think. I have just been able to find the solution that others somehow must have missed”. That is quite a good thing as it pushes analysts to climb to the top and is one of the most important driving forces of Intelligence Analysis. Such instincts, however, should be kept under control, not only to minimize analytical costs but also to reduce risks.

Analysts should be aware of their mental limits to undertake efforts to go far and beyond in information products. This is due to the situation that most analytical products are reports crossing mental frontiers and other limitations. A blunt, direct, and strong analytical attack is generally not a feasible solution as analysts should withdraw from their assumptions from time to time, think things over, and find new ways, methods, techniques, and tools. Even if the final lap is a burst of intuition, for analysts it is just a kind of reward for previous renunciation and sacrifices, a bonus for their painstaking work and giving up cheap successes. Only a person who knows their constraints and has a lot of respect for them can go beyond and generate added analytical values. An analyst who is not ready to take up such a challenge will fail long before he approaches the core of a problem. As already indicated, the identification of own talents and capabilities should always go with humility. In this specific case, humbleness should be perceived as a virtue that allows one to make self-evaluations in the light of truth.

An analyst, despite his/ her achievements, talents, and beliefs, normally launches a series of actions similar to those of a strategist, evaluates the balance of forces, and terrain, and assesses an adversary.

Such an analogy is accurate and justified as a confrontation with an analytical problem equally depends on recognising analytical potential as military victory depends on staff work and staff calculations.

The self-awareness of own limitations also pushes analysts to use the works of other people. No analyst can work alone. Of course, there are sometimes periods of long, intensive, and solitary analytical work. Of course, some people are particularly predestined to carry out the analytical burden alone. Eventually, an analyst uses outcomes of other projects and the works of other analysts anyway, directly, or indirectly. Indirect consultation could refer to various analytical products, monographs, and other works as well as the use of advanced computer software. The direct use of expertise could be done through discussions with other people, consultations in different forms and also formalized cooperation within project teams.

In many cases, bi- and multilateral cooperation is not the strongest suit despite the situation that the abilities and skills of analysts are at a quite high level. Certainly, higher than shown in many cases by the Intelligence production. The fault in this situation is partly attributable to the sense of individuality. This is, in many cases, exemplified by the situation that every member of the projects team has their own, sometimes brilliant, and outstanding ideas, but rarely they can resign from their positions and try to force their theories. This mechanism leads to the situation that project teams do not live for long, sinking in a large number of specific, sometimes irrelevant tasks.

Such effects might be reinforced by the jealousy and other personal engagements of team members. In addition, team leaders, in most cases, do not have too many tools to guide the team properly. Sometimes, they are kind of powerless and the only thing such teams are good at is writing average-level analytical products, even with inconsistent and different quality-level contributions from analysts.

There is also another problem. It is an unpleasant and short-sighted practice of hiding data, information, research results and analytical products from other colleagues and collaborators. This is mainly due to the presence of people afraid that others will steal their ideas and solutions or outrun them in finding solutions and generating analytical products. However, good analysts still have many ideas, elements and

plans up their sleeve. This results in the existence of groups, in which average analysts can win their laurels and geniuses are not able to stand out from fellow analysts. This also leads to the situation that there is no group success and group satisfaction with the project completed. There is also no joint and combined satisfaction in discovering new, unknown analytical lands.

Now, it is time for some additional remarks. Analytical work, as each creative type of activity, brings with it some hazards. One of them is the creation of a separate, mental world that an analyst can live in and operate. In many cases, such a creation is even more interesting and more engaging, sometimes even addictive. It allows one to get away from things that are considered ordinary and find for themselves a brave, new world with several elements that build it in its specific way. Such creations may influence mental health. If connected with the reprogramming of the brain can result in losing contact with reality and bring difficulties in dealing with every day, normal problems. Such symptoms can surface in the case of some analysts. Therefore, it is necessary to keep them under tight, strict control and not allow the new world to take precedence over the normality and analytic routine.

There are several solutions to such problems. Firstly, regular family life and normal professional relations. If there is a problem with this, analysts, their superiors or colleagues should force them to get involved in ordinary problems and not move to the other side of the mirror. Secondly, it is necessary to continuously build, develop and maintain the capacity to be aware of and recognize other people's needs. Thirdly, it is necessary to find someone or something that can be taken care of. Still, one can become a weirdo when they are not able to find the time for the proper work due to being overloaded with many other things. All is a matter of proportions, not just a problem of dedicating more or less time. This is also the issue of balancing the degree of commitment, between everyday life and analytical world.

Therefore, it is also necessary to find ways to get away from analytical problems and tasks. It is not true that you will lose everything when you stop mid-sentence. This would give the subconscious a chance to digest data and information and build the fundament for a future solution. It is also necessary to have a hobby – to have a stepping stone

from professional hardships. However, a hobby should allow one to relax properly and efficiently and should not dominate over professional life. Hence, the issue of balance pops up yet again. No element should occupy the mind and time to such a degree that it causes an analyst to turn away from the most important things.

Now turning to the next concern – organization of relaxation. Analysts must not overdo intellectual work and push too hard with assigned tasks. Our brain and nervous system are both delicate creations and mental effort, especially such intensive analytical work, can enervate a person's strength. Without necessary regeneration, a catastrophe, including mental deterioration, may become a serious threat. Each of the veteran analysts experienced the situation when going beyond the certain threshold of fatigue, it is not possible to do anything constructive and all efforts would prove futile. The trotting in the same place starts and even much worse thing happens – looping for days and weeks, going forward and in reality – moving backwards.

If somebody wants to prove to themselves that despite their tiredness, they can solve the problem, they forget about the physical laws of entropy. Normally, on the next day, the problem would not be so difficult to solve. The problem of sleep and sport are intricately linked. The problem of analysts falling asleep is as much a question of their mental work, which is still moving around in their brain, as a matter of lack of regular exercise. Many people give others much different advice, for example – stop mental work every hour and dedicate five minutes to gymnastics, plan half a day per week for hiking or any other physical activity, and organize each year at least three weeks of vacations each – with mental work reduced to a minimum.

It is not effective to recommend to Intelligence structures to strictly follow these suggestions. Instead, each analyst should find his/her ways to apply such recipes to everyday practice. Analysts should find his/her type of exercise and establish doses of physical activities. One thing is for sure, it is necessary to be not too thrifty. Time dedicated to relaxation pays off, mainly in the form of analysis results and great Intelligence products.

An important element should be emphasized here, any activity should be an active rest, with the brain involved. It is also necessary to

enjoy the activities and not to think about work that waits for us in the office. This significantly reduces the effect of relaxation. But even in the office, we can use short moments that distract us from the work, for example doing necessary shopping. Even in such a case, it is necessary to find in it a “local pleasure” and consider this as a half-relaxation. This sometimes helps. We should know that difficulties with falling asleep and with sleep are normally indicators that the organism needs more physical activity. Of course, the dosage of it should be regulated individually, according to personal needs. A slumber always acts as an anti-entropic factor.

During an analytical project sometimes, it is not possible to avoid periods of hard work, which consumes our mental and physical forces at a rapid pace. This could be a series of calculations, experiments, and tests, in which most of the activities should be done with a single swing due to the time pressure or editing of the final Intelligence product that should have been done “yesterday.” Some consider such things as romantic and interesting, but for analysts, this is a great mental and physical effort and exploitation of an organism. After such a time, it is just necessary to take a good rest.

There is one more aspect of the Intelligence Analysis work that links with all the elements mentioned before. It is a mental rigour and discipline of personal thoughts, ideas, and concepts. Without such an approach analyst could turn out to be weirdoes, enter strange mental dead ends and even bring themselves to the state of analytical geekery and other pathologies linked with too intensive consumption of mental and physical resources.

There are always costs associated with analytical tasks, such as feelings of big stress, being under pressure, concerns about failures or being overtired. Those are conditions close to anxiety and depression. All or part of them surface when analytical euphoria passes out. If such elements are not accompanied by mental rigour and discipline of personal thoughts, which in practical terms means an ability to “stop thinking” or “think about something different,” then costs might take on catastrophic proportions and even end with the bankruptcy of the organism.

Relax, physical activities and good sleep certainly help in retaining the mental rigour and discipline of personal thoughts, but they will not solve problems by themselves. Mental rigour and discipline of personal thoughts is a kind of art and as such – is a kind of analytical asceticism. This, as each asceticism, could only be achieved by assiduous exercises.

There is one more warning. All that has been written so far in the paper should be taken lightly, but judiciously, sensibly, and flexibly. They should be applied as things by themselves not just a regime that could make analysts' lives miserable.

It is also mentioned that there always will exist a special category of analysts who will not achieve many successes but will concentrate only and mainly on finding strategies, methods and techniques that allow them to avoid excessive exploitation of their mental and physical forces. We have to note this fact and realize that they will not significantly contribute to the organization as they just concentrate on their well-being and careers.

Then, why become an Intelligence Analyst? There is one element that compensates for all the efforts, time, and risks. Those are cognitive enjoyment and an awareness that an analyst contributes to his/her nation's security and welfare.

Is it a good and nice thing to know something and know more than most of the people in the country? Most of the time, we do not know that we know, that we have specific knowledge. It is rather something asleep, something absent and deep inside our brain, which awakes and is present with the presence of specific mental associations and reminders. This is a thing similar to learning and usage of a foreign language when a needed word comes into our consciousness as it is needed and should be used for communication. Most of the time, it is absent but always ready for use in case of need.

Despite the situation that the knowledge gathered and accumulated is stored somewhere in subconscious areas of the brain, it always allows analysts to see the world in a different light, it changes the hierarchy of values, shows new, sometimes unexpected, and new things, and opens new cognitive areas. It also enriches the personality of the analyst.

There is one close out of this – the most perceptible joy emerging from exercising the Intelligence Analysis is not the possession and relevance of acquired knowledge but the process of gaining knowledge itself. This is a kind of adventure, a way of an explorer and a pioneer. It is both an effort and a route to gaining and accumulating knowledge. The best situation for any analyst is when we know where we are going, which direction we are taking and that there is a reward at the end of the road and such a challenge is worth our time and effort.

Conclusions

Thinking is a human act imbuing thing with values. We have to remember that it is an act of thinking that changes our environment and the world, from morally neutral to one permeated with values. The act of thinking is also a human-specific action, and it takes place somewhere in the grey matter of the brain.

It is not possible to see it, but it is a human action par excellence. It is the first element of a long causal chain as well, for which only a human can take responsibility. Responsibility is linked with morality and ethics. As for Intelligence Analysis, it should be considered a rational thing, and it leads us directly to the issue of morality of thought. Rational thoughts and actions mean rational thinking and building rationality. It should also be considered as a permanent effort to use rational types of searches and mental evaluations imposed upon reality.

Rationality is a basic term and as a posture, it should be guided by intellectual rigour and experience. Only with these two, one can consider that they are somewhere close to both truth and reality. However, there is still a trap here if we follow the positivist type of rationalism as it is strongly associated with chains of mathematical consequences. Such an approach claims that without them any method and technique may dissipate in indeterminacies.

As for empirical methods and techniques, they are neither a monolith nor a ruler of rationality. Although it is not possible to resign from such an approach, we have to keep in mind that the empiric approach has its limits. We have also to acknowledge that there is also another rationality, not guided by empiric results and this is a world of philosophy and metaphysics. The empiric-mathematical type of

rationality is the easiest part of the whole methodology concept with its clear criteria and details. However, still, it is still necessary to approach problems with maximum caution and not take for granted things that only pretend to be the ones.

The situation becomes more difficult with some justifications, which are linked with the necessity to make a choice and/or take action. This is the moment when sentient and insentient desires replace logic and clear judgment. It puts analysts in a difficult situation. However, it is still possible to define some principles. They would not become rationality criteria, but they can be used as pre-conditions as analysts who violate them permanently could be considered irrational and analytically ineffective.

Then, we can propose seven analytical commandments.

- The first is on the necessity to be accurate and informative in building opinions, preparing assessments, and proposing forecasts, all with clear language and terms. We have to remember that, apart from formal languages, it is not possible to achieve absolute certainty, predictability, and clarity. The strength and the beauty of the natural language emerge from its plasticity and indeterminacy. Such features can be used to express and transfer necessary meanings, spirits, and subtleties, avoiding elements aimed at imposing specific actions and behaviours that could not be done with rational and logical arguments.
- The second piece of advice is on openness, i.e. openness to discussion with others. If we want to sharpen our criticism, we have to have an open discussion, we have to listen to others and try to understand their arguments. Only with it and with an understanding of consequences, it is possible to change the position and personal judgment and accept the judgements of other analysts. A refusal to engage in a discussion is always a manifestation of irrationality.
- The third item is the self-criticism. It has been mentioned earlier. Now, it is necessary to complement previous statements with a few elements such as the requirement to continue

efforts to find even the tiniest gaps in assumptions and the fabricated network of logical constructs. In addition, where empiricism ends, it can be replaced by self-criticism.

- Fourth, it is critical to examine other possibilities and other solutions.
- The fifth refers to the internal cohesion of views and ideas to question doctrines and beliefs.
- The sixth is the sense of consequence. If we assume certain premises, we also have to accept conclusions resulting from accepted methods of reasoning. This builds the logic of thought and supports the idea of applied rationality.
- Last but not least, the seventh commandment states that analysts should be aware of language limitations and conditions that can influence their work. These seven rules look like a recommendation for personal use. Therefore, if somebody wants to act in the light of reason, it has to follow them without too much discussion as this is a result of the knowledge and experience of many distinguished analysts.

Of course, there will always be analysts who simply do not care to be rational or have at least an ambiguous relation with the rationalistic approach. However, stupid things make us pay dearly for services.

In the case of Intelligence Analysis, rationality and irrationality are not personal things. Irrationality is like a disease. It spreads out and contaminates others. In the worst-case scenario, it leads directly to an analytical catastrophe. On the other side, rationality builds the morality of thought and as such it is a part of ethics. The wickedness of immorality surfaces in a situation when inanity replaces recognized and cherished values.

Then, what makes a good analyst? This is a question that is quite often presented to Intelligence organizations. For sure, it should be the person who can put enough effort into studying and applying analytic methods, techniques, and tools, although some skills required for the job often come more naturally to certain people.

Future analysts should have a natural curiosity and an interest in how things work and why they work. Analysts should be problem

solvers, pattern finders and puzzle solvers and the main motivation for this job should come from the task itself. An analyst should also have a critical mind, be aware of their own biases and limitations, and be conscious of the situation that the human mind is inherently biased and that it requires a lot of cognitive effort to solve complex problems.

If complemented by knowledge, the ability to apply scientific methods and different techniques becomes a major asset for an analyst. Analysts also need to be competent in several fields and have a broad knowledge of different analytical concepts and fundamentals for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. At the same time, they have to pay a lot of attention to details.

This means a necessity to apply several different approaches to a problem and avoid reaching for the first available solution. Analysts should also master the tools and technologies at their disposal and keep an eye out for the latest technological developments.

Analysts and their teams can have an enormous positive impact on a situation, but only if the Intelligence products they generate are properly understood and accepted by national decision-makers, politicians, and military commanders. Therefore, they should possess the ability to explain their products and associated conclusions in simple terms. No matter how clever the analyst is and how elegant analysis methods, techniques and tools might be, the analyst should be able to communicate results clearly to Intelligence stakeholders – to be perceived and appreciated as a professional.

This requires adjusting the terminology to the audience's level of knowledge and presenting the implications of the product's findings in simple terms. To do all this, analysts should pay a lot of attention to continuous learning. They also need to continuously improve at their job, to fine-tune methods, techniques and tools as well as discover new tools and technologies.

The best approach is to maintain a dynamic exchange with other analysts and share ideas. It can be an effective way to prepare the competent and diverse intelligence workforce of the future, which would then become an enabler of national security.

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