THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

Author(s): Sergey MINASYAN
Publication name: Romanian Intelligence Studies Review
Publisher name: Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy
Publication type: Journal article
Publication date: December 31, 2020
Pagination:
Issue/ Volume: 24/2020
DOI:

Abstract
Deterrence is both a theoretical branch of the theory of international relations
and security studies, and a practical strategy used by states (and sometimes non-state
actors) to manage conflicts and crises. Given the special role it plays in regional and
international security issues, military, and politics, deterrence has long been an object of
interest to scholars as well as the military, politicians, and diplomats.
To analyse deterrence in regional conflicts, one must begin with a brief typology
of the elements and mechanism of deterrence in general, and only then see how they can
be applied to regional conflicts. Deterrence can rely on conventional weapons or
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In regional conflicts without direct involvement of
nuclear superpowers, the most applicable scenario is that of deterrence with
conventional weapons, i.e. conventional deterrence.
However, the use of conventional deterrence in regional conflicts has not been
covered by political science in great detail. Therefore, from academic and practical
perspectives, it is important to clarify the conceptual aspects for a more precise
theoretical understanding and subsequent discussions applicable to some regional
conflicts, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Keywords: conventional deterrence, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, South
Caucasus, regional security, conflict resolution.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic License.

Download