

HISTORY AND MEMORY IN INTELLIGENCE

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND THE CIA – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE FOUR SUBSTANTIAL COMPONENTS OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DAYS OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES (1950 – 1973)

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Abstract:

The early 1950s brought significant changes in the internal organization of the CIA, as a result of problematic issues, limitations, and deficiencies that were noted in reports evaluating the Agency's work. The most important changes have been in the CIA's analytical area, which has seen a notable expansion, along with the diversification of intelligence activities. The dismantling of its first structure engaged in intelligence analysis, the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), was followed by a notable consolidation of these activities through new dedicated structures. Among these, the Office of National Estimates (ONE) in particular played a major role.

Keywords: *American, analysis, CIA, Cold War, estimates, intelligence, historical, organization, Sherman Kent.*

Introduction

Although less well-known and certainly not spectacular compared to other CIA activities – among which the first thought naturally goes to covert operations/black ops –, intelligence analysis is one of the CIA's flagship activities. Moreover, the Agency has distinguished itself as a founder and consistent user of this activity, which has individualized it in the intelligence world. The strong predilection for analysis has underpinned the creation of a complex ensemble in the CIA, made up of several such entities for intelligence analysis. In fact, it inscribes an essential characteristic of American intelligence, as emphasized, for example, by Mark M. Lowenthal, a former CIA analyst (Lowenthal, 2000, pp. 39-48).

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This study is part of a larger research activity that is designed in four parts. The first part covered the period from 1947 to 1950, encompassing the beginnings of intelligence analysis in the CIA and the evolution of the entity in which this work was carried out¹. The second part, the subject of the present study, covers the following period up to the early '70s. It was a period characterized by significant developments in intelligence analysis: the emergence of new sub-domains, the crystallization of more elaborate intelligence products, and the refinement of terms. All this will be addressed in the following pages. The third part of the study will present the evolution of intelligence analysis in the CIA over the last two decades of the Cold War. Finally, the last part aims to present a picture covering as many elements as possible from the post-Cold War period to the current forms of work and organization in the CIA.

The entire study is based mainly on a series of declassified documents from CIA archives (www.cia.gov/readingroom). These represent a primary source, which places the research at ground zero on this topic.

CIA Intelligence Analysis Reconsidered

The problems and limitations facing the CIA's fledgling field of intelligence analysis were exposed, along with other shortcomings within the American intelligence community, at length in the two government studies issued in the period of 1948-1949. Both the *Eberstadt Report* – which took a broader look at the American national security establishment – and the *Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report* – which looked specifically at the CIA's relations with other agencies in the American intelligence community – revealed multiple deficiencies and inadequacies. The changes produced in the CIA by the two reports were rather minor. Except for the Office of Scientific Intelligence, set up in December 1948, shortly before the two reports were finalized, things remained largely the same. However, this organizational inertia did not last long.

¹ Dan Roman, "Intelligence Analysis and the CIA – a historical perspective: the doings, the critics and the unexpected dissolution of ORE/ Office of Reports and Estimates (1947-1950)", in *Romanian Intelligence Studies Review (RISR)*, no. 2 (30)/2023, p. 164-188.

The failure of CIA intelligence analysis to forecast the risk of war in Korea between the communist North and the American-backed South, which began in June 1950, was not without consequences. The first casualty in the American intelligence community was its most important person: Vice Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoeter, the Director of Central Intelligence/ the CIA Director. In October 1950, he was replaced by General Walter Bedell Smith, who began an extensive reorganization process in the CIA.

The new director paid high attention to intelligence analysis, which he has significantly developed so that estimated failures such as the Korean War could be avoided by the CIA. His reorganization of intelligence analysis within the CIA encompassed two major directions: functional and structural. Thus, there was a diversification of the activity, expressed through the creation of new entities charged with distinct analytical tasks.

In this context, the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) was replaced by new analytical structures. In 1952, these were integrated into the new Department of Intelligence, initially consisting of:

- Office of National Estimates (ONE), with a central role in CIA intelligence analysis;
- Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), responsible for the President's Daily Brief and also having an early warning role;
- Office of Research and Reports (ORR), responsible for economic intelligence on the USSR;
- Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which had been set up at the end of 1948;
- Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI), in charge of producing documentary material.

Especially the first four, and among them the first structure, were of particular relevance in the CIA. The following pages give a brief overview of their activities and their particularities.

The Center of Central Intelligence: The Office of National Estimates (ONE)

Achieving a substantial reform of the CIA's analytic area as part of a broader, institution-wide process was one of the first goals taken on and articulated as such by the new Director Walter Bedell Smith.

Appointed the head of CIA on October 7, 1950, Smith was quick to articulate his determination to fundamentally change the CIA's analytic organization.

Later that same month, at his first meeting with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), a consultative forum that brought together intelligence representatives of the State, Army, Navy, and Air Departments, and the Atomic Energy Commission, the new CIA Director announced his intention to set up a new structure within the Agency to carry out predictive intelligence work – the Office of National Estimates (ONE). According to the perspectives that he presented on that occasion, Smith envisioned this entity to become “the heart of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the national intelligence machinery” (CIA Document No.1, p. 37).

The early internal activities to create the new analytic component of the CIA were shrouded in secrecy so that very few within the Agency were notified about it. According to a declassified CIA document dated October 24, 1950, initially marked “EYES ONLY”, it was only on that date – a few days after the IAC meeting – that William Harding Jackson, the Agency's Deputy Director, informed Theodore Babbit, the Assistant Director and head of the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), of the decision to establish the new structure.

According to this document, ONE was to be operationalized by December 1, 1950, and discretion over the establishment of the new structure was to be maintained until the end of the project, which was expected to take place by November 15, 1950, at the latest. In this regard, it was expressly stated: “No announcements of any kind regarding this Office will be made until the details of the plan are complete” (CIA Document No. 2).

The demarches were kept in the same register as the ORE, which was to be responsible for the actual preparation of the new structure according to the same document:

“No directive or memorandum will be issued by this office in connection with this matter at this time as Mr. Babbit advised us that he will issue the necessary instructions orally to the ORE staff at their regular meeting tomorrow, 25 October” (CIA Document No. 2).

According to another early ONE document identified in the CIA archives (*Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence*, dated July 9, 1951, which refers to the “Activities of the Office of National Estimates”), the new CIA analytical entity was established by the General Order 37 of the CIA’s Director dated November 13, 1950.

The order also mentions the appointment of William Langer, an outsider, as head of ONE. Langer had previously served as a professor of history at Harvard University, and his move to the CIA appears to have been at the suggestion of W. Donovan, the former head of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Langer was no novice in the intelligence world, however. During the Second World War, he was part of the Research and Analysis Branch, the analysis division of the Office of Coordination of Information, which became the OSS after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.

The same document gives an extensive overview of the objectives and responsibilities of ONE, the organization of this structure, and, last but not least, how it operates. About the first two aspects, from the perspective of the ONE mission, it briefly mentions:

“The Assistant Director for National Estimates is charged with the production of national intelligence estimates and with assisting the Director of Central Intelligence in the coordination of intelligence production activities relating to national security.” (CIA Document No. 3).

A larger space concerns the organization of the CIA’s new analytical structure. As presented, ONE was organized on three major levels: the National Estimates Board, the Estimates Staff, and the Support Staff. To these components was added another: the so-called Panel of Consultants, which represented a real innovation in the intelligence world. A brief overview of each of them, as follows, is useful to understand how the ONE works.

The National Estimates Board consisted, as stated in the same CIA document (no. 3), of “the Assistant Director as chairman, six to eight members, and an executive secretary.” The details of the quality of its members emphasize the notion of their excellence, and the following is said about them:

“Members are personally and individually selected by the Director from among outstanding scholars of national repute, experts in the fields of strategy, political science, economics and other social sciences, and individual having the broadest of experience in the field of intelligence at the highest level. Professional military expertise is brought to bear on intelligence matters, for example, by membership on the Board of a Lieutenant General and a Vice Admiral.” (CIA document no. 3)

Beyond the CIA’s internal documents, the character and functioning of the National Estimates Board are also highlighted in several materials written by its early members.

For example, Sherman Kent, deputy director and then director of ONE after Langer’s departure, made notable contributions to the presentation from the inside of what the process of preparing National Estimates Intelligence (NIE) products meant, as well as the organizational structure surrounding them. Aware of the importance of preserving institutional memory, the former Yale University history professor wrote two substantial materials for the CIA History Staff, in which he extensively explained both the place and role of NIE products and the functional mechanisms of ONE. Last but not least, he also presented the first members of the National Estimates Board, on which occasion he also revealed the relationship between them. The main elements of Kent’s writings on the functioning of ONE – and implicitly the National Estimates Board – are contained in the essay entitled *The Law and Custom of National Intelligence Estimates* (first published in *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essay*, Center for the Intelligence Study, CIA, 1994). According to the brief introduction that accompanies the mentioned material: 1) it was completed in 1975; 2) it has its origins in a memorandum prepared by Kent ten years earlier, and, most importantly; 3) it presents a “memoir-history of the National Intelligence Estimate and the Board of National Estimates” (Steury 1994, p. 49).

In the essay, Serman Kent gives some background on how the Board of National Estimates operated:

“They met first thing in the morning to hear the day’s news and perhaps discuss it in terms of NIEs in the works or to come; they met again often with the ONE staff, often with representatives of

the IAC agencies to talk about the schedule, to produce terms of reference, to review drafts, and to arrive at duly coordinated texts [...] They invited and listened to ambassadors, officers of the foreign aid program, attachés, members of the numerous military assistance groups (MAG, later MAAG), CIA officers in from the field, and many others. Above all they studied the new intelligence." (Steury 1994, p. 55).

In the same article, Kent also mentions the first configuration of the Board of National Estimates, which had nine members: Langer (head of ONE), Kent (deputy, then head of ONE since 1952), General Clarence Ralph Huebner and Admiral Bernard Bieri (persons with extensive experience in the military intelligence sphere), Maxwell Foster (a Boston lawyer), Raymond J. Sontag and Calvin B. Hoover (professors of modern history and economics respectively, both the choice of Langer), DeForest Van Slyck and Ludwell Lee Montague, senior officers of ORE. About CIA History Staff, Kent wrote another article, *The First Year of The Office of National Estimates. The Directorship of William L. Langer*. It was published in the same collection of essays and contains an account from a personal perspective of the first members of the Board of National Estimates and their relationships (Steury 1994).

The second source containing first-hand information on the organization and functioning of ONE is another CIA officer, Ludwell Lee Montague, already mentioned as a senior officer of ORE and member of the first Board of National Estimates. In a 1971 study of Smith's leadership of the CIA (1950-1953), published under the CIA History Staff, Montague refers extensively to the organization he was in during that period – also describing how the creation of ONE came about. Of the author's statements that fall into this primary source category, those referring to the CIA Director's high level of interest in the new Board of National Estimates, evidenced by the fact that he carefully selected these members himself, are especially noteworthy (CIA Document No. 1, p. 41). In the same study, Montague also makes brief portraits of the members of the first Board of National Estimates (already before Kent), another thing that gives his work a distinct quality beyond its documentary value.

The Estimates Staff was formed, as the same CIA *Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence* from July 9, 1951 states,

from a small “group of intelligence officers selected for their competence to give substantial staff support to the Board of National Estimates.”

What does this support consist of? The CIA document details it along three lines:

- preparing drafts from all existing sources for estimates products (these include both CIA materials and “contributions submitted by the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Joint Staff, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission”, and the FBI);

- providing data and expertise on intelligence matters („knowledge and judgment on trends and developments in areas the world over”);

- maintaining a permanent connection with all entities from the American intelligence system (“liaison with organizations which this office serves or is served by on a continuing basis”).

In terms of the internal organization of this structure to carry out its activities, three groups have been operationalized:

- the General Group, made up of a small number of highly experienced intelligence officers with responsibility for preparing draft estimates (“planning and synthesis of IAC contributions”);

- the Specialists Group, which brought together specialized intelligence officers to provide expert judgment (“analysis and critical review of IAC contributions”);

- “a small group with specific assignments”, as it is referred to in the CIA document, tasked with liaising, including working closely, with government institutions not directly involved in intelligence activities/ the production of NIE.

The Support Staff provided administrative support to the two main components of the structure (National Estimates Board and Estimative Staff). The activities and resources available to this component of the ONE included: “an information control unit, a reading room and reference centre, a publication unit, and research, clerical, stenographer services.” (CIA Document No. 3)

The Consultants Panel, an extension of the work carried out by the Board of National Estimates, comprised a small number of people (six in its first composition) – which was also variable. These were “eminent individuals of national reputation in their respective fields” and their role

was to “comment the most important draft estimates prepared by the Board” (CIA Document No. 3).

How was this formula for developing National Intelligence Estimates products arrived at, and what notorious individuals with outstanding activities outside the U.S. intelligence community have acquired the select consultantships? An inside look is provided by one of the Board members, Ludwell Lee Montague. In the aforementioned study of Walter Bedell Smith’s directorship, Montague notes that he, along with his deputy, William Harding Jackson, “had no confidence in the judgment of intelligence analysts, whether in CIA or in the Departmental agencies” (Montague, 1971, p. 50). They also both shared the view of William Donovan, the former head of the OSS, that there was a need for a board of “men of affairs”, through whose perception analysts’ findings and judgments would be passed. Among these Princeton consultants (after their meeting location) were people like Burton Fahs, director of humanities for the Rockefeller Foundation, or Hamilton Fish Armstrong, journalist and editor of *Foreign Affairs*.

The production of NIEs was the ONE’s most important activity, which required, as mentioned above, both the involvement of internal CIA specialists and external consultants and substantial inter-agency collaboration (the latter, however, was little accomplished, especially during the 50’s). This wide participation aimed to make the NIE products as comprehensive as possible and to give as broad a perspective on the topics presented as possible

But what were these NIEs? The first standardized definition in intelligence circles is contained in the *Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions*, originally “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”. Published in June 1978, this professional contribution represents, as noted in its introduction, “the product of an interagency group formed by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.”

The NIE type product is designated as follows: “A through assessment of a situation in the foreign environment which is relevant to the formulation of foreign, economic, and national security policy, and which projects probable future courses of action and developments.” (*Glossary of Intelligence...*, 1978, p. 11)

A more recent (and more comprehensive) definition was formulated directly by a CIA official. Donald P. Steury, a member of the CIA History Staff, notes the following in the NIE's collection of documents on Soviet strategic forces (edited in 1996 under the aegis of the CIA History Staff and the CIA Centre for Intelligence Study):

"Estimative intelligence may be defined as regular, detailed analyses of diverse aspects of the world situation, which include the policy objectives and likely actions of the other nations, and their military capabilities and potential." (Steury 1996, p. XI)

The same representative of the CIA History Staff reveals the merits of ONE's work in operationalizing these information products. Although their conception had been "fully developed at the end of World War II, the machinery for NIE production did not really take shape until 1950, as part of a substantial reorganization instigated by the incoming Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith" (Steury 1996, p. XIII).

A brief presentation of the products produced by ONE, including some statistical references (for the period 1950 to 1966) was given by Sherman Kent, the well-known chief of this organization. According to a declassified document identified in the CIA archives (*Memorandum for Executive Director-Comptroller*, dated February 7, 1966), he notes about the work of ONE:

"The major publication of the Office of National Estimates is, as you know, the National Intelligence Estimate. In our 15-plus years we have produced an average of 57 estimates annually – the number has ranged from below 50 in our early years to a high of 84 in calendar 1961. In calendar 1965 we produced 72 estimates." (CIA Document No. 4).

NIE products were the main activity at ONE, with a significant amount of material being produced for the most important legal beneficiaries in the US establishment. In addition to these products, ONE also produced, according to the aforementioned document, a series of estimated memoranda, (*Memoranda for the USIB*, *Memoranda for the DCI*, *Special Memoranda*, and *Staff Memoranda*). As peculiarities of these materials produced by ONE, the same document mentions the following:

- *Memoranda for the USIB* are published quite infrequently (two or three products per year) and have the same audience as NIE products;
- *Memoranda for the DCI* are personal communications from the Board of National Estimates to the DCI, have restricted dissemination within the CIA, and outside only at the request of the DCI;
- *Special Memoranda* contain the official views of the Board on a given subject and have a consistent dissemination that includes the White House, State and Defence Department officials, and members of the intelligence community;
- *Staff Memoranda* are working papers prepared on various topics of interest, disseminated only within the CIA (after review by the Board of National Estimates they may be converted into official Agency documents, such as Special Memoranda).

ONE products (NIEs in particular) have not always been to the liking of US policymakers. The latter criticized various aspects of the estimates produced by ONE, and the complaints were usually related to their imprecision, unclear wording, or lack of substantive information. The presence in the NIEs of different estimates for the same subject, because the views of all the contributing intelligence agencies could not be harmonized, was another weakness.

The topic that raised the most questions and discussion about the relevance of NIEs was that of Russian military capabilities. Among the fiercest critics of these NIEs were, unfortunately, President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. None of them shied away from expressing “their mistrust for the Central Intelligence Agency’s analytical process and their dissatisfaction with its output” (Pulcini 2022).

In 1971, against this backdrop of high dissatisfaction, Nixon promoted the need for broad reform in the intelligence community. To this end, he commissioned James Schlesinger, who worked for the White House Office of Management and Budget, to conduct a detailed study of the work of the intelligence agencies. Of course, the CIA was central to it, and its estimating function was not presented in a favourable light at all. According to the claims, “the national estimating machinery” could benefit from „increasing the competition in the interpretation of evidence” and „the addition of new estimating centres” (Pulcini 2022).

Eventually, the difficult relationship between the White House and the CIA led to the dismissal of CIA Director Richard Helms in 1973. After the short directorships of James Schlesinger and Vernon A. Walters of only a few months, another career officer was appointed to head the CIA: William Colby, former chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of the Agency (until March 1973, when he became deputy director of the CIA). It began a sweeping reorganization of the CIA, and among the first casualties was ONE.

On November 1, 1973, ONE ceased to exist. Its place was taken by a new organizational formula with the creation of the position of National Intelligence Officer (NIO).

Sherman Kent: A Brief Look at „the father of intelligence analysis”

Most of ONE's history is linked to Sherman Kent. He headed the CIA's main analytical structure for over a decade and a half until his retirement in 1968. Above all, he is widely regarded as the founder of intelligence analysis. Perhaps the three attributes most aptly characterizing the former Yale history professor's professional work in the CIA are (and not necessarily in that order): notable, substantial, and innovative.

Before briefly presenting the main coordinates on which this activity was based, a brief biographical sketch of Kent, up to his entry into the CIA, is more than useful.

A person of remarkable genealogy, as you will see, Kent was born in 1903 in Chicago. However, his childhood was spent in the town of Kentfield, California, which had been founded by his grandfather Albert Emmet Kent. He was descended from Roger Sherman, one of the founding fathers of the United States. As for his parents, his father was William Kent, an influential congressman and philanthropist, and his mother, Elizabeth Thacher Kent, was a vehement women's rights activist (Davis 2002).

Young Kent quickly strayed from the family tradition. Instead of going into business or politics himself, he opted for a university career. Drawn to history, he attended Yale University. He specialized in European history and stayed on to teach there. At Yale, he quickly became known as an unusual professor, a „cultured cowboy”, with a reputation as a tough man.

His history exam was one of the hardest, but many students accepted the high standards he set to attend his lectures, where they heard, as one observer put it, „the most colourful language ever used in a Yale classroom” (Davis 2002). In 1941, Kent wrote and published his first book, *Writing History*, which was a runaway success, becoming „a bible for a generation of students” (Davis 2002). In the same year, before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour (December 7, 1941), Kent left the university and joined the newly created intelligence entity Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He was assigned to the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A), where he served, with substantial results, until the end of the war. For a brief period, he was acting Deputy Director for Intelligence, heading the OSS division which moved to the State Department.

Returning as a professor at the newly established College of War, Kent devoted himself to the systematic study of intelligence and its importance to U.S. foreign policy. His research in this new field showed in short order. In 1949, he published *Strategic Intelligence for American Word Policy*, „probably the most influential book ever written on U.S. intelligence analysis” (Davis 2002).

Beyond establishing him as one of the pioneers of the new intelligence literature, the book also opened Kent's path to the CIA. In 1951, at the suggestion of Deputy Director William Harding Jackson, he returned to American intelligence as Deputy of ONE, the new CIA's analytical entity. A year later, he became the head of ONE, and he carried out a notable professional activity for the foundation and development of intelligence analysis. He also initiated an internal CIA journal, *Studies in Intelligence*. Published since 1955, the bulletin (today the most important in the field) aimed to create specialized literature necessary for the professionalization of intelligence activity.

Enabling Economic Intelligence: The Office of Research and Reports (ORR)

ORR was established to produce an in-depth analysis of the Soviet economic bloc, according to the functional responsibilities established by CIA Regulations No. 70 of January 19, 1951. These were later included in National Security Council Intelligence Directive 15 (NSCID 15) of June 13, 1951, entitled “Coordination and production of foreign economic intelligence”. Based on this document, the CIA substantiated and exercised

its attributions in the field of economic intelligence. The new structure did more than that: from the very beginning, it integrated into its analytical products elements with a military valence, mainly related to the effective war capabilities of the USSR. In a short time, these activities 1) led to the explicit assumption of military intelligence analysis and 2) established an adequate organization for the new field of interest.

This direction was imprinted on the ORR's work from the very beginning. The promoter was its Assistant Director, Max Millikan. A former member of the OSS during World War II, Millikan had established himself as a renowned economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In his opinion, a country's capabilities to wage war were inextricably linked to its economic power, which required an integrated analysis of the main economic areas, as well as the size and costs of the defence sphere. Or, in the formulation of Robert Vickers, author of the official history of the Office of Strategic Research (OSR), an organization with consolidated analytical activities in the sphere of military estimates, which replaced the ORR in the late 1960s:

“He believed that this micro-analytic approach would help analysts to estimate the total economic resources available to the Soviet Bloc, the allocation of these resources to the military sector, and the strengths and limitations of the economy. This, in turn, would assist in determining enemy capabilities and weaknesses and help policymakers exploit Soviet Bloc economic vulnerabilities” (Vickers 2019, p. XI).

Millikan's conception is revealed in his study “The Role of ORR in Economic Intelligence”, published as an internal CIA document in 1951. It represents the fundamental text for the conceptualization of this field in the CIA, as well as for the development of working methods. At the same time, Millikan's study stands out for its contribution to the theory of the concept of economic intelligence from the perspective of the new field's capacity to preserve the security of the United States.

At least five significant purposes can be attached to it, to estimate:

- the magnitude of threats (military and non-military) that may be occurring at any given time;
- their character or locations;

- the intentions of the USSR or other potential enemies;
- support for the decisions of political decision-makers;
- the likely relative power developments in the East and West.

In the spring of 1956, the study was published (minus its last part) in the CIA's in-house journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, under the title "The Nature and Methods of Economic Intelligence", also emphasizing the role assigned to it in specialized professional training. Following his vision for the field of economic intelligence, Millikan created a new structure, the Economic Research Area (ERA), as the main component of ORR. This became the main driving force of the ORR in terms of research and economic analysis. It was there that the CIA's capabilities related to the new field of professional activity were concentrated.

The ERA was in addition to the other two components that had been retained from the former ORE: The Basic Intelligence Division and the Map Division, which were maintained in their old roles. The responsibilities of the Basic Intelligence Division were mainly related to the production of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) materials, characterized in official documents of the American Congress as "compendia of descriptive information on nearly every country in the world, which were of primary interest to war planning agencies" (*Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental operations*, Book IV, 1976, p. 20).

The other structure taken over from ORE, the Map Division, was made up of cartographers and geographers, most of whom had completed internships at OSS. As the only organization within the US government institutions that dealt with the production of external maps, it provided a wide range of services (although not explicitly specified), as mentioned in the previously cited document. ORR is considered in the specialized literature to be Millikan's creation (Vickers, 2019, p. XI). It was he who organized the new structure of the CIA into four functional areas: Materials Division, Industrial Division, Economic Services Division, and Economic Analysis Division.

Also, two support components operated in ORR: Reports Division (with responsibilities for planning and coordinating various projects, editing final products, and disseminating them to beneficiaries) and Requirements and Control Division (with responsibilities for receiving,

sorting specific intelligence materials received and transmitting information needs requested by analysts). Additionally, ORR functional diagram explicitly mentions external consultants, in two categories: Industrial Consultants and University Consultants.

The principles of ORR were expressed in a document (*Draft Statement of Functions*, April 11, 1951) that stated the mission of each division of this analytical structure and the duties of their leaders. Regarding ERA, for example, it states that the heads of the economic divisions “will fulfil the research, advisory, and report production responsibilities of O/RR about foreign economic intelligence affecting national security.” (CIA Document No. 5).

The head of the ORR did not limit himself to activities related to these issues, considering, as we have shown before, that the various elements of economic intelligence are a fundamental resource for knowing and establishing the country’s war potential. Therefore, he supported the development of various estimates that also addressed military intelligence issues. Robert Vickers, already mentioned, writes the following about the changes imposed by the former MIT economist regarding the approach of such aspects in ORR’s analytical materials: “Millikan also wanted ORR to make independent evaluations of military service estimates of Soviet military production in support of its defence spending analysis despite the bureaucratic obstacles to getting consistent and reliable data from the Department of Defence.” (Vickers 2019, p. XI)

Internal ORR documents confirm the early interest shown by members of this structure in activities with military implications, as well as the involvement of the new CIA analytical entity in evaluating military aspects. ORR Diary from July 3, 1951, shows, for example, several situations of this kind from the previous day. Among these, three situations:

- a discussion between an ORR representative and one from the USAF, about a project developed by the US Army, “consisting of a broad general study concerning overt methods for the collection and collation of intelligence with emphasis on scientific intelligence”;
- a request from an Air Establishment Division official “to get B/TR evaluation on a SO report concerning the PURCHASE OF SPARE PARTS FOR ROMANIAN AIRCRAFT”;

- discussions held by Special Assistant of ORR about the operating conditions of captured German military materials (CIA Document No. 6).

At the same time, another document from the CIA archives (Office of Research and Reports, *Progress Report*, dated 11 July 1951), which contains a preliminary assessment of the new analytical entity, carried out six months after the start of its activity, already highlights as its main achievement “the performance of authoritative basic research on the economy of the Soviet Orbit.” (CIA Document No. 7)

To get a clear picture of what this meant in terms of its relevance, it is necessary to recall the state of affairs in the American establishment before the ORR was established. This was revealed by an estimate produced by the CIA, together with other government agencies. The CIA document was developed based on NSC Action 282, March 1950, which requested a study of the situation in the field of foreign economic intelligence, as well as projections for strengthening knowledge in the same area of interest (Sims 2021, p. 47).

The study was completed in May 1951 (the original deadline had been set for November 30, 1950), and its conclusions are summarized in the ORR report already mentioned. According to it, the study revealed four essential problems, noting that:

- 24 government agencies were collecting and analysing a considerable amount of data related to foreign economies;
- there was no single agency responsible for evaluating the data in terms of their relevance to national security;
- there was no efficient communication system that would allow for rapid access to the data and its use by a single agency;
- no agency had the responsibility to identify information gaps and initiate measures to fill them.

To remedy the deficiencies, the CIA was primarily concerned with establishing an appropriate collaborative framework. To do this, it established a new entity: the Economic Intelligence Committee. This was headed by the chief of ORR and consisted of representatives from the State Department and the three uniformed services of the US (Army, Navy, and Air Force). There was also the possibility that representatives

of other government agencies could be invited to discuss issues that were within their area of competence.

As for the materials developed by the ORR, among the first activities it carried out was an extensive inventory of the Soviet economy, as well as of the states placed in the USSR's orbit. According to the same document, the Progress Report of 11 July 1951, this involved a big effort:

"[...] an industry by industry and commodity by commodity inventory of the knowledge already available with particular attention to identification of the important gaps in that knowledge. This was followed by a similar inventory covering the European satellites" (CIA Document No. 7).

The inventory process helped fill information gaps within a new six-month period, under the coordination of the Economic Intelligence Committee, so that good knowledge could be ensured. Also, ORR estimates in the first six months showed a lack of consistent information about China, given that this country had entered the Soviet orbit. As a result, the new analytical structure of the CIA began to reveal the need to consolidate knowledge on this sequence.

In parallel, through its other components, ORR acted for the development of NIS products (12 materials completed and another 10 planned by the end of the year) and their corresponding maps (base maps for 45 NIS Areas). Last but not least, it made a notable contribution (systematically developed over the 50s) to the completion of NIEs, under the responsibility of ONE.

According to available archival documents, the first activity of the ORR in this direction seems to be its involvement in the development of NIE-60, Civil Defence in the USRR, dated April 30, 1952. This document was designed in three parts, and ORR was tasked with substantiating the last one, concerning the relationship between the Soviet strategic stockpiling program and Soviet civil defence. Beyond the work carried out for this purpose, the ORR report was not what was expected. The limited intelligence that the ORR had at the time prevented it from supporting a clear position, which emphasized the need to deepen its knowledge of the Soviet economy.

The chief of the Strategic Division of ORR presents the brief history behind the involvement in this activity in a Memorandum addressed to the Assistant Director of ONE, dated 10 April 1952. Along with presenting the circumstances surrounding this subject, he does not hide his disappointment for the minor role his organization had in developing NIE-60:

“It became apparent to us, in the final stages of analysis, that we are going to contribute little that was new in the way of knowledge about the USSR, that about all we were going to be able to accomplish was a compilation under a single cover of selected samples of our information on Soviet economic activities [...]” (CIA Document no. 8).

ORR’s analytical capabilities have developed significantly in the following years so that its materials have begun to acquire an increasingly significant share in NIE-type products. Throughout the 1960s, which marked the height of the Cold War, the ORR underwent several reorganizations (in 1962 and 1965) to better adapt to international developments and to carry out its mission as efficiently as possible.

Office of Current Intelligence (OCI): Intelligence round-the-clock

The establishment of this CIA analytical structure took place to ensure the maintenance of current intelligence activities within the CIA (carried out until the emergence of the new entity by ORE).

A brief presentation of the circumstances in which the creation of the OCI took place and its evolution can be summarized in a few lines:

- the Dulles-Jackson-Korea Report of January 1949 criticized in harsh terms the CIA’s duplication of similar activities that were being carried out by other US government entities, especially the State Department;
- William Harding Jackson, co-author of the report, was appointed, in October 1950, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), and worked to abolish the CIA’s function of producing current political intelligence materials;

- as a result of the changes Jackson made, most of the ORE staff moved to the two new analytical structures, ONE and ORR, and the State Department was to choose from those not assigned;
- the intentions of the new DDCI did not materialize in full, however: although it was planned to waive the ORE personnel who did not transfer to ONE or ORR, or were not taken over by the State Department, this did not happen;
- initially, the ORE personnel was maintained in the COMINT Division of ORR, which formed in December 1950 the nucleus of a new structure under the name Office of Special Services (along with the Advisory Council and the Director's staff for COMINT matters).

A month later, this was renamed the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI). As its name suggests, the new analytical structure's mission was to produce current intelligence. What does this expression mean? According to National Security Council Intelligence Directive #3, issued on January 13, 1948 (which also includes the authorization of the activities carried out by the OCI), the notion of current intelligence is defined as follows:

“Current intelligence is that intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest, which is usually disseminated without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation” (CIA Document No. 9, p. 1).

The same document establishes the role and primary beneficiaries of current intelligence materials produced by the CIA: “to meet the needs of the President and National Security Council; in addition, it serves the common needs of the interested departments and agencies of the Government for current intelligence which they themselves do not produce”. The document also emphasizes the primary responsibility of the CIA in producing this type of intelligence, with the contribution of other government entities: “The departments and agencies will contribute to the Central Intelligence Agency current intelligence publications as practicable.”

A broader view of the OCI's activities can be found in the extensive material on this analytical entity within the CIA, developed by the Office of Training in 1970 (*The Office of Current Intelligence. A Study of its*

Functions and Organization). Beyond the OCI's activities – including several examples of intelligence products of this entity – the study brings some helpful clarifications about current intelligence. Moreover, this professional field is presented through its importance in supporting intelligence analysis in the CIA.

The first defining element of the OCI materials is the diverse range of information sources used. These include, as the previously cited document shows, “all incoming information that might indicate a threat or a potential threat to US security – whether political, economic, or military.” Added to this is a high requirement for action, which implies that potential threats against the US, from the range mentioned above, 1) “be recognized immediately and without fail”, and this data 2) be “processed immediately without waiting on the regular production schedule.”

These two major themes were complemented by another peculiarity found at the beginning of the OCI's activity: the use of information from all available sources. Through this permanent way of working, OCI's activities also had an innovative character, as declassified CIA documents show:

“Since the founding of OCI, the all-sources principle has been a fundamental consideration in the office's operations. All information, regardless of security classification, is distributed to the analytic desk of primary concern. OCI was the first element of CIA and of the Intelligence Community to adopt this procedure in regard to all-source material” (CIA Document No. 10, p. 2).

OCI's organization, as mentioned in the same study written by the CIA, was made into three categories of activity that included a production area, functional support, and a managerial part. The arrangement of production was made on geographical criteria, by establishing four divisions, as follows: European Division, Middle East – Africa Division, Far East Division, and Western Hemisphere Division with “all countries in the southern United States and dependent possessions of European countries in the Western Hemisphere”.

There were also four staffs:

- the Production Staff, “responsible for reviewing, editing, publishing, and disseminating the regular publications and special current intelligence production of OCI”;
- the Research Staff, “charged with stimulating research throughout OCI”;
- the Special Projects Staff, with multiple tasks, among which can be mentioned the provision of substantive intelligence support as well as preparation and delivery of the President’s Daily Brief;
- the Management Staff, responsible for the management of OCI staff, budget, logistics, etc.

Alongside these, another important component has been added to the OCI: the CIA Operation Centre, described by the CIA document mentioned above as “a 24-hour intelligence alert facility”. Its main function is to monitor international situations and events that require immediate attention and alert key decision-makers in the US establishment. Also, it “watches developments requiring priority intelligence information collection, and operates a Situation Room for the display of US and friendly military operations and critical intelligence situations.” (CIA Document No. 10, p. 8).

A brief look at the most important intelligence products under the responsibility of the OCI, lists the following types of publications:

- **Current Intelligence Bulletin**, a departmental product, prepared daily by OCI (the first is dated February 28, 1951), with a small number of beneficiaries – the initial dissemination was limited, according to the aforementioned CIA study, “to the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three service chiefs”. In terms of its content, the information was accompanied by an analytical qualification – in fact, it was a commentary on what was presented, as the same document emphasizes: “Each item carried out a paraphrase of a field intelligence information report and an analyst’s comment on its significance”;
- **Central Intelligence Bulletin**, a national intelligence product, developed in 1958, instead of the one presented above, due to its limitations, which included only OCI data (the change was made by the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities,

which conveyed to the Director of CIA/ Central Intelligence the need to create an integrated product, which would also contain data from other government agencies);

- **Weekly Summary**, conceived as a necessary complement to the product presented at the previous point, given the limits imposed by its short deadlines, compared to which it has two advantages: “it is able to provide the continuity that the daily lacks, and to present more speculative judgments that is possible in the coordinated CIB” (moreover, the main elements are treated distinctly, because the material was complemented with one, up to three separate products – Special Reports);

- **President’s Daily Brief**, a product coordinated only with the other analytical entities in the CIA; it is intended for the personal information of the President and aims “to anticipate policy questions and such special requirements as those which arise from the forthcoming visit of a foreign dignitary or from Presidential visits abroad” (its writing began for President Kennedy, in 1961, and the format and style of presentation have undergone differences, adapted to the requirements of the beneficiary)

- **National Intelligence Survey**, a type of product with a fairly large scope (several dozen pages), which contains documentary information (known as basic intelligence) about various states and regions of the world: “relatively unchanging natural features, fundamental characteristics and basic resources [...] and covers its geographic, oceanographic, transportation, sociological, political, economic, scientific, and military aspects” (the program was initiated during the Second World War by the Joint Army – Navy Intelligence Studies/JANIS, to provide decision-makers with relevant information, especially for supporting military operations in Europe; later, the program, carried out under the coordination of the CIA, was expanded by presenting intelligence on economic, political and sociological issues).

Like other structures in the CIA, the OCI has undergone a series of changes and reorganizations so that its products best meet the intelligence consumers *need to know*. In particular, the *early warning* function underwent considerable development during the 60s, which gave a particular touch to this structure.

Science as a Weapon: The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI)

As with other types of intelligence within it (such as economic intelligence or political intelligence, to mention the most relevant), a search for the starting point of scientific intelligence activities in the American system does not open up a path that is too complicated or a knowledge journey too far. On the contrary. The situation is relatively the same as for the other types of intelligence already highlighted. Their common body is the National Security Act of July 1947, which established the American intelligence community as a tool against the then-Soviet threat.

However, scientific intelligence concerns in the American system preceded – slightly, it is true – the formation of this community. Its origins should probably be traced back to the Manhattan Project, the name of the research and development program for the first atomic weapon, carried out by the United States, together with the United Kingdom and Canada. Soon after the end of the Second World War, the first explicit mention of this intelligence activity appeared: the Scientific Branch, which was a small structure within the Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE), the analytical component of the new American intelligence institution, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).

The strengthening of the role of scientific intelligence in the American system took place in the CIA, where it developed considerably shortly after the establishment of the Agency. The importance of this area was particularly highlighted in the so-called Eberstadt Report, commissioned by the US government in 1948 to evaluate the structure and operations of the Department of Defence and the newly created intelligence community. Finalized in January 1949, the Eberstadt Report highlighted a multitude of problems and deficiencies in the evaluated areas. These included scientific intelligence – alongside medical intelligence, a related field that was also beginning to be increasingly emphasized. Among others, it mentioned:

“The Committee is particularly concerned over the nation’s inadequacies in the fields of scientific and medical intelligence. There are difficulties peculiar to this situation which the Committee

has not overlooked. Yet the vital importance of reliable and up-to-date scientific and medical information is such as to call for far greater efforts than appear to have been devoted to this essential need in the past.” (Eberstadt Report, 1949)

The conclusions of the report point to the need for a wide-ranging reform of the US intelligence system to streamline activities. The same applies to the field of scientific intelligence, to which, as we have seen, important responsibilities have been assigned. The developments that have taken place up to its finalization have, however, to a large extent rendered the findings on the new scientific intelligence activity irrelevant. Or, at least, they have largely neutralized them.

This was because the CIA Director, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, reconsidered the field of scientific intelligence and raised it to a new level commensurate with its assigned importance. On December 31, 1948, he set up a structure within the Agency devoted strictly to this activity: the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI).

One of the notable features of the new organization was, according to a brief monographic and anniversary material about it, produced under the aegis of the CIA, that it “brought together the collectors and the processors of intelligence information” (*Office of Scientific Intelligence: The Original Wizards of Langley*, CIA, 2008, p. 7).

The same paper outlines the rationale for the creation of this specialized structure within the CIA by evoking the challenges and dangers of the world in the early years of the Cold War:

“Concern that other countries might develop nuclear weapons and an awareness that advanced knowledge was the only practical shield against a surprise attack fed a sense of urgency among US policymakers. Concern extended to biological and chemical warfare and to the likely development of guided missiles, which would increase the danger of surprise attack on the continental United States.” (*Office of Scientific Intelligence...*, 2008).

As with other CIA entities during the Cold War, the evolution and organization of OSI (at least in its first two decades of operation) can be thoroughly traced through its official history. A comprehensive study

of the organization was prepared by Karl H. Weber in 1972 under the auspices of the CIA History Staff. Running nearly 700 pages, it provides a detailed picture of the OSI, covering the organization's evolution and activities, as well as its place in the American establishment, from 1949 to 1968.

Initially, OSI was assigned no less than 100 functions, a high number that fully reflects the importance given to this entity. Its first organizational chart shows the situation in January 1949, according to which the new OSI consisted of four staffs and seven divisions. Karl H. Weber, already mentioned, considers that this organization reflects the emphasis on intelligence gathering. He points out that OSI's high interest in obtaining specialized information (scientific and technical intelligence) was "evident in the establishment of a Collection Staff along with Administrative, Production and Scientific Services Staffs." On the last component, the same author also points out that it was "an interesting, though probably premature, attempt to provide information gathering and collating services centrally and did not survive for long." (CIA Document No. 11, p. 10)

To these four staffs were added the following divisions: Biology, Physics and Electronics, Chemistry, Medical, Ordnance, Naval and "A" Branch (for COMINT exploitation).

As expected, OSI's major interest was in nuclear intelligence. In the same official history of the early years of the CIA, this mission is summarized as follows:

"In the nuclear energy field, particularly, OSI feeling ran high. Under the strong leadership of the redoubtable Herbert I. Miller, using such means as the control of Restricted Data documents and others, OSI maintained its hold on nuclear intelligence. Also, in the field of in-depth intelligence research, ORE was performing analyses that at times appeared to OSI to reach too far back into the R&D phases of weapons systems development, clearly an OSI responsibility." (CIA Document No. 11, p. 12).

One of the most important resources used by OSI in its early years was that of *electronic intercept / electronic intelligence* (ELINT). Starting in the mid-1950s, it evolved into complex activities. These developments

led to the creation of a dedicated entity, through the creation of the Office of ELINT, staffed with specialists in the new field of activity. However, major responsibility has been transferred to the National Security Agency (NSA), which specializes in these activities.

According to a definition in an official paper published under its aegis in 2009, ELINT is succinctly described as “information derived primarily from electronic signals not containing speech or text (considered COMINT)” (Bernard 2009). Within the range of activities carried out by OSI, it was also concerned with medical intelligence (active since the early days of the American intelligence community, as documents from that period show, including the Eberstadt Report, already mentioned in this study). An illustration of this type of intelligence is given in the CIA’s professional journal, *Studies in Intelligence* (also cited). Revealing the importance of assessing the health of the political leaders of a foreign country, especially an enemy one, the authors of a study published under the title *Remote Medical Diagnosis* analyse four relevant cases in terms of their implications for intelligence work: Georges Pompidou, President of France, Houari Boumediene, President of Algeria, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel.

The conclusion of the study and the challenge for the intelligence work as follows: “The importance of evaluating medical incapacity in chiefs of state is obvious, yet the almost total reliance on human collection makes such analyses as difficult as they are intriguing” (*Studies in Intelligence*, CIA, Spring 1979).

Conclusions

Intelligence analysis in the CIA during the 1950s and 1960s (a period with the broadest spectrum of the USSR’s threat to the national security of the United States, marked by a substantial arms race between the two superpowers that risked transforming the Cold War between them into a nuclear one at any time), went through one of its most difficult stages. Emerging as a professional activity and emblematic in the young American intelligence community created in 1947, intelligence analysis developed as a representative element of the CIA.

The path to this result, partially achieved during this period, was not without obstacles, difficulties, or challenges. To provide more specific answers to the multiple demands and changes, intelligence analysis in the CIA has evolved and diversified systematically. It has been continuously professionalized. The legacy of the ORE from the early 1950s has been enriched with new resources, directions, and objectives.

The establishment of ONE, as an analytical structure of the CIA tasked with the production of integrated intelligence, known as National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), was one of the most important measures that led to the foundation and legitimization of this new activity. Under the leadership of Sherman Kent, ONE became the centre of intelligence analysis in the CIA. More than the other analytical structures of the CIA at that time, it wrote an important page in the history of the Agency. Certainly, fundamental in terms of intelligence analysis.

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