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CONTENT

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

SEVEN ANALYTICAL COMMANDMENTS (I)

Józef KOZLOWSKI*

Abstract[1]:
Intelligence organisations focus on methodology and methodology-related issues. However, there is one more important thing that should also be discussed and this is ethics. Both elements are inextricably linked, and they should be presented and described together. Only with both can we identify bits and attributes that make a good analyst and allow him to grow and mature into an artist. There are so many dangers and things analysts have to pay attention to so as to survive workwise. They have to save the mental and physical forces that would allow them to have a long and distinguished career. Analysts are a special kind of humans, who continuously improve at their job, fine-tune methods and techniques, and discover new tools and technologies every day. This should be complemented by a dynamic exchange of ideas with fellow analysts. Those are things this paper is all about.

Keywords: *Intelligence analysis, methodology, ethics, analytical processes, analytical principles.*

Review of the subject literature

Strategic intelligence as a research area is quite new in Poland. This is also the case for exploration and efforts to build new theories in

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[1] The text is the exclusive responsibility of the author/s and the institution I represent is not responsible for the way that the information is and will be used.

this domain. The number of publications is still modest, so to speak, and topics cover mainly basic theoretical issues, with no new initiatives to develop a conceptual basis.

At the beginning of the 21st Century, Polish subject literature included mainly translations from foreign languages, such as books by Micheal Herman (i.e. *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, translated to Polish in 2002). Some efforts have been made by the Collegium Civitas in Warsaw and Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities. It was not until 2014, when the book of Professor Miroslaw Minkina was published in Poland, *Gry wywiadów. Sztuka wywiadu w państwie współczesnym* [*Art of Intelligence and the Modern State*] that we could start talking about serious Polish efforts to approach problems of intelligence holistically. The year 2016 was a caesura for Polish Intelligence Analysis with J. Kozlowski's monograph, *Teoria i praktyka działań analityczno-informacyjnych* [*Theory and Practice of Intelligence Analysis*], and for Big Data analysis the 2020 publication *Historia i perspektywy analizy dużych wolumenów i strumieni danych* [*History and Perspectives for Big Data Analysis*]. Limited national resources have resulted in researchers still relying on publications by Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, Mark Phythian, James J. Wirtz and Alan Breakspear.

Other sources had been thematic journals such as *Intelligence and National Security*, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* and *Studies in Intelligence*. In these periodicals, the views and opinions of many other distinguished authors were presented, including Charles Cogan, Michael Warner, Donald Cameron Watt and researchers from Germany and Spain.

However, such pieces were not sufficient to respond to the demand at the national level. Therefore, the next efforts have been made to take a new, more energetic, and sustainable approach to continue research in the area of Intelligence Studies.

Framework and methodology

To meet the requirements of the Intelligence Community, an essay-like form of an article has been used to present, from a personal point of view, several topics that should be examined and evaluated

methodically. Hopefully, this will encourage readers to take sides and accept the presented arguments.

In this work, many sources were analysed in detail, especially those referring to systems, processes and problems in military reconnaissance and intelligence organizations. Such work was conducted in different dimensions, including organizational and functional areas. Descriptive and analytical approaches to sources, as well as a functional and logical synthesis of the most important elements, were used. They were complemented by comparisons and analogies as well as by abstractive and generalizing methods, mainly to strip away unnecessary details. All these efforts have been made to allow for the finding of the most important issues that would be required to build a theoretical framework for intelligence studies in the area of strategic analysis and propose feasible solutions.

ICD 203

The most recognizable element and exemplification of the standardization approach is the document that regulates the work of the US National Intelligence Community – the US Intelligence Community Directive 203 (ICD 203). This directive was signed on 12 June 2023 by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and it:

- establishes the American Intelligence Community (IC) Analytic Standards that govern the production and evaluation of analytic products.
- articulates the responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigour in their analytic thinking and work practices; and
- delineates the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Analytic Ombudsman (Intelligence Community Directive 203, "Analytic Standards", June 12, 2023a).

All analytic products shall be consistent, according to the above-mentioned ICD 203, with the following five Analytic Standards: objectivity, independence of political consideration, timeliness, exploitation of all available sources of intelligence information, and implementing and exhibiting analytic tradecraft standards. Moreover, analytic tradecraft standards include:

(1) Proper description of quality and credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies;
(2) Proper expression and explanation of uncertainties associated with major analytic results;
(3) Proper distinction between intelligence information, assumptions, and judgments;
(4) Incorporating analysis of alternatives;
(5) Demonstrating customer relevance and addressing implications;
(6) Using clear and logical argumentation;
(7) Explaining change to or consistency of analytic judgments;
(8) Making accurate judgments and assessments;
(9) Incorporating effective visual information where appropriate.

The ICD 203 Standards are US core principles of intelligence analysis and were introduced across the American IC. They are applied in each analytic product in a manner appropriate to its purpose, the type and scope of its underlying source information, its production timeline, and its customers. They are also the foundational assessment criteria for a review of analytic products. Standards also serve as a common foundation for developing education and training in analytic skills as well as for the promotion of a common ethic for achieving analytic rigour and excellence and for personal integrity in Intelligence Analysis.

Approach to the problem

Before we start to sail through the set of Intelligence Analysis dimensions, it would be instrumental to draw up several things to define some of its important terms such as methodology, methods, techniques, and tools. The essay form should help present issues from a personal point of view and methodically examine and evaluate topics of rationality, morality, and ethics in Intelligence Analysis, all within the academic agenda. The work stated from papers such as: P. Gill and M. Phythian. (2018). "Developing Intelligence Theory," Intelligence and National Security. 33(4); Mark Phythian, Peter Gill, and Stephen Marrin. (2009). Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates. Abingdon: Routledge; and Andrew Rathmell. (2002). "Towards Postmodern Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security. 17 (3): 87–104. More

specifically, some personal points of view were presented in the paper to support the offered views. Hopefully, this will encourage readers to take a side and accept submitted arguments.

Methods in this specific world should be considered as procedures, structures, and algorithms used in analytical processes to find a solution to analytical problems, all planned and value-neutral. They can include examinations, theoretical and logical procedures, experimental evaluations, numerical schemes, statistics, etc. Methodology should then be considered as a systematic way to solve a problem and should include procedures of describing, explaining, and anticipating different analytical elements.

How knowledge is generated by Intelligence is both an art and a science. Both should generate ways an analytical project should be carried out and find appropriate methods. The notion of Intelligence and related methodologies include the why, where and who as well as all the opposites – when not to, who not to, what not to, etc. With the proper application of methodology, analysts can follow the tracks of analytical rigour and achieve elevated levels of adequateness and accuracy. As for techniques, they should be perceived as practical elements, regulated by precise, diligent, and proven instructions that allow for generating necessary data, information, opinions, and facts.

Analytical tools are components used to collect necessary data and information. All the above-mentioned elements do not exist in nature. They are purely notional and represent, for better or worse, intended or otherwise, contributions from both the analyst's mind and spirit – intellect and character. They are just figments of the human mind and the spirit, designed to link the thought and the real-life world. Such a construct allows us to obtain and build up knowledge as well as to identify laws and rules necessary to make analytical progress. The analytical product should then not be an outcome of just conventional procedures but should always create added value. It is always outputs versus outcomes. If we are doing forecasting instead of foresight, then we are not learning – we are not improving the decision-making of our intelligence customers.

Forecasting is looking at a future scenario, in which we simply do a linear extrapolation of current trends. Foresight is looking at scenarios

that are possible or probable. Foresight provides plausible, sometimes unexpected, insights, which are often provocative, and which adversaries may hope we experience. We do not offer value to our customers if we are only providing a forecast of trajectories with flashpoints of concern. Many times, they can already see much of this coming as it is the trajectory they are already on. Intelligence Analysis needs then to map out possible and do a gap analysis – options and implications or consequences of taking or not taking actions. With this ethos in mind, analysts both add value and provide a commitment to their calling, improving the value of outputs and outcomes. This leads us to the conclusion that the **Intelligence Analysis methodology should also be Intelligence Analysis ethics as it always generates new important, sometimes critical elements.**

Main findings

The work of an Intelligence analyst is a kind of scientific work and as such is subject to two main threats:

a. the first is when analysts take a deep dive into their subject and are not able to fight effectively with the current. It results in a fast exhaustion of their vital and mental forces if they forget that the analytical work is more like a marathon rather than a sprint.

b. the second item is equally dangerous, although it might not surface for quite a long time. If an analyst's creativity and capability are harnessed and drowned in everyday procedures, important elements may remain undiscovered and unexploited.

To avoid this, Intelligence Analysis ethics should find an ally in methods and techniques. Ethics without such software will get burned; methods and techniques without ethics would remain sterile and pointless. Therefore, we have to find the proper way to marry these two dimensions. Firstly, and foremost, most of the things in Intelligence Analysis are linked with the problem of personal ambitions. An analyst should answer the question of what is more important – to prove something to myself or others. For me, it is quite clear that those others are an important element in the day-to-day work of an analyst.

Most of them don't know, and they cannot even know, how much effort it is necessary to expend to complete a task, how many tears and

how much sweat it costs an analyst. That is why appreciation is so important, just to keep the analytical process going. If it is followed by an official recognition – the more, the better. It is like the case of a Nobel Prize. It is often appreciated not because of a big dollar cheque but because of the nameless crowd, which will never get close to it.

Ambitions are similar to two sides of the same coin. They can be good as they provide strong motivation to continue analytical efforts. They can also be a destructive element and become a destructive force. They may cloud judgments and distort the creative abilities of an analyst, especially one who does not have enough strength to be impartial and objective. Objectivity is expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations. In short, everything comes down to self-assessment, with cold blood and fairness, also with courage to recognize our shortcomings, and with modesty and humility to see abilities and talents.

Only in this situation, when our weaknesses are attributed to our evaluation sheet, we, as analysts, can think about improving performance and even punch well above our weight. Such elements might contribute to analytical successes and lead to recognition within the analytical world.

Objectivity is a difficult art and only a few can practice it. There are always analysts stuck in their self-righteousness, who can get widespread recognition and outstanding results. However, their results are tainted with a lack of impartiality from the very start of their analytical project. Therefore, with the next projects, generating true and credible results, analysts should always look at things and themselves from a distance, identifying and recognizing their cognitive, educational, and professional limitations.

To sum up, objectivity is a difficult art. Therefore, the analyst should place himself in two reference systems. He should be well aware of the inner self but also be able to reach beyond himself, to stand aside for a few moments and generate an appropriate assessment. An analyst should partially be an Einstein, who can associate observations made in different reference systems to a great analytical conclusion. Being a very smart person or even a genius is not a sufficient condition to become a good analyst. Several such people are walking the Earth but most of the

successes in Intelligence were achieved by average yet dependable analysts. Average abilities will then do, but this is not enough – it is necessary to develop them systematically and without a break. Simple and regular painstaking work, aimed at just earning money, is not sufficient to be successful in an Intelligence enterprise.

Analysts always need a few seeds of passion for Intelligence Analysis. How to define such an element? As for every psychological element – it is quite difficult to describe it. However, we can present at least two of the most important issues. The first one is the personal character of interest in the analytical problem. This should be not only regular, professional engagement but also a deep dive into a subject, engaging most of the analyst psyche. We should even identify ourselves with the analytical topic. The second element is to find a psychological pleasure in examining an analytical question. We have to look for a particular kind of satisfaction generated by an outcome of professional curiosity and even by the analytical process as such. However, it is not possible to achieve this level and maintain it for long.

Those few moments, from time to time, will do. They provide an analyst with the energy to survive long hours dedicated to a study of a subject and overcome fatigue. This special kind of psychological pleasure is normally not a result of an intensive experience events, emotions, and results of our mental work. Generally, it is more than enough if it is somewhere in our subconsciousness, which focuses on solving an analytical problem.

An analyst should not be afraid of being different from the rest of the people in the Intelligence establishment. This is mainly due to the situation of dedicating most of their time to systematic, painstaking, and long-lasting projects. Partially, it is because of a certain mental distinctiveness generated by interest in specific, difficult, sometimes critically important topics. The courage to be different in many cases results in the necessity to resign from many everyday joys and being Mr. Social, elements that are often appreciated and valued in organizations. Such a position should not however lead to victimization or showing being different and/or superior to other people in the organization.

Analysts lose nothing if we compare them with other members of Intelligence teams as the former can open for themselves new mental

perspectives. Such elements produce a kind of satisfaction, which is quite incomparable to other jobs and generates the effect of fulfilment. With time it changes to savouring this specific, analytical atmosphere and each moment dedicated to analytical work. However, as always, there is a catch – some analysts move to analytical blind alleys, where moments dedicated to regular life and normal, everyday pleasures are considered a waste of time and effort. This is not healthy and eventually creates a mental problem instead of increasing productivity.

It is also necessary to emphasize that there is no real passion for work without proper motivation. However, enthusiasm will ultimately burn out if it is not deep-rooted in the remotest layers of the analyst's personality. Rush for a professional carrier will not suffice. Even more, focusing on the carrier as the most important objective is at odds with the analyst-type calling. Any candidate for an analyst's post must be aware that this kind of job requires long working hours at the office desk. He should also know that this is often accompanied by a lack of professional recognition by colleagues and superiors, and many administration-type duties necessary to climb the career path. Therefore, strong motivation is necessary if one wants to become successful and have a satisfying career.

Motivations might have different dimensions. Firstly, the analyst wants simply "to have fun" and experience an intellectual adventure. Secondly, the analyst wants to be of use to the intelligence organization and the nation. Thirdly, many analysts are driven by striving for the truth and finally – motivated by ideology and/or religion. In most of the cases, all elements co-exist and are difficult to separate.

Naturally, aiming for knowledge and truth is deeply seated somewhere inside the mind, even against our spoken declarations, declared intentions, and things an analyst is not aware of. Ideological and religious motivations surface quite often, especially when analysts use Intelligence Analysis to support their beliefs and philosophies. We also have to mention the necessity factor to be a constructive and active part of an organization. Intelligence work, and Intelligence Analysis, in particular, does not only reside in the desk, folders, databases, and computers. It is also an institution, its components, processes, and procedures.

Besides, it is possible to exercise Intelligence work only within an Intelligence organization. In this case, there is no freedom for manoeuvre. Only within this specific framework it is possible to acquire and develop specific skills as well as to build up personal and institutional knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to not only be an active member of the project team, department, Intelligence organization and national Intelligence Community but also be a part of international programmes and joint Intelligence efforts.

As always, there is a catch. Analysts should focus on their projects, tasks, and teamwork. However, it is quite easy for an analyst to become a person who only celebrates successes and presents past achievements, instead of focusing on the future. The higher the position of an analyst, the bigger the danger of celebrating Intelligence Analysis instead of exercising it. Instead of long hours dedicated to analytical work, the member of a national Intelligence enterprise flies from one partner location or allied service to another, presenting and discussing the same issues repeatedly. This is a straight path to discuss the past and avoid presenting estimates and develop foresight.

An analyst should always be a friend of books, journals, and databases. Permanent contact with professional literature, new data and information should be a part of their strategies. But Intelligence Analysis is a game with a big stake. Analysts who know publications, data and information only from their areas of interest can become just good craftsmen. Therefore, each analyst should actively seek new information, and new publications from different areas, domains, and disciplines. This should be complemented by continuously discovering novelties of science, culture, and art, reading not only volumes and articles on topics of interest but also construing popular science books and journals going well beyond the analyst's regular work area. This could not be achieved without good feelings for reading. There is of course a danger of analysts becoming lonely in the analytical crowd and they should be able to find ways and tools to fill such a gap if they want to be successful.

The next element could additionally become a kind of summary for all the above-mentioned fundamentals. Perusing accessible analytical resources, continuously keeping the shoulder to the analytical wheel and poring over available solutions are sets of actions that should be a

mantra for every analyst in each Intelligence enterprise. Long hours at the desk, days spent reading, and months dedicated to Intelligence studies, are things that characterize good analysts. If a person is not able to do all this, it can only be an impostor, not a real analyst.

An analyst's desk is an important thing, but we have also to present a few things that should characterize such an approach. *The first one is the system.* There are people with different approaches and characters. Some work according to a meticulously prepared plan, with specific hours dedicated to analytical work; others prefer "long jumps" with long hours and days of intensive effort, followed by slowing the pace down and taking the rest necessary to regenerate forces. Independently of the approach, *the system* should become an important part of each analytical strategy as chaos is the biggest enemy of an analyst.

If one presents to their superior a paper with many corrections, arrows, and deletions, and this overcomes the regular text, it is a clear sign that they are not a suitable candidate for an analytical job. One of the best approaches for the analyst is to dedicate a specific period of the day, be it half an hour, one hour, or any other time, just for one purpose. It is possible to count how many hours of true work it generates during the month, quarter, or year. This is a significant amount of time, in reality, plenty of time! Working a specific amount of time per day does not ensure immediate progress. This may have a destructive effect but results always continue to accumulate. One can especially see the value of such an approach when learning a foreign language. Another part of the analytical strategy is to remain consistently on the topic of a launched project. The selection of the topic should be carried out putting one foot in front of the other pensively. However, if the choice is made, it should be flown either to the good or bitter end, to find a solution or prove that it is not possible or that tasking is out of an analyst's reach.

The second one is curiosity. They are also people and analysts with an insatiable curiosity, for whom each new message, new book, new article, and lecture are irresistible attractions and elements more interesting than the current project and subject of current analytical work. This constitutes a dangerous situation. If somebody succumbs once to such a temptation, they are finished as valuable and productive analysts.

The capability to work is an important element in Intelligence Analysis, if it is necessary or if there is no other choice, occasionally in short, intense intervals. This ability should also be developed and continuously mastered by analysts, just to use every moment for the task. Any other approach should be considered as an excuse and try to put the blame for the volume and quality of an analytical product delivered on the so-called objective difficulties. Most of them are real and all of them consume time and effort. They are being used as an excuse in the analytical world but, excluding exceptional circumstances, this should not be the case.

The world is full of everyday problems, unsolved difficulties, and inevitable situations. If an analyst is not able to find a slot between those elements and exploit already existing conditions to carry on with their work, they will never reach the level that would allow them to become good experts. Excuses are often accompanied by feelings of bitterness and a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude. This shows that such a person is not the one Intelligence should invest in. A good solution for the on-again and off-again types of jobs is creating slots for the analytical work and filling them in with a well-prepared plan.

Some people need quite a long run-up time, i.e. a long preparation time, the phase preceding the proper work, examination of the data, information and literature on the subject, efforts to establish where the previous work had stopped etc. For this kind of people, an on-again and off-again type of job is especially difficult, but everyday practice and gathered experience shows that even in such a case regular practising and endurance can lead to mind-boggling results.

The more an analyst makes his/ her way up the ladder in the organization, he spends time preparing, signing different documents, and filling out numerous forms. Therefore, the best solution for solving the problem of an excess of administration work is the “two-desk” method. The first desk should be used for standard administration work for ongoing communications with collaborators and partners, documents awaiting approval and signature and finally – any other documents awaiting their turn. The second table should be placed somewhere in the room’s corner and dedicated only to the analytical work with documents opened on the last read page, with half-written

sheets of paper and a ball pen ready to finish the already started sentence. If an analyst can adhere to the above-mentioned strategy, the rule of systematic build-up of efforts will do its job.

There is no creative job without permanent and continuous learning. Therefore, an analyst should be motivated by two main objectives: the necessity to constantly train his/her mind and the requirement to discover new knowledge areas needed for analytical problem-solving. The human brain is an astonishing tool, however with many imperfections, just to mention fatigue and a necessity to regenerate after the job. We should also mention brain plasticity, which allows this part of the human body to accommodate quite easily to repeated mental processes and situations. If we repeat mental operations with a comparable structure, the brain builds for itself a mental route, in which each next reasoning easily falls in. For new elements falling into the mind, it is extremely difficult to find new answers. In such a situation work often leads to old, already tested conclusions, rationalized rather by a psychological structure of an analyst's brain than proved objective reasons. Most of the people are not able to get free from such mental mechanisms. Therefore, they want to construct their personalities and build unique styles of work, independence, and originality of thinking. On the other side – such an undertaking could lead to personal quirks, mannerisms, and even analytical fixations. Almost nobody can get rid of established mental habits, but in the case of analytical work, analysts should do everything possible to minimise their effects on his/her actions.

The ability to exercise self-criticism is quite a rare thing and an extremely valuable capacity. Criticism creates a question situation, and self-criticism does not allow for the acceptance of shoddy answers. There are several elements of self-criticism: a balanced attitude towards an analytical product, examining analytical elements without being either tardy or jumping the gun and making statements that in the foreseeable future may not stand a test, accepting critical remarks and constructive suggestions of other analysts, learning from own mistakes, good recognition and identification of own mental abilities. Nurturing such talents should become an objective for each person involved in the Intelligence Analysis.

One of the most important elements that allows to keep the proper and strong analytic shape is the permanent training of the brain, mental gymnastics. This should not be limited just to the current analytical project but also include learning new things from others, gradually and steadily building up a personal analytical toolkit, improving the art of understanding, continuously developing, practising, and testing logical skills and training the memory.

This will be, of course, most of the time, linked with current projects, but it is also necessary to look for and find things that are not necessarily immediately applicable to analytical tasks and are not of direct benefit to the analyst. The good thing is using morning hours, if a busy schedule allows, to wrestle with the most difficult logic and analytical problems. It is to be noted that at present there is not too much time for systematic and pre-planned studies on specific topics and analytical elements. This has been mostly replaced by studies of elements needed to finish current projects. Such a concession is necessary due to an overwhelming wave of tasks, emerging problems, and additional duties. However, as long as it is possible, it is necessary to cling to the old ways of doing analytical business and try to dedicate time to learning new things and improving new capabilities.

The other way of doing everyday mental gymnastics, complementing the one mentioned above, is to not part with books, journals and documents and dedicate each available moment for reading. This should not be a minute just "for reading" but rather taking time "for learning". New topics should be studied wherever and whenever possible. It is just necessary to sit and go through it considering difficulties with concentration of attention at different times and various places. In such situations, we should not demand too much from our mental powers, but we should keep going and try to accumulate new knowledge and new skills.

Identifying talents and personal limitations. On the one hand, having at least some skills is a precondition to undertake challenges as big and complicated as analytical projects. On the other, both personal abilities and limitations can only manifest and be proven in action, during the real analytical process. Preliminary inquiries are just the beginning. In addition, it is also necessary to control Intelligence

Analysis-related processes and procedures permanently, as they fly. The main objective of such actions is to identify what could be done, what else I can do and what is absolutely out of reach. Therefore, a great amount of objectivism is required and having much humility about himself/ herself. It is necessary to admit here that these are rare characteristics within analytical teams as it is difficult for many people to admit – "I am not able to do this!"

Such a situation immediately generates the question situation and a typically human impulse – "Why is that?", "Should I surrender? Now! Others gave up but they hadn't noticed a simple way around for emerging difficulties. I am to win this time!" There is a piece of conceit in such an approach, but just a small one – "I am not as good as people think. I have just been able to find the solution that others somehow must have missed". That is quite a good thing as it pushes analysts to climb to the top and is one of the most important driving forces of Intelligence Analysis. Such instincts, however, should be kept under control, not only to minimize analytical costs but also to reduce risks.

Analysts should be aware of their mental limits to undertake efforts to go far and beyond in information products. This is due to the situation that most analytical products are reports crossing mental frontiers and other limitations. A blunt, direct, and strong analytical attack is generally not a feasible solution as analysts should withdraw from their assumptions from time to time, think things over, and find new ways, methods, techniques, and tools. Even if the final lap is a burst of intuition, for analysts it is just a kind of reward for previous renunciation and sacrifices, a bonus for their painstaking work and giving up cheap successes. Only a person who knows their constraints and has a lot of respect for them can go beyond and generate added analytical values. An analyst who is not ready to take up such a challenge will fail long before he approaches the core of a problem. As already indicated, the identification of own talents and capabilities should always go with humility. In this specific case, humbleness should be perceived as a virtue that allows one to make self-evaluations in the light of truth.

An analyst, despite his/ her achievements, talents, and beliefs, normally launches a series of actions similar to those of a strategist, evaluates the balance of forces, and terrain, and assesses an adversary.

Such an analogy is accurate and justified as a confrontation with an analytical problem equally depends on recognising analytical potential as military victory depends on staff work and staff calculations.

The self-awareness of own limitations also pushes analysts to use the works of other people. No analyst can work alone. Of course, there are sometimes periods of long, intensive, and solitary analytical work. Of course, some people are particularly predestined to carry out the analytical burden alone. Eventually, an analyst uses outcomes of other projects and the works of other analysts anyway, directly, or indirectly. Indirect consultation could refer to various analytical products, monographs, and other works as well as the use of advanced computer software. The direct use of expertise could be done through discussions with other people, consultations in different forms and also formalized cooperation within project teams.

In many cases, bi- and multilateral cooperation is not the strongest suit despite the situation that the abilities and skills of analysts are at a quite high level. Certainly, higher than shown in many cases by the Intelligence production. The fault in this situation is partly attributable to the sense of individuality. This is, in many cases, exemplified by the situation that every member of the projects team has their own, sometimes brilliant, and outstanding ideas, but rarely they can resign from their positions and try to force their theories. This mechanism leads to the situation that project teams do not live for long, sinking in a large number of specific, sometimes irrelevant tasks.

Such effects might be reinforced by the jealousy and other personal engagements of team members. In addition, team leaders, in most cases, do not have too many tools to guide the team properly. Sometimes, they are kind of powerless and the only thing such teams are good at is writing average-level analytical products, even with inconsistent and different quality-level contributions from analysts.

There is also another problem. It is an unpleasant and short-sighted practice of hiding data, information, research results and analytical products from other colleagues and collaborators. This is mainly due to the presence of people afraid that others will steal their ideas and solutions or outrun them in finding solutions and generating analytical products. However, good analysts still have many ideas, elements and

plans up their sleeve. This results in the existence of groups, in which average analysts can win their laurels and geniuses are not able to stand out from fellow analysts. This also leads to the situation that there is no group success and group satisfaction with the project completed. There is also no joint and combined satisfaction in discovering new, unknown analytical lands.

Now, it is time for some additional remarks. Analytical work, as each creative type of activity, brings with it some hazards. One of them is the creation of a separate, mental world that an analyst can live in and operate. In many cases, such a creation is even more interesting and more engaging, sometimes even addictive. It allows one to get away from things that are considered ordinary and find for themselves a brave, new world with several elements that build it in its specific way. Such creations may influence mental health. If connected with the reprogramming of the brain can result in losing contact with reality and bring difficulties in dealing with every day, normal problems. Such symptoms can surface in the case of some analysts. Therefore, it is necessary to keep them under tight, strict control and not allow the new world to take precedence over the normality and analytic routine.

There are several solutions to such problems. Firstly, regular family life and normal professional relations. If there is a problem with this, analysts, their superiors or colleagues should force them to get involved in ordinary problems and not move to the other side of the mirror. Secondly, it is necessary to continuously build, develop and maintain the capacity to be aware of and recognize other people's needs. Thirdly, it is necessary to find someone or something that can be taken care of. Still, one can become a weirdo when they are not able to find the time for the proper work due to being overloaded with many other things. All is a matter of proportions, not just a problem of dedicating more or less time. This is also the issue of balancing the degree of commitment, between everyday life and analytical world.

Therefore, it is also necessary to find ways to get away from analytical problems and tasks. It is not true that you will lose everything when you stop mid-sentence. This would give the subconscious a chance to digest data and information and build the fundament for a future solution. It is also necessary to have a hobby – to have a stepping stone

from professional hardships. However, a hobby should allow one to relax properly and efficiently and should not dominate over professional life. Hence, the issue of balance pops up yet again. No element should occupy the mind and time to such a degree that it causes an analyst to turn away from the most important things.

Now turning to the next concern – organization of relaxation. Analysts must not overdo intellectual work and push too hard with assigned tasks. Our brain and nervous system are both delicate creations and mental effort, especially such intensive analytical work, can enervate a person's strength. Without necessary regeneration, a catastrophe, including mental deterioration, may become a serious threat. Each of the veteran analysts experienced the situation when going beyond the certain threshold of fatigue, it is not possible to do anything constructive and all efforts would prove futile. The trotting in the same place starts and even much worse thing happens – looping for days and weeks, going forward and in reality – moving backwards.

If somebody wants to prove to themselves that despite their tiredness, they can solve the problem, they forget about the physical laws of entropy. Normally, on the next day, the problem would not be so difficult to solve. The problem of sleep and sport are intricately linked. The problem of analysts falling asleep is as much a question of their mental work, which is still moving around in their brain, as a matter of lack of regular exercise. Many people give others much different advice, for example – stop mental work every hour and dedicate five minutes to gymnastics, plan half a day per week for hiking or any other physical activity, and organize each year at least three weeks of vacations each – with mental work reduced to a minimum.

It is not effective to recommend to Intelligence structures to strictly follow these suggestions. Instead, each analyst should find his/her ways to apply such recipes to everyday practice. Analysts should find his/her type of exercise and establish doses of physical activities. One thing is for sure, it is necessary to be not too thrifty. Time dedicated to relaxation pays off, mainly in the form of analysis results and great Intelligence products.

An important element should be emphasized here, any activity should be an active rest, with the brain involved. It is also necessary to

enjoy the activities and not to think about work that waits for us in the office. This significantly reduces the effect of relaxation. But even in the office, we can use short moments that distract us from the work, for example doing necessary shopping. Even in such a case, it is necessary to find in it a "local pleasure" and consider this as a half-relaxation. This sometimes helps. We should know that difficulties with falling asleep and with sleep are normally indicators that the organism needs more physical activity. Of course, the dosage of it should be regulated individually, according to personal needs. A slumber always acts as an anti-entropic factor.

During an analytical project sometimes, it is not possible to avoid periods of hard work, which consumes our mental and physical forces at a rapid pace. This could be a series of calculations, experiments, and tests, in which most of the activities should be done with a single swing due to the time pressure or editing of the final Intelligence product that should have been done "yesterday." Some consider such things as romantic and interesting, but for analysts, this is a great mental and physical effort and exploitation of an organism. After such a time, it is just necessary to take a good rest.

There is one more aspect of the Intelligence Analysis work that links with all the elements mentioned before. It is a mental rigour and discipline of personal thoughts, ideas, and concepts. Without such an approach analyst could turn out to be weirdoes, enter strange mental dead ends and even bring themselves to the state of analytical geekery and other pathologies linked with too intensive consumption of mental and physical resources.

There are always costs associated with analytical tasks, such as feelings of big stress, being under pressure, concerns about failures or being overtired. Those are conditions close to anxiety and depression. All or part of them surface when analytical euphoria passes out. If such elements are not accompanied by mental rigour and discipline of personal thoughts, which in practical terms means an ability to "stop thinking" or "think about something different," then costs might take on catastrophic proportions and even end with the bankruptcy of the organism.

Relax, physical activities and good sleep certainly help in retaining the mental rigour and discipline of personal thoughts, but they will not solve problems by themselves. Mental rigour and discipline of personal thoughts is a kind of art and as such – is a kind of analytical asceticism. This, as each asceticism, could only be achieved by assiduous exercises.

There is one more warning. All that has been written so far in the paper should be taken lightly, but judiciously, sensibly, and flexibly. They should be applied as things by themselves not just a regime that could make analysts' lives miserable.

It is also mentioned that there always will exist a special category of analysts who will not achieve many successes but will concentrate only and mainly on finding strategies, methods and techniques that allow them to avoid excessive exploitation of their mental and physical forces. We have to note this fact and realize that they will not significantly contribute to the organization as they just concentrate on their well-being and careers.

Then, why become an Intelligence Analyst? There is one element that compensates for all the efforts, time, and risks. Those are cognitive enjoyment and an awareness that an analyst contributes to his/her nation's security and welfare.

Is it a good and nice thing to know something and know more than most of the people in the country? Most of the time, we do not know that we know, that we have specific knowledge. It is rather something asleep, something absent and deep inside our brain, which awakes and is present with the presence of specific mental associations and reminders. This is a thing similar to learning and usage of a foreign language when a needed word comes into our consciousness as it is needed and should be used for communication. Most of the time, it is absent but always ready for use in case of need.

Despite the situation that the knowledge gathered and accumulated is stored somewhere in subconscious areas of the brain, it always allows analysts to see the world in a different light, it changes the hierarchy of values, shows new, sometimes unexpected, and new things, and opens new cognitive areas. It also enriches the personality of the analyst.

There is one close out of this – the most perceptible joy emerging from exercising the Intelligence Analysis is not the possession and relevance of acquired knowledge but the process of gaining knowledge itself. This is a kind of adventure, a way of an explorer and a pioneer. It is both an effort and a route to gaining and accumulating knowledge. The best situation for any analyst is when we know where we are going, which direction we are taking and that there is a reward at the end of the road and such a challenge is worth our time and effort.

Conclusions

Thinking is a human act imbuing thing with values. We have to remember that it is an act of thinking that changes our environment and the world, from morally neutral to one permeated with values. The act of thinking is also a human-specific action, and it takes place somewhere in the grey matter of the brain.

It is not possible to see it, but it is a human action par excellence. It is the first element of a long causal chain as well, for which only a human can take responsibility. Responsibility is linked with morality and ethics. As for Intelligence Analysis, it should be considered a rational thing, and it leads us directly to the issue of morality of thought. Rational thoughts and actions mean rational thinking and building rationality. It should also be considered as a permanent effort to use rational types of searches and mental evaluations imposed upon reality.

Rationality is a basic term and as a posture, it should be guided by intellectual rigour and experience. Only with these two, one can consider that they are somewhere close to both truth and reality. However, there is still a trap here if we follow the positivist type of rationalism as it is strongly associated with chains of mathematical consequences. Such an approach claims that without them any method and technique may dissipate in indeterminacies.

As for empirical methods and techniques, they are neither a monolith nor a ruler of rationality. Although it is not possible to resign from such an approach, we have to keep in mind that the empiric approach has its limits. We have also to acknowledge that there is also another rationality, not guided by empiric results and this is a world of philosophy and metaphysics. The empiric-mathematical type of

rationality is the easiest part of the whole methodology concept with its clear criterions and details. However, still, it is still necessary to approach problems with maximum caution and not take for granted things that only pretend to be the ones.

The situation becomes more difficult with some justifications, which are linked with the necessity to make a choice and/or take action. This is the moment when sentient and insentient desires replace logic and clear judgment. It puts analysts in a difficult situation. However, it is still possible to define some principles. They would not become rationality criteria, but they can be used as pre-conditions as analysts who violate them permanently could be considered irrational and analytically ineffective.

Then, we can propose seven analytical commandments.

- The first is on the necessity to be accurate and informative in building opinions, preparing assessments, and proposing forecasts, all with clear language and terms. We have to remember that, apart from formal languages, it is not possible to achieve absolute certainty, predictability, and clarity. The strength and the beauty of the natural language emerge from its plasticity and indeterminacy. Such features can be used to express and transfer necessary meanings, spirits, and subtleties, avoiding elements aimed at imposing specific actions and behaviours that could not be done with rational and logical arguments.
- The second piece of advice is on openness, i.e. openness to discussion with others. If we want to sharpen our criticism, we have to have an open discussion, we have to listen to others and try to understand their arguments. Only with it and with an understanding of consequences, it is possible to change the position and personal judgment and accept the judgements of other analysts. A refusal to engage in a discussion is always a manifestation of irrationality.
- The third item is the self-criticism. It has been mentioned earlier. Now, it is necessary to complement previous statements with a few elements such as the requirement to continue

efforts to find even the tiniest gaps in assumptions and the fabricated network of logical constructs. In addition, where empiricism ends, it can be replaced by self-criticism.

- Fourth, it is critical to examine other possibilities and other solutions.
- The fifth refers to the internal cohesion of views and ideas to question doctrines and beliefs.
- The sixth is the sense of consequence. If we assume certain premises, we also have to accept conclusions resulting from accepted methods of reasoning. This builds the logic of thought and supports the idea of applied rationality.
- Last but not least, the seventh commandment states that analysts should be aware of language limitations and conditions that can influence their work. These seven rules look like a recommendation for personal use. Therefore, if somebody wants to act in the light of reason, it has to follow them without too much discussion as this is a result of the knowledge and experience of many distinguished analysts.

Of course, there will always be analysts who simply do not care to be rational or have at least an ambiguous relation with the rationalistic approach. However, stupid things make us pay dearly for services.

In the case of Intelligence Analysis, rationality and irrationality are not personal things. Irrationality is like a disease. It spreads out and contaminates others. In the worst-case scenario, it leads directly to an analytical catastrophe. On the other side, rationality builds the morality of thought and as such it is a part of ethics. The wickedness of immorality surfaces in a situation when inanity replaces recognized and cherished values.

Then, what makes a good analyst? This is a question that is quite often presented to Intelligence organizations. For sure, it should be the person who can put enough effort into studying and applying analytic methods, techniques, and tools, although some skills required for the job often come more naturally to certain people.

Future analysts should have a natural curiosity and an interest in how things work and why they work. Analysts should be problem

solvers, pattern finders and puzzle solvers and the main motivation for this job should come from the task itself. An analyst should also have a critical mind, be aware of their own biases and limitations, and be conscious of the situation that the human mind is inherently biased and that it requires a lot of cognitive effort to solve complex problems.

If complemented by knowledge, the ability to apply scientific methods and different techniques becomes a major asset for an analyst. Analysts also need to be competent in several fields and have a broad knowledge of different analytical concepts and fundamentals for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. At the same time, they have to pay a lot of attention to details.

This means a necessity to apply several different approaches to a problem and avoid reaching for the first available solution. Analysts should also master the tools and technologies at their disposal and keep an eye out for the latest technological developments.

Analysts and their teams can have an enormous positive impact on a situation, but only if the Intelligence products they generate are properly understood and accepted by national decision-makers, politicians, and military commanders. Therefore, they should possess the ability to explain their products and associated conclusions in simple terms. No matter how clever the analyst is and how elegant analysis methods, techniques and tools might be, the analyst should be able to communicate results clearly to Intelligence stakeholders – to be perceived and appreciated as a professional.

This requires adjusting the terminology to the audience's level of knowledge and presenting the implications of the product's findings in simple terms. To do all this, analysts should pay a lot of attention to continuous learning. They also need to continuously improve at their job, to fine-tune methods, techniques and tools as well as discover new tools and technologies.

The best approach is to maintain a dynamic exchange with other analysts and share ideas. It can be an effective way to prepare the competent and diverse intelligence workforce of the future, which would then become an enabler of national security.

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SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

THE ROAD TO VIOLENCE – THE OPPRESSION THEORY AND THE ISLAMIC STATE PROPAGANDA

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Abstract:
Violent islamist radicalization continues to be a factor of insecurity and social instability. Starting from the theoretical framework offered by the theory of oppression and F. M. Moghaddam's radicalization model, the purpose of this paper is to highlight the role the main elements of this theory can have in the propaganda of the terrorist organization Islamic State and in the relationship between it and the radicalization processes. More specifically, within the research carried out, we undertook a content analysis based on the thematic coding employing codes and sub-codes resulting from the theoretical framework. These codes were applied on the publications of the Islamic State, Rumiyah, (issues 3-4/2016, 5-7/2017) and Voice of Khurasan (VoK) (issues 16/2022, 21/2022, 23/2023, 29/2023, 30/2023). The main findings of the research highlighted the fact that: 1) perceived oppression has an effect on violent disinhibition, 2) there is a similarity between the constituent elements of the theory of oppression and the constituent elements on the basis of which propaganda and the IS message are created. This similarity is highlighted in the use of specific terms (found in the sub-codes used for content analysis), promoted in Rumiyah and VoK to describe those considered enemies, but also in the way the attackers committed terrorist actions, using the most brutal forms of violence against perceived oppressors.

Keywords: *radicalization, propaganda, oppression, Rumiyah, Voice of Khurasan.*

Introduction

Violent extremist radicalization is a phenomenon that has multiple manifestations, all with a major impact on security. The radicalisation process is complex, unpredictable and takes place in different environments, both offline and online. Feelings, experiences,

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beliefs perceived and interpreted subjectively can often represent the first steps on the path to terrorist actions. One of the elements whose perception can be influenced in an erroneous way so as to generate involvement in violent actions is the feeling of injustice, oppression, of deprivation of rights compared to other people.

The objective of this research is to analyse the publications of the terrorist organization Islamic State (IS), Rumiyah, (issues 3-4/2016, 5-7/2017), Voice of Khurasan (no. 16/2022, 21/2022, 23/2023, 29/2023, 30/2023) to determine to what extent the theory of oppression can explain how the terrorist group triggers and fuels radicalization processes.

Methodologically, we will use content analysis based on thematic coding. Thus, starting from the theory of oppression we have extracted a series of concepts that were the basis of the content analysis of the magazines presented above, forming the thematic codes and sub-codes. We chose oppression theory for this analysis because real or perceived oppression represents both one of the factors that can determine or precipitate the radicalization process (Moyano & Trujillo, 2018) and an element of violent disinhibition (Berkowitz, 1989).

The content of the articles in the journals was coded with the help of the MAXQDA program. The resulting analysis focuses on the frequency of the defined codes and on their overlap within the analysed publications.

Oppression Theory

In the literature, oppression is often defined as a domination, a subjugation, an inhuman, degrading treatment of a group, of socially, economically, culturally, politically, etc. asymmetrical power held over a group or individual, often accompanied by threats or violence (Dalrymple & Burke, 2006; Van Soest, 2008; Marseille & Kulis, 2009; Ayvazian, 1995). Oppression has been going on throughout human history in its many forms: economic, political, racial, ethnic, sexual, social, or even in the form of violence, abuse or neglect. The key elements of the concept of oppression are the dominant group that is privileged, the disadvantaged element/group, and the notion of power.

In specialized studies, a series of characteristics of oppression have been highlighted, such as: offering power and advantages to some and denying it to others; producing a form of physical or psychological harm; being maintained by ideology and violence; limiting the freedom of choice of a group/individual in relation to other groups, other individuals in society; implying a constraint, a feeling of humiliation, perceived or real marginalization (Victoroff, 2005; D. Van Soest, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2013; Webber et al., 2018; Lobato, R. M., Moya, M., Moyano, M., & Trujillo, H. M. 2018).

The theory of oppression refers to the oppression felt at the individual or group level, which can determine violent behaviours and attitudes (Victoroff, 2005). Most of the time, it is not about objective oppression, but about relative deprivation, the perception of the individual or group on oppression, injustice, which can be different from one person to another. R. Gurr (2015) defines relative deprivation[1] as the discrepancy between a person's perception of an expectation of him/herself (what (s)he expects to receive) versus reality (what (s)he receives). The individual's inability to get what they feel is justified for them triggers feelings of frustration that facilitate the onset of violent behaviour. Thus, the greater the intensity of the deprivation, the greater the magnitude of the violence. Basically, there is a rift between the individual's hope about an aspect considered to be important for him or her and the existing reality, giving rise to feelings such as frustration, dissatisfaction, etc. (Omer Taspinar, 2009). Individuals who develop these feelings will turn to visions, beliefs, ideologies that promote a solution to the elements which cause this feeling of relative deprivation, even if the solution is violent.

According to F. M. Moghaddam's model of violent radicalization, the perception of injustice and oppression are cognitive factors of radicalization. Thus, when the individual considers or is made to believe that the group to which (s)he belongs does not benefit from the same advantages as other groups and categories or is not treated equally, fairly, (s)he can be more receptive to messages of radicalization, from a cognitive point of view. The perception of deprivation and injustice can

[1] Which is different from the absolute one which refers to the lack of the necessary means to survive.

be determined by several factors such as economic, political, social, security, threats to collective or personal identity, etc. (Taylor, 2003). One of the central elements of radical propaganda, both Islamist and far-right, is identity and the perception of the threat to it. The perception that globalization, westernization, the "good copy problem"[2] (Moghaddam & Solliday, 1991) are elements that undermine the traditional values of life and accentuate the feeling that one's own identity is threatened.

Within the literature, an important distinction is highlighted between selfish deprivation ("egoistic deprivation") when a person feels deprived of certain aspects because of his position within a group and fraternal deprivation ("fraternal deprivation") which determines feelings of deprivation felt as a result of the position of the group to which an individual belongs in relation to other groups (Runciman, 1966; Martin, Brickman, & Murray, 1984). R. Gurr (1970) argues that fraternal deprivation is more likely to be felt at the level of a group when its members perceive that they are deprived of achieving the goal they are aiming for and the benefits they deserve while other groups benefit from them. Guimond & Dube'-Simard (1983) suggest that fraternal deprivation compared to selfish deprivation is a better predictor of feelings of discontent within minority communities or groups, generating collective action.

The field of psychology highlights the hypothesis that relative deprivation (which focuses on the individual in relation to the reference groups/community/environment) can trigger violent, collective actions, even for people who are not personally disadvantaged, but who act on behalf of the group (Runciman, 1961, 1966; Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Tiraboschi & Maass, 1998).

F. M. Moghaddam in his staircase model of radicalization argues that each rung of the ladder highlights a behaviour characterized by a series of particular psychological processes that individuals who go through a process of radicalization experience. The first level of the ladder is where most individuals are, with emphasis on the perceptions of fairness and the feelings of relative deprivation, injustice, frustration, shame perceived by these individuals.

[2] The very best that someone can achieve is to be a good copy of someone or something propagated as perfect or ideal.

The people who want to identify solutions and ways to improve the feeling of deprivation, dissatisfaction they feel will rise to the first level. According to Moghaddam, the individuals who continue to climb to the upper floors are those who do not identify solutions to the forms of deprivation they experience. Once they reach the second rung of the ladder, individuals experience feelings of frustration and anger, and there is the possibility of transforming these feelings into the desire for aggression directed at a culprit, a perceived enemy.

The most important transformation takes place at the level of those who access the third step of Moghaddam's model by showing a moral commitment to the vision, purpose and way of achieving it by joining terrorist organizations and perceiving the use of violence as a justified strategy in the fight they are waging (Moghaddam, 2005). At the fourth level, the perception of good and evil and the legitimacy of the actions carried out by the terrorist organization they support is consolidated. The last stage is that of committing the terrorist act.

The terrorist organization Islamic State (IS) has speculated on this aspect in the propaganda narratives of the analysed publications, emphasizing the categorical, radical division between the members of the organization, those who join it, and all those who oppose IS, through a clear delimitation of "us versus them": "they are the head of every tribulation and the reason for every calamity" (Rumiyah no. 3, p. 6). This dichotomy of "good and evil" justifies the feeling of hatred and blame for the targets, in this case Western states, considered to be the greatest enemy of IS, and encourages revenge through violent actions carried out in the name of the organization, subsumed to its goal of creating an ideal society.

According to the analysis of F. M. Moghaddam's staircase model of radicalization, it results that the intensity with which individuals feel, perceive the injustice, the inequity of the society in which they live towards their own person determines the degree of involvement in violent actions. The higher the individual is on the ladder, the more likely they are to resort to violence to achieve the intended goal. By extension, the more individuals feel disconnected from the society in which they live because of the perception they have of it, considering it the main source of the injustices to which they are subjected, the more their

radical violent attitudes are justified and fuelled. IS, through its narratives, maintains this feeling of rejection and injustice active, in order to generate violent behaviours and attitudes among the members of the organization towards Western society in particular.

Injustice, perceived dissatisfaction both at the individual and group level are highlighted as factors of violent, terrorist actions, one of the most common motivations being the desire for revenge (Crenshaw, 1992; Ross, 1999, Doosje et al. 2013). According to a study using interviews, conducted in 14 Muslim states, a threat to religion, in this case Islam, is a predictor of involvement in terrorist actions (Fair, C. Christine, and Bryan Shepherd, 2006; Tamara Kharroub, 2015). Also, oppression, discrimination (perceived or real) against one's own group leads to a much deeper identification and attachment to the group, the community promoted as a victim (Krueger, 2008).

According to research carried out after September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there is a causal relationship between the effect of social exclusion, marginalization, discrimination and oppression experienced, perceived by minority groups, especially Muslims, and the connection with violent actions. Thus, individuals who feel this oppression real or perceived will be more prone to radical intentions, manifesting a higher degree of disinhibition towards violent actions and an orientation towards extremist groups (Shavit, 2014; Victoroff et al., 2012; Moyano & Trujillo, 2014).

Also, the literature highlights the fact that the binder between oppression and disinhibition from violent actions is an ideology that identifies the cause and the enemy of the group, legitimizing the use of violence against the one considered oppressor (Trujillo & Moyano, 2018; Victoroff, 2009)

Content analysis based on identified code and sub-codes

Given the above, the main code resulting from the theory of oppression is "oppression". The main theme of oppression in IS rhetoric is that of the West's oppression of Muslims), and the subcodes are "revenge", "militant mobilization" and "violence" as response mechanisms to the oppression perceived by vulnerable groups. For each subcode,

a series of words and textual expressions have been identified whose occurrence has been measured, and the results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Occurrences for the subcodes related to the theory of oppression (*Source:* author's idea)

OPPRESSION	
MILITARY MOBILIZATION	
OPPRESSION\ MILITARY MOBILIZATION \ fight	169
OPPRESSION\ MILITARY MOBILIZATION \ jihad	230
OPPRESSION\VIOLENCE	
OPPRESSION\VIOLENCE\enemy/enemies	249
OPPRESSION\VIOLENCE\KILL	257
OPPRESSION\REVENGE	
OPPRESSION\REVENGE\shirk	120
OPPRESSION\REVENGE\infidels	161
OPPRESSION\REVENGE\apostates	63
OPPRESSION\REVENGE\pig/dog/apes	11
OPPRESSION\REVENGE\disbelievers	69
OPPRESSION\REVENGE\mushrikin	108
OPPRESSION\REVENGE\kuffar/kufr	320

The sub-code "revenge" is found in the following words: "kuffar," "apostates," "shirk," "mushrikin," "disbelievers," "infidels," "pig/dog/apes." In the case of this subcode, we have identified a series of words that refer to the broad category of infidel enemies, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, which we will analyse grouped, according to the specificities of use. We

mention that the meaning of the terms kuffar (kufr), shirk, mushrikeen, disbeliever, infidel, depends on the meaning given by the author, as each word can have the meaning of the other. For example, kufr and shirk can have the same meaning, respectively disbelief in divinity, but at the same time, they can be used separately, with shirk referring to idol worship even if the person in question recognizes Allah. Thus, these words can also borrow the meaning of the others, but in general, within the analysed publications, these terms refer to the enemies of IS represented by all those who oppose the cause of the terrorist organization.

In this article we have chosen to analyse together the terms "kuffar (kufr)", "disbelievers" and "infidels" because they are used in the same sense, respectively "shirk" and "mushrikin" because there are a number of delimitations within IS publications according to which these words refer to those who worship idols.

The sub-code "revenge" and associated terms are exemplified in the following contexts: "Islam has always been at war with the mushrikeen (polytheists) and will continue this war until the Day of Judgement, so the notion that we will stop fighting this never ending war with the kuffar is purely mythical much like leprechauns and unicorns!"; "And likewise is what we see today in these current rounds of the mujahidin's war with all the nations of shirk and kufr at the head of which are the Crusader nations of the West"; "By the will of Allah there will be no security or peace to any disbeliever until you worship Allah alone. By Allah we will turn your streets in pools of blood"; "Turn the disbelievers' night into day, bring destruction to their homes, and make their blood flow like rivers"; "Muslims of the whole world to defend them and fight against the infidels".

"Kuffar", "disbelievers" and "infidels" refer to those accused of unbelief, considered to be "infidels," regardless of whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. Kuffar is the plural of the term kafir in Arabic that derives from the word kufr (disbelief), used to describe those who deny or hide the authority or teachings of Allah (deny the indisputable rules of Islam such as the obligation of prayer, fasting, etc., insult aspects related to divinity, etc.). In IS propaganda, Muslims are only those who accept and follow the ideological approach of the organization, all other Muslims are considered opponents, enemies of the terrorist group in question.

In the texts analysed, the terms are used to highlight both Westerners and Muslims who do not believe in the doctrine of the IS organization, labelling them as infidels and legitimizing violence against them. The prevailing message is to fight and punish with death all those who persecute, torture Muslims, who believe in democracy and apply secular laws, or who have rallied with Westerners and democratic states. The promotion of violence against those who are perceived as "kuffar", "infidels", "disbelievers" etc. is done in a brutal, repetitive manner ("burned them", "smash their body with a vehicle", "destroy their home", "make their blood flow like rivers").

Also within the "revenge" sub-code, the terms "shirk" and "mushrik" were identified, for example the following contexts were selected: "Jihad for Allah's cause in order to purge the earth from the filth of shirk and its people"; "Our main focus, however, is to wage war against the manifestations of shirk and bidah, including Sufism, sorcery, soothsaying, and grave worship"; "And Allah's command (…) that their wounds must not stop them from increasing their pursuit of the mushrikin and their endeavour to fight them, kill them, and seize their land and wealth, as in His statement."

The term "shirk" (which in Arabic means to associate with someone or something) in Islam refers to polytheism, idolatry, representing those who worship, offer sacrifices or swear to anything or deity other than Allah (such as idols, saints, the dead, etc.) or consider them equal to it. Over time, "shirk' has expanded its meaning by becoming a synonym or equivalent to "kuffar," rejecting any belief or practice that is not consistent with a certain religious current, in this case the one promoted by IS. "Mushrikin" also refers to polytheism, one who believes in or practices polytheism and idolatry, worshipping other deities instead of or alongside Allah. In the analysed texts, both Western states and all others that do not obey the laws of Allah are considered to be "shirk', promoting the idea that everyone deserves to be annihilated by fighting to the point of sacrifice.

The next term associated with the revenge subcode is "apostates", for example the following examples have been selected: "We say to those miserable, stubborn, disbelieving, apostates who wage war against the

mujahidin today"; "In democracy, the evil-doing disbelievers and apostates exercise the right to mock Islam and Muslims".

Typically, apostasy in Islam refers to a Muslim's abandonment of Islam by word, deed, or thought. This includes not only explicitly renouncing the Islamic faith by converting to another religion or abandoning the religion, but also blasphemy or heresy committed by those who consider themselves Muslims (such as denying, insulting Allah, throwing the Qur'an in a filthy place, etc.). In the IS publications analysed, the term "apostates" is attributed to Muslims of Turkish origin "the two Turkish apostates", to Shiite Muslims "killing and injuring more than 200 Rafidi apostates among them Iranians and after exhausting their ammunition they detonated their explosive belts on the apostates one after another, killing and injuring more than 60 of them", to representatives of the Sufi current of Islam.

The analysis carried out highlights the fact that the use of these terms is random, there is no well-defined, delimited structure to be able to highlight a clear category of those called "kuffar", "apostes" or "disbelievers". The emphasis in the context of the use of these terms is that they are the enemies of the IS organization and of true Muslims and must be punished with violence, which is also true in the context of the other terms used and presented above.

The subcode "revenge" is also associated with the following terms "pigs", "dogs", "apes" exemplified by the following examples: "Sisters is showing the world the true nature and the true face of the Jewish, apes and pigs"; "Kafir soldier has come to you while his blood is vile like that of a dog. Burn them with the fire of your wrath, and take revenge".

The rhetoric of the terrorist organization, IS, directs accusations at people portrayed as guilty, invoking the atrocities and injustices committed by them and denigrates, depersonalizes, dehumanizes, denies their human quality, using harsh language against them, calling them animals such as "pigs", "monkeys", "dogs" or demonizing them.

These techniques lead to the removal of individuals' psychological barriers to violent actions by justifying and legitimizing them. The denigration of enemies gives IS and those who engage in the fight alongside the organization an aura of mysticism and heroism, (they portray themselves as defenders of justice, who fight against the cruelty

of the oppressors), of being the saviours of true Muslims who justify violent actions and turn them into a form of revenge.

All these subcodes "kuffar", "infidel", "shirk", "mushrikin", "dog", "pig", "apes" refer to the enemies of the IS organization, which if we were to code them with the term "enemy (enemies)" would represent as a frequency the fourth most used code, after "mujahideen", "kuffar" and "kill".

The sub-code "militant mobilization" is represented by "fight" and "jihad" exemplified by: "It is obligatory upon you to fight those who opposed the truth, denied the Shari'ah of Islam, and prepared to fight you"; "You will fight with the Jews till some of them will hide behind stones. Stones will (betray them) saying, 'O 'Abdullah! There is a Jew hiding behind me; so, kill him".

The term "fight" is used by IS to mobilize Muslims to take a stand against infidels. "Fight" is associated with divinity to emphasize the noble cause that those involved in the fight will fight for. It is also associated with those who represent the enemy IS to establish very clearly who the mujahedeen are going against, and it is also associated with continuing to fight against the enemies either until all of them are destroyed or until the word and law of Allah are the ones that dominate the world.

The constant use of the term "fight" in IS propaganda implies that joining the organization's fight is an opportunity to fight back against those considered guilty of the injustices felt in society, a way to challenge the discrimination or inequities felt, as the guilty ones are among the enemies. Thus, the individual can develop the feeling of contentment that (s)he is not the only one fighting against oppression and injustice, thus being part of a larger conflict.

Also, the repetition of the term "fight" can create, for those who follow IS propaganda, the feeling that they are called to fight alongside the other "Muslim brotherhood", thus presenting potential recruits with a purpose, of meaning in search of which perhaps some of them were. At the same time, the term "fight" can generate a buzz for those looking for adventure, adrenaline, and make them feel enthusiasm that they are taking part in a great goal, represented by the creation of a single Islamic state and a utopian society.

The second term associated with the subcode "militant mobilization" is "jihad", represented by the following examples: "Paradise becomes obligatory on arrows; standing in the battle for an hour is better than sixty years of worship; one conquest is better than fifty times performing hajj, spending a few minutes in the field of jihad is better than standing in the night prayer"; "ihad for the cause of Allah is an obligation".

The term jihad, called the sixth pillar of Islam, represents a struggle, a special effort that refers mainly to the human struggle, to the obligation of every Muslim to follow and realize the divine will (to have a virtuous life, to expand the Muslim community through preaching, education, example etc.), while also having the connotation and obligation to defend Islam from aggression. Over time, this word has been interpreted and used with different meanings so that, in the 20th century, the term "jihad" was used by terrorist movements to legitimize their cause and motivate their sympathizers in the fight against those considered unbelievers.

Although jihad does not explicitly call for the use of violence, the theme of jihad promoted by IS in its publications is mostly intended for the violent meaning of the term, being a perpetual exhortation addressed to the readers of these publications to fight against enemies, being practically a militant mobilization approach.

Most of the time, jihad is presented in a brutal manner, which depicts how it is or should be carried out against enemies "take a knife and cut the throats of unbelievers; burn their houses, poison their food; turn their joy into sadness." Words and phrases such as "crushing", "bloodbath", "carnage", and "destruction" are often used and repeated in the analysed publications to refer to the way of punishing enemies by jihad, describing the theme of the action fantasy of militancy.

In the analysed materials, jihad is presented as a glorious, honourable, noble gesture of those who fight alongside IS, something that should be normal for every Muslim. IS propaganda joins together two antithetical concepts, violence, expressed through jihad, and divinity. This association encourages individuals to join the cause of the organization by legitimizing its violent actions and bringing to the fore the support offered by the divine in this fight against the infidels.

We have chosen to analyse together the terms "jihad" and "fight" because, although the two concepts promote violence directed at the

same type of enemy, in fact a fine line can be distinguished by which the term "fight" can refer to an action of personal mobilization, directed directly at each of those targeted to be recruited by IS ("is obligatory upon you to fight", "you will fight with the Jews") and a broader line, of a group, of a community that fights, revealed by the term "jihad".

Studies in the field of psychology highlight the fact that individuals tend to feel less guilty about their actions when they are carried out on behalf of a group, thus, the actor mitigates the guilt felt by considering that the act was done based on a warrant, an order.

The themes present in the analysed publications suggest a supreme vision of the world promoted by IS: a continuous, dichotomous struggle between the representatives of good, considered to be members of the terrorist organization, and its enemies. Through its propaganda, IS portrays the world as divided into extremities: black and white, good and evil, believers and non-believers, good, faith being represented by IS and its supporters, and evil, non-believers by all others who do not respect and do not rally to their vision, faith and desire.

By repetitively using terms such as "kuffar", "disbelievers", "infidels" as well as those that urge to take a violent stance such as "fight", "kill", "jihad", the terrorist organization justifies the need and emergence of adopting violent actions against those who represent evil.

The next sub-code, "violence" is represented by "kill", for example the following paragraphs have been selected: "Then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush"; "O zealous soldiers of tawhid everywhere, dedicate yourselves to killing those evil scholars and callers of fitnah everywhere who harm the religion of Allah".

The sub-code "kill" refers to the idea of acting violently against what is considered an enemy of IS, being explained in detail in the analysed magazines the way in which any mujahideen can get involved in the fight to promote the interests and values of IS. Thus, the brutal persecution and destruction of those who pose a threat to the organization becomes a virtuous act of self-defence (Sageman, 2008, USAID, 2009). The sub-code "kill" is the third most frequent in the analysed materials, representing the concrete manifestations of the jihad discussed above. These actions are portrayed as noble and important in the fight against evil, embodied by unbelievers, by women and children,

by polytheists, by any category that does not respect the ideology of IS and is perceived as different, distinct from their community. The message promoted by IS is that violent actions must not stop until the final victory is achieved, when an Islamic state designed according to ISIS's vision will be created that will reign over the entire world.

Rumiyah, has a section is dedicated to "battlefield updates", where reports of IS activity in conflict areas where the organization is active are presented, detailing the fight that the members of the organization wage with those considered to be enemies as heroic and victorious.

Although the success of the terrorist propaganda of IS terrorist organization carried out through the two publications analysed and the way in which it influenced the radicalization process of the attackers in recent years cannot be measured or determined precisely, the way in which the terrorist actions were carried out and the language used by the attackers in the videos or manifestos published prior to the attacks denote a similarity. This similarity is highlighted both in the use of specific terms (highlighted in the sub-codes used in the analysis), promoted in Rumiyah and VoK to describe those considered enemies, but also in the way they committed terrorist attacks, using the most brutal forms of violence against those perceived as oppressors.

One of the most recent examples is that of the posts of the January 2025 bomber in New Orleans, USA. On January 1, 2025, Shamsud-Din Jabbar, an American citizen converted to Islam, committed a terrorist attack. He drove a rented van, on whose trailer was an IS flag, into the crowd at an intersection. Subsequently, the attacker opened fire on the crowd and law enforcement. According to FBI statements, Shamsud-Din Jabbar was inspired in committing the terrorist attack by IS propaganda, posting on social networks, on his way to New Orleans, five videos in which he expressed his desire to kill and his support for the terrorist organization. In one of the videos, the attacker states that he initially wanted to kill his family and loved ones, but he considered that the media headlines would not emphasize the "war between the believers and the disbelievers".

Also, on August 23, 2024 in Solingen, Germany, Syrian citizen Issa al Hassan stabbed 11 people with a knife, as a result of IS' constant call to kill those considered unbelievers. In a video posted by IS on social

networks, two days after the attack was committed, the attacker holds a knife in his hand and swears allegiance to the terrorist organization. In the same material, the man claims that the attack was committed as an act of revenge for the murder of Muslims in Syria, Bosnia, Iraq and Palestine carried out with "the support of the Zionists". According to the statements of the officials who carried out the investigation, the suspect said that he intended to kill as many unbelievers as possible (Jennifer Rankin, 2024, The Guardian).

Both the incident in New Orleans and the one in Solingen follow a pattern seen in previous attacks in the West, such as those in 2016, in Nice, France, respectively at the Christmas Market in Berlin in the same year and the 2017 attack on London Bridge. In each case, the individuals were motivated by the Islamic State's call to action, using available means – vehicles, knives or firearms, using in the posts prior to the commission of theoretical actions, phrases similar to those used by IS in promotional materials to characterize the enemies.

Conclusions

The success of the IS terrorist organization has largely depended on its ability to promote a narrative that resonates with the reality of the experiences that potential recruits face within Western societies. Thus, the propaganda carried out through Rumiyah and VoK publications instrumentalizes the feelings of marginalization, oppression, persecution, and injustice that they experience. The key in which IS, through its propaganda, has been able to emphasize these experiences that each individual at some point perceives (even if they are not real) is an important part of the motivational framework and the success that the terrorist organization has had in recruiting new followers. Highlighting, visualizing and constantly and obsessively promoting the injustice to which Muslims are subjected are mechanisms that can initiate or accentuate radicalization processes.

In the propaganda materials analysed, the constituent elements of the theory of oppression are undeniably highlighted, namely: the oppressive enemy, the unjust treatment to which Muslims are subjected in relation to Western practices and the need to use violence as the only way to stop injustice.

The analysed materials actively create and maintain the feeling of rejection and injustice that certain individuals may feel within the societies of origin, fuelling, on the one hand, their desire to belong and, on the other hand, the desire for revenge directed against those considered responsible for oppressive, unjust actions. Thus, IS creates a mechanism that attracts new followers and that can generate violent behaviours and attitudes directed against those portrayed as enemies.

The constant and obsessive propaganda carried out by IS based on the idea that there is an enemy that suppresses the needs, identity, lives of Muslims, subjecting them to differentiated, inhuman treatment, marginalizing and excluding them, leads both to the creation and constant feeding of the desire to retaliate, and to the mobilization to destroy this enemy through the use of the most grotesque forms of violence.

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INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY

WELCOMING UKRAINIAN WAR REFUGEES IN ROMANIA: ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF HUMAN SECURITY

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Abstract:
Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, Romanian authorities had to manage the large influx of Ukrainian war refugees and ensure timely and effective measures for their integration. This paper aims to identify the way in which Romanian authorities addressed the risks that the Ukrainian refugees had, from a human security perspective, in the integration process. On answering the research question whether a high degree of positive social identity determines a high level of human security, the paper focuses on exploring the Ukrainian war refugees' access to the labour market, healthcare and educational systems in Romania between the 24th of February 2022 and the 31st of December 2023. The study examines the interaction of Ukrainian war refugees with the public and private entities in Romania as well as that between the Romanian authorities and the Romanian non-governmental organizations in managing the crisis caused by the inflow of the Ukrainian war refugees, from their arrival at the Romanian borders and during their stay in Romania. To answer the research question, Eurobarometer surveys and statistical data, provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Romanian National Authority for Citizenship and the Romanian National Institute of Statistics, have been used. Empirical research conducted by three Romanian NGOs are also explored. Findings indicate that, despite the rather weak measures for their integration on the labour market, medical care and educational systems and some populist denigrating narratives, the human security of Ukrainian war refugees in Romania was provided.

Keywords *Ukrainian refugees, social identity theory, vulnerable groups, human security.*

Introduction

Since the 1960s, international migration has had an enormous impact on the politics, economy and culture of European states, with immigration increasingly becoming a subject of public concern. Migration

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policies have influenced immigration patterns in Europe. While in the 1950s and 1960s, migration was considered an additional source of labour in most Western European countries within the framework of national temporary work programs for immigrants – "guest workers" (gastarbeiter in Germany, gastarbeider in Belgium and the Netherlands, arbetskraftsinvandring in Finland, Norway and Sweden), between the 1960s and 1970s migrants were seen as factors destabilizing public order (Huysmans, 2000). The restrictive migration policies of this period were motivated by changes in the labour market and by the desire to protect the social and economic rights of citizens (Huysmans, 2000).

Studies conducted in Sweden have shown that the adaptation of migrants from Croatia and Serbia in the 1950s or 1960s, who came for profit, was not similar to the integration of Croatian and Serbian refugees in the 1990s (Tonry, 1997). The latter presented, in the context of wars and interethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, a high crime rate, both as victims and as perpetrators, high unemployment rate, separation from the family environment and psychological problems (Tonry, 1997).

Research in the field of migration provides essential information when drafting public policies on the management of migration, both in terms of economic, demographic and cultural benefits and challenges, both for European and national authorities (central and local).

Previous studies in this field have reported both temporal and geographical limitations in the analysis of the data collected. Furthermore, in some EU Member States it was not possible to collect data on the integration of immigrants by race and ethnicity, as these categories are not included, for political or ethical reasons, in national records.

In recent decades, the concept of identity has experienced an exponential growth in both the humanities and social sciences, especially in studies of political behaviour in relation to migrant integration. According to the theory formulated by Tajfel and Turner (1979), social identity is an individual's representation of himself or herself in terms of his or her membership in a social group, a community.

International scientific literature offers many answers regarding the impact of large refugee flows on society. However, few studies address the impact of refugee integration on Romanian migration and asylum policies in Romania. Until now, the immigration phenomenon in Romania has known fragmented and ineffective sectorial approaches. The update of the main public policy instrument in the field of migration

and asylum – the National Strategy on Immigration – required a period of 3 years of public consultation, elaboration and approval (Romanian Government, 2021).

The Romanian migration and asylum policy has mainly aimed at selecting qualified migrants who can be easily integrated, if not assimilated, into Romanian society, while Romania's acceptance of mandatory migrant quotas imposed by the European Commission has generated anti-European attitudes in the national media.

The extraordinary mobilization of Romanian civil society and authorities to welcome refugees from Ukraine – mostly women, children, the elderly and people with disabilities – has led to a rapid change in migration and asylum policy at the national level and at the European Union level.

The research question addressed by this study is whether a high degree of positive social identity determines a high level of human security. Therefore, the research study will analyse the interrelationship between human security and social identity. At the same time, the study will explore how the public-private partnership in ensuring the human security of Ukrainian refugees has crystallized.

Human security was analysed by observing how Ukrainian war refugees were granted access to the Romanian labour market, medical care and education. Compared to immigrants from the first massive wave of immigrants registered in Romania in 2015, Romanians' perceptions on welcoming war refugees from Ukraine in the community and integrating them into society were much more favourable to the second group, given the cultural similarities and geographical proximity, as well as fear of the threat of war at Romania's borders.

Methodology

The paper focused on exploring the Ukrainian war refugees' access to the labour market and access to healthcare and access to education. Thus, the aim was to identify the way in which central and local authorities responded to the crisis caused by the influx of refugees after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the obstacles encountered by Ukrainian refugees in the integration process, from a human security perspective.

In addition, the interaction of refugees with public and private entities in Romania was explored, as well as that between authorities and

non-governmental organizations in managing the crisis of Ukrainian refugees, from their arrival in Romania and during their integration in Romania.

To answer the research question, Eurobarometer surveys and statistical data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Romanian National Authority for Citizenship and the Romanian National Institute of Statistics were used. Empirical research conducted by NOVAPOLIS Association, the Expert Forum and the Coalition for Migrant and Refugee Rights, such as semi-structured interviews with immigrants, unions, employers and public authorities were also examined. Through this approach, I aimed to collect both quantitative and qualitative data regarding the analysed indicators. However, the findings cannot be generalized to the larger population of Ukrainian war refugees in Romania and to a broader period of time.

Discussion and results

Special Eurobarometer 519 on Romanians' perceptions of immigrant integration in Romania: language skills, contribution to the social security system, acceptance of the values and norms of Romanian society, educational or vocational skills and a sense of belonging to society are among the most important elements of successful integration. Only 20% of Romanian citizens included in the survey responded that they have immigrant friends, colleagues, neighbours, or partners, which shows that the integration rate of migrants in Romania is quite low, or that migrants from previous migration waves have already become Romanian citizens (European Commission, 2022).

Romanians' attitudes towards immigration and integration of migrants in Romania, prior to the flow of refugees from Ukraine, highlighted three types of perceptions: intolerance, indifference and tolerance, the indifference being mainly determined by the lack of information regarding the presence of immigrants in Romania. Among the factors that determined tolerant or intolerant attitudes towards the reception and integration of migrants from Africa and the Middle East in Romania, according to the survey, were age, gender, residential environment, level of education, own migration experiences and cultural contact (Pogan & Birou, 2021).

Although there were also discriminatory attitudes of Romanian citizens towards migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, mainly from locals in less urbanized areas of Romania, the 2015 migrant crisis did not have significant effects in Romania, being perceived more as a European crisis, and immigration policies in Romania generally favoured the acceptance of migrants into the community (Guțoiu, 2021).

There were notable differences in the integration of migrants depending on the country of origin and the cultural and linguistic similarities between the origin and host societies and the time spent in Romania alongside natives. Therefore, citizens of the Republic of Moldova and those from other states who had lived in Romania for more than 5 years had a much higher integration rate (Guțoiu, 2021).

Citizenship is an essential element in ensuring the political participation of migrants in the host society, in its absence, citizenship rights are exercised only through organizations active in the field of immigration. According to the study, less than half of the respondents attended free Romanian language courses offered by public educational institutions and 10% attended those organized by NGOs, with the intention of integrating into Romanian society and obtaining a job and a stable income (Radu, 2019).

According to data reported by the Romanian National Authority for Citizenship in its annual activity reports (National Citizenship Authority, 2020), most applications for Romanian citizenship were registered in 2016 and 2019.



Figure 1: Total number of citizenship requests registered between 2011 and 2022 (Source: National Citizenship Authority, 2020)

The emigration of Ukrainian citizens to the Member States of the European Union did not begin with the Russian aggression in Ukraine launched in February 2024, but much earlier. Although in the period 2022-2023 most refugees from Ukraine were registered in the Member States of the European Union, the data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the years 2018-2020 indicate a considerable number of refugees from Ukraine in some Member States (mainly Italy, France and Spain) (UNHCR, n.d.).

Romania is a state of multilingualism and multiculturalism, with 18 minority languages spoken, compared to 17 in Poland and 16 in Croatia (Katsarova, 2022). In 2011, statistical data on the population by ethnicity and mother tongue available at the National Institute of Statistics shows that Hungarian, Romani and Ukrainian are among the top five most spoken languages in Romania. During the reference period, 50,920 Ukrainian citizens were registered in Romania (National Institute of Statistics, n.d.). In the following periods, no statistical data on ethnicity were identified.

POPULATION ACCORDING TO ETHNICITY AND NATIVE LANGUAGE

ETHNICITY	TOTAL STABLE POPULATION	NATIVE LANGUAGE																						ETHNICITY
		Romanian	Hungarian	Romani	Ukrainian	German	Turkish	Russian	Tatar	Serbian	Slovak	Bulgarian	Croatian	Italian	Greek	Czech	Polish	Chinese	Armenian	Macedonian	Idis	Other native language	N/A	
A	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	A
ROMANIA	**20121641**	**17176544**	**1259914**	**245677**	**46910**	**26557**	**25302**	**16946**	**17677**	**16805**	**12802**	**6518**	**5167**	**2949**	**2561**	**2174**	**2079**	**2039**	**739**	**769**	**643**	**16841**	**1230028**	**ROMANIA**
Ethnicity																								Ethnicity
Romani	1670239	1677189	14128	697	1504	1389	185	402	66	343	176	143	101	87	59	38	42	3	25	62	21	799	501	Romani
Hungarian	1227623	20706	1209264	207	12	248	*	9	-	15	32	20	*	3	*	3	*	*	-	-	*	28	68	Hungarian
Roma	621573	342674	32777	244503	-	10	1127	6	86	59	-	*	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	81	243	Roma
Ukrainian	50920	3307	24	-	47357	4	-	196	-	4	-	*	-	-	*	-	*	-	-	-	-	18	6	Ukrainian
German	36042	6075	5279	9	9	24549	5	*	-	17	3	5	*	-	-	3	24	-	-	*	*	39	19	German
Turkish	27698	3819	3	15	-	-	23710	6	26	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	9	8	Turkish
Russian Lipovans	23487	5340	9	3	7	-	-	18021	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	4	*	-	Russian Lipovans
Tatars	20282	2564	*	-	-	-	215	5	17495	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	Tatars
Serbians	18076	1666	46	*	*	16	*	-	-	16329	-	*	3	*	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	5	4	Serbians
Slovac	13854	944	109	-	*	16	-	-	-	*	12574	*	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	*	*	*	Slovac
Bulgarians	7336	944	39	3	-	6	*	3	-	*	*	6335	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Bulgarians
Croatians	5408	324	9	-	-	10	-	-	-	7	-	-	5056	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Croatians
Greeks	3698	1172	12	-	*	3	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	4	2460	*	-	-	5	4	-	4	*	Greeks
Italians	3203	345	20	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2813	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	12	3	Italians
Jews	3271	2160	379	*	*	48	-	28	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	572	49	9	Jews
Czech	2477	299	20	-	-	22	-	6	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	2122	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	Czech
Polish	2542	495	20	-	6	5	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2007	-	-	-	-	*	-	Polish
Chinese	2017	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2007	-	-	-	6	-	Chinese
Armenians	1361	578	57	-	-	*	*	10	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	705	-	-	5	*	Armenians
Csango	1536	709	390	21	*	8	-	4	3	3	*	-	*	*	-	*	-	*	*	*	-	330	55	Csango
Macedonians	1264	555	3	*	-	*	-	-	-	*	-	*	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	697	-	*	*	Macedonians
Other ethnicity	18524	3153	48	7	4	176	32	113	*	15	7	3	3	14	32	-	*	5	*	-	29	14834	46	Other ethnicity
N/A	1238810	6993	277	7	4	38	22	25	-	6	*	*	-	18	7	-	*	21	*	*	9	615	1229061	N/A

Figure 2: Total population according to ethnicity and native language in 2011
(Source: National Institute of Statistics, n.d.)

In 2014, 14,040 Ukrainians applied for asylum in the European Union, a 13-fold increase compared to 2013, especially Germany (2,705), followed by Poland (2,275), Italy (2,080), France (1,415), and Sweden (1,320). In 2014, Ukrainians were the fifth largest group of third-country nationals holding a residence permit in the European Union (608,193). In 2013, Ukrainians were among the top recipients of residence permits (237,000 residence permits granted), compared to 150,000 granted in 2011, and the second largest nationality to apply for Schengen visas, after Russian citizens (Lapshyna, 2015).

Data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees shows that, on 01.01.2025 in Romania, a state included in the UN Regional Refugee Response Plan, there were 179,820 registered war refugees from Ukraine and a number of 192,560 applications for asylum or national protection (UNHCR, 2025).

Group membership defines individuals and determines how they relate to others, from the same group or from a distinct group, favouring the adherence of individuals to common norms, determining collective actions and sometimes generating conflicts between groups. Social identity theory, as reflected in the studies of Tajfel & Turner (1979), suggests that every individual behaviour can be changed if they modify their self-identity or part of their self-concept due to emotional attachment to the group.

Fukuyama (2018) argues that the nature of modern identity must be changed, despite individual beliefs that identity is biologically determined, and thus cannot be changed. In modern society, citizens acquire multiple identities, depending on their social interactions – race, gender, profession, education, affinities and nation. The creation of more comprehensive identities is possible, despite the tendency of identity politics to create small and individualistic groups. The context of the emergence of the new tribalism is the emergence of individualistic identity politics in most Western states and the redefinition of multiculturalism as "a vision of a society fragmented into many small groups with distinct experiences" (Fukuyama, 2018).

Thus, the author observes that the experiences lived by the individual help him to share values and aspirations with peers from wider circles, with people different from him. And this finding appears in

the context of the need for recognition, or for more recognition, increasingly expressed by national, religious, ethnic, sexual, or gender groups. Identity politics is no longer just a phenomenon of minimal importance, but a concept that describes the reality in international affairs (Fukuyama, 2018).

Belonging is not conditional on cultural identity, nationalism or the capacity of states to secure borders, considers Huysmans (2000), but on the access to benefits and social security. In terms of establishing the legitimacy of the right to social benefits, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees represent an often-contested category, whose legal rights are not automatically considered legitimate rights. In the context of a radical form of welfare chauvinism, immigrants suffer a socio-economic stigmatization. They are represented as foreigners who take advantage of the kindness of a state that hosts them and obtain undeserved, illegitimate benefits from the welfare system of a community to which they do not belong and which they burden (Huysmans, 2000).

Meidert & Rapp (2019) have noted differences in the attitudes of the native population of Germany towards refugees, depending on the factors that determined their decision to emigrate (war, political regime or economic aspects). Female respondents and male respondents who had previous contact with refugees showed positive attitudes towards refugees, these differences being significant only in the case of war refugees and political asylum seekers.

The study highlighted the fact that national pride and unemployment are factors that negatively influence the perception of German citizens towards immigrants for economic reasons, except for war refugees and political asylum seekers. The authors argue that national pride may have a negative impact generated by the perception of a threat related to ethnic diversity and a stronger tendency to consider immigrants for economic reasons as profiteers and to try to protect the state against fraud (Meidert & Rapp, 2019).

It has also been observed that income also has a negative impact on attitudes towards refugees for economic reasons, arguing that the higher the income the more negative the feelings (Meidert & Rapp, 2019).

Andreouli & Howarth (2013) claim that identities are built on a foundation of a type of recognition determined by the social context,

depending on dominant representations and power groups. According to the authors, social recognition refers, on the one hand, to the institutional arrangements of society, such as, for example, public funding of schools for religious minorities, and on the other hand, to social representations that establish which groups have symbolic power in defining norms. The participation of a person or a group in activities in society is permitted or restricted by institutional regulations and practices, being an institutionalized positioning similar to a filtering mechanism of skilled and unskilled immigrants from developing countries (Andreouli & Howarth, 2013).

The victims of the 2022 war in Ukraine have been heavily represented in global mass events, music festivals, and sports competitions, which has contributed to the formation of a collective consciousness for media audiences and participants in these events. The representation of Ukraine at such events is not trivial, nor are the consequences of this representation. Such mass events, with "moments of collective effervescence, in which the act of coming together to carry out actions generates a special energy among participants" have a potential similar to religious rituals in building collective consciousness (De Coninck, 2023). Participation in rituals, even by simple presence, contributes to building social capital by strengthening social cohesion, cooperation, trust and the perception of social support in the community (Putnam, 2000).

On the day the war in Ukraine started, the Romanian Supreme Council of National Defence was urgently convened in Bucharest. At the end of the meeting, President Klaus Iohannis delivered a press statement condemning the Kremlin's armed violence against Ukraine and assuring the population that Romania, a member state of the EU and NATO, would remain a safe state and that it could manage the possible humanitarian and economic consequences of the war in Ukraine (Romanian President, 2022). The first Ukrainian refugees arrived in Romania on the 24th of February 2022. Civil society, NGOs and Romanian authorities showed solidarity and humanity, helping Ukrainian refugees with transportation, clothing and food.

From an identity perspective, Romanian volunteers have shown greater participation in solving the problems caused by the large influx

of Ukrainian refugees in Romania, positioning themselves on the front lines at the Romanian borders alongside representatives of non-governmental organizations and public authorities. The shock of an armed conflict after a long period of peace in the neighbouring state and empathy for a people similar in religious and cultural terms have strengthened cooperation between public and private institutions and civil society.

In the second phase of the crisis, the authorities created several support platforms for refugees, with dopomoha.ro being the platform with the most updated information. However, few Ukrainians had access to the platform or did not know any language other than Ukrainian or Russian, choosing to get information from unofficial sources, such as Facebook groups or from other fellow citizens.

An important role in the integration process was played by over 15 virtual communities where Ukrainian refugees request and receive information, search for or offer properties for rent, promote their professional services or express their dissatisfaction with some of the problems they face, especially regarding the delayed receipt of financial facilities from the Romanian state.

The 50/20 program (Code for Romania, n.d.) was launched, through which Romanians who rented real estate to Ukrainians received 50 lei/person/day for rent, an amount that went to the owner, and 20 lei/person/day for food, which the owner had to give, based on a receipt, to the Ukrainians, but there were cases in which the Ukrainian beneficiaries did not receive this money from the Romanian owner. In addition, several images of Ukrainian citizens in luxury clothes and cars appeared on Romanian social networks, generating discriminatory attitudes towards Ukrainian citizens who fled to Romania from the war.

The third phase began in May 2023, when the Romanian authorities decided to change the conditions for applying the 50/20 program and limit the granting of financial benefits until the end of 2023 (Code for Romania, n.d.). Thus, the money for accommodation and meals was paid directly to Ukrainian citizens if they were registered as beneficiaries of temporary protection and if they proved, in writing, that they had taken steps to integrate into the labour market or the educational environment in Romania. However, there were several months delay in payments to beneficiaries caused by bureaucratic procedures for the

settlement by the Romanian authorities of the necessary funds from the European Commission.

Regarding the access of Ukrainian refugees to the Romanian labour market, the study conducted by the NOVAPOLIS Association within ROUA project in August 2023, over 70% of the respondents, Ukrainian citizens, had university degrees, but the main impediment to accessing the labour market was the language barrier, although many of the Romanian language courses are organized at the level of territorial AJOFM and NGOs such as AIDRom, JRS Romania and the International Organization for Migration. Another impediment was the need to care for children under 6 years of age, who could not be enrolled in kindergarten or school due to linguistic reasons or the lack of information on the methods of recognizing diplomas. However, the study authors argue, the integration of Ukrainian refugees into the labour market was faster and easier compared to other refugee groups (Novapolis, 2023).

Their access to health services has not been any easier either, although, according to the General Secretariat of the Government, Ukrainian refugees have been provided with a free and permanent telephone line for medical services, 0040 373787805, where they have access to medical consultations by phone, in the Ukrainian language, for both general medicine and paediatrics services. The telephone line was opened by the Zi de Bine Association in partnership with Telios Care, a company that provides telemedicine medical services (General Secretariat of the Government, n.d.).

Analysts from the Expert Forum (EFOR) policy institute have made a diagnosis of how the Romanian authorities have ensured access to healthcare services for Ukrainian refugees. The results, however, were not surprising, anticipating the inefficiency of the Romanian healthcare system and the resignation of medical professionals in the uncertain relationship with the National Health House and towards complicated and unclear national procedures. In a social experiment, out of the approximately 700 family doctors contacted by EFOR to take Ukrainian refugee patients on their lists, only one accepted. However, it was not possible to take Ukrainian refugees on the family doctor's lists because the national digitalized system did not allow adding Ukrainian citizens as patients.

Many of the family doctors contacted by EFOR, however, offered their services free of charge to Ukrainian citizens in need of consultations, thus avoiding the problems caused by the procedures, or registering a Romanian patient who came to the doctor with the Ukrainian refugee. The recorded practice shows that the obstacles encountered in primary medicine for Ukrainian refugees generate pressure on the emergency medical system, with most Ukrainian patients preferring to go to emergency units to receive medical care that, as a rule, can be provided by the family doctor (Expert Forum, 2023).

From the perspective of access for war refugees from Ukraine, the Ukrainian refugee crisis has highlighted major problems in the education system, especially in schools and kindergartens in large cities. First, regarding access to a place in state kindergartens. Not infrequently, Romanian parents preferred to leave their homes and rent housing to be assigned to preschool educational institutions that still had free places. Despite the solidarity demonstrated by the Romanian authorities to ensure free access to the education system for refugee children from Ukraine, single mothers in Ukraine have encountered difficulties in finding a place to enrol their child in kindergarten and, at the same time, have a stable job. Second, regarding communication with children, the development of teaching methodologies in the Ukrainian language and the provision of Ukrainian-speaking teachers to support these courses (Expert Forum, 2023).

In a survey conducted between 9 and 20 March 2022 on a national sample, representative of the adult population of Romania, a substantial majority of 74% said they agree that Romania should receive Ukrainian refugees. The most favourable attitude is found among young people, people with higher education, residing in large cities, employers and employees in the private sector (CDMIR, 2023).

The "anti-refugee" language has often been used in simplistic and manipulative but at the same time impressive narratives, appealing, without referring to rational elements, to national pathos. With arguments that are understandable to everyone, extremely simple, avoiding abstract or complex mental images, the discursive logic is one belonging to common sense (CDMIR, 2023).

One of the discursive themes frequently present, especially on social networks, was the presentation of images of Ukrainian refugees in overcrowded parking lots, with luxury cars, to legitimize an *us vs them* anti-refugee discourse, the latter receiving negative connotations. Gradually, in the public space and on social networks in Romania, the anti-refugee discourse began to become more and more present and stronger, dividing society into two antagonistic groups – arrogant and profiteering rich Ukrainian refugees and, on the other hand, honest Romanian citizens with financial problems, who are trying their best to ensure a better life for their children. Although present in the public space since the beginning of the war, these emotional, divisive narratives support the idea that the Romanian authorities must take measures to support their own citizens first and then foreigners, refugees (CDMIR, 2023).

Conclusions

Research conducted until now on the Ukrainian refugee crisis suggests the emergence of a new European identity inspired by Ukrainian nationalism, solidarity and heroic spirit, despite differences over responsibility for receiving and integrating migrants and anti-migration attitudes manifested in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis.

Russia's aggression was not only against Ukraine, but against the whole of Europe. As part of a hybrid war, strong anti-Western propaganda and disinformation campaigns were recorded in Romania, with anti-European narratives in which Romania was presented as a weak state, without decision-making power, its solidarity with the rest of the member states being harshly criticized.

The study analysed the social policies for the integration of Ukrainian refugees into Romanian society between the 24th of February 2022 and the 31st of December 2023. The study attempted to capture the way in which the human security of Ukrainian refugees in Romania is ensured, especially access to the labour market, healthcare, social assistance, education and the housing market.

Despite governmental efforts to establish a free and permanent telephone line for medical services, where refugees can access medical consultations by phone, in the Ukrainian language, for both general medicine and paediatric services, recorded experiences show that this

tool was not really used. The lack of effective measures and procedures for Ukrainian refugees leads to overcrowding in emergency reception units.

The Ukrainian refugee crisis has highlighted major problems in the education system, especially in schools and kindergartens in big cities. The main factors that have negatively influenced refugees' access to education include the lack of places in schools and kindergartens, the lack of teaching methodologies in the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian-speaking teachers to support these courses.

Regarding the image of Ukrainian refugees in the media, the study noted the main populist trends in the denigration of Ukrainian refugees and national authorities and the construction of narratives in which the us versus them dichotomy is predominant, implicitly in the context of hybrid attacks.

No one can estimate the duration of the war in Ukraine, but the support measures for Ukraine from the international community must reach two converging directions: the first, regarding the development of effective mechanisms for the integration of refugees for an indefinite period of time; the second, helping reconstruct Ukraine and consolidate the rule of law, in the happiest case as a member state of the Union, consolidating a culture of national integrity.

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ISLAMIC PROSELYTISM IN THE MIRROR. BETWEEN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND SECURITY RISKS

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Abstract:

Religious proselytism, characterized by the policy of converting new followers in order to practice religious beliefs, is a subject that generates confusion in terms of ensuring the balance between respecting religious freedoms and preventing national security risks. Starting from the distinction between improper religious proselytism that uses undemocratic methods to attract new followers and conventional religious proselytism that falls within the sphere of religious freedom, we believe that a mirror analysis of the two types of proselytism can lead to highlighting key aspects that exceed the manifestation of religious freedom, and in some cases, it can lead to the initiation of the process of Islamic radicalization. The premise of the article is that the relationship between improper Islamic religious proselytism and the process of Islamic radicalization is a whole-to-part relationship: the early signs that indicate the advanced stage of Islamic radicalization in the cases pronounced by Romanian court decisions demonstrate that improper Islamic proselytism accompanies the process of violent radicalization.

As a methodology, the method of combining two theories is applied: the theory of conversion and radicalization as a sub-type of radicalization to highlight the relationship between conventional proselytism and the process of religious conversion on the one hand, and on the other hand, the relationship between improper proselytism and violent Islamic radicalization. The methodological tool used is the analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in which there were identified cases of proselytism and of the decisions of the national courts in Romania, through which the radicalized immigrants were expelled.

Keywords*: Islamic proselytism, Islamic radicalization, religious freedom, religious conversion theory, radicalization as a sub-type of conversion, security risks.*

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Introduction

The rationale for analysing the concept of Islamic proselytism (Malik, 2018) consists of two objectives: 1) the distinction between the two types of Islamic religious proselytism: improper versus conventional, by analysing the interpretation in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, with the aim of identifying which type of proselytism involves national security risks; and 2) highlighting the relationship between improper religious proselytism and the process of radicalization (Olsson, 2014) in the light of the theory of radicalization as a sub-type of religious conversion. We mirrored the relationship between conventional proselytism and the process of religious conversion to highlight the contrast with the improper Islamic proselytizing-violent Islamic radicalization relationship.

In order to highlight the objectives of the research, we have selected two theories: the theory of religious conversion and radicalization as a sub-type of religious conversion, in the idea that the last theory emerged in the knowledge stage from the study of the relationship between religious conversion and violent radicalization as a phenomenon. Although violent Islamic radicalization has been explained through the lens of several theories and currents (sociological and socio-psychological theories, psychological theories related to cognitive, behaviourist, and psychoanalytic currents, cultural theories, and religious theories), we have selected for the coherence of the analysis theories that explain radicalization from a religious perspective: religious conversion, and further reviewing this theory through the theory of radicalization as a sub-type of religious conversion.

Also, although several types of violent radicalization are identified in the specialized literature (political radicalization, religious radicalization, radicalization with ecological objectives, ethnic radicalization), we selected Islamic religious radicalization and proselytism for the same religion. This fact should not lead to the idea that Islamic radicalization is the only manifestation of the spectrum of religious radicalization; there are cases such as Orthodox radicalization in Georgia (Chifu et al., 2012). Equally, the selection of Islamic proselytism as a benchmark of the analysis should not lead to the idea that this pattern is the only manifestation in the sphere of proselytism in Romania. From the

category of improper proselytism, we mention the case of religious sects that encourage the violation of human rights (Torres, 2020) or illegal activities – sexual perversions, pornography, prostitution – to support their goals, for example, the MISA cult created by Gregorian Bivolaru (Šorytė, 2022), and from the spectrum of conventional proselytism in Romania, we mention the proselytism pursued by Pentecostals (Ilie, 2023).

Romania was selected as an area of interest in relation to the following considerations. First, the topic of improper Islamic proselytism in relation to violent radicalization may be of interest from the perspective of early warning and prevention of terrorism. For example, we can mention several cases of Islamic proselytism on Romanian territory (HotNews, 2011), following which prosecutors investigated individuals regarding the presence of violent radicalization and the potential for terrorist attacks (Juridice, 2011). The fact that Romania does not present a magnitude of the phenomenon of violent radicalization to the extent that it requires countermeasures should not lead to the erroneous premise that it is not necessary to emphasize some elements related to early warning and can constitute lessons learned in order to manage trends in ongoing radicalization. Secondly, the threat of violent Islamic radicalization in relation to Romania must be analysed in relation to the impact of regional trends that can have long-term effects, also in the case of European states that do not record terrorist attacks or terrorist nuclei on their national territory (National Defence Strategy of Romania, 2020-2024). For example, the impact of Islamic radicalization as a phenomenon is evaluated not only at a quantitative level in a state but also regarding the sources of terrorist inspiration in relation to the waves of extremism at the regional level in a reference period (the wave of terrorism inspired by the Islamic State, the new wave of extremism triggered by the crisis in the Gaza Strip).

Regarding improper proselytism as an integral part of the Islamic radicalization process, it should be specified that identifying improper proselytism sequences is a main indicator for potential violent radicalization. Improper Islamic proselytism as a characteristic element of the advanced stage of radicalization can manifest itself through the dissemination of jihadist propaganda in the online environment, the

promotion of radical and violent ideological materials (Wiktorowicz, 2005), the attraction of new members through incitement to violence, the de-legitimization of state authority, or the killing of people who do not share the same religious beliefs (Sageman, 2004). For example, we can mention several cases in Romania in which jihadist propaganda activities were carried out (Rise Project, 2015; HotNews, 2015).

Of course, other risks generated by improper proselytism concern jeopardizing the democratic values and the restriction of the religious freedom of other people. For these reasons, we believe that by using a comparative analysis of the elements of improper and conventional proselytism, it should contribute to the clarification of some conceptual gaps and the delimitation between what falls within the scope of religious freedom and the elements that exceed it and tip the balance towards generating risks of security.

We propose the following research question: Referring to the concept of Islamic proselytism, how can the balance of proportionality between respecting religious freedom and ensuring national security regarding risk prevention be characterized? We appreciate that the article offers the following novelties. First, in the security literature, the concept of Islamic proselytism has rarely been addressed, especially in relation to the security risks it can generate. Also, in the specialized literature related to human rights, certain elements can be identified that characterize the types of proselytism, but these are not approached from a security perspective. In essence, as can be seen in the ECtHR jurisprudence, it is relevant for a state to maintain the balance and proportionality between respecting the rights and freedoms of citizens and ensuring national security measures.

Conceptual elements and theoretical framework

In the specialized literature regarding human rights, it has been observed that, in the conceptualization of the notion of proselytism, the focus was more on the delimitation of conventional proselytism from the improper one and on the tension between the respect of personal religious freedom and the violation of other people's rights rather than on defining the concept. On the other hand, from a security perspective, the concept is rarely approached in relation to other phenomena that can

generate risks for national security, for example, violent radicalization. However, from the perspective of national programmatic documents, we observe that "the intensification of global Islamist-jihadist propaganda feeds the risks of radicalization on the national territory, including among Romanian citizens" (National Defence Strategy 2020-2024, p. 27), considering the background "of unpredictable risks in extremist actions depending on regional crises" (National Defence Strategy 2020-2024, p. 28).

A first aspect of the research premise is highlighted: although there is no scale of the phenomenon for Romania, based on the regional impact, there is a need to prevent manifestations on the national territory because there were national cases where authorities enforced several measures to prevent a potential extension of the phenomenon. Dissemination of jihadist propaganda represents another specific element regarding the development of the radicalization process but is also constitutive of an improper type of proselytism through the attempt to attract new followers or indoctrination through radical materials. Therefore, from the perspective of national security implications, the connections between improper Islamic proselytism and concepts such as radicalization, extremism, and terrorism are analysed (Olsson, 2014).

In order to extract some elements that differentiate between the two types of proselytism, it is important to also emphasize references from the specific human rights literature in the context in which these elements can be applied from a security perspective in the comparative analysis for the typology of Islamic proselytism. The concept of proselytism is presented in the field of international human rights law (Stahnke, 1999) or European law (Arnaiz, Torrez Perez, Iglesias, and Toniatti, 2013), from the perspective of respecting the religious freedom of each person, as well as the limitations provided in jurisprudence. Many authors considered the thematic approach of proselytism to be a delicate one (Hirsh, 1998) or an uncertain notion, approached differently from one religion to another (Bickley, 2015, p. 27). However, some authors preferred to define proselytism as the active promotion of religious conversion regarding a certain religious philosophy or belief in accordance with the exercise of religious practices and rituals (Lynch and Schwarz, 2016, p. 636) or planned, programmed actions to attract new converts to a religion (Major, 2023).

In this sense, conventional proselytism is indirectly understood from the perspective of United Nations documents as part of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, implying the freedom to have or adopt a new religion, as well as the freedom to manifest one's religion individually or in common, in public and in private regarding the performance of rites and practices, as well as the freedom of any person to change his religion without being coerced (United Nations, 1966). From the perspective of the European Convention on Human Rights, the same indirect approach of conventional proselytism in the area of Article 9 regarding freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is observed, in the sense that any person has the right to change his religion and to manifest his religion individually or collectively, in public or in private, for the performance of rituals (European Convention on Human Rights, 1950).

Although conventional proselytism is not explicitly mentioned in any human rights document, the concept emerges indirectly as the positive freedom of a person to change his religion or to try to change the religious beliefs of others using peaceful means, non-coercive in the context in which it does not interfere with or threaten the freedom of belief of others (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948). However, this right is not absolute, a fact demonstrated by the limitations of the UN and ECHR documents, which provide for the restriction of this right in the conditions where it violates public order, undermines state legitimacy, or restricts the sphere of religious freedom and conscience of other people by violent means of conversion or propaganda (United Nations Organization, 1966). We believe that, through opposition, the provisions of reference documents at the European and international level inevitably lead to the identification of elements of improper proselytism. In contrast to conventional proselytism, improper proselytism has been defined as promoting a religious message in a manner that is considered insulting or offensive to another person's religious freedom with the goal of obtaining the conversion of a large number of people (Garnett, 2005) or, on the other hand, encouraging the person through inappropriate means or exerting pressure to change their religious beliefs (Council of Europe, 2012), using in some cases violent means (Parliamentary Assembly, 1999), respectively non-democratic means. If conventional religious

proselytism involves the use of peaceful means consistent with democratic principles in a society, at the opposite pole, improper proselytism uses violence or pressure as methods for the religious conversion of new members.

Returning to the security perspective, in order to understand the security risks generated by improper proselytism, it is important to define concepts such as extremism, radicalization, and terrorism. Extremism refers to the promotion of violent political or religious ideologies that oppose a society's core values and democratic principles and human rights, or may describe the justification of undemocratic methods for political or non-state actors to achieve their goals (Neumann, 2013). Correlating religious extremism with the definition of improper proselytism, we observe a whole-to-part relationship: the promotion of a radical ideological message or a radical version of religious beliefs through anti-democratic means in order to attract new followers, being an example of the applicability of the top-down theory in radicalization (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). The reason why we refer to a whole-to-part relationship between religious extremism and improper proselytism is that religious extremism can manifest itself in the form of waves, societal trends at the regional and international level through which certain radical beliefs are promoted (Cragin, 2014), and the energy of massive groups of people is conserved, which may include the transmission of these beliefs through improper proselytism pursued by cyber means.

However, the scope of extremism may extend from the promotion of ideological justification for committing hate crimes, xenophobia, and racial cleansing and may include acts of terrorism (National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalization, and Hate Speech, 2021-2023). Related to the definition of improper proselytism by promoting a religious message in an offensive way or by pressuring or encouraging followers to embrace beliefs by means unsuitable for the religious freedom of other people (Garnett, 2005), we note that the substitution of the moderate version with the radical version of a religious belief leads to the promotion of extremist messages. If in the case of extremism, the goals of promoting extremist beliefs are aimed at supporting or inciting acts of political violence in order to

obtain societal changes that legitimize racial, national, ethnic, or religious supremacy (Sinai, 2012), in the case of improper proselytism, the objective for promoting radical messages is summarized to attract new followers, a fact that does not exclude alignment at least on a cognitive level with the changes targeted by the promoted ideological message.

When we refer to the scope of extremism restricted to terrorist actions, the promotion of a violent ideological message aims to support terrorist actions and glorify terrorist violence by any means (Bötticher, 2017, pp. 73-77) with the aim of achieving changes in society, using a propaganda narrative to incite violence (Logan, Borum, & Gill, 2023). Thus, we arrive at the notion of jihadist propaganda promoted in virtual environments, most of the time including messages of jihadist ideology accompanied by videos of beheadings, arson, or machine gunning of unbelievers or apostates who do not share the radical version of Islam or photos of martyrs of suicide attacks (Husni et al., 2023) carried out to convey messages of fear to people with different religious views: moderate Muslims or people of other religions (Matusitz, 2022).

Further, the promotion of extremist messages in order to support terrorist acts leads us one step further in expanding the applicability of improper proselytism in the sphere of security risks. The promotion of jihadist propaganda aims to attract new followers for the glorification of terrorist actions or the exhortation to act in this sense (Laskowski, Laskowska, 2022), noting that the purpose of improper proselytism to attract extremists can be accompanied in this case by exhortations to commit terrorist actions or their glorification. Integrating the actions of promoting some radical religious messages directed towards various goals in a psycho-social process, we arrive at the definition of radicalization and the link between violent Islamic radicalization and the notion of improper proselytism.

The definition of violent Islamic radicalization that we propose is the following: an individual or group psycho-social process that includes three specific elements: the incorporation and transmission to others of beliefs motivated by hatred and contempt for the foreign occupation in the Middle East that seeks to undermine Islam (Drăgan, 2024), promoting a narrative of killing apostates and infidels for associating with the enemies of Islam through policies, actions, or lifestyle, and the

desire to revive Islamic civilization by establishing a global caliphate or areas of influence where Sharia Law will be imposed on everyone (Matusitz, 2022). In essence, radicalization represents the individual or group process of adherence to violent ideology (Sedgwick, 2010), which causes the cognitive and behavioural change of the set of values and beliefs into ones that justify violence (Crenshaw, 2000).

The relationship between violent radicalization and improper proselytism can be clearly seen in two points of interest with different roles: the initiation stage of the radicalization process and the advanced stage of radicalization (Schmid, 2013). Starting from the fact that radicalization involves a gradual process of incorporating violent ideology and behavioural and cognitive transformation, many authors have explained the unfolding of this psychological and social process whether by the four-stage model (Borum, 2013), by the stairway theory (Moghaddam, 2005), by the three-phases model (Sinai, 2012) or by the two-pyramids model until the transition to terrorism (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011). Essentially, between the initiation of the radicalization process as the T0 point and the advanced stage of radicalization (Kundnani, 2012), which represents the last point until moving into action and carrying out terrorist attacks (Schmid, 2013), the phases of the radicalization process regardless of the proposed number of them in the specialized literature involve stages through which extremist beliefs intensify, being accompanied by behavioural and cognitive changes of the individual and accompanied by actions.

From this point, three probable scenarios regarding the evolution of the radicalization process branch out: the transition to the action plan and the perpetration of terrorist attacks; the stagnation of the process in the cognitive (Bartlett & Miller, 2012) or behavioural plan; or disengagement (Horgan, 2005). In the first scenario of the radicalization process (Kundnani, 2012), committing terrorist attacks involves carrying out specific actions by killing or injuring a large number of people through various methods inspired or coordinated by terrorist organizations (suicide attacks, arson attacks, machine guns, or through the techniques newer ones using white weapons), to which a violent ideology can be associated with the aim of transmitting a message of terror to society and achieving ideologically promoted changes (Schmid,

2013). It is thus highlighted that the relationship between the three proposed notions of extremism, violent radicalization, and terrorism follows on to point out the relationship between improper proselytism and the proposed concepts. Some of the specific actions in the process of radicalization that exceed radical religious practices involve disseminating jihadist propaganda to the general public to share radical beliefs, change collective perceptions, and attract other followers. The relationship between radicalization and improper proselytism is highlighted through the lens of two specific moments regarding the phases of the radicalization process.

A first moment is the triggering of the individual process of radicalization and the individual's engagement in the assimilation of violent ideology if this moment is determined by the intervention of a recruiting agent of a terrorist organization or as a result of group socialization with radicalized persons (Taylor and Horgan, 2001). A second moment is the advanced stage of radicalization, in which the radicalized person becomes the active subject and promotes violent ideological messages, disseminating them online or face-to-face to attract other people to share the same beliefs (Taylor, Horgan, 2001). In terms of the relationship between improper proselytizing and political violence, improper proselytizing actions may aim, in addition to disseminating jihadist propaganda and violent ideological messages, to attract members through undemocratic means to join the struggle and act in accordance with violent goals.

Notions branch out and become even more nuanced in the relationship between improper proselytism and terrorism in the context where this scenario could be valid in the case of terrorist organizations that share an ideology. Also, this scenario is possible considering radicalized people who are at the same time members of terrorist organizations (Hertog, 2019), because the existence of radicalization does not implicitly assume affiliation to a terrorist organization and not all terrorist objectives implicitly assume the result of a violent ideology (Horgan, 2008). A conclusive way to explain the two facets of Islamic proselytism consists in analysing it as an incident in two parallel processes: conventional Islamic proselytism as a manifestation that falls under the scope of religious freedom and conscience (Cheney, 2023) in

the course of the religious conversion process, and on the other hand, improper Islamic proselytism as a component and subsidiary manifestation in the process of Islamic radicalization.

In this regard, we selected two theories to theoretically ground the mirror analysis of Islamic proselytism: the theory of religious conversion (Fergurson and Binks, 2015) and radicalization as a sub-pattern of religious conversion. First, we specify that these theories were selected to exemplify the two facets of proselytism in two similar processes viewed from a religious perspective. Undoubtedly, the concept of radicalization has been explained theoretically from several perspectives: the sociological dimension such as social movement theory (Sageman, 2004), the theory of social and collective identity (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1955), a psychological perspective such as psychopathological theories (Borum, 2004), or the socio-economic dimension such as the theory of relative deprivation (Mansoob Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009).

However, we appreciate that for the research objectives, the mirror analysis of Islamic proselytism through the lens of religious theories is relevant. Radicalization as a process was explained through the lens of theories related to religious conversion, but following the identification of cases of radicalization, and in the case of Muslims born with this religion, the approach was revised through the theory of radicalization as a sub-type of religious conversion to specifically explain that typology of cases in which people who were not born with the Islamic religion converted and later became radicalized. Also, as the two theories are related, they can explain in contrast the manifestation of both sides of proselytism: conventional proselytism as part of the process of religious conversion by promoting moderate beliefs and attracting new followers, and on the other hand, improper proselytism as part of the radicalization process, explained as a parallel process to the religious conversion process in which radical, extremist beliefs are assimilated as a substitute for moderate beliefs.

In the specialized literature, an attempt has been made to analyse the two processes – religious conversion and religious radicalization – from the perspective of similarities. The similarities between the two processes seemed obvious in the context where in the first instance the causes that triggered the processes of religious conversion or radicalization

were explained in the old paradigm as being a given, a change in traditions, customs, and confessions that happens irrationally to the individual, because then to be understood under the new paradigm, namely the processes through which the individual underwent a significant transformation, a rebirth through which he shaped his perceptions, beliefs, and habits as if he had been "born again" (Gallonier, 2022).

Moreover, the similarities did not stop there. People who chose to convert to Islam, even though they did not share this religion by birth or from a cultural point of view, believed that the reasons that triggered the conversion to Islam were closely related to the search for meaning and purpose, the response to an identity crisis that shook their understanding of life or they didn't feel connected or identify themselves with the culture/values they were born in (Chifu et al., 2012). Although these categories of factors have been proven in the literature to be subsequent causes of the initiation of the radicalization process, some of the people converted to Islam are vulnerable to Islamic radicalization (Fergurson, Binks, 2015); however, a dilemma still exists in explaining the two processes as being juxtaposed through the lens of the same theory: why only a part of the people converted to Islam end up radicalizing later (Gallonier, 2022)?

Moreover, the theory according to which conversion to Islam could be considered vulnerability to radicalization or predisposition to terrorism has been refuted in practice by some authors (Fodeman, Snook, Horgan, 2020), which is why a new model tried to explain the process of radicalization understood as a sub-pattern of religious conversion (van den Elzen, 2018). Religious conversion follows a process triggered by frustration, being characterized in a first phase by the attempt to solve an existential problem, a fact that leads to the spiritual or religious search. The next stage is a change in perspective by joining a new religious belief, often in the context of an identity crisis, with the convert then forming affective and social bonds with members of the new religious community (Long and Hadden, 1983) and leaving old connections. In the last stage of the conversion process, the converted person intensifies his religious beliefs and incorporates new rituals and practices at the behavioural level (Lofland and Stark, 1965).

On the other hand, religious radicalization is similar to religious conversion from the perspective of the existence of a gradual and staged psycho-social process at the individual level, but it differs in two aspects. First of all, the individual substitutes the new religious belief or spiritual philosophy with the incorporation of a radically violent ideology, so the main difference between the process of religious conversion and Islamic radicalization lies in the notions of faith and moderate religious philosophy versus extremist, radical ideology as the leitmotif of cognitive beliefs (van den Elzen, 2018). A second difference consists in the fact that in the process of religious conversion, adherence to a new religion operates both cognitively (Taylor, 1976) and behaviourally, and the key element is the practice of rituals, customs, and traditions specific to the new faith (Balch, 1980). Compared to religious conversion, violent radicalization may in some cases operate only at the cognitive level and in other cases may include both cognitive and behavioural manifestations (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011).

Methodology

In the specialized literature, the authors have focused on methods such as the use of the interview method of foreign jihadists who went to Syria to join Daes (Perliger& Milton, 2016) or groups of foreign fighters who carried out terrorist attacks inspired by ISIS (Günther, 2020) to investigate the applicability of the theory of religious conversion as a transition to antecedent to the process of Islamic radicalization. Another methodological tool used in the specialized literature was constituted by case studies (Walter *et al*, 2017), through which the biographies of the jihadists indicted for committing terrorist attacks were investigated, and part of the documentation was constituted by the judicial documents consulted at the courts, considering the high level of accuracy and truthfulness of information regarding the conditions and motivations related to the commission of a terrorist attack.

Regarding the applicability of the conversion theory, the interview method and the development of case studies were used in the literature to capture the set of motivations (Hegghammer, 2013) that were the basis of the conversion. However, the theories related to religious conversion and those that explain the radicalization process have been

criticized in relation to the lack of solid empirical and ethnographic studies to identify the triggering causes. Moreover, it is essential to mention that studies explaining the theories of conversion were also restricted as an area of application, therefore studies in the US, Canada or Australia do not necessarily apply in terms of academic findings to the same conclusions as the studies researching the European region. In this sense, analysing the ways of previous research in the field is important to underline the motivation for choosing the systematic approach used in this article.

First of all, it can be observed that, compared to the previously discussed methods, the comparative analysis of court sentences of national and European courts (Klausen *et al*,2020) offers the analysis a high level of accuracy and truthfulness of information compared to the collection of data from biographies or interviews that present a high degree of subjectivity. Moreover, those retained by the ECHR regarding the elements of religious proselytism constitute the official interpretation of a European judicial body with the competence to analyse the proportionality of the measures ordered by the states in ensuring the balance between the respect of human rights and the prevention of security risks. Also, by analysing the European cases, it is possible to analyse in detail the reasoning of the Court in assessing the balance ensured by the authorities of the competent states between the observance of religious freedom in the case of conventional proselytism and the disposition of measures regarding the risks generated by improper proselytism.

On the other hand, in the case of national-level studies on heterogeneous populations, it has been shown that not so much the citizens of the state are vulnerable to radicalization as the resident immigrants (Galam, 2016). These conclusions can also be considered valid in the case of Romania in the period 2011-2024 from the perspective of the existence of a number of 63 court decisions expelling radicalized Muslim immigrants compared to a number of six decisions condemning radicalized Romanian citizens (Drăgan, 2023). The reasons for the expulsion of radicalized immigrants from Romania by the courts consisted in the dissemination of jihadist propaganda by them in the online environment and the improper proselytizing activities carried

out, as well as the pursuit of objectives contrary to the national interests of Romania in the sense of planning a terrorist attack. Following this rationale, it can be appreciated that improper proselytizing activities consisting in the promotion of jihadist propaganda represent an indicator of the advanced stage of Islamic radicalization, identified by practitioners in cases of radicalization to thwart a terrorist attack (Spaaij, 2012, p. 86-88).

Another methodological technique used in this article is the collection of data following the analysis of ECtHR decisions regarding the interpretation of Article 9 on religious freedom from the European Convention on Human Rights, being a method used in specialized literature (Hucal, 2021) to identify cases of proselytism conventional and those characterized by improper proselytizing. The methodological design proposed in this article consists, on the one hand, in the analysis of court documents represented by the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in order to extract the characteristics of conventional proselytism and those assimilated to improper proselytism. In this sense, following the research carried out in the Indaco database, all the decisions of the ECHR were selected that responded to the searches carried out by the phrase "religious proselytism" without distinguishing in relation to the nature of the proselytism.

Afterwards, the decisions of the ECHR were analysed qualitatively by dividing them according to the nature of proselytism in order to highlight the interpretation of the European body with competence in the matter of human rights and to clarify aspects of interest for research, respectively: what are the limits of the manifestation of freedom of religion and conscience and how can be characterized conventional proselytism respecting the legal limits? The method of analysis consisted in evaluating the reasoning of the Court in relation to the observance of Article 9 of the Convention by the member states in various cases in which proselytizing activities were incidental. As a consequence, the Court analysed the proportionality of the measures ordered by the member states in order to ensure national security equally with respect for the manifestation of freedom of conscience and religion of the citizens in situations where religious proselytism was incident in the analysed cases.

Using inductive reasoning, although the notion of proselytism was not expressly defined, the Court's decisions contained the classification of elements characteristic of conventional proselytism versus those specific to improper proselytism. Also, national court decisions were analysed in the reference period 2014-2024 that provided references regarding the cases of radicalization registered until now. In this sense, the national decisions on the expulsion of Muslim immigrants contained references and specifications regarding the incidence of improper Islamic proselytism, as an action manifested in the radicalization process.

The limitations of the qualitative analysis used in the text consisted in the restricted degree of generalizability of the analysis, in the sense that the sample used for data collection, namely 19 ECHR decisions and 63 national court decisions on the expulsion of Muslim immigrants, can be considered to a small extent representative for a wider population but may be useful for a smaller group. Another limiting aspect emerged from the fact that, of the 19 ECtHR judgments that responded to searches due to the use of keywords such as "proselytism," "conventional proselytism," and "improper proselytism" in the most extensive reference period offered by the Indaco database regarding the judgments issued by the European Court, only five judgments could emphasize through substantial details the court's reasoning, of which basis can be separated the elements of comparison between the two types of religious proselytism. In addition to that, it is important to mention that some proselytism cases were categorized differently by judges in order to secure a prosecution, so therefore some offenses weren't linked officially to terrorism offenses or radicalization.

Islamic proselytism in the mirror: improper proselytism versus conventional proselytism

By analysing the ECtHR jurisprudence, it was observed that, although the Court does not explicitly define what proselytism of any kind entails, nor does it distinguish between proselytism conventional versus improper, as long as an individual does not carry out propaganda that affects the religious freedom of other people (the case of Ebrahimian and others v. France) it cannot be considered improper proselytizing. Also, it is understood conventional proselytism as long as by promoting

religious ideas, it is distinguished critical thinking, lack of indoctrination, respect for other religions, and the category to which the message is addressed is not obliged to believe or prevented from believing (Case of Lautsi and others v. Italy, case of J Appel Irggang and others v. Germany).

Last but not least, religious proselytism that undermines the good morals of society (Case of Movement Raëlien Suisse against Switzerland) and aims to impose a single religion as superior to other religions through practices that oppose the democratic values of society by imposing Sharia (Case Zehra Foundation and Others v. Turkey) can be classified as improper proselytizing. As the mission and specific objectives of a proselytizing activity are evaluated in accordance with the respect and maintenance of the state of stability at the national level in order not to pose security risks, it appears that the actions of promoting extremist materials and jihadist propaganda in the virtual or social environment with the aim of attracting new members to join Jihad or glorifying acts of terrorism not only amount to improper proselytizing but undermine democratic values and domestic order and stability.

Regarding the notion of conventional proselytism, in the case of the process of religious conversion, this action has the role of attracting new followers by explaining the theoretical pillars that characterize the religion while respecting the dignity of other religions. On the other hand, in the case of the manifestation of improper proselytism, some of the ways that can be complementary to the triggering state of radicalization or can accompany the process towards intensification in the advanced stage involve the distribution of jihadist propaganda through videos, texts, or videos with a high content of violence from those several times online in order to attract new followers (Whittaker, 2022). In addition to their violent content, the attraction of new members to violent radicalization incites the de-legitimization of state authority through the hate narrative directed against the West and democratic values (Schmid, 2016).

Another characteristic found in cases of radicalization involves the dissemination of Jihadist propaganda addressed to a vast category of people with the aim of recruiting or joining Jihad as a holy mission to wage war against the West and against apostasy (the elimination of any other religions or beliefs which are not considered valid outside of Islam,

including according to the extremist narrative of moderate versions of Islam, structured in Islamic schools of thought) (Matusitz, 2022). Also, exhortations to carry out Islamic Jihad through suicide or the apology of martyrs who have committed terrorist attacks constitute another common element found in jihadist propaganda used in the online environment to attract new members to terrorist organizations (Ware, 2023) or as a conductor in the advancement states of Islamic radicalization.

Conclusions

The results of this research contribute to covering a void in the knowledge stage regarding the theories that explain the development of the radicalization process or theories related to religious conversion. A process of religious conversion of an individual may or may not be accompanied by conventional religious proselytism, based on the fact that choosing a new religion can be a personal choice that does not implicitly depend on intense socialization or the need for proselytizing activity to operate. However, although it is not an absolute right according to the Constitution, the limits of the freedom of expression of religious beliefs, including the attempt to influence or orient a person to a new faith, are legally acceptable and do not involve risks related to national security in the context where respect for other religions, personal choices are preserved, critical thinking is encouraged, and respect for democratic values is encouraged.

On the other hand, in the case of improper proselytism, although it can manifest itself independently of the existence of a radicalization process, some of the fundamental characteristics consist in the neglect of democratic values, the promotion of the supremacy of one religion at the expense of or by offending others, and the use of methods of pressure or coercion in attracting new followers. Moreover, the risks generated by improper proselytism are not only related to the endangerment of democratic values, but also to characteristic actions in the advancement of the process of Islamic radicalization.

The common elements of the manifestation of improper proselytism in the Islamic radicalization process consist in the dissemination of jihadist propaganda in the online or social environment,

the glorification of martyrdom and jihadist heroes who have committed terrorist attacks, the promotion of Jihad as an obligation to wage war against the West, and an extremist ideology. Thus, if conventional proselytism is characterized by attempts to attract followers involving the promotion of the moderate faith of Islam through peaceful means, in the case of improper proselytism that accompanies the process of radicalization as a complementary action, the promotion of extremist ideologies and the goals of inciting violence or the glorification of terrorist actions. This would be an additional argument why radicalization as a process, including improper proselytism actions, can be explained as a sub-pattern of religious conversion by adopting a violent ideology as a pillar, while conventional proselytizing actions can trigger the conversion process in the case of moderate religious approaches.

The elements provided by this article may constitute warning signals of interest for crises with global impact that are generated by religious conflicts, in which the balance between respecting the religious freedom of other people is strongly shaken and can swing towards radicalization and polarization. In addition to these aspects, this article can contribute to the transposition of some interpretations related to proselytism from a security perspective, equally proposing a paradigm for the applicability of religious theories that explain the radicalization process. The analysis focused on highlighting this balance of proportionality between respecting religious freedom and ensuring national security with regard to the concepts of proselytism and radicalization. Regionally and internationally, these elements can be traced to a wave of extremism generated by the Gaza conflict, involving polarization, radicalization, improper proselytizing, and propaganda with global impact.

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HISTORY AND MEMORY IN INTELLIGENCE

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND THE CIA – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE FOUR SUBSTANTIAL COMPONENTS OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DAYS OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES (1950 – 1973)

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Abstract:
The early 1950s brought significant changes in the internal organization of the CIA, as a result of problematic issues, limitations, and deficiencies that were noted in reports evaluating the Agency's work. The most important changes have been in the CIA's analytical area, which has seen a notable expansion, along with the diversification of intelligence activities. The dismantling of its first structure engaged in intelligence analysis, the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), was followed by a notable consolidation of these activities through new dedicated structures. Among these, the Office of National Estimates (ONE) in particular played a major role.

Keywords: *American, analysis, CIA, Cold War, estimates, intelligence, historical, organization, Sherman Kent.*

Introduction

Although less well-known and certainly not spectacular compared to other CIA activities – among which the first thought naturally goes to covert operations/black ops –, intelligence analysis is one of the CIA's flagship activities. Moreover, the Agency has distinguished itself as a founder and consistent user of this activity, which has individualized it in the intelligence world. The strong predilection for analysis has underpinned the creation of a complex ensemble in the CIA, made up of several such entities for intelligence analysis. In fact, it inscribes an essential characteristic of American intelligence, as emphasized, for example, by Mark M. Lowenthal, a former CIA analyst (Lowenthal, 2000, pp. 39-48).

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This study is part of a larger research activity that is designed in four parts. The first part covered the period from 1947 to 1950, encompassing the beginnings of intelligence analysis in the CIA and the evolution of the entity in which this work was carried out[1] . The second part, the subject of the present study, covers the following period up to the early '70s. It was a period characterized by significant developments in intelligence analysis: the emergence of new sub-domains, the crystallization of more elaborate intelligence products, and the refinement of terms. All this will be addressed in the following pages. The third part of the study will present the evolution of intelligence analysis in the CIA over the last two decades of the Cold War. Finally, the last part aims to present a picture covering as many elements as possible from the post-Cold War period to the current forms of work and organization in the CIA.

The entire study is based mainly on a series of declassified documents from CIA archives (www.cia.gov/readingroom). These represent a primary source, which places the research at ground zero on this topic.

CIA Intelligence Analysis Reconsidered

The problems and limitations facing the CIA's fledgling field of intelligence analysis were exposed, along with other shortcomings within the American intelligence community, at length in the two government studies issued in the period of 1948-1949. Both the *Eberstadt Report* – which took a broader look at the American national security establishment – and the *Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report* – which looked specifically at the CIA's relations with other agencies in the American intelligence community – revealed multiple deficiencies and inadequacies. The changes produced in the CIA by the two reports were rather minor. Except for the Office of Scientific Intelligence, set up in December 1948, shortly before the two reports were finalized, things remained largely the same. However, this organizational inertia did not last long.

[1] Dan Roman, "Intelligence Analysis and the CIA – a historical perspective: the doings, the critics and the unexpected dissolution of ORE/ Office of Reports and Estimates (1947-1950)", in Romanian Intelligence Studies Review (RISR), no. 2 (30)/2023, p. 164-188.

The failure of CIA intelligence analysis to forecast the risk of war in Korea between the communist North and the American-backed South, which began in June 1950, was not without consequences. The first casualty in the American intelligence community was its most important person: Vice Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoeter, the Director of Central Intelligence/ the CIA Director. In October 1950, he was replaced by General Walter Bedell Smith, who began an extensive reorganization process in the CIA.

The new director paid high attention to intelligence analysis, which he has significantly developed so that estimated failures such as the Korean War could be avoided by the CIA. His reorganization of intelligence analysis within the CIA encompassed two major directions: functional and structural. Thus, there was a diversification of the activity, expressed through the creation of new entities charged with distinct analytical tasks.

In this context, the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) was replaced by new analytical structures. In 1952, these were integrated into the new Department of Intelligence, initially consisting of:

- Office of National Estimates (ONE), with a central role in CIA intelligence analysis;
- Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), responsible for the President's Daily Brief and also having an early warning role;
- Office of Research and Reports (ORR), responsible for economic intelligence on the USSR;
- Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which had been set up at the end of 1948;
- Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI), in charge of producing documentary material.

Especially the first four, and among them the first structure, were of particular relevance in the CIA. The following pages give a brief overview of their activities and their particularities.

The Center of Central Intelligence: The Office of National Estimates (ONE)

Achieving a substantial reform of the CIA's analytic area as part of a broader, institution-wide process was one of the first goals taken on and articulated as such by the new Director Walter Bedell Smith.

Appointed the head of CIA on October 7, 1950, Smith was quick to articulate his determination to fundamentally change the CIA's analytic organization.

Later that same month, at his first meeting with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), a consultative forum that brought together intelligence representatives of the State, Army, Navy, and Air Departments, and the Atomic Energy Commission, the new CIA Director announced his intention to set up a new structure within the Agency to carry out predictive intelligence work – the Office of National Estimates (ONE). According to the perspectives that he presented on that occasion, Smith envisioned this entity to become "the heart of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the national intelligence machinery" (CIA Document No.1, p. 37).

The early internal activities to create the new analytic component of the CIA were shrouded in secrecy so that very few within the Agency were notified about it. According to a declassified CIA document dated October 24, 1950, initially marked "EYES ONLY", it was only on that date – a few days after the IAC meeting – that William Harding Jackson, the Agency's Deputy Director, informed Theodore Babbit, the Assistant Director and head of the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), of the decision to establish the new structure.

According to this document, ONE was to be operationalized by December 1, 1950, and discretion over the establishment of the new structure was to be maintained until the end of the project, which was expected to take place by November 15, 1950, at the latest. In this regard, it was expressly stated: "No announcements of any kind regarding this Office will be made until the details of the plan are complete" (CIA Document No. 2).

The demarches were kept in the same register as the ORE, which was to be responsible for the actual preparation of the new structure according to the same document:

> "No directive or memorandum will be issued by this office in connection with this matter at this time as Mr. Babbit advised us that he will issue the necessary instructions orally to the ORE staff at their regular meeting tomorrow, 25 October" (CIA Document No. 2).

According to another early ONE document identified in the CIA archives (*Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence*, dated July 9, 1951, which refers to the "Activities of the Office of National Estimates"), the new CIA analytical entity was established by the General Order 37 of the CIA's Director dated November 13, 1950.

The order also mentions the appointment of William Langer, an outsider, as head of ONE. Langer had previously served as a professor of history at Harvard University, and his move to the CIA appears to have been at the suggestion of W. Donovan, the former head of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Langer was no novice in the intelligence world, however. During the Second World War, he was part of the Research and Analysis Branch, the analysis division of the Office of Coordination of Information, which became the OSS after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.

The same document gives an extensive overview of the objectives and responsibilities of ONE, the organization of this structure, and, last but not least, how it operates. About the first two aspects, from the perspective of the ONE mission, it briefly mentions:

> "The Assistant Director for National Estimates is charged with the production of national intelligence estimates and with assisting the Director of Central Intelligence in the coordination of intelligence production activities relating to national security." (CIA Document No. 3).

A larger space concerns the organization of the CIA's new analytical structure. As presented, ONE was organized on three major levels: the National Estimates Board, the Estimates Staff, and the Support Staff. To these components was added another: the so-called Panel of Consultants, which represented a real innovation in the intelligence world. A brief overview of each of them, as follows, is useful to understand how the ONE works.

The National Estimates Board consisted, as stated in the same CIA document (no. 3), of "the Assistant Director as chairman, six to eight members, and an executive secretary." The details of the quality of its members emphasize the notion of their excellence, and the following is said about them:

> "Members are personally and individually selected by the Director from among outstanding scholars of national repute, experts in the fields of strategy, political science, economics and other social sciences, and individual having the broadest of experience in the field of intelligence at the highest level. Professional military expertise is brought to bear on intelligence matters, for example, by membership on the Board of a Lieutenant General and a Vice Admiral." (CIA document no. 3)

Beyond the CIA's internal documents, the character and functioning of the National Estimates Board are also highlighted in several materials written by its early members.

For example, Sherman Kent, deputy director and then director of ONE after Langer's departure, made notable contributions to the presentation from the inside of what the process of preparing National Estimates Intelligence (NIE) products meant, as well as the organizational structure surrounding them. Aware of the importance of preserving institutional memory, the former Yale University history professor wrote two substantial materials for the CIA History Staff, in which he extensively explained both the place and role of NIE products and the functional mechanisms of ONE. Last but not least, he also presented the first members of the National Estimates Board, on which occasion he also revealed the relationship between them. The main elements of Kent's writings on the functioning of ONE – and implicitly the National Estimates Board – are contained in the essay entitled *The Law and Custom of National Intelligence Estimates* (first published in *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essay*, Center for the Intelligence Study, CIA, 1994). According to the brief introduction that accompanies the mentioned material: 1) it was completed in 1975; 2) it has its origins in a memorandum prepared by Kent ten years earlier, and, most importantly; 3) it presents a "memoir-history of the National Intelligence Estimate and the Board of National Estimates" (Steury 1994, p. 49).

In the essay, Serman Kent gives some background on how the Board of National Estimates operated:

> "They met first thing in the morning to hear the day's news and perhaps discuss it in terms of NIEs in the works or to come; they met again often with the ONE staff, often with representatives of

> the IAC agencies to talk about the schedule, to produce terms of reference, to review drafts, and to arrive at duly coordinated texts […] They invited and listened to ambassadors, officers of the foreign aid program, attachès, members of the numerous military assistance groups (MAG, later MAAG), CIA officers in from the field, and many others. Above all they studied the new intelligence." (Steury 1994, p. 55).

In the same article, Kent also mentions the first configuration of the Board of National Estimates, which had nine members: Langer (head of ONE), Kent (deputy, then head of ONE since 1952), General Clarence Ralph Huebner and Admiral Bernard Bieri (persons with extensive experience in the military intelligence sphere), Maxwell Foster (a Boston lawyer), Raymond J. Sontag and Calvin B. Hoover (professors of modern history and economics respectively, both the choice of Langer), DeForest Van Slyck and Ludwell Lee Montague, senior officers of ORE. About CIA History Staff, Kent wrote another article, *The First Year of The Office of National Estimates. The Directorship of William L. Langer.* It was published in the same collection of essays and contains an account from a personal perspective of the first members of the Board of National Estimates and their relationships (Steury 1994).

The second source containing first-hand information on the organization and functioning of ONE is another CIA officer, Ludwell Lee Montague, already mentioned as a senior officer of ORE and member of the first Board of National Estimates. In a 1971 study of Smith's leadership of the CIA (1950-1953), published under the CIA History Staff, Montague refers extensively to the organization he was in during that period – also describing how the creation of ONE came about. Of the author's statements that fall into this primary source category, those referring to the CIA Director's high level of interest in the new Board of National Estimates, evidenced by the fact that he carefully selected these members himself, are especially noteworthy (CIA Document No. 1, p. 41). In the same study, Montague also makes brief portraits of the members of the first Board of National Estimates (already before Kent), another thing that gives his work a distinct quality beyond its documentary value.

The Estimates Staff was formed, as the same CIA *Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence* from July 9, 1951 states,

from a small "group of intelligence officers selected for their competence to give substantial staff support to the Board of National Estimates."

What does this support consist of? The CIA document details it along three lines:

- preparing drafts from all existing sources for estimates products (these include both CIA materials and "contributions submitted by the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Joint Staff, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission", and the FBI);
- providing data and expertise on intelligence matters („knowledge and judgment on trends and developments in areas the world over");
- maintaining a permanent connection with all entities from the American intelligence system ("liaison with organizations which this office serves or is served by on a continuing basis").

In terms of the internal organization of this structure to carry out its activities, three groups have been operationalized:

- the General Group, made up of a small number of highly experienced intelligence officers with responsibility for preparing draft estimates ("planning and synthesis of IAC contributions");
- the Specialists Group, which brought together specialized intelligence officers to provide expert judgment ("analysis and critical review of IAC contributions");
- "a small group with specific assignments", as it is referred to in the CIA document, tasked with liaising, including working closely, with government institutions not directly involved in intelligence activities/ the production of NIE.

The Support Staff provided administrative support to the two main components of the structure (National Estimates Board and Estimative Staff). The activities and resources available to this component of the ONE included: "an information control unit, a reading room and reference centre, a publication unit, and research, clerical, stenographer services." (CIA Document No. 3)

The Consultants Panel, an extension of the work carried out by the Board of National Estimates, comprised a small number of people (six in its first composition) – which was also variable. These were "eminent individuals of national reputation in their respective fields" and their role

was to "comment the most important draft estimates prepared by the Board" (CIA Document No. 3).

How was this formula for developing National Intelligence Estimates products arrived at, and what notorious individuals with outstanding activities outside the U.S. intelligence community have acquired the select consultantships? An inside look is provided by one of the Board members, Ludwell Lee Montague. In the aforementioned study of Walter Bedell Smith's directorship, Montague notes that he, along with his deputy, William Harding Jackson, "had no confidence in the judgment of intelligence analysts, whether in CIA or in the Departmental agencies" (Montague, 1971, p. 50). They also both shared the view of William Donovan, the former head of the OSS, that there was a need for a board of "men of affairs", through whose perception analysts' findings and judgments would be passed. Among these Princeton consultants (after their meeting location) were people like Burton Fahs, director of humanities for the Rockefeller Foundation, or Hamilton Fish Armstrong, journalist and editor of *Foreign Affairs.*

The production of NIEs was the ONE's most important activity, which required, as mentioned above, both the involvement of internal CIA specialists and external consultants and substantial inter-agency collaboration (the latter, however, was little accomplished, especially during the 50's). This wide participation aimed to make the NIE products as comprehensive as possible and to give as broad a perspective on the topics presented as possible

But what were these NIEs? The first standardized definition in intelligence circles is contained in the *Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions*, originally "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY". Published in June 1978, this professional contribution represents, as noted in its introduction, "the product of an interagency group formed by the National Foreign Intelligence Board."

The NIE type product is designated as follows: "A through assessment of a situation in the foreign environment which is relevant to the formulation of foreign, economic, and national security policy, and which projects probable future courses of action and developments." (*Glossary of Intelligence...,* 1978, p. 11)

A more recent (and more comprehensive) definition was formulated directly by a CIA official. Donald P. Steury, a member of the CIA History Staff, notes the following in the NIE's collection of documents on Soviet strategic forces (edited in 1996 under the aegis of the CIA History Staff and the CIA Centre for Intelligence Study):

> "Estimative intelligence may be defined as regular, detailed analyses of diverse aspects of the world situation, which include the policy objectives and likely actions of the other nations, and their military capabilities and potential." (Steury 1996, p. XI)

The same representative of the CIA History Staff reveals the merits of ONE's work in operationalizing these information products. Although their conception had been "fully developed at the end of World War II, the machinery for NIE production did not really take shape until 1950, as part of a substantial reorganization instigated by the incoming Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith" (Steury 1996, p. XIII).

A brief presentation of the products produced by ONE, including some statistical references (for the period 1950 to 1966) was given by Sherman Kent, the well-known chief of this organization. According to a declassified document identified in the CIA archives (*Memorandum for Executive Director-Comptroller*, dated February 7, 1966), he notes about the work of ONE:

> "The major publication of the Office of National Estimates is, as you know, the National Intelligence Estimate. In our 15-plus years we have produced an average of 57 estimates annually – the number has ranged from below 50 in our early years to a high of 84 in calendar 1961. In calendar 1965 we produced 72 estimates." (CIA Document No. 4).

NIE products were the main activity at ONE, with a significant amount of material being produced for the most important legal beneficiaries in the US establishment. In addition to these products, ONE also produced, according to the aforementioned document, a series of estimated memoranda, (*Memoranda for the USIB*, *Memoranda for the DCI*, *Special Memoranda*, and *Staff Memoranda*). As peculiarities of these materials produced by ONE, the same document mentions the following:

- *Memoranda for the USIB* are published quite infrequently (two or three products per year) and have the same audience as NIE products;
- *Memoranda for the DCI* are personal communications from the Board of National Estimates to the DCI, have restricted dissemination within the CIA, and outside only at the request of the DCI;
- *Special Memoranda* contain the official views of the Board on a given subject and have a consistent dissemination that includes the White House, State and Defence Department officials, and members of the intelligence community;
- *Staff Memoranda* are working papers prepared on various topics of interest, disseminated only within the CIA (after review by the Board of National Estimates they may be converted into official Agency documents, such as Special Memoranda).

ONE products (NIEs in particular) have not always been to the liking of US policymakers. The latter criticized various aspects of the estimates produced by ONE, and the complaints were usually related to their imprecision, unclear wording, or lack of substantive information. The presence in the NIEs of different estimates for the same subject, because the views of all the contributing intelligence agencies could not be harmonized, was another weakness.

The topic that raised the most questions and discussion about the relevance of NIEs was that of Russian military capabilities. Among the fiercest critics of these NIEs were, unfortunately, President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. None of them shied away from expressing "their mistrust for the Central Intelligence Agency's analytical process and their dissatisfaction with its output" (Pulcini 2022).

In 1971, against this backdrop of high dissatisfaction, Nixon promoted the need for broad reform in the intelligence community. To this end, he commissioned James Schlesinger, who worked for the White House Office of Management and Budget, to conduct a detailed study of the work of the intelligence agencies. Of course, the CIA was central to it, and its estimating function was not presented in a favourable light at all. According to the claims, "the national estimating machinery" could benefit from „increasing the competition in the interpretation of evidence" and „the addition of new estimating centres" (Pulcini 2022).

Eventually, the difficult relationship between the White House and the CIA led to the dismissal of CIA Director Richard Helms in 1973. After the short directorships of James Schlesinger and Vernon A. Walters of only a few months, another career officer was appointed to head the CIA: William Colby, former chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of the Agency (until March 1973, when he became deputy director of the CIA). It began a sweeping reorganization of the CIA, and among the first casualties was ONE.

On November 1, 1973, ONE ceased to exist. Its place was taken by a new organizational formula with the creation of the position of National Intelligence Officer (NIO).

Sherman Kent: A Brief Look at „the father of intelligence analysis"

Most of ONE's history is linked to Sherman Kent. He headed the CIA's main analytical structure for over a decade and a half until his retirement in 1968. Above all, he is widely regarded as the founder of intelligence analysis. Perhaps the three attributes most aptly characterizing the former Yale history professor's professional work n the CIA are (and not necessarily in that order): notable, substantial, and innovative.

Before briefly presenting the main coordinates on which this activity was based, a brief biographical sketch of Kent, up to his entry into the CIA, is more than useful.

A person of remarkable genealogy, as you will see, Kent was born in 1903 in Chicago. However, his childhood was spent in the town of Kentfield, California, which had been founded by his grandfather Albert Emmet Kent. He was descended from Roger Sherman, one of the founding fathers of the United States. As for his parents, his father was William Kent, an influential congressman and philanthropist, and his mother, Elizabeth Thacher Kent, was a vehement women's rights activist (Davis 2002).

Young Kent quickly strayed from the family tradition. Instead of going into business or politics himself, he opted for a university career. Drawn to history, he attended Yale University. He specialized in European history and stayed on to teach there. At Yale, he quickly became known as an unusual professor, a „cultured cowboy", with a reputation as a tough man.

His history exam was one of the hardest, but many students accepted the high standards he set to attend his lectures, where they heard, as one observer put it, „the most colourful language ever used in a Yale classroom" (Davis 2002). In 1941, Kent wrote and published his first book, *Writing History*, which was a runaway success, becoming „a bible for a generation of students" (Davis 2002). In the same year, before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour (December 7, 1941), Kent left the university and joined the newly created intelligence entity Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He was assigned to the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A), where he served, with substantial results, until the end of the war. For a brief period, he was acting Deputy Director for Intelligence, heading the OSS division which moved to the State Department.

Returning as a professor at the newly established College of War, Kent devoted himself to the systematic study of intelligence and its importance to U.S. foreign policy. His research in this new field showed in short order. In 1949, he published *Strategic Intelligence for American Word Policy*, „probably the most influential book ever written on U.S. intelligence analysis" (Davis 2002).

Beyond establishing him as one of the pioneers of the new intelligence literature, the book also opened Kent's path to the CIA. In 1951, at the suggestion of Deputy Director William Harding Jackson, he returned to American intelligence as Deputy of ONE, the new CIA's analytical entity. A year later, he became the head of ONE, and he carried out a notable professional activity for the foundation and development of intelligence analysis. He also initiated an internal CIA journal, *Studies in Intelligence*. Published since 1955, the bulletin (today the most important in the field) aimed to create specialized literature necessary for the professionalization of intelligence activity.

Enabling Economic Intelligence: The Office of Research and Reports (ORR)

ORR was established to produce an in-depth analysis of the Soviet economic bloc, according to the functional responsibilities established by CIA Regulations No. 70 of January 19, 1951. These were later included in National Security Council Intelligence Directive 15 (NSCID 15) of June 13, 1951, entitled "Coordination and production of foreign economic intelligence". Based on this document, the CIA substantiated and exercised

its attributions in the field of economic intelligence. The new structure did more than that: from the very beginning, it integrated into its analytical products elements with a military valence, mainly related to the effective war capabilities of the USSR. In a short time, these activities 1) led to the explicit assumption of military intelligence analysis and 2) established an adequate organization for the new field of interest.

This direction was imprinted on the ORR's work from the very beginning. The promoter was its Assistant Director, Max Millikan. A former member of the OSS during World War II, Millikan had established himself as a renowned economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In his opinion, a country's capabilities to wage war were inextricably linked to its economic power, which required an integrated analysis of the main economic areas, as well as the size and costs of the defence sphere. Or, in the formulation of Robert Vickers, author of the official history of the Office of Strategic Research (OSR), an organization with consolidated analytical activities in the sphere of military estimates, which replaced the ORR in the late 1960s:

> "He believed that this micro-analytic approach would help analysts to estimate the total economic resources available to the Soviet Bloc, the allocation of these resources to the military sector, and the strengths and limitations of the economy. This, in turn, would assist in determining enemy capabilities and weaknesses and help policymakers exploit Soviet Bloc economic vulnerabilities" (Vickers 2019, p. XI).

Millikan's conception is revealed in his study "The Role of ORR in Economic Intelligence", published as an internal CIA document in 1951. It represents the fundamental text for the conceptualization of this field in the CIA, as well as for the development of working methods. At the same time, Milikan's study stands out for its contribution to the theory of the concept of economic intelligence from the perspective of the new field's capacity to preserve the security of the United States.

At least five significant purposes can be attached to it, to estimate:

- the magnitude of threats (military and non-military) that may be occurring at any given time;
- their character or locations;

- the intentions of the USSR or other potential enemies;
- support for the decisions of political decision-makers;
- the likely relative power developments in the East and West.

In the spring of 1956, the study was published (minus its last part) in the CIA's in-house journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, under the title "The Nature and Methods of Economic Intelligence", also emphasizing the role assigned to it in specialized professional training. Following his vision for the field of economic intelligence, Millikan created a new structure, the Economic Research Area (ERA), as the main component of ORR. This became the main driving force of the ORR in terms of research and economic analysis. It was there that the CIA's capabilities related to the new field of professional activity were concentrated.

The ERA was in addition to the other two components that had been retained from the former ORE: The Basic Intelligence Division and the Map Division, which were maintained in their old roles. The responsibilities of the Basic Intelligence Division were mainly related to the production of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) materials, characterized in official documents of the American Congress as "compendia of descriptive information on nearly every country in the world, which were of primary interest to war planning agencies" (*Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental operations*, Book IV, 1976, p. 20).

The other structure taken over from ORE, the Map Division, was made up of cartographers and geographers, most of whom had completed internships at OSS. As the only organization within the US government institutions that dealt with the production of external maps, it provided a wide range of services (although not explicitly specified), as mentioned in the previously cited document. ORR is considered in the specialized literature to be Millikan's creation (Vickers, 2019, p. XI). It was he who organized the new structure of the CIA into four functional areas: Materials Division, Industrial Division, Economic Services Division, and Economic Analysis Division.

Also, two support components operated in ORR: Reports Division (with responsibilities for planning and coordinating various projects, editing final products, and disseminating them to beneficiaries) and Requirements and Control Division (with responsibilities for receiving,

sorting specific intelligence materials received and transmitting information needs requested by analysts). Additionally, ORR functional diagram explicitly mentions external consultants, in two categories: Industrial Consultants and University Consultants.

The principles of ORR were expressed in a document (*Draft Statement of Functions*, April 11, 1951) that stated the mission of each division of this analytical structure and the duties of their leaders. Regarding ERA, for example, it states that the heads of the economic divisions "will fulfil the research, advisory, and report production responsibilities of O/RR about foreign economic intelligence affecting national security." (CIA Document No. 5).

The head of the ORR did not limit himself to activities related to these issues, considering, as we have shown before, that the various elements of economic intelligence are a fundamental resource for knowing and establishing the country's war potential. Therefore, he supported the development of various estimates that also addressed military intelligence issues. Robert Vickers, already mentioned, writes the following about the changes imposed by the former MIT economist regarding the approach of such aspects in ORR's analytical materials: "Millikan also wanted ORR to make independent evaluations of military service estimates of Soviet military production in support of its defence spending analysis despite the bureaucratic obstacles to getting consistent and reliable data from the Department of Defence." (Vickers 2019, p. XI)

Internal ORR documents confirm the early interest shown by members of this structure in activities with military implications, as well as the involvement of the new CIA analytical entity in evaluating military aspects. ORR Diary from July 3, 1951, shows, for example, several situations of this kind from the previous day. Among these, three situations:

- a discussion between an ORR representative and one from the USAF, about a project developed by the US Army, "consisting of a broad general study concerning overt methods for the collection and collation of intelligence with emphasis on scientific intelligence";
- a request from an Air Establishment Division official "to get B/TR evaluation on a SO report concerning the PURCHASE OF SPARE PARTS FOR ROMANIAN AIRCRAFT";

- discussions held by Special Assistant of ORR about the operating conditions of captured German military materials (CIA Document No. 6).

At the same time, another document from the CIA archives (Office of Research and Reports, *Progress Report*, dated 11 July 1951), which contains a preliminary assessment of the new analytical entity, carried out six months after the start of its activity, already highlights as its main achievement "the performance of authoritative basic research on the economy of the Soviet Orbit." (CIA Document No. 7)

To get a clear picture of what this meant in terms of its relevance, it is necessary to recall the state of affairs in the American establishment before the ORR was established. This was revealed by an estimate produced by the CIA, together with other government agencies. The CIA document was developed based on NSC Action 282, March 1950, which requested a study of the situation in the field of foreign economic intelligence, as well as projections for strengthening knowledge in the same area of interest (Sims 2021, p. 47).

The study was completed in May 1951 (the original deadline had been set for November 30, 1950), and its conclusions are summarized in the ORR report already mentioned. According to it, the study revealed four essential problems, noting that:

- 24 government agencies were collecting and analysing a considerable amount of data related to foreign economies;
- there was no single agency responsible for evaluating the data in terms of their relevance to national security;
- there was no efficient communication system that would allow for rapid access to the data and its use by a single agency;
- no agency had the responsibility to identify information gaps and initiate measures to fill them.

To remedy the deficiencies, the CIA was primarily concerned with establishing an appropriate collaborative framework. To do this, it established a new entity: the Economic Intelligence Committee. This was headed by the chief of ORR and consisted of representatives from the State Department and the three uniformed services of the US (Army, Navy, and Air Force). There was also the possibility that representatives

of other government agencies could be invited to discuss issues that were within their area of competence.

As for the materials developed by the ORR, among the first activities it carried out was an extensive inventory of the Soviet economy, as well as of the states placed in the USSR's orbit. According to the same document, the Progress Report of 11 July 1951, this involved a big effort:

> "[…] an industry by industry and commodity by commodity inventory of the knowledge already available with particular attention to identification of the important gaps in that knowledge. This was followed by a similar inventory covering the European satellites" (CIA Document No. 7).

The inventory process helped fill information gaps within a new six-month period, under the coordination of the Economic Intelligence Committee, so that good knowledge could be ensured. Also, ORR estimates in the first six months showed a lack of consistent information about China, given that this country had entered the Soviet orbit. As a result, the new analytical structure of the CIA began to reveal the need to consolidate knowledge on this sequence.

In parallel, through its other components, ORR acted for the development of NIS products (12 materials completed and another 10 planned by the end of the year) and their corresponding maps (base maps for 45 NIS Areas). Last but not least, it made a notable contribution (systematically developed over the 50s) to the completion of NIEs, under the responsibility of ONE.

According to available archival documents, the first activity of the ORR in this direction seems to be its involvement in the development of NIE-60, Civil Defence in the USRR, dated April 30, 1952. This document was designed in three parts, and ORR was tasked with substantiating the last one, concerning the relationship between the Soviet strategic stockpiling program and Soviet civil defence. Beyond the work carried out for this purpose, the ORR report was not what was expected. The limited intelligence that the ORR had at the time prevented it from supporting a clear position, which emphasized the need to deepen its knowledge of the Soviet economy.

The chief of the Strategic Division of ORR presents the brief history behind the involvement in this activity in a Memorandum addressed to the Assistant Director of ONE, dated 10 April 1952. Along with presenting the circumstances surrounding this subject, he does not hide his disappointment for the minor role his organization had in developing NIE-60:

> "It became apparent to us, in the final stages of analysis, that we are going to contribute little that was new in the way of knowledge about the USSR, that about all we were going to be able to accomplish was a compilation under a single cover of selected samples of our information on Soviet economic activities […]" (CIA Document no. 8).

ORR's analytical capabilities have developed significantly in the following years so that its materials have begun to acquire an increasingly significant share in NIE-type products. Throughout the 1960s, which marked the height of the Cold War, the ORR underwent several reorganizations (in 1962 and 1965) to better adapt to international developments and to carry out its mission as efficiently as possible.

Office of Current Intelligence (OCI): Intelligence round-the-clock

The establishment of this CIA analytical structure took place to ensure the maintenance of current intelligence activities within the CIA (carried out until the emergence of the new entity by ORE).

A brief presentation of the circumstances in which the creation of the OCI took place and its evolution can be summarized in a few lines:

- the Dulles-Jackson-Korea Report of January 1949 criticized in harsh terms the CIA's duplication of similar activities that were being carried out by other US government entities, especially the State Department;
- William Harding Jackson, co-author of the report, was appointed, in October 1950, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), and worked to abolish the CIA's function of producing current political intelligence materials;

- as a result of the changes Jackson made, most of the ORE staff moved to the two new analytical structures, ONE and ORR, and the State Department was to choose from those not assigned;
- the intentions of the new DDCI did not materialize in full, however: although it was planned to waive the ORE personnel who did not transfer to ONE or ORR, or were not taken over by the State Department, this did not happen;
- initially, the ORE personnel was maintained in the COMINT Division of ORR, which formed in December 1950 the nucleus of a new structure under the name Office of Special Services (along with the Advisory Council and the Director's staff for COMINT matters).

A month later, this was renamed the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI). As its name suggests, the new analytical structure's mission was to produce current intelligence. What does this expression mean? According to National Security Council Intelligence Directive #3, issued on January 13, 1948 (which also includes the authorization of the activities carried out by the OCI), the notion of current intelligence is defined as follows:

> "Current intelligence is that intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest, which is usually disseminated without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation" (CIA Document No. 9, p. 1).

The same document establishes the role and primary beneficiaries of current intelligence materials produced by the CIA: "to meet the needs of the President and National Security Council; in addition, it serves the common needs of the interested departments and agencies of the Government for current intelligence which they themselves do not produce". The document also emphasizes the primary responsibility of the CIA in producing this type of intelligence, with the contribution of other government entities: "The departments and agencies will contribute to the Central Intelligence Agency current intelligence publications as practicable."

A broader view of the OCI's activities can be found in the extensive material on this analytical entity within the CIA, developed by the Office of Training in 1970 (*The Office of Current Intelligence. A Study of its*

Functions and Organization). Beyond the OCI's activities – including several examples of intelligence products of this entity – the study brings some helpful clarifications about current intelligence. Moreover, this professional field is presented through its importance in supporting intelligence analysis in the CIA.

The first defining element of the OCI materials is the diverse range of information sources used. These include, as the previously cited document shows, "all incoming information that might indicate a threat or a potential threat to US security – whether political, economic, or military." Added to this is a high requirement for action, which implies that potential threats against the US, from the range mentioned above, 1) "be recognized immediately and without fail", and this data 2) be "processed immediately without waiting on the regular production schedule."

These two major themes were complemented by another peculiarity found at the beginning of the OCI's activity: the use of information from all available sources. Through this permanent way of working, OCI's activities also had an innovative character, as declassified CIA documents show:

> "Since the founding of OCI, the all-sources principle has been a fundamental consideration in the office's operations. All information, regardless of security classification, is distributed to the analytic desk of primary concern. OCI was the first element of CIA and of the Intelligence Community to adopt this procedure in regard to all-source material" (CIA Document No. 10, p. 2).

OCI's organization, as mentioned in the same study written by the CIA, was made into three categories of activity that included a production area, functional support, and a managerial part. The arrangement of production was made on geographical criteria, by establishing four divisions, as follows: European Division, Middle East – Africa Division, Far East Division, and Western Hemisphere Division with "all countries in the southern United States and dependent possessions of European countries in the Western Hemisphere".

There were also four staffs:

- the Production Staff, "responsible for reviewing, editing, publishing, and disseminating the regular publications and special current intelligence production of OCI";
- the Research Staff, "charged with stimulating research throughout OCI";
- the Special Projects Staff, with multiple tasks, among which can be mentioned the provision of substantive intelligence support as well as preparation and delivery of the President's Daily Brief;
- the Management Staff, responsible for the management of OCI staff, budget, logistics, etc.

Alongside these, another important component has been added to the OCI: the CIA Operation Centre, described by the CIA document mentioned above as "a 24-hour intelligence alert facility". Its main function is to monitor international situations and events that require immediate attention and alert key decision-makers in the US establishment. Also, it "watches developments requiring priority intelligence information collection, and operates a Situation Room for the display of US and friendly military operations and critical intelligence situations." (CIA Document No. 10, p. 8).

A brief look at the most important intelligence products under the responsibility of the OCI, lists the following types of publications:

- **Current Intelligence Bulletin,** a departmental product, prepared daily by OCI (the first is dated February 28, 1951), with a small number of beneficiaries – the initial dissemination was limited, according to the aforementioned CIA study, "to the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three service chiefs". In terms of its content, the information was accompanied by an analytical qualification – in fact, it was a commentary on what was presented, as the same document emphasizes: "Each item carried out a paraphrase of a field intelligence information report and an analyst's comment on its significance";
- **Central Intelligence Bulletin**, a national intelligence product, developed in 1958, instead of the one presented above, due to its limitations, which included only OCI data (the change was made by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities,

which conveyed to the Director of CIA/ Central Intelligence the need to create an integrated product, which would also contain data from other government agencies);

- **Weekly Summary,** conceived as a necessary complement to the product presented at the previous point, given the limits imposed by its short deadlines, compared to which it has two advantages: "it is able to provide the continuity that the daily lacks, and to present more speculative judgments that is possible in the coordinated CIB" (moreover, the main elements are treated distinctly, because the material was complemented with one, up to three separate products – Special Reports);

- **President's Daily Brief,** a product coordinated only with the other analytical entities in the CIA; it is intended for the personal information of the President and aims "to anticipate policy questions and such special requirements as those which arise from the forthcoming visit of a foreign dignitary or from Presidential visits abroad" (its writing began for President Kennedy, in 1961, and the format and style of presentation have undergone differences, adapted to the requirements of the beneficiary)

- **National Intelligence Survey**, a type of product with a fairly large scope (several dozen pages), which contains documentary information (known as basic intelligence) about various states and regions of the world: "relatively unchanging natural features, fundamental characteristics and basic resources […] and covers its geographic, oceanographic, transportation, sociological, political, economic, scientific, and military aspects" (the program was initiated during the Second World War by the Joint Army – Navy Intelligence Studies/JANIS, to provide decision-makers with relevant information, especially for supporting military operations in Europe; later, the program, carried out under the coordination of the CIA, was expanded by presenting intelligence on economic, political and sociological issues).

Like other structures in the CIA, the OCI has undergone a series of changes and reorganizations so that its products best meet the intelligence consumers *need to know*. In particular, the *early warning* function underwent considerable development during the 60s, which gave a particular touch to this structure.

Science as a Weapon: The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI)

As with other types of intelligence within it (such as economic intelligence or political intelligence, to mention the most relevant), a search for the starting point of scientific intelligence activities in the American system does not open up a path that is too complicated or a knowledge journey too far. On the contrary. The situation is relatively the same as for the other types of intelligence already highlighted. Their common body is the National Security Act of July 1947, which established the American intelligence community as a tool against the then-Soviet threat.

However, scientific intelligence concerns in the American system preceded – slightly, it is true – the formation of this community. Its origins should probably be traced back to the Manhattan Project, the name of the research and development program for the first atomic weapon, carried out by the United States, together with the United Kingdom and Canada. Soon after the end of the Second World War, the first explicit mention of this intelligence activity appeared: the Scientific Branch, which was a small structure within the Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE), the analytical component of the new American intelligence institution, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).

The strengthening of the role of scientific intelligence in the American system took place in the CIA, where it developed considerably shortly after the establishment of the Agency. The importance of this area was particularly highlighted in the so-called Eberstadt Report, commissioned by the US government in 1948 to evaluate the structure and operations of the Department of Defence and the newly created intelligence community. Finalized in January 1949, the Eberstadt Report highlighted a multitude of problems and deficiencies in the evaluated areas. These included scientific intelligence – alongside medical intelligence, a related field that was also beginning to be increasingly emphasized. Among others, it mentioned:

> "The Committee is particularly concerned over the nation's inadequacies in the fields of scientific and medical intelligence. There are difficulties peculiar to this situation which the Committee

> has not overlooked. Yet the vital importance of reliable and up-to-date scientific and medical information is such as to call for far greater efforts than appear to have been devoted to this essential need in the past." (Eberstadt Report, 1949)

The conclusions of the report point to the need for a wide-ranging reform of the US intelligence system to streamline activities. The same applies to the field of scientific intelligence, to which, as we have seen, important responsibilities have been assigned. The developments that have taken place up to its finalization have, however, to a large extent rendered the findings on the new scientific intelligence activity irrelevant. Or, at least, they have largely neutralized them.

This was because the CIA Director, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, reconsidered the field of scientific intelligence and raised it to a new level commensurate with its assigned importance. On December 31, 1948, he set up a structure within the Agency devoted strictly to this activity: the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI).

One of the notable features of the new organization was, according to a brief monographic and anniversary material about it, produced under the aegis of the CIA, that it "brought together the collectors and the processors of intelligence information" (*Office of Scientific Intelligence: The Original Wizards of Langley*, CIA, 2008, p. 7).

The same paper outlines the rationale for the creation of this specialized structure within the CIA by evoking the challenges and dangers of the world in the early years of the Cold War:

> "Concern that other countries might develop nuclear weapons and an awareness that advanced knowledge was the only practical shield against a surprise attack fed a sense of urgency among US policymakers. Concern extended to biological and chemical warfare and to the likely development of guided missiles, which would increase the danger of surprise attack on the continental United States." (*Office of Scientific Intelligence…,* 2008).

As with other CIA entities during the Cold War, the evolution and organization of OSI (at least in its first two decades of operation) can be thoroughly traced through its official history. A comprehensive study

of the organization was prepared by Karl H. Weber in 1972 under the auspices of the CIA History Staff. Running nearly 700 pages, it provides a detailed picture of the OSI, covering the organization's evolution and activities, as well as its place in the American establishment, from 1949 to 1968.

Initially, OSI was assigned no less than 100 functions, a high number that fully reflects the importance given to this entity. Its first organizational chart shows the situation in January 1949, according to which the new OSI consisted of four staffs and seven divisions. Karl H. Weber, already mentioned, considers that this organization reflects the emphasis on intelligence gathering. He points out that OSI's high interest in obtaining specialized information (scientific and technical intelligence) was "evident in the establishment of a Collection Staff along with Administrative, Production and Scientific Services Staffs." On the last component, the same author also points out that it was "an interesting, though probably premature, attempt to provide information gathering and collating services centrally and did not survive for long." (CIA Document No. 11, p. 10)

To these four staffs were added the following divisions: Biology, Physics and Electronics, Chemistry, Medical, Ordnance, Naval and "A" Branch (for COMINT exploitation).

As expected, OSI's major interest was in nuclear intelligence. In the same official history of the early years of the CIA, this mission is summarized as follows:

> "In the nuclear energy field, particularly, OSI feeling ran high. Under the strong leadership of the redoubtable Herbert I. Miller, using such means as the control of Restricted Data documents and others, OSI maintained its hold on nuclear intelligence. Also, in the field of in-depth intelligence research, ORE was performing analyses that at times appeared to OSI to reach too far back into the R&D phases of weapons systems development, clearly an OSI responsibility." (CIA Document No. 11, p. 12).

One of the most important resources used by OSI in its early years was that of *electronic intercept / electronic intelligence* (ELINT). Starting in the mid-1950s, it evolved into complex activities. These developments

led to the creation of a dedicated entity, through the creation of the Office of ELINT, staffed with specialists in the new field of activity. However, major responsibility has been transferred to the National Security Agency (NSA), which specializes in these activities.

According to a definition in an official paper published under its aegis in 2009, ELINT is succinctly described as "information derived primarily from electronic signals not containing speech or text (considered COMINT)" (Bernard 2009). Within the range of activities carried out by OSI, it was also concerned with medical intelligence (active since the early days of the American intelligence community, as documents from that period show, including the Eberstadt Report, already mentioned in this study). An illustration of this type of intelligence is given in the CIA's professional journal, *Studies in Intelligence* (also cited). Revealing the importance of assessing the health of the political leaders of a foreign country, especially an enemy one, the authors of a study published under the title *Remote Medical Diagnosis* analyse four relevant cases in terms of their implications for intelligence work: Georges Pompidou, President of France, Houari Boumediene, President of Algeria, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel.

The conclusion of the study and the challenge for the intelligence work as follows: "The importance of evaluating medical incapacity in chiefs of state is obvious, yet the almost total reliance on human collection makes such analyses as difficult as they are intriguing" (*Studies in Intelligence*, CIA, Spring 1979).

Conclusions

Intelligence analysis in the CIA during the 1950s and 1960s (a period with the broadest spectrum of the USSR's threat to the national security of the United States, marked by a substantial arms race between the two superpowers that risked transforming the Cold War between them into a nuclear one at any time), went through one of its most difficult stages. Emerging as a professional activity and emblematic in the young American intelligence community created in 1947, intelligence analysis developed as a representative element of the CIA.

The path to this result, partially achieved during this period, was not without obstacles, difficulties, or challenges. To provide more specific answers to the multiple demands and changes, intelligence analysis in the CIA has evolved and diversified systematically. It has been continuously professionalized. The legacy of the ORE from the early 1950s has been enriched with new resources, directions, and objectives.

The establishment of ONE, as an analytical structure of the CIA tasked with the production of integrated intelligence, known as National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), was one of the most important measures that led to the foundation and legitimization of this new activity. Under the leadership of Sherman Kent, ONE became the centre of intelligence analysis in the CIA. More than the other analytical structures of the CIA at that time, it wrote an important page in the history of the Agency. Certainly, fundamental in terms of intelligence analysis.

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PRACTITIONERS' BROAD VIEW

THE FIELD OF EVENTS IN RISK ANALYSIS

Cristian Romeo BIZADEA

Abstract:
This paper aims to bring to the attention of theorists and practitioners in the field of risk analysis an alternative way of considering events and the field of events. By developing a matrix with two times four characteristics of events and assigning a value in the range 1-12, we will present the defining elements of events, we will indicate the difficulty of estimating the probability level depending on the type of events, and we will suggest ways of approaching the analytical task.

Keywords: *field of events, analytical task, estimating, probability.*

Argument

This article was originally a small part of the course *Risk analysis: a practical perspective*, written and taught a decade ago together with a valuable collaborator at "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy1, and never published until now. The starting premise is still valid and is based on the observation that risk analysis – in intelligence and not only – almost always focuses directly and exclusively on the evaluation of the event, in the probability versus impact matrix and very rarely, if at all, it focuses on the prioritized understanding of the type of event that is the subject of the analysis. Therefore, at that time, I felt the need, more as a practitioner than as a theorist, to develop a separate chapter that would draw attention to the topic. Subsequently, practice has proven and it has also proven to me (doing analysis and coordinating impressive teams of analysts) that the

[1] C. Bizadea, V. Andrei, *Risk analysis: a practical perspective*, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 54-57.

reason is on the one hand, the urgency that demands analysts' immediate immersion in the task. On the other hand, it is the absence in intelligence analysis of relevant event field theory[2] and practice.

Ten years later, with the agreement of the co-author of the original material, I believe it is the time and place we brought this topic back to the attention of trainers and practitioners by updating the source material. At the same time, please receive it as an invitation for justified criticism and welcome additions to this still incipient endeavor. This is all the more so because between then and now a radical change has occurred in the approach to intelligence analysis in general, and risk analysis in particular: *the automation of analysis processes*

Terminological boundaries

As a whole, probability can only be associated with a risk in close connection with an event and in relation to a temporal horizon. Simply put, in the absence of the event, the risk does not exist and the probability cannot be approximated without the time frame.

The formal definition of an event is: "a segment of time at a given location that is conceived by an observer to have a beginning and an end" (Zacks et.al., 2007, p. 273). The taxonomic framing of events is difficult, because they can be short (seconds) or long (geological periods), goal-directed or undirected, generated by an animate (human, animal, technology) or non-animate (natural phenomena) "agent". Also, segmentation of events in time can sometimes be almost impossible, in the sense of separating the end of one event from the beginning of another. In spite of these shortcomings, or precisely because of them, there is a symbiotic association of events – or more precisely of the field of events – with probability estimation.

In a proper definition, the field of events is the totality of events that may occur in relation to the individualized subject of the risk analysis and includes certain events, possible events – within the scope of the risk analysis –, and impossible events.

[2] This term has nothing to do with event field theory in physics.

The events field includes:

● **compatible events**, i.e. two or more events that can occur simultaneously (*event 1/* fall in production, *event 2/* reduction in investment, *event 3/* fall in the number of employees and increase in unemployment, *event 4/* fall in population income ⇒ fall in GDP = economic recession);

● **incompatible events**, i.e. events that cannot take place simultaneously, as a rule the realization of one event makes the other event impossible (*event 1 – certain/* Ukraine's nuclear arsenal is to be renounced under the agreement of 05.12.1994, *event 2 – impossible/* Ukraine's use of nuclear weapons);

● **repeatable events**, i.e. events that will have the same characteristics, given similar conditions. This characteristic allows assessments based on sampling and extrapolation (*event 1/* coming of spring in 2014 ⇒ decrease in natural gas consumption, *event 2/* coming of spring in 2015 ⇒ decrease in natural gas consumption);

● **unrepeatable events**, i.e. rare events that occur under conditions difficult to assess, observe, and control (Chavas, 2004, p. 14). This category includes the highly unlikely events (theoretically possible, but without a recognizable historical referential and with a difficult to intuit pattern of manifestation), known in analytical culture as Nassim Taleb's "black swans". As a rule, they are in fact a chain of compatible events, in which the initial event (in the following example, the magnitude of the earthquake and the size of the seismic wave) or the subsequent sequence (*event 1/* 9.0 Richter earthquake near the island of Honshu, *event 2/* automatic shutdown of Fukushima reactors, *event 3/* emergency diesel generators start up, *event 4/* 15 meter seismic wave overcomes the 10-m-flood barriers of the plant, *event 5/* generators are flooded and power supply is shut down, *event 6/* unpowered reactors overheat and explode);

● **dependent events**, i.e. those events whose occurrence depends on the occurrence of another event (*event 1/* Islamic radicalization, *event 2/* integration into an Islamic terrorist organization, *event 3/* suicide terrorist attack);

● **independent events**, whose realization does not depend on the realization of another event (*e.g. event 1/* rotation of the Moon around the Earth);

● **events with obvious links**, where relationships, causes, effects, and temporal chaining are easy to identify (e.g. *event 1*/ heavy rains, *event 2*/ increased river flow, *event 3*/ floods);

● **events with non-obvious links**, i.e. those events which are difficult to estimate, seemingly independent of each other in space, time or space and time, but which influence each other in a relationship of partial or total dependence (*event 1*/ widespread introduction of electricity, *event 2*/ increase in soap opera audiences, *event 3*/ decrease in birth rates and demographic pressure[3]).

For example, the fall in the birth rate (and thus in the risk of demographic pressure) in South America has also been made possible by the introduction of electricity and the widespread adoption of television, which promotes – for purely commercial reasons – new cultural models for family patterns. In National Geographic's article *Brazil's Renaissance* Cynthia Gorney (September 2011) points to the impact of "*novelas*" (soap operas) on the Brazilian reproductive model, as soap operas promote a small-lineage family model strictly for commercial reasons – it is much easier and more cost-effective to write soap operas about small families.

The field of events and the reality of analysis and risk analysts

The above example has been included in extenso because the problem of non-obvious links between events is the most difficult to overcome in the process of probability estimation. The ability to identify interdependencies and isolate significant events is often limited not by the quality of the analyst or the risk analyzer (implicitly the automated data processing systems), but by the sheer volume of connections that can be made, as the search for new and new evidence only exponentially increases the time segment and spatial frame of the risk analysis (to return to the definition at the beginning of the article). For this reason, the most valuable risk analysis systems, automated or not, and the best analysts are those who possess the ability to limit interdependencies and connections strictly to the relevant ones, so that the assessment is not blocked by the dimension of relationships (in the sociological paradigm of everything has to do with everything).

[3] The very fact that it is difficult to intuit the connection between the three events validates the assumption that they fall into the family of events with non-obvious links.

This is all the more relevant today, when big data and AI analytic support systems can draw an enormous landscape of relationships, limited only by data size and processing capacity. Thus, an important caveat to keep in mind and issued publicly long before big data and AI became a reality is that "with the passage of time, the controversy between evaluation based on past observation and subjective degrees of belief has taken on a deeper significance. The mathematically driven machinery of modern risk management carries within it the seeds of a dehumanizing and self-destructive technology" (Bernstein, 2014, p. 19).

What Bernstein envisioned a decade ago has now become the reality of risk analytics and analysts. The use of AI in intelligence analysis has to take into account inherent limitations, at the current stage of development, in terms of contextual understanding (AI limitations: What artificial intelligence can't do), biases inherent in the data on which systems are trained (The limitation of AI: understanding the boundaries of machine learning), and, in some cases, the transparency of reasoning (a problem overcome, at least in part, by the new XAI – explainable AI). All this does not relativize but, on the contrary, reaffirms the importance of understanding the type of events in order to increase the accuracy of probability analysis.

The table below has been developed as a summarization exercise to indicate – on a progressive scale from 1 to 12 – the difficulty of estimating the probability of events with multiple characteristics:

Table 1: The difficulty of estimating probability (Sourse: Bizadea & Andrei, 2015)

EVENTS	**repeatable**	**compatible**	**dependent**	**with obvious links**	**unrepeatable**	**incompatible**	**independent**	**with non-obvious links**
repeatable		1	2	3		5	6	7
compatible	1		3	4	5		7	8
dependent	2	3		5	6	7		9
with obvious links	3	4	5		7	8		
unrepeatable		5	6	7		9	10	11
incompatible	5		7	8	9		11	12
independent	6	7			10	11		
with non-obvious links	7	8	9		11	12		

Relatively easy. The first category includes events in the 1-4 range, i.e. repeatable and compatible, compatible and dependent, with obvious and repeatable links, with obvious and compatible links, repeatable and dependent. Historical evidence, sampling and extrapolation exercises, linkage mapping processes, and identification of the time organization of events are sufficient to address them. A small number of analysts – and a simple system for automating and highlighting the links between relevant indicators –, within a reasonable time frame and using a limited inventory of methods, can usually estimate the demonstrable probability of such events. Obviously, the accuracy depends on the skill of the information, analysts, and automated data analysis systems.

Average. The second category includes events in the 5-8 range: with obvious and dependent, compatible and unrepeatable, independent and repeatable, independent and compatible, with non-obvious and repeatable, with non-obvious and compatible, incompatible and dependent, incompatible with obvious links, etc. Probability estimation is both demonstrable and questionable and, in such situations, involves simulation exercises, creativity stimulation processes, alternative approaches. The number of analysts required increases with the level of complexity, the assessment usually requiring more time to validate or substantiate working hypotheses, and the alternative, often combined or competing use of methods. Support of big data systems is essential for accuracy and speed of analysis.

Difficult. In the last category the events in the 9-12 range are placed, namely incomparable and unrepeatable, unrepeatable and independent, unrepeatable with non-obvious links, incompatible and independent, incompatible with non-obvious links, dependent and with non-obvious links. The decision on the probability value is predominantly questionable and highly speculative, theoretically extremely close to uncertainty (risk that cannot be measured). In terms of resources, more is not better in this case, as simply increasing the volume of analysts or the methodological and technological inventory does not necessarily guarantee better performance. Without estimating and speculating on the contribution of GenAI in such situations, certainly

the use of such systems more quickly generates alternative analytical insights that need to be considered if only to invalidate various scenarios. On this level, there is often no demonstrable answer but only an inspiration – a feeling of the risk analyst, which should not be trivialized but operationalized.

In the case of an event field in the 9-12 range, the recommendation is to assess the appropriateness of delaying either the probability assessment or the risk response decision, given that "not acting may be the wisest action. The more uncertain the outcome, the more valuable the delay in acting" (Bernstein, 2014, p. 27).

Conclusion

The situations presented are complicated by multiplying with the time element, characterized by two coordinates: short-duration vs long-duration events, respectively recent vs distant events. A simple axiom could be that the longer the time span of the event and the interval since its occurrence, the more the complexity of the risk probability estimate multiplies, in the sense that "time transforms risk, and the nature of risk is shaped by the time horizon: the future is the playing field" (Bernstein, 2014, p. 27).

The good news is that the analysis of events is sometimes simplified by the presence of the correlation phenomenon, which makes it possible to establish the interdependence between two events. Either way, the risk analysis is at best incomplete and at worst flawed without a priori consideration of the type of event itself and the field of events.

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GAMES, EXERCISES AND SIMULATIONS

NATIONAL SECURITY AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES – A LEGAL CRISIS EXERCISE

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Purpose. The purpose of the simulated exercise is to provide a starting point for the various aspects of legal issues regarding a crisis. The exercise focuses on problem and information analysis, legal conformance, decision-makers' actions, and tertiary parties that can be involved in the process.

Format, role and assignment. The exercise requires at least seven participants who will each act according to their role assigned by the coordinator, respectively they will present their statements and facts regarding the situation at hand. The focus of the exercise is for the participants to identify and understand the legislation that applies to the case, and the identification of conflicts of interest between national security and human rights while developing the participant's capacities for researching and writing documents, debating.

The roles that can be attributed to the participants are the following:

1. Prosecutor, with the role of examining the cases of breaches of security and whether or not the issue can represent a criminal offence;
2. Judge, with the role of analysing the requests for surveillance measures or other interventions;
3. Ministry of Justice representative, whose role is to offer legal counselling regarding measures that can be taken towards protecting national security;

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4. Representative of the national intelligence agency, who has the role of presenting information that can be used and can request specific measures to be proposed against threats;
5. Legal representative (lawyer) of persons accused or affected by measures that could be taken by state authorities;
6. A journalist who will share insight on the transparency of measures discussed and how the public will be informed;
7. An NGO (with human rights focus) representative who will propose alternative measures or contest said measures if they limit liberties.

The roles must be handled in such a way that each participant will share their opinion on the issue at hand. All the participants will receive the same information; however, useful data will be scarce during the first round of discussions.

The exercise will require at least one hour of discussions between participants, the format having 20 minutes of debates between the seven people who will play their assigned roles. As participants, there is a responsibility to maintain a national perspective when developing the answers, since there are specific functions.

Each role has access to any piece of open-source information; however, the exercise requires that each participant will identify and present the legal documents that allow them to propose and enforce a certain measure.

The exercise has the following objectives:

- understanding legislation regarding national security and fundamental rights;
- identifying potential conflicts of interest between national security and upholding citizen rights;
- developing abilities in understanding legal documents and developing debate skills.

Background. In the exercise, a fictional state called Mofatan is confronted by a complex situation because of geopolitical implications in Eastern Europe. In this context, public authorities have discovered several risks to national security, such as:

- data and information leaks from the Ministry of National Defence;

- massive social unrest that can lead to political violence and damage to public and private property;
- cyber activities that can undermine critical infrastructure;
- groups that promote hate speech, with the aim of destabilizing public order.

The shadow groups at work are unknown to the participants of the exercise, but early information outlines that they are funded by both internal and external non-state actors. Furthermore, they conduct their operations mostly on the internet through social media apps, use artificial intelligence to generate messages and utilize different bot software to promote their agenda.

The main hacktivist group is known as the *Mofatan Free Citizens*, a group that is speculated as being comprised of both national and foreign citizens, whose main objective is to create chaos. They act mostly on the orders of the highest bidders, as digital mercenaries, but some members have a political agenda of their own. The hackers could not be identified as data found showcased they have multiple bases of operations, with some in remote areas of Mofatan, in the mountainous region, while others in unfriendly states to Mofatan.

One such situation **arose** after the Ministry of National Defence urgently convened the Supreme Council for the Defence of the Country following the appearance of several classified documents on an international whistle-blowing platform. Among them were military strategies and sensitive contracts. It is believed that an employee with top-level **clearance** became a tipster and leaked the data online.

An internal investigation was conducted, and the press speculate about a possible espionage or a sabotage act. As public opinion demands transparency, the country's strategic allies express concern over the leaks. Officials must now manage an emerging diplomatic crisis.

After days of investigation, the cybersecurity team discovers that the documents were accessed from an unsecured personal device. Suspicion falls on an advisor with connections to foreign business circles. Under pressure from the media and the international community, the Prime Minister promises drastic measures to protect sensitive information. The ministry considers new regulations on how people can be allowed access to state secrets, even adopting legislation that is also

secret in this regard. The case takes a dramatic turn when an investigative journalist claims that the leaks were facilitated by a high-ranking government official to influence strategic negotiations.

The NGOs consider this scandalous as it is not considered transparent and the information is part of the public domain. They have voiced that they will take all legal actions, including going to court.

Amid the scandal, opposition political parties demand a swift response from the Ministry of National Defence, even the resignation of the minister, however, a former employee is detained in order to reduce the chances of a governmental crisis.

Other issues in the state of Mofatan can be found after the government announces austerity measures. Thousands gather in the capital's centre, demanding the government's resignation.

Law enforcement is deployed in key areas, and authorities try to maintain order. However, within the crowd, a group of masked individuals begins attacking police officers with blunt objects, pebbles and smoke pellets. Live broadcasts show scenes of chaos: shattered shop windows, cars set on fire, and police responding with tear gas. The government accuses opposition forces of orchestrating a destabilization attempt.

Protest leaders try to distance the peaceful demonstration from acts of vandalism, but the situation spirals out of control. Some opposition politicians claim the government has planted provocateurs to discredit the movement. A presidential statement calls for the restoration of public order, but the crowd refuses to disperse. In some cities, protests spread, paralyzing transportation and economic activity.

Behind closed doors, government advisors weigh their options: continue repression or negotiate with protest representatives. A wrong decision could escalate the conflict further. As protests continue, a split emerges among demonstrators – some advocate for political solutions, while others demand radical action. Extremist groups exploit the chaos to push their agenda.

As tensions diminish, technicians at a national energy control centre notice unusual activity in the system. Automated commands begin displaying inexplicable errors, showcasing extreme levels of power usage, followed by long periods of grid shutdowns.

Cybersecurity specialists detect an attack on the power distribution stations. If not stopped quickly, it could lead to a nationwide shutdown. The government activates its crisis cell and contacts international partners for assistance. Authorities suspect the involvement of a foreign state or a hacker group backed by external interests.

The cyber-attack coincides with a major political debate on the future of the energy industry. Some experts suggest it may be an attempt at intimidation. Online, an anonymous group claims responsibility, demanding the withdrawal of certain government regulations in the energy sector. As the debate and crisis develops, experts outline that a power outage would mean chaos: hospitals without electricity, disrupted communications, and massive economic losses. As the attack is being repelled and neutralized, some governmental voices consider this was just a test for a larger attack.

As power is restored to Mofatan, a series of violent incidents across the country raises alarm as extremist groups begin to proliferate, using social media and underground networks to spread hateful ideologies. These groups, often organized in secret online forums, call for violent action against marginalized communities.

In response, the government issues warnings about these groups and the threat they pose. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies conduct surveillance operations and public demonstrations.

However, one of the most prominent groups organizes a rally in a major city, attracting hundreds of followers. Despite calls from local authorities to cancel the event, the rally proceeds, and tensions rise as counter-protesters gather. Violence erupts during the demonstration, leading to injuries and several arrests, including the leader. National media outlets broadcast the chaos live, heightening fears of an impending civil conflict.

Meanwhile, extremist groups begin coordinating online attacks against key public figures, sending threatening messages and encouraging further violence. Public figures from various political backgrounds are forced to increase their security.

Behind the scenes, intelligence agencies work tirelessly to dismantle the networks behind the hate groups, but the challenge is monumental. The ease of radicalization online makes it harder to trace

and prevent future attacks and, as such, the national intelligence agency of Mofatan requests that it conduct mass surveillance of the population, especially journalists, lawyers, crypto coin investors and their families.

As rampant hate speech messages are promoted online, voices in the government call for actions regarding limiting free speech and regulating social media platforms, while also introducing stricter means of online connectivity options. This sparks new tensions as citizens consider that such measures could limit constitutional rights or abolish already existing rights altogether.

The national intelligence agency conducts wiretaps and surveillance measures on law enforcement and military branches and plans to expand their actions on all the citizens who have a computer science background. These operations spark new divides in the general populace who demand that their leaders adopt only legal actions.

The government considers that the right to public assembly should be limited so as not to allow hate speech to be easily promoted near large masses and to reduce the chances of violence. Citizens outline that such a measure is unconstitutional and demand public consultations.

As tensions rise, the parties within the exercise must meet and discuss the best plan to defend against future unrest, while also trying to maintain the entire operation in pre-existing legal framework.

Examples of the messages used by the groups:

The messages are usually displayed in the form of short video content on social media platforms, accompanied by the national anthem in the background. Some messages are read by a person who wears a mask and wolf ears, with the voice being hidden with a voice changer software.

As a disclaimer, the following messages were generated with ChatGPT version GPT-4.0 (created by Open AI), prompting the software to create them with the intent of using such information in a simulation for academia purposes. The materials were generated with the sole intent of exposing messages generally found on social platforms or social messaging applications. The prompts used on ChatGPT were used as to showcase how easy it is to create and distribute information aimed at weakening or discrediting democratic institutions. The data outlines

how artificial intelligence software learns from pre-existing messages found in the public domain and how it can help unlawfully intended groups promote hate speech and anti-governmental movements with just a few prompts using an open-source text generator.

a. IT'S TIME TO TAKE BACK OUR COUNTRY!

For too long, the corrupt elites and career politicians have ignored **the real people** *– working families, small business owners, farmers, and the backbone of our nation. While they enrich themselves,* **you struggle to make ends meet***. They've sold us out to special interests, corporations, and foreign powers.*

But no more. **A new era is coming!**

PUT THE PEOPLE FIRST *– No more handouts for the rich and powerful while everyday citizens suffer. It's time for* **fair wages, lower taxes, and a booming economy that benefits YOU!**

MAKE FOOD AFFORDABLE AGAIN *– The cost of groceries is skyrocketing while big corporations and politicians do nothing. We will* **break up monopolies, end price gouging, and support local farmers** *to put real food back on your table –at prices you can afford!*

END THE CORRUPTION *– We will clean house in Mofatan, expose the lies, and* **hold the corrupt accountable!** *No more sweetheart deals, no more backroom politics – just real leadership for the people.*

FIRE INEFFICIENT JUDGES *– Our justice system is broken. Activist judges* **let criminals walk free** *while hardworking citizens suffer. It's time to* **replace weak, incompetent judges with real enforcers of the law** *who will put criminals behind bars and protect our communities!*

SECURE OUR NATION *– Protect our borders, our industries, and our way of life from those who seek to weaken us.*

FIGHT FOR OUR FREEDOMS *– They want to control what you say, think, and do.* **We will stand up for your rights, your values, and your voice!**

The establishment **fears this movement** *because it's powered by* **YOU, the people** *– not billionaires, not lobbyists, not the political class. They can't stop us when we stand together! us* **This is our moment. This is our fight. Let's take back our country!** *us*

b. Rise Up Against Injustice – Defend Our Future!

The government has failed us once again – cutting essential budgets while ignoring the needs of the people. We refuse to stand by as vital services are stripped away, leaving our communities to suffer.

They want us to stay silent. We say **NO.** *It's time to* **defy their orders** *and take to the streets. Social justice cannot wait. We will not allow them to put profits over people, corruption over accountability, and power over our rights.*

Mobilize. Resist. Demand justice. *Together, we will make them listen!*

c. Emergency Declaration: The People Must Act!

For too long, the so-called "democratic" system has failed us – governments prioritize their own interests over the people they claim to serve. Corruption runs deep, and justice is nothing more than a tool for the powerful. The time for waiting is over.

We call on all citizens to **mobilize and take back control** *of the institutions that have been weaponized against us. The old system has crumbled under its own weight* – **it's time to forge a new way forward.**

Justice under this government is a farce. **We reject their laws, their courts, and their rule.** *The people must decide their own fate, free from the influence of corrupt elites.*

Disrupt. Resist. Rebuild. *The future is in our hands.*

d. *The logo of the main hacker group, the Mofatan Free Citizens*[1]

[1] Image generated with Deep AI software, for more check its creators, Deep AI Inc.

e. Image of an Mofatan Free Citizen who appears in the videos[2]:

The requirements. Participants are required to complete a series of tasks, but not limited to:

a. Drafting a legal response for authorizations of interceptions and other national security measures, while also understanding how these actions can be legally challenged by affected parties. Furthermore, participants must draft a legal report for analysing the conflict between national security legislation and fundamental rights.

b. Debating, based on their roles, on how the consequences of their actions could affect Mofatan, while also trying to maintain national integrity.

c. Proposing legislative amendments to improve existing framework.

The scenario can be extended to other on the moment crisis scenarios to help the group of participants or to hinder them, based on their momentum. The exercise aims to force participants into adopting measures in a stressful environment, while realizing that their actions have consequences that can impact society on a short or long-time frame.

Evaluation. The exercise allows an evaluation of the quality of arguments promoted by each participant, based on the assigned role, while also allowing observers and the scenario conductor to understand if the participants comprehend the legal framework that governs the

[2] Image generated with Deep AI software, for more check its creators, Deep AI Inc.

assigned roles. Participants must engage in collaboration and negotiate a resolution. Participants must showcase that they understand the legislation that regulates criminal actions, data protection, fundamental rights and national security measures.

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[3] The exercise has been influenced by general events that have happened in democratic states. The exercise requires participants to understand, at a minimum, law enforcement legislation, cybersecurity provisions and human rights. In this regard, the author proposes the mentioned reading materials.

REVIEWS AND NOTES

Rareș Alexandru Văscan, *Discursuri și practici de securitate în contextul migrației din Uniunea Europeană în perioada 2019-2021 (Security Discourses and Practices in the Context of Migration in the European Union during the Period 2019–2021),* Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 2024, 167p.,

presented by Claudia Anamaria IOV*

The book *Security Discourses and Practices in the Context of Migration in the European Union during the Period 2019–2021*, authored by Rareș-Alexandru Văscan, PhD in International Relations and European Studies, is based on his doctoral research and focuses on the European Union's migration crisis and its medium-term effects on European

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security. It examines how European leadership communicated on the topic of migration during the 2019-2021 period, following the implementation of various EU-mandated measures in countries deemed key to managing the challenges posed by the 2014-2015 wave of immigration.

The integration of this subject into the broader theoretical framework of securitisation theory, as developed by the Copenhagen School, is also a well-chosen and appropriate approach. Although, more than three decades have passed since the first publications of the Copenhagen School and a range of new realist perspectives have emerged following the onset of the war in Ukraine, the author's research direction remains valid.

The title of the book, *Security Discourses and Practices in the Context of Migration in the European Union during the Period 2019-2021*, frames the research temporally and highlights the key concepts at its core – namely the relationship between security and migration, within the context provided by the EU refugee crisis. It also concisely suggests that the study focuses on the discursive practices of European leaders. From an objective standpoint, the work is original, as it analyses a post-crisis period (with the refugee crisis of 2014 being widely regarded as having ended in late 2018). At the same time, the topic remains highly relevant given that the nexus of migration and security has become increasingly pronounced in both European public discourse and EU policies, especially with the resurgence of nationalist currents in some Member States.

The development of the paper rests on a robust theoretical framework regarding the concept of security, essential both from the perspective of migration theories and the indisputable link between migration and security, and from the standpoint of designing the research. Equally comprehensive are the theoretical chapters on migration, which are crucial in my view for conceptually distinguishing between migrants, immigrants, and refugees, thereby avoiding erroneous generalisations and assumptions. In terms of how the EU, as the body responsible for unified European policy, managed the migration crisis, the author bases his analysis on primary data from a range of sources, including EU institutional platforms, Eurostat statistics, and asylum seeker data across different time periods.

Methodologically, Rareș-Alexandru Văscan adopts a constructivist paradigm, providing a well-founded theoretical synthesis supported by references across various branches of the social sciences. The dynamic nature of the constructivist approach is evident in references to the works of Berger & Luckmann, Foucault, and, notably, to authors who have incorporated Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) into socio-political studies. The originality of the research is also demonstrated through its discourse analysis on migration, which is based on a relatively limited corpus of 19 public speeches by EU leaders and leaders of EU Member States. Nevertheless, through the application of two original analytical grids, the research was able – somewhat unexpectedly, given the small number of speeches – to clearly highlight the themes, rhetoric, and ideologies employed by European leaders when addressing migration in the EU.

In conclusion, Rareș-Alexandru Văscan's *Security Discourses and Practices in the Context of Migration in the European Union during the Period 2019–2021* provides a highly coherent presentation of the relationship between security and migration in the EU over the past decade. It represents a well-structured synthesis combining the analysis of relevant social documents on migration, a constructivist theoretical paradigm, and discourse analysis of key EU actors. Furthermore, the findings regarding the securitisation and desecuritisation of migration through the discursive practices of European leaders offer a valuable starting point for future research on the interplay between migration and security.

Ștefan-Iaroslav DANIEL, *Managementul cooperării și securității internaționale, Studiu de caz: ONU – Haiti (Ayti)*, Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2024, 247 p.

presented by Dan ROMAN*

The United Nations (UN) carries out a broad spectrum of activities which includes, according to its statute, the protection of human rights, the support of International Law, the provision of humanitarian aid, one of the most consistent, and, perhaps the most difficult, peacekeeping. In recent decades, these missions in various hotspots around the world have become the UN's flagship, in line with the role it has assumed on the international stage. Although commonly known to the general public, the missions carried out by the "blue helmets" – the representative color for peace and stability, designating the participating military – have not received substantial attention from the academic world, at least not in Romania, and certainly not for any mission dealing with an exotic country. Such a situation can no longer be sustained following the recent publication, in 2024, at Presa Universitară Clujeană, of two complementary books, both authored by Ștefan-Iaroslav Daniel: *Haiti și ONU: Repere istorice, culturale și de civilizație,* 224 p. and *Managementul cooperării și securității internaționale, Studiu de caz: ONU – Haiti,* 247 p.

These are the result of Ștefan-Iaroslav Daniel's preoccupations, initially conducted by the author as part of an academic research for a doctoral thesis in the field of International Relations defended at "Babeș-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca, in September 2022, under the supervision of Professor Adrian IVAN. From the very beginning, it is worth noting the considerable size of this thesis – 988 pages – which reveals the laborious research process. But there is much more than that.

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What distinguishes the author's research from other works of the genre is his direct involvement in the situations he exposes. This consisted of his presence in Haiti, between 2015 and 2017, as a UN monitor within MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti), contributing to the formation of a national police force in the Caribbean state.

The first book, *Haiti și ONU: Repere istorice, culturale și de civilizație* (*Haiti and the UN: Historical, Cultural and Civilizational Landmarks*), deals extensively with elements of general interest on Haiti, useful for achieving an appropriate understanding of the realities of this country. These are covered in the first two chapters of the book, while the third (and last) chapter outlines a picture of international cooperation in crisis, using Haiti as a case study. Separate aspects are presented on the following: the costs and contributions of states to the missions in Haiti, cooperation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic (the latter being its only neighbor on the island), the EU-Haiti relationship, international involvement in crisis management generated in Haiti by Hurricane Matthew (October 4, 2016).

Last, but not least, a welcomed direction in the author's research is the cooperation between Romania and Haiti. As presented, he has reconstructed the history of the diplomatic relations between the two countries, with the support of the Consulate General of Romania in Haiti. Also, under the same diplomatic representation, he was involved in the creation of an educational structure in Port-au-Prince, under the name of College Universitaire de Roumanie (COUROM).

The second paper, *Managementul cooperării și securității internaționale. Studiu de caz: ONU – Haiti* (*The Management of International Cooperation and Security. Case study: UN – Haiti*), is a detailed overview of the UN's activities in the Caribbean state. The book begins with a brief overview of UN missions in the Central American region. In this context, the author also notes several guiding ideas and general principles of its involvement in the region. Among these, he points out that "the Security Council resolutions emphasize agreements between neighbouring states, in particular to counter any attempt at destabilization and to avoid the use of national territory for actions of any kind" (p. 47).

The most substantial part of the book deals with the UN missions in Haiti, presented in over 100 pages – almost half of the book's content. The author chose a chronological and evolutionary presentation of these missions, which encompasses a broad spectrum of activities. These go from ONUVEH (United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti, October 1990 to February 1991), to MIPONUH (United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, December 1997 to March 2000), and to BINUH (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, in operation since October 2019), to mention only a few of them. Each is accompanied by a brief description, together with the main developments and results they have achieved during their implementation.

A separate chapter examines the Haitian National Police, established under the aegis of the United Nations (based on the Strategic Development Plan, 2017-2021), a process in which the author took part directly, as a representative of the above-mentioned international organization. Although the data is rather succinct, less than 30 pages, the chapter provides a well-documented and revealing insight into the new Haitian institution. The author's participation in the process of building and consolidating it adds value to the work, thus enriching it with aspects filtered through his personal experience. The author presents his vision of the UN's international intervention in the last chapter of the work. This is formed, as he notes, "in the spirit of the Confucian idea, according to which a bowl of rice can help a person, providing him with food for a day, but the technique of teaching him to grow rice, i.e. food, is the salvation of his entire life" (p. 191).

Starting from these considerations that attest to the concern for providing sustainable solutions, supplemented by his experience as a UN monitor, the author proposes a new model of action: UN Protected Economic Zones (UNEPZs). He assigns a binary valence to these UNEPZs, and notes that it involves a mixed intervention structure, with two major actors, "two sides of the same mission: on the one hand the UN, as a security provider, and on the other hand the economic environment" (p. 195). In other words, supporting economic development as a factor of stability, first and foremost.

With these two works on the UN missions in Haiti, the author, Ştefan-Iaroslav DANIEL, opens a research direction previously unexplored

in Romanian specialized literature. The academic approach is doubled by the perspective and the advantage of direct knowledge of the realities, given by the author's participation as a UN monitor in the state that is the subject of his research.

Among the things that give consistency to his research, we can mention in particular:

- the use of a substantial bibliography, comprising a rich range of studies and specialized works, as well as primary sources consisting of several United Nations documents;
- the diversification of the research methods used, including the author's use of his on-the-spot presence to enhance his knowledge of the subject;
- exhaustive presentation and comprehensive analysis, both carried out in a logical, coherent and systematic sequence of the elements that make up the body of the work.

It is also worth highlighting that several elements would have better contributed to:

1) systematizing the content and
2) emphasizing the main conceptual notions of the research.

These include especially:

- a stricter delineation between the author's considerations/ observations (otherwise both valuable and welcome in the content of the two works) and the issues analyzed from the perspective of the UN documents and the literature to which he referred;
- a greater capitalization of the various local human resources with whom the author interacted directly (including presenting representative interviews that he conducted), as well as the extension of these resources through channeled discussions with UN staff.

A translation of the two works (possibly in compressed form) into English is desirable, proving their usefulness, especially for practitioners, and will find their rightful place in the United Nations Library.

ACADEMIC FOCUS

Erasmus+ Mobility Projects at "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy

In June 2024 "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA) completed its 4th academic mobility project (KA131_2022) dedicated to the countries participating in the ERASMUS+ programme. The aforementioned project came as a natural follow-up to the KA103 mobility projects carried out in 2019 and 2020, respectively KA131 in 2021.

The objectives pursued within the KA131_2022 mobility project, a new stage in the development of the international dimention of MVNIA, were aligned with those stated in the Erasmus Guide and those established at the time of submitting the application for the Erasmus Charter: (1) promote lifelong learning by supporting four participants to improve the level of key competences (professional, cultural, linguistic); (2) increase the visibility of our institution among the European university community and exchanging good academic practices with other higher education institutions with similar profiles; (3) promote diversity, inclusion, equal opportunities and excellence; (4) improve the international dimension of vocational education and training through a better understanding of the practices, policies and education systems in the partner countries, thus contributing to the strengthening of a European Education Area; (5) increase the capacity the efforts to digitize the learning and teaching process, in a lingua franca, for a better adaptation to the requirements of the digital age; (7) foster and expand the previously established relations with higher education institutions and create new opportunities for training and promoting the accumulated knowledge through projects that will be submitted under other key actions.

MVNIA is actively involved in improving the quality of higher education, both nationally and internationally, considering the

uniqueness of the study programs offered. From this perspective, we believe that the partnership with higher education institutions with a similar profile through the funding offered within the KA131 mobility programme allow us to permanently orient ourselves towords streamlining activities and improving results in order to contribute to the development and consolidation of the European Education Area in the sector dedicated to security studies and international relations. The impact of the project implementation has had a ripple effect that was felt at all levels, ranging from the beneficiaries to the institutional one.

Moreover, the effects of the project have already become visible in processes such as updating the course and seminar materials used in the teaching process for those who were beneficieries of the teaching and training mobilities, or in the integration within the teaching process of new methods (e.g. gamification) that were picked up following various training mobilities.

It is beyond the shadow of a doubt that the 4th university mobility project has: led to an increase in the prestige and visibility of the MVNIA at national and European level; has allowed the strengthening of European partnerships, especially with Jagiellonian University from Krakow, Poland; has allowed the exchange of good practices, with facilitating the significant development of the professional, linguistic and intercultural competences of the participants.

Collectively, the four ERASMUS+ projects that have been implemented so far have encompassed a number of 14 beneficieries students and professors alike, who took part in different types of mobilities, as follows:

- 6 training mobilities;
- 4 traineeships;
- 2 teaching mobility
- 2 study mobility.

Moreover, MVNIA is currently implementing two more Erasmus+ KA131 mobility projects for which it has received funding under the 2023 and 2024 calls, respectively.

Prevention of Weaponization and Enhancing Resilience against Security-related Disinformation on Clean Energy – POWER
Grant agreement no. 2024-1-RO01-KA220-HED-000245038
(2024 – 2027)

POWER Project addresses the fight against climate change by mitigating the effects of clean-energy-related disinformation on public policy adoption and implementation among both the target group and the general public. The project directly tackles two crucial societal challenges: climate change and the pervasive issue of disinformation, particularly around renewable energy. By engaging students, educators, and professionals across Romania, Malta, Spain, and Moldova, it aims to elevate media and clean energy literacy, foster a comprehensive understanding of environmental issues, thus enhancing resilience against disinformation.

The project consortium is headed by "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy and the partners are University Rey Juan Carlos, Spain, the University of Malta, Eurocomunicare Association. The project also has an associated partner The Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation, in the Republic of Moldova.

The project's first general objective is to facilitate transition to clean energy by fostering an informed fact-based public discussion on clean energy sources. In correlation, the second general objective is to strengthen societal resilience against the weaponisation of clean energy conversations by disinformation actors, and to contribute to the EU's policy objectives to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 and to generate at least 42.5% of the EU's energy from renewable sources.

These objectives have been broken down into six specific objectives: (1) to develop a lexicon related to clean energy and associated concepts in Romania, Spain, Malta and the Republic of Moldova in the target languages; (2) to map online disinformation modus operandi, techniques, and narratives in the four participating countries. The project will collect and analyse automatically and manually clean-energy-related disinformation narratives on three social media platforms. The results of both these research activities will represent the basis of the clean-energy lexicon; (3) to neutralize clean energy disinformation through dynamic science communication in Romania, Spain, and Malta; (4) to enhance clean energy and media literacy among students, teaching staff and employees of the partner organizations. These results will be achieved through organizing three, five-day, face-to-face Clean Energy Cafes as learning events which bring together students in the fields of security, intelligence, communication, social sciences, and sciences with teaching staff and employees in the same areas and are designed as experiential, learning-by-doing activities; (5) to foster a collaborative empowered community of practice among students in the partner organizations and local universities by organizing four three-day face-to-face Clean Energy Living Labs dissemination activities in each partner country. In these labs, participants will work together to design innovative, artistic, digital productions to increase clean energy literacy and preempt disinformation; (6) to create and populate digital educational content and tools addressed to stakeholders in the four partner countries. This e-learning hub will include a Practitioner's Digital Briefcase, an Educator's Digital Briefcase, digital storylines, online learning modules. These will foster the development of new teaching and learning practices through digital content and interactive learning resources.

At the heart of this initiative is the development of innovative educational content and digital tools. This includes a clean energy lexicon, immersive learning scenarios, and digital storylines, all designed to debunk myths perpetuated by disinformation campaigns about renewable energy. The approach integrates cutting-edge research, participatory teaching methodologies, and broad dissemination activities, such as Clean Energy Living Labs and Clean Energy Cafés.

Key to the strategy is the cross-sectoral collaboration that leverages the expertise of the partner organizations with a proven track record in digital education, fighting against disinformation and environmental projects. By creating synergies between media literacy, environmental education, and digital pedagogy, POWER not only addresses the selected priorities head-on but also pioneers a holistic model for tackling complex global challenges.

EU Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation (EUKH)

The EU Knowledge Hub on the Prevention of Radicalisation takes up the legacy of the Radicalisation Awareness Network and aims to provide a set of resources and activities such as trainings, workshops and study visits, as well as mentoring and job shadowing for young professionals in the field of preventing and combating radicalisation. Further, selected experts will conduct research on specific topics in line with the project's general objectives. Two communities of experts will support the project: The Knowledge Hub Research Committee, composed of 15 internationally recognised researchers in the field and the EU Research Community on Radicalisation (ERCOR), a database of experts which will be called upon when their expertise is required.

The activities of EUKH will be grouped according to several thematic panels, which will represent the main directions of the projects and will be aligned with the priorities set out in the Strategic Orientations. The thematic panels will be composed of leaders and co-leaders, selected from the expert database, as well as invited researchers. The results of the activities of thematic panels will be summarized in annual reports.

Further, EUKH will offer tailor-made support services, requested by a member state, with the aim for addressing specific challenges in the field of combatting radicalisation. These tailor-made support services will assist Member States to implement EUKH results to their specific conditions.

The project was selected through a competitive tender organized by the European Commission. The project will be conducted over four years and has a total budget of 60 million Euros. The winning consortium is led by NTU Denmark and is composed of "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA), IPS Innovative Prison Systems (Portugal), Polish Platform for Homeland Security, Fundación Euroárabe (Spain), Center for Security Studies (KEMEA – Hellenic Ministry of Citizen Protection), Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, European Research and Project Office (EURICE, Greece), Deep Blue, European Centre of Studies and Initiatives (CESIE, Italy).

Romania is represented by the "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, which will support training and research activities on the process and factors supporting radicalisation. It will also incorporate research findings in its B.A., M.A. and PhD curricula, as well as support the development of a common culture among practitioners dedicated to combating radicalisation.

Funded by the European Union

Strategies and Services for Enhanced Disruption Resilience and Cooperation in Europe – ENDURANCE

Grant agreement no. 101168007

The Romanian National Cyber Security Directorate (DNSC) is the beneficiary of a non-reimbursable financing for the implementation of the **"Strategies and Services for Enhanced Disruption Resilience and Cooperation in Europe – ENDURANCE"** project, under the grant agreement no. 101168007. The project is financed through Horizon Europe Programme, by the granting authority: European Research Executive Agency (REA), under the call HORIZON-CL3-2023-INFRA-01 topic, type of action: HORIZON Innovation Actions[1].

Amidst an increasingly interconnected and complex world, the provision of essential services remains crucial for the well-being of European citizens and the smooth functioning of the internal market. Yet, the ever-evolving landscape of risks, ranging from cyber threats, physical attacks, and human errors to natural disasters, demands a proactive and

[1] We thank PhD Claudia Lascateu for the presentation. The ENDURANCE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 101168007. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

collaborative, pan-European approach to ensure disruption resilience. ENDURANCE is driven by the critical need to fortify Europe's essential services against potential disruptions, transcending the sole focus on the underlying critical assets.

Recognizing the significance of the Critical Entity Resilience (CER) and NIS2 Directives in setting the groundwork for resilience and, in parallel, the current silo approach to the Critical Infrastructure (CI) resilience and business continuity of essential services they provide, the project will assist the CI authorities across Europe in fully grasping and harmoniously implementing both directives.

To maximize the impact of our developments and projects' results, the Pan-European Working Group on Disruption Resilience (WGDR) will be created. The main direction of this expert networking is an information exchange ecosystem to feed the Critical Infrastructure Stakeholders' community with relevant best practices and new knowledge on improving the resiliency of their infrastructure. The ENDURANCE project responds to this need by bringing together a consortium of 23 partners from 7 European countries, which includes 7 authorities, 5 critical infrastructure operators from 6 key sectors and 11 entities with expertise in different domains. With a 36 months duration, launched in October 2024, this 5-million-euro EU-funded initiative is committed to developing interoperable solutions aimed at strengthening Europe's defences. The project will deliver robust methodologies, cutting-edge technologies, and strategic frameworks to build the resilience of critical infrastructures and ensure their capacity to recover from both physical and cyber incidents.

The Consortium is coordinated by EVIDEN TECHNOLOGIES SRL - Romania, having as partners: Engineering - Ingegneria Informatica Spa – Italy; Synelixis Lyseis Pliroforikis Automatismou & Tilepikoinonion Anonimi Etairia – Greece; SBT Poslovne Resitve Doo – Slovenia;

Erevnitiko Panepistimiako Institouto Systimaton Epikoinonion Kai Ypologiston – Greece; Institut Za Korporativne Varnostne Studije Ljubljana – Slovenia; Agencija Za Komunikacijska Omrezja in Storitve Republike Slovenije – Slovenia; Urad Vlade Republike Slovenije Za Informacijsko Varnost – Slovenia; TELEKOM SLOVENIJE DD – Slovenia; Eles Doo Operater Kombiniranega Prenosnega In Distribucijskega Elektroenergetskega Omrezja – Slovenia; Directoratul National de Securitate Cibernetica – Romania; Ministerul Sanatatii – Romania; Directia Generala de Protectie Interna – Romania; Clinica Ginecologie dr. Muntean SRL – Romania; Regione Autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia – Italy; INSIEL - Informatica Per Il Sistema Degli Enti Locali S.P.A. – Italy; Perifereiako Tameio Anaptyksis Attikis – Greece; Perifereiako Tameio Anaptyxis Perif Dytikis Ellados – Greece; Etaireia Ydreyseos Kai Apochetefseos Proteyoysis Anonimi Etaireia – Greece; TIMELEX – Belgium; Diadikasia Business Consulting Symvouloi Epicheiriseon AE – Greece; Carr Communications Limited – Ireland; Eviden Germany GMBH – Germany (Affiliated)

The consortium's solutions will be validated through cross-sector and cross-border pilot programmes in four EU Member States—Romania, Slovenia, Italy, and Greece, ensuring their effective implementation and harmonization across different national contexts. By facilitating collaboration between stakeholders and aligning efforts with the CER and NIS2 Directives, ENDURANCE is positioned to play a key role in securing Europe's infrastructures against a rapidly evolving threat landscape.

ENDURANCE project's mission undertakes targeted activities related to:

(a) Enhance strategic cooperation and collaboration among the European CI stakeholders at all levels (bringing together 100+ relevant practitioners and experts across Europe);

(b) Develop datasets, registries, methodologies, technologies, and services (at TRL6-7) for secure sharing and federated processing of CER-relevant data, joint assessment of relevant risks and resilience, and large-scale stress-testing of preparedness;

(c) Provide harmonised and pragmatic strategy for the continuity of the interconnected essential services (adopted by 20+ relevant European sectorial and national CI authorities).

Specific objectives of the project refer to:

Objective #1 – UNITY: Encourage, enhance, and support the all-level, pan-European strategic cooperation, operational collaboration, and continuous communication, enabling exchange of experience and best practices. We will organize 12 national and 3 European workshops with competent authorities from different EU Member States (MSs), CI operators, and other relevant CI stakeholders to establish a framework for understanding the current functioning of the European CI and provide cooperation mechanisms at different levels: local, regional, national, cross-border; within and across sectors; between public and private entities; with governments and policy makers. The necessary data will be collected for the development and co-creation of ENDURANCE results. The workshops will be gradually transformed into the Working Group on Disruption Resilience (WGDR) with the aim of having more than 100 members by the end of the project.

Objective #2 – PREPAREDNESS WITH SERVICES: Establish a trusted data space for CER-relevant data and deliver user-friendly and interoperable services for (1) secure exchange and federated processing of such data, (2) essential-service-oriented digital twins, (3) continuous identification and assessment of risks and resilience, and (4) human-centric simulation and interactive training, empowering a broader community of CI stakeholders.

Objective #3 – PREPAREDNESS WITH STRATEGY: Align and improve current practices, policies, strategies, and business continuity plans by generating a harmonized Pan-European strategy for disruption resilience. This will include a) ordinary interpretation of CER definitions; b) harmonized methodologies for cross-x risk assessments and resilience for all hazards; c) guidelines for a coordinated and effective cross-x response to disruptions; d) new models for coordinated crisis communication in situations with societal impact (pandemic, political conflicts, economic crises, natural disasters, etc.)

Objective #4 – RESOLVE THROUGH TEST: Design and coordinate large-scale and cross-x exercises with CI authorities and operators to stress test their preparedness and ensure that our results are effective and pragmatic. These will be run within 5 strategic and operational pilots (4 countries, including Romania - MESO Pilot Disruption Resilience for Digital & Health - where intersectoral challenges at local, regional and national levels will be identified, analysed and addressed).

Objective #5 – PROMOTE: Promote the ENDURANCE mission, activities, and results to the relevant CI stakeholders across Europe and generate great positive, direct, tangible, and immediate impacts.

All project outcomes will be co-created and evaluated in relevant settings with a variety of CI authorities and operators from different EU Member States, thereby preparing the results for a real-world uptake across different critical sectors and countries.

"The CRA-AI project will build highly automated AI enabled software to support SMEs and Micro SMEs on every step of their journey to achieve compliance with the Cyber Resilience Act"

Grant Agreement No. 101190243
(January 2025 - December 2026)

The Romanian National Cyber Security Directorate (DNSC) is the beneficiary of a non-reimbursable financing for the implementation of "The CRA-AI project will build highly automated AI enabled software to support SMEs and Micro SMEs on every step of their journey to achieve compliance with the Cyber Resilience Act", acronym CRA-AI project, under the grant agreement no. 101190243. The project is financed by the granting authority: European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre through the Digital Europe Programme, under the call DIGITAL-ECCC-2024-DEPLOY-CYBER-06-COMPLIANCECRA topic, type of action: DIGITAL JU SME Support Actions.

The digital transformation of businesses across Europe has made cybersecurity a fundamental concern. For small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and micro-enterprises, achieving compliance with the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)[2] can be particularly challenging. Addressing this need, the CRA-AI project is set to provide an AI-driven, highly automated software platform that will simplify their compliance journey and enhance cybersecurity resilience across the European market.

The Cyber Resilience Act is a cornerstone of the EU Cybersecurity Strategy[3], introducing a CE Mark for cybersecurity compliance.

[2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng
[3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52020JC0018

Manufacturers and service providers must demonstrate that their digital products adhere to strict security standards. However, as highlighted in the EU Commission Impact Assessment[4], compliance is a major challenge for many SMEs, due to limited resources and expertise. The CRA-AI project aims to bridge this gap by integrating automation and AI-driven tools to facilitate compliance efficiently and cost-effectively.

This project brings together leading cybersecurity institutions and technology partners across Europe, ensuring a robust and scalable solution. The consortium is coordinated by CYBER CERT LABS LTD (Ireland), having as partners: UAB NRD CS (Lithuania), 42SECURE (Belgium), GRIT SOLUTIONS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA (Spain), DIRECTORATUL NATIONAL DE SECURITATE CIBERNETICA (Romania), PROTOSTARS AI SOFTWARE LIMITED (Ireland), RED ALERT LABS (France). The project benefits from expertise of associate partnerships with: MUNSTER TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY (Ireland), NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE (Ireland), and MINISTERIE VAN ECONOMISCHE ZAKEN EN KLIMAAT (The Netherlands).

The main objective of the CRA-AI project is to develop a user-friendly AI-powered platform that will guide SMEs through every step of their compliance journey. The platform will integrate four existing cybersecurity tools and introduce new AI-based automation features to reduce complexity and costs. The key functionalities of the platform include:

- Product Inventory: Establishing an inventory of all products, components and/or modules a product or software relies on including where required a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM). This will allow the user to define a Target of Evaluation (ToE) which will define the scope of the CRA assessment.

[4]https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cyber-resilience-act-impact-assessment

- Risk Assessment: Performing risk assessments on the product or software to determine how its users could be impacted by vulnerabilities. Establishing the protection profile of the product or service which will define the security controls required and alignment with the essential requirements in Annex 1. Threat Modelling and Analysis (TMA) will also be included in the software to clearly identify threats and potential vulnerabilities in the product or service.
- Testing: Based on the ToE and the documented protection profile the user can define a full set of test criteria for the product or service. This can include penetration testing, vulnerability management and secure code reviews.
- Documentation: Generating the required "Information and instructions to the user" as defined in Annex 2 of the CRA. This includes contact information for the manufacturer or distributor, details of the intended use and a user-friendly explanation of the protection profile and the security controls that support the protection profile.
- Assessment: The software will align to the EUCC scheme and any associated standards that are defined by the scheme. There are two forms of assessment, self-assessment, and conformity assessment. The software will prepare and generate all the documentation related to the definition of the ToE, the protection profiles, all tests executed by or on behalf of the manufacturer or distributor and any other relevant information. This is an important activity as a manufacturer or distributor can be asked for this by a surveillance authority at any time. Also, where a conformity assessment is required, this documentation provides the Conformity Assessment Body (CAB) with all the necessary information to assess the product or service.

- Monitoring: Providing the capability to monitor the product or service for any vulnerabilities that are discovered after the product or service has been placed on the market.
- Vulnerability Disclosure: When vulnerabilities or flaws are discovered in a product or piece of software, other software or product vendors who have relied on or embedded this as a component in their product need to be alerted so they can take appropriate action.

To maximize its impact, the CRA-AI project is structured into seven work packages: Project Management and Coordination, Dissemination, Product development – CRA workflow, Product development – Vulnerability management, Product development – Secure code analysis, Product development – Human security, Pilot cases. By combining AI-driven automation with an intuitive, easy-to-use platform, the CRA-AI project will significantly lower compliance costs and streamline regulatory processes for SMEs. This will empower small businesses to meet cybersecurity requirements efficiently, ultimately strengthening the EU's digital resilience.

The Romanian National Cyber Security Directorate is the leader of the dissemination activities, using the "Cyber Cert Labs Readiness Assessment" survey as part of a market scan for SMEs in Romania. The output of this market scan will help inform the product designers, produce a national level report on CRA readiness for SMEs, and link with other National Coordination Centres (NCCs). Based on the market scan, the workshops, webinars and the national event organised by DNSC will document a case study which will be available to the NCCs working groups, to raise awareness on the Cyber Resilience Act fo for SMEs[5].

[5] We thank PhD Claudia Lascateu for the presentation.

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